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ABSTRACT 
From the latter decades of the 20'h century, information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) permeated societies and the internet emerged as a mass medium 
across many parts of the globe. The thesis investigates the efforts of government to 
exploit these technologies in the delivery of public services in the UK up to 2004, 
under the aegis of e-govemment. 
This thesis critically examines the development of e-government in the UK from the 
1950s. Specifically it looks at the role of ICTs in facilitating joined up or seamless 
government in a range of contexts. Aside from the work of a few key scholars, the 
relationship between e-government and joined up government had not received 
sustained attention within the public administration scholarly domain. The thesis aims 
to fill this gap, through an exploration into the history of government computing, 
research into the central e-governnient strategy and two case studies. 
The study finds both a longstanding desire to use ICTs to coordinate the delivery of 
services across government and a number of organisational and institutional barriers 
to doing so. A succession of central units used a range of tools and measures to 
achieve ICT-mediated joining up across government, which met with varying levels 
of success. The case studies illustrate strong variation in the institutional landscape in 
which e-government operated. Through historical analysis over a sustained period, the 
thesis offers a fuller understanding of the relationship between ICTs; and government 
than was offered by contemporary explorations of e-governinent. 
The thesis concludes that, whilst national technical infrastructural systems were a 
viabld option to e-govemment policyrnakers wishing to initiate joining up through 
ICTs, it was also possible to take other more consensual or localised routes, which 
could go with, rather than against, the institutional grain. 
iii 
CONTENTS 





CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION P1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION P1 
The UK e-Government Strategy: Achieving joined up government through ICTs p2 
Studying e-Government in the UK p4 
1.2 STUDYING GOVERNMENT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY p6 
Surveillance and the Information Society P8 
Critical Public Administration: The information polity P9 
Critical Public Administration: Informatization p12 
Critical Public Administration: The institutional approach p 14 
1.3 CONCEPTIONS OF &GOVERNMENT IN WIDER LITERATURE p16 
Conceptions of e-Govemment in Business and Management Literature: The 
stages model 
P19 
1.4 ACADEMIC UNDERSTANDING OF JOINED UP GOVERNMENT IN 
THE UK 
p2l 
Joined Up Government: Parallels with the past p24 
Joined Up Government under the Labour Government from 1997 p25 
U-nderstanding of Joined Up Government: The omission of ICT considerations p27 
1.5 ICT-MEDIATED JOINED UP GOVERNMENT: CONSIDERATIONS OF 
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION VANGUARD 
p29 
The Vanguard in the e-Government Era: Reviewing government. direct p32 
Researching e-Government: The thesis approach p34 
1.6 METHODOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS p36 
CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF COMPUTERS IN THE UK 
GOVERNMENT - 1945 to 1996 
p42 
2.1 INTRODUCTION p42 
2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT COMPUTING: 
AUTOMATING OPERATIONS 
p43, 
The NPL and Government Computing p45 
The Proliferation of Computing across Government Organisations P50 
The Organisation and Methods section of the Treasury: Early cancepts of 
computer-mediated joining up 
p5l 
2.3 GOVERNMENT IT POLICY IN THE 1960s: SUPPORTING A 
FLEDGLING INDUSTRY 
p53 
2.4 TOWARDS COORDINATION: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY p55 
iv 
COMMITTEES AND THE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT 
The Creation and Work of the Civil Service Department p59 
2.5 THE CENTRAL COMPUTER AGENCY: REINVIGORATING 
COORDINATION 
p62 
2.6 GOVERNM T COMPUTING DURING THE THATCHER ERA: 
DEPARTMENTAL AUTONOMY AND THE STRUGGLE TO 
COORDINATE 
p65 
Scrutiny of Departmental Computer Projects in the 1980s P9 
The Politics of Government IT in the mid-1980s: The diminishing role of the 
CCTA 
p72 
2.7 NEXT STEPS AND MARKET TESTING: INCREASING THE 
COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNMENT IT 
p76 
Contractualization p77 
Market Testing: Privatization and optsourcing P78 
2.8 GOVERNMENT IT IN THE EARLY 1990s: THE PERCEIVED 
FAILURES IN DEPARTMENTAL PROJECTS 
P80 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS p83 
CHAPTER THREE: THE UK &GOVERNMENT STRATEGY - 
1996-2004 
p88 
3.1 INTRODUCTION p88 
3.2 &GOVERNMENT UP TO 1997: STEERING'INFORMATION AGE' 
GOVERNMENT 
P90 
The Birth of Government Online in the UK: Open. gov. uk P91. 
The Steering Mechanisms for 'Information Age' Government: The Central IT 
Unit 
p92 
The Emerging Central Strategy: e-government to achieve joining up p95 
3.3 &GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 1990s: THE MODERNISING 
GOVERNMENT APPROACH 
p98 
The Modernising Government White Paper: Crystallising the joined up approach 
in e-government 
P101 
3.4 &GOVERNMENT UNDER SCRUTINY: GOVERNMENT ON THE WEB p105 
Parliamentary Committee Reports: Scrutinizing the steering of e-government P109 
3.5 THE E-ENVOY: FACILITATING &GOVERNMENT FROM THE 
CENTRE 
P111 
3.6 SUCCESSFUL IT? THE FINAL OUTPUT OF THE CITU P115 
Departmental IT Failure in the e-govemment Era: Detracting from the 
facilitation of joined up government 
pl 17 
3.7 CONSTRUCTING &GOVERNMENT TOOLS AND MEASURES: 
JOINING UP FROM THE CENTRE THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE E- 
ENVOY 
p122 
UK Online: Facilitating joining up on the web and in departmental back offices p124 
3.8 &GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY UNDER ANDREW PINDER p127 
Departmental Projects During Pinder's Tenure: e-government in silos p128 
The Second Annual UK Online Report: Further e-government tools and 
measures to facilitate _joining up 
p130 
3.9 DEPARTMENTAL &GOVERNMENT AND AUDIT SCRUTINY p132 
3.10 THE FINAL PHASE OF OFFICE OF THE E-ENVOY ACTIVITIES: 
SUSTAINING AND RENEWING ATTEMPTS TO FACILITATE JOINING 
UP THROUGH E-GOVERNMENT 
p136 
The Decline of the Office of the e-Envoy p138 
3.11 ASSESSING THE STRATEGIES AND OUTPUTS OF THE OFFICE OF 
THE E-ENVOY 
p140 
3.12 CONCLUSIONS p148 
The Changing Approach to e-government in 2004: Towards a consensual model 
for joined up government 
p154 
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY ONE - CRIME "PING AND &GOVERNMENT 
p157 
4.1 INTRODUCTION p157 
Geographic Information and e-government p157 
4.2 THE ORDNANCE SURVEY AND THE JOURNEY TO DIGITIZATION P159 
The Digital Mapping Programme: Faltering steps p 162 
Digital Maps and the Market Approach: Holding back public sector GIS 
applications 
p164 
4.3 THE COORDINATION OF DIGITAL GEOGRAPHIC DATA: FORUMS, 
STANDARDS AND REPOSITORIES 
p167 
The Chorley Committee Recommendations: Steering government GIS use p168 
Standards and Repositories: Joining up digital geographic data p170 
Census Data: Demographic data repositories p172 
4.4 THE ROOTS OF MULTI-AGENCY CRIME MAPPING p173 
The Barriers to Multi-Agency Crime Mapping Development p175 
Trends in Criminology and Crime Mapping p178 
The Crime Prevention Partnership Approach in Policy and Practice P180 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships p181 
Crime Mapping and CDRPs p183 
The Barriers to Multi-Agency Working in CDRPs p183 
4.5 CRIME MAPPING IN ACTION: ACHIEVING JOINING UP THROUGH 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS 
p185 
The Criminal Justice System in the e-government Era: Joining up information at 
a national level 
P189 
Crime Mapping and Local Data Sources P191 
Joining Up Through Trust Relationships: Going with the institutional grain p193 
4.6 CRIME MAPPING STANDARDISATION: ATTEMPTS TO 
ORCHESTRATE CDRP OPERATIONS 
p197 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS P199 
CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY TWO - ELECTRONIC CARE 
RECORDS AND &GOVERNMENT 
204 p204 
5.1 INTRODUCTION p204 
vi 
Welfare Information and e-government P204 
5.2 JOINING UP WELFARE: STRATEGIES TO SCALE THE BERLIN 
WALL 
p206 
Approaches to Joining Up Welfare Services p209 
Joined Up Welfare: Political influences of the 1980s p210 
Renewed Attempts to Join Up in the 1990s p213 
Joined Up Welfare in the 1990s and Beyond: New measures and institutional 
barriers 
p215 
5.3 THE HISTORY OF WELFARE COMPUTING p221 
Computerization in Healthcare in the 1980s: The K6rner influence p223 
Towards Joined Up Healthcare Through ICT Infrastructures: The NHSnet p226 
The History of General Practice IT - p229 
5.4 INFOR MA TION FOR HEALTH. THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNIFIED 
ELECTRONIC RECORDS CONCEPT IN THE &GOVERNMENT ERA 
p231 
The History of Electronic Records p234 
5.5 THE ERDIP AND WELFARE IT POLICY 2000-2003: WORKING 
TOWARDS A UNIFIED ELECTRONIC RECORDS SYSTEM 
p23 8 
Welfare IT Policy Activity 2000-2003 p242 
5.6 THE NPFIT AND ECR: JOINING UP HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE AT 
A NATIONAL LEVEL 
p245 
NPf[T: Modernising the NHS p247 
Electronic Care Records: Contradiction and ambiguity in plans to join up welfare 
information 
p250 
Doubts about Joining Up Across the Health and Social Care Divide through 
Electronic Records 
p256 
Joined Up Welfare Outside the NPflT: Tensions between local and national 
requirements 
p259 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS p263 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION p269 
6.1 INTRODUCTION p269 
Lessons from Case Study One: Taking into account institutions in e-government p274 
Lessons from Case Study Two: Taking into account institutions in e-government p277 
6.2 RECOMMENDING A BALANCED APPROACH TO &GOVERNMENT: 
THE BENEFITS OF A HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
INSTITUTIONS - 
p281 
Final Remarks: The future of e-government in the UK p286 
ANNEX ONE: METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS P290 
ANNEX TWO: INTERVIEWEE NUMBERING AND DETAILS p300 
BIBLIOGRAPHY p303 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE ONE p120-121 
viii 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AC - AUDIT COMMISSION 
ACE - AUTOMATIC COMPUTING ENGINE 
ADP - AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 
AGI - ASSOCIATION FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
BJHC&IM - BRITISH JOURNAL OF HEALTHCARE COMPUTING AND 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
BMA - BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 
BPR - BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING 
BT - BRITISH TELECOM 
CCA/CCTA - CENTRAL COMPUTER (AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS) 
AGENCY 
CD - COMPACT DISC 
CDRP - CRIME AND DISORDER REDUCTION PARTNERSHIP 
CITU - CENTRAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY UNIT 
CJIT - CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
CMPS - CENTRE FOR MANAGEMENT AND POLICY STUDIES 
CCCJS - COORDINATION OF COMPUTERIZATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
CSA - CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY 
COP - COMPUTERIZATION OF PAYE 
CPRS - CENTRAL POLICY REVIEW STAFF 
CRAMS - CASE RECORD AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
CSD - CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT 
DEFRA - DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS 
DETR --ý DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND THE 
REGIONS 
DfES - THE DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION AND SKILLS 
DSS/DHSS - DEPARTMENT OF (HEALTH AND) SOCIAL SECURITY 
DOH - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DoTP - DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE 
DSIR - DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH 
DTI - DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
DTLR - DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
REGIONS 
DVLA - DRIVER AND VEHICLE LICENSING AGENCY 
DWP - DEPARTMENT OF WORK AND PENSIONS 
ECR-. ELECTRONIC CARE RECORDS 
ECU - EXPERIMENTAL CARTOGRAPHY UNIT 
EDI - ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE 
EDS - ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS 
E-GIF - &GOVERNMENT INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK 
E-GOVERNMENT - ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT 
EHI - E-HEALTH INSIDER 
EHR -ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 
ix 
EPR - ELECTRONIC PATIENT RECORDS 
ERDIP - ELECTRONIC RECORD DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
PROGRAMME 
ESCR - ELECTRONIC SOCIAL CARE RECORDS 
FMI - FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE 
GIS - GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
GISP - GENERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR PLANNING 
GOL - GOVERNMENT ONLINE 
GSI - GOVERNMENT SECURE INTRANET 
HISS - HOSPITAL INFORMATION AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
HMCE - HER MAJESTIES CUSTOMS AND EXCISE 
HMIC - HER MAJESTIES INSPECTORATE OF THE CONSTABULARY 
HMSO - HER MAJESTIES STATIONARY OFFICE 
HOTN - THE HEALTH OF THE NATION 
IACS - INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
IBM - INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES 
ICL - INTERNATIONAL COMPUTERS LIMITED 
ICRS - INTEGRATED CARE RECORDS SERVICE 
ICT -INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
IEEE - INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS 
IGGI - INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP ON GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
ILA - INDIVIDUAL LEARNING ACCOUNT 
IM&T - INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
IPU - INFORMATION POLICY UNIT 
ISH - INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 
IT - INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
ITSA - INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES AGENCY 
JASP - JOINT APPROACH TO SOCIAL POLICY 
LEO - LYONS ELECTRONIC OFFICE 
LOP - LOCAL OFFICE PROJECT 
MAFF - MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD 
MINTECH - MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY 
MIS - MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
MoD - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
MOH - MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
MPNI - MINISTRY OF PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE 
MR - MONTHLY REPORTS 
NAO - NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE 
NCC -NATIONAL COMPUTING CENTRE 
NHS -NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
NHSIA - NHS INFORMATION AUTHORITY 
NHSE - NHS EXECUTIVE 
NIRS -NATIONAL INSURANCE RECORDING SYSTEM 
NLPG - NATIONAL LAND AND PROPERTY GAZETTEER 
NLIS - NATIONAL LAND INFORMATION SERVICE 
NPfIT - NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT 
x 
NPL -NATIONAL PHYSICAL LABORATORY 
NSPSIS - NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POLICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
NPM - NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
NPSISS - NATIONAL PROBATION SERVICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
STRATEGY 
NRDC - NATIONAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
O&M - ORGANISATION AND METHODS 
OCI - OFFICE OF CENTRAL INFORMATION 
ODPM - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER 
OECD - ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
OeE - OFFICE OF THE e-ENVOY 
OGC - OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT COMMERCE 
OMCS - OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE 
ONS - OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS 
OPSS - OFFICE OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND SCIENCE 
OS - ORDNANCE SURVEY 
PAC - PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE 
PAS - PATIENT ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM 
PAYE - PAY AS YOU EARN 
PBM - PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS MODEL 
PESC - PUBLIC EXPENDITURE SURVEY COMMITTEE 
PFI - PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE 
PIN - PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
PITO - POLICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION 
PIU - PERFORMANCE AND INNOVATION UNIT 
PNC - POLICE NATIONAL COMPUTER 
PO - POST OFFICE 
PPP - PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
SOCITM - SOCIETY OF IT MANAGERS 
SS&T - SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
SSI - SOCIAL SERVICES INSPECTORATE 
TSU - TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT 
UNDPEPA - NATIONS DIVISION FOR PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
VAT - VALUE ADDED TAX 
xi 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the latter decades of the 20'h century, information and communication 
technologies permeated societies, in industry, commerce, banking, education, leisure, 
mass media and other sectors (Castells, 1996; 2001). Government and the delivery of 
multifarious public services had been no exception. From the 1990s in particular, 
governments had begun investing heavily in such technologies; for instance in the 
UK, billions of pounds of public funds had been poured into projects in central 
government alone and public sector information technology (IT) spending had been 
estimated at f 12.4 billion for 2003/04 (OGC, 2003, p 11). By the late 1990s, these IT or 
information and communication technology (ICT)l investments were largely being 
made under the auspices of 'electronic government', usually abbreviated to 'e- 
government'. 
E-government was defined as 'the use of electronic channels for interaction between 
government and citizens, businesses or other government organisations' 
(Margetts/Yared, 2003, pl). In particular, e-government programmes across the world 
had an emphasis on use of the internet and related ICT applications to improve and 
modernise public service delivery. According to Hansard, electronic government 
became a common term in the British parliament in 1998 and was used in that arena 
for the first time by Margaret Moran in April of that year (Hansard, 1997/98d, col. 
133). 
But what was expected from e-governments investments? Many governments, 
including Australia, Canada, Netherlands, United States, UK, Japan and others, had 
associated ICTs with transformations in the business of public service delivery 
(Heeks/Davies, 1999, p24-25). Broadly, this thesis is an assessment of the roots, 
1 Which, in line with government definitions, did not include telephony or other traditional 
telecommunications. 
development, initiation and implementation of policies, strategies, programmes and 
projects associated with e-government. Specifically, the thesis explores the role of e- 
government in joining up service delivery to the public, as explained below. To give 
this broad objective structure, the thesis has chosen to study the specific case of e- 
government in the VK. 
The UK e-Government Strategy: Achievingjoined up government through ICTs 
The application of new ICTs to public service delivery, particularly under the 
auspices of e-government, had been associated in many countries with positive 
transformations. The UK was no exception to this; the argument originating from the 
heart of government just before and at the beginning of the new millennium was that 
profound change would be achieved through e-government. The government. direct 
green paper of 1996 heralded a new phase of 'radical and wide ranging reform' that 
was 'founded on the new possibilities offered by informatl'On technology' 
(CITU, 1996/97, pl). The reform would: 
change fundamentally and for the better the way that government provides services to 
citizens and businesses. Services will be more accessible, more convenient, easier to 
use, quicker in response and less costly to the taxpayer. And they will be delivered 
electronically (ibid) 
A few years later, Minister Ian McCartney repeated and developed this aspiration: 
The Government's objective, though, is to do more than put individual services 
online, important though that is. It is to transform the delivery of government 
services, so that they are based on customer needs rather than the structures of 
government ... working across organisational boundaries to deliver joined-up services; 
transforming the internal efficiency of government by organising to meet consumer 
needs not producer preferences; putting e-government at the heart of strategic 
planning; and developing new partnerships in service delivery 
(Hansard, 2000/O I fcol. 782) 
These comments encapsulated the approach underpinning the UK e-government 
strategy emanating from central government, setting electronic service delivery as the 
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jewel of the wider modernisation project crystallised in the Cabinet Office 
Modernising Government white paper of 1999, building on the government. direct 
green paper of 1996. In the foreword to the White Paper the then Minister for the 
Cabinet Office, Jack Cunningham, made it clear that departmental collaboration was 
the key to the ultimate mission of the modernisation project, that of improved public 
services. Collaboration between government organisatigns, consisting of a wide range 
of policies, strategies and tools, was expressed as 'joined up government' in the new 
mantra of modernisation. Moreover, e-govemment was seen as the vital tool in 
achieving this joining up, hence: 
To improve the way we provide services, we need all parts of government to work 
together better. We need joined-up government. We need integrated government. And 
we need to make sure that government services are brought forward using the best and 
most modem techniques, to match the best of the private sector - including one-stop 
shops, single contacts which link to a range of government Departments and 
especially electronic information-age services (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p5) 
Using the private sector as a model, the Modernising Government white paper argued 
that government organisations too often tended to be structured around their own 
needs rather than that of the users (ibid, p 11-12). Research for the paper indicated that 
services were falling short of customer expectations (ibid, p23); the reason offered was 
that 'the separation of government into different units ... often means that people 
do not 
receive services in a co-ordinated way' (ibid. ). A joined up approach was offered as a 
solution to this problem and became the focus of the modernisation project. The paper 
went on to argue that it was ICTs that would be the vital element in achieving joined 
up service delivery, with them being used for; 
achieving joined up working between different parts of government and providing new, 
efficient and convenient ways for citizens and businesses to conununicate with 
goverment and to receive services (ibid. &45) 
However, a problem was identified in that the IT systems already in place in 
government tended to reflect the departmental configuration of service delivery; 'we 
have incompatible systems and services which are not integrated. We must do more if 
3- 
we are to obtain the real benefits of information age government' (ibid) and 'IT 
systems have tended to be developed separately by different public service agencies; 
we need now to encourage them to converge and inter-connect' (ibid&46). Thus, 
under the rubric of a 'corporate IT strategy' (ibid), the objective was to join up IT 
systems and information, and this in turn would help unlock a joined up approach to 
service delivery. 
There had been a perceived step-change in ICT capability brought with the internet; 
'information technology is changing our lives: the way we work, the way we do 
business, the way we communicate with each other, how we spend our time ... It will 
make our lives easier' commented the paper (ibid., p45). Modernising Government had 
outlined an approach to take advantage of this change; to use ICTs more effectively, 
specifically to integrate, converge, coordinate and synchronise information systems. 
The argument was that this process would lead to joined up working between different 
parts of government, which would in turn lead to responsive, efficient and seamless 
public service provision. E-government was placed at the centre of the modemisation 
project in these terms. 
The Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) was set up within the Cabinet Office in 
1998 to review and improve the capacity of government to address 'strategic and 
cross-cutting issues' as part of the drive for 'better and more joined up government' 
(PIU, 2000b, p 104). In 2000, the unit brought that remit to bear on e-government, 
continuing and expanding on the policy discussions in Modernising Government with 
e-gov - Electronic Government Servicesfor the 21" Century. The overarching 
message was familiar: 
Electronic service delivery should be used to join up service provision across 
departmental boundaries, to break down silo-based delivery networks and to allow 
citizens to interact with government whenever they choose, whether at home, or 
work or on the move (ibid., p6) 
Studying e-Government in the UK 
4 
Because of the policy developments and underlying rationales outlined above, 
the UK was chosen for study; the high investment levels, centrality of e-government in 
the public service modernisation plans and its role in achieving forms ofjoined up 
government in UK policyrnaking made for a suitable case for research. Furthermore, 
the existing configuration of public administration in the UK would bring into sharper 
relief the impact of e-govemment. Following Haldane (1918) in particular, the long 
traditions of the British civil service were cemented in hierarchical and functional 
departments (Bridges, 1957; Hennessy, 1989). Despite constant efforts to reform 
machinery and service delivery, there had been an enduring perception by scholars and 
other observers that the institutions of the UK public sector were not conducive to 
change (Fry, 1979; 1993; 1995; Theakston, 1995a; Smellie, 1950; Pyper, 1991; 
Willson, 1968; Pollitt, 1984; Jordan, 1994), although, as discussed elsewhere in the 
thesis, the agentification of the civil service in the late 1980s and 1990s did create 
some significant alteration. 
Considering this functional configuration, the UK was particularly appropriate for 
study as the modernisation agenda, with e-government at its heart, was explicitly 
positioned to challenge the modus operandi of departments by, amongst other things, 
inducing increased coordination or j oining up (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p23). The role 
of ICTs in the UK case was therefore of particular interest, with the new technologies 
placed to facilitate this coordination within a landscape where services were delivered 
within segregated silos. In addition, the history of government computing, as discussed 
in Chapter Two, provided a further reason to research e-government in the UK. As 
demonstrated in the thesis, computers pervaded many areas of the public sector yet 
development had largely followed a different pattern to the orchestrated mode implied 
by e-govemment policy documentation. 
The broad objective of the thesis is to investigate the role of new ICTs in facilitating 
joined up government under the auspices of e-government, as articulated at the heart 
of the UK government and embodied in particular in the work of the Office of the e- 
Envoy at the beginning of the new millennium. To set the stage for this, the thesis will 
provide original research into the history of government computing, finding that there 
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have been attempts to coordinate IT across departments in the past, with limited 
success. Then, central e-govermnent strategy and activity will be profiled and two case 
studies will be presented to explore the facilitation ofjoined up government through 
ICTs. 
This first chapter however will review and characterise the relevant existing literature; 
whilst the contribution of some key scholars in particular is identified, the thesis 
provides the first rich research into the role of e-government in achieving joining up in 
public service delivery. 
Firstly, despite an erstwhile lacuna, there was more research on the relationship 
between government and ICTs from the beginning of the 1990s, sometimes under the 
specific remit of understanding and discussing e-government. Secondly, there was also 
a body of literature that considered the attempts in, and possibilities of, forging higher 
levels of coordination and collaboration between discrete public sector units, and of 
creating seamless provision of services for citizens. From 1997 some scholars looked 
specifically at the New Labour incarnation of this broad objective, expressed as joined 
up government. However, despite some important work discussed below, overall there 
had been little in public administration that attempted to put the two together, to 
consider the role of ICTs in facilitating coordination of service delivery, particularly as 
a means of understanding the crux of the modernisation project as expressed in parts 
of the Modernising Government white paper. The thesis researches e-govemment's 
contribution and role in joined up government in the UK specifically to add to 
understanding of this under-explored issue. 
1.2 STUDYING GOVERNMENT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
Since Daniel Bell's The Coming ofPost-Industrial Society, published in 1973, there 
had been a large volume of scholarly texts attributing transformational capabilities to 
ICTs in society. Many of these works drew from the theory that industrial age 
structures were being replaced by a post-industrial information society. Operating 
under this rationale, bodies of literature developed which sought to understand ICT or 
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information-led changes in the economy, in organisations, at work, at home or at play 
and in society as a whole (Porat, 1978; Dizard, 1982; Nora/Minc, 1980; Perez, 1983; 
Liepietz, 1987; Negroponte, 1995; Leadbeater, 1999; Brown, 1997; Tapscott, 1998; 
Lyon, 198 8; Castells, 1996). Some of these 'information society' writers tended to trace 
the impact of ICTs upon societal relationships with 'heady images being called up of a 
more egalitarian society' as a result of new forms of knowledge and heightened 
information access (Bellamy/Taylor; 1998a, p I). Others tended to adopt a more 
sceptical view of the emergence of a new mode of human existence (Slack, 1984; 
May, 2002) or argued that the 'information society' concept was not helpful 
(Webster, 2002). 
Specifically in terms of government, Margetts observed that, within the broad context 
of scholarly attention to the 'information society', ICTs had been associated with a 
definitive process of modernisation (1999, p 164-165). Max Weber's texts, placed 
within a much wider Western phenomenon, saw society changing and developing 
through rationality. This rationality would be enshrined in bureaucratic systems, which 
could allow precise methodical control over society. ICTs seemed apt enough to 
provide the tools of this rationalisation process far beyond the imagination of Weber 
himself-, to 'out-Weber Weber' (Hood, 1 994, p 140). Certainly, the indications given 
from the Modernising Government white paper, even in the title itself, suggested that 
high-level UK government policy had taken this association between ICTs and public 
administrative modemisation to heart. 
At times, the assertion that ICTs could modemise public administration had been 
taken to the extreme in scholarly work, with bold claims of a technologically driven 
society. Alvin Toffler's trilogy (1970; 1980; 1990) had been seminal in predicting 
startling transformations to society and government through ICTs. He noted that 
computers with 'unprecedented power for analysis and dissemination of extremely 
varied kinds of data in unbelievable quantities and at mind-staggering speeds' were 
driving accelerated change (I 970, p3 0-3 1). In subsequent works (1980; 1990) Toffler 
suggested ICTs would cause a decentralisation of political power and transform 
government; a theory refuted elsewhere despite the infiltration of Toffler's ideas into 
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US policy in the early 1990s (Margetts, I 999, p 166,172; May, 2002, p2l-22). Similarly 
to Toffler, other authors suggested that the importance of the state and government 
would decline with the rise of the information society (e. g. Caimcross, 1998; 
Coyle, 1997); a theory strongly contested by others (Keohane/Nye, 1988; May, 2002). 
Surveillance and the Information Society 
Contrasted with the bright allusions by Toffler and others to a much improved, 
ICT-enabled society, other writers predicted that ICTs would be used by governments 
and other institutions to control and restrict a citizenry. Part of the concern was that 
powerful technologies would provide governments with new abilities in gathering and 
joining together personal citizen data. Beniger (1986; 199 1) argued that ICTs were 
inherently technologies of control used by malevolent governments to dominate 
society. Burnham (1983), Warner and Stone (1970), Angell (2000) and Whitaker 
(1999) provided similarly pessimistic observations and predications. O'Harrow, 
writing largely about the USA, provided a catalogue of alarming government and 
commercial surveillance techniques and networks, working through internet, mobile, 
radio tags, CCTV and other channels (2004). 
Related to these works, there were also concerted attempts to understand the role of 
new ICTs in society and government in terms of their propensity to provide 
surveillance capabilities. 'Surveillance Studies' was led by David Lyon (1994; 200 1; 
2003) and influenced by Rule (1973), Dandeker (1990) and ultimately Foucault (1975; 
McNay, 1994). Scholarly attention to surveillance, monitoring and data collection grew 
to cover many different fields and perspectives (e. g. Bain/Taylor, 2000; Gandy, 1993; 
Norris/Armstrong, 1999; Grahani/Marvin, 2001; Ball, 2003; Ball/Webster, 2003; 
McCahill, 2001) and often considered surveillance processes in government. A 
dedicatedjournal entitled Surveillance andSociety was created, and the, literature not 
only embraced important observations on the real or potential threats to privacy by 
ICT-enabled surveillance, but also uncovered wider implications of new surveillance 
processes on society, governing and the individual. For example, in a subset of the 
Surveillance Studies corpus, attention was paid to the 'sorting' capabilities and 
processes applied to citizen data derived from various collection procedures (e. g. 
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Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 2003; Bowker/Star, 1999; Lessig, 1999; Graham/Wood, 2003). 
Surveillance Studies then, did draw attention to the role of ICTs in affording new 
powers to government through the joining together and manipulation of citizen 
information. 
The concerns expressed in Surveillance Studies literature about the potentially 
negative effects of the use of ICTs in public administration had filtered through to 
some political circles. As far back as 1972 Tony Berm expressed concern that, because 
of computing, 'the spectre that haunts us ... is that every child at birth will be traced 
and tapped by government and business' (I 972, p 14). Furthermore, popular literature 
and film had often fuelled fear of a society overshadowed by close state surveillance, 
usually enabled by technologies. Novels by Orwell (1949), Huxley (1932), Kafka 
(1925), Zamyatim (1920) and feature films such as The Conversation (1974), Brazil 
(1985), Gattaca (1997), The Matrix (1999) and Minority Report (2002) contributed to 
something of a general perception that government may wish to use ICTs and other 
technologies to impose surveillance and control. Journalists took to using phrases 
taken from such works, most prominently 'Big Brother', as an argot to describe 
virtually any notable instance whereby governments collected and used personal 
citizen data, or monitored individuals in ways which could be considered intrusive, via 
new technologies. 
Critical Public Administration: The information polity 
Existing in parallel to some of these wider patterns, researchers in the UK 
began to provide more systematic scholarly attention to the influence of ICTs in public 
administration, most notably within a wide ranging Economic and Social Research 
Council research initiative, known as the Programme on Information and 
Communications Technologies (PICT). From the PICT, some scholars carved out the 
'information polity' in the early and mid- I 990s as a useful conceptual tool from which 
important work derived. 
The PICT was a ten-year programme begun in 1986 to research the long-term 
. economic, social and policy 
implications of ICTs; many articles were published under 
its broad remit, some of which looked at ICTs in public administration (see 
Bellamy/Taylor, 1994). This work was set within a general climate in the academic 
discipline during the 1990s and before, where ICTs were given little by way of serious 
consideration (Frissen, 1 998, p33); a trend that was set to continue (Fountain, 200 I, p 16; 
Taylor/Lips, 2004, p 1 -2). This thesis is positioned to enrich this under-researched arena. 
Protagonists in the PICT, such as Taylor and Williams in particular, argued that a 
number of changes were occurring within government organisations, including the 
widespread adoption of ICTs, the increased use of information in service delivery, 
increased provision of information to third parties, changes in labour processes 
contingent on ICTs and increased use of information for strategic management 
purposes (I 990, pl 59). They argued that these changes had received little scholarly 
attention and suggested that the term 'information polity' would provide the 
4 conceptual focus' for these changes (ibld, p 15 1). Taylor and Williams had conviction 
that, despite caveats, the 'transformation of contemporary public administration is 
being enabled by the adoption of new information and communication technologies' 
and profound changes, such as significant decentralization, could ensue (199 1& 187- 
188). 
Subsequent work by some writers (Bellamy/Taylor, 1992; 1994; 1996; Taylor, 1992) 
developed the information polity, a 'parallel concept' to the information economy and 
society, which drew 'attention to the need for systematic investigation of the 
significance of changing information and communication capabilities for government' 
(Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p 148). The term 'polity' was used to refer to a 'stable, 
legitimized, "routinized'; form of governance', conjoined with 'information' to 
emphasise the importance of information to the 'definition, maintenance and reform of 
the institutional order which*it reflects and represents' (Bellamy/Taylor, I 996, p57). 
Later, Bellamy would reflect that despite avoiding a "simple technological- 
deterministic' stance that might suggest a linear relationship between ICT 
implementation and government change (2003, p7), some of the PICT-related output of 
the early 1990s assumed properties of ICTs were 'given and generic' and showed little 
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interest in how 'particular technological applications are formed or varied by specific 
social contexts or human agencies' (ibid. ). Although never strongly deterministic in its 
views on the abilities of information technologies, the PICT and information polity 
work did enter into the debate couched as technological determinism versus social 
shaping of technology, which emerged in part from scholarly considerations of the 
information society. Some writers tended to infer that technologies had the power to 
instil profound transformations in society (Toffler, 1970; 1980; 1990; 
Negroponte, 1995; Frissen, 1994), others retorted that society itself also had a 
prominent role in shaping technology (Edge, 1995; Waj cman/Makenzie, 1999). Whilst 
many scholars (e. g. Winner, 1999) reasoned that there was some form of balanced 
interaction between technology and its societal context, the subject matter of this 
thesis does raise questions in terms of the assumptions of policyrnakers regarding the 
power of new ICTs to transform service delivery. 
Beyond the PICT, other scholars were adopting a critical stance to the implementation 
and management of IT projects in the public sector. Margetts and Willcocks 
highlighted a number of factors that impinged on the adoption of IT in the public 
sector, using examples of problematic IT implementation in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Department of Social Security (DSS). They concluded 
that 'IT as an instrument of policy is not an uncontentious or unproblematic issue' 
(1993, p56). A little earlier, Margetts described the large 'Operational Strategy' to 
computerise the social security benefits system in the then DSS. Her preliminary 
evaluation indicated that few of the expected benefits of the programme materialised; 
as well as running dramatically over budget and offering little by way of efficiency 
gains, the more innovative aspects of. the programme, such as the 'whole person' 
concept, failed to materialise (Margetts, 1991, p331-332). The whole person approach 
aimed to reform services by doing away with ftagmented 'benefit-by-benefit' delivery 
and developing a seamless service, for all benefits, for each citizen (ibid, p328). This 
did not emerge, and Margetts argued the experience of the Operational Strategy 
indicated the prospect that, with reference to the work of Taylor and Williams, 'other 
possible benefits embodied in the notion of the 'information polity' will remain 
elusive', (ibid, p3 4 1). 
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Critical Public Administration: Informatization 
Further scholarly work on the use of ICTs in social security service delivery 
helped develop and focus analytical concepts. Drawing in particular from Frissen 
(1992) and Bellamy and Taylor (1994), Bellamy argued that many of the post- 
Operational Strategy ICT policies amounted to the 'informatization' of benefits 
administration (Bellamy, I 996, pl 60). Informatization was taken as the emphasis on 
creating and exploiting new information capabilities, particularly through new 
information flows across networking computer systems, and was set against 
'automation', where computers were used to mimic existing information structures 
and replace human labour (ibid. ). Bellamy argued that informatization did feature in 
the original Operational Strategy, particularly with the whole person concept 
(ibid., p162). 
Informatization had become a prominent concept in discussions regarding ICT use in 
government processes and began to provide a focus on the role of technology in 
drawing together service delivery around needs of the user. The concept was - 
developed in Dutch scholarly discussions (e. g. Frissen, 1992; Snellen, 1994) and was 
picked up in Britain. For instance, Muid (1992) and Bellamy and Taylor (1994) 
associated the rise of New Public Management with informatization processes, while 
Taylor (1998) argued that the concept enabled an 'x-ray vision' of government by 
focusing on informational relationships. 
In the case of the Operational Strategy, the informatizing whole person concept did not 
emerge and the strategy settled on a more straightforward and 'not unsuccessful' 
automation programme (Bellamy, I 996, p 165). However, post-Operational Strategy, 
the Benefits Agency proposed that a one-stop service sho uld be developed for clients, 
through convergence and connectivity of technical systems, a unified computer 
database and a fundamental reengineering of the benefits system (ibid. &168-170). Not 
only an indication of an appreciation of the benefits of informatization in the use of IT 
in service delivery (ibid., p 176-177), the post-Operational Strategy plans demonstrated 
the aspiration to coordinate IT and data systems to help join up benefits services 
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around clients. However, the barriers to one-stop services were also apparent; the 
influence of existing mainframe systems in the Benefits Agency, the 'cultural 
hegemony' of dominant automation perspectives on technology in Whitehall and 
ascendant political agendas affected the direction and pace of informatization 
(ibid., p 177). Despite the long-standing notion in the DS S that ICTs could reform 
welfare services to join up around client groups, barriers often stymied wholesale 
progress, although in 2002 the DSS was reorganised into the Department of Work and 
Pensions, a department structured around the needs of different groups 
(Bellamy, 2002, p2l7-218). 
Research on the Coordination of Computerization in the Criminal Justice System 
(CCCJS) programme, a long-term initiative originating in the mid- I 980s, provided 
further important observations on informatization that feed into this thesis. The various 
arms of the criminal justice system, police, Home Office, probation, the courts etc had 
been decentralised and compartmentalised historically (Bellamy, 1998b, p300). During 
the 1980s these institutions were implementing or were considering implementing 
national information systems. Home Office officials thought it. beneficial to induce 
interoperability between these systems (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p59), to streamline case 
management, encourage effectiveness and efficiency across the system and improve 
the quality of statistics (Bellamy, I 998b, p3O2; Bellamy/Taylor, 1996, p52-53); to 
informatize criminal justice services. 
However, scholars argued that existing compartmentalised criminal justice 
information domains were protected by civil and constitutional rights, the traditions, 
sensibilities, priorities and operations of the professions and organisations involved, 
uncoordinated budgeting and the legacy of incompatible IT systems (ibid, pQ). The 
research indicated that this highly institutionalised configuration would not 
accommodate interoperability and new information flows easily. However, there was 
also reason to suppose that the institutional order of the criminal justice system could 
conceivably be altered to a more integrated form. Bellamy and Taylor suggest that a 
widespread perception of inefficiency and ineffectiveness within the system, along 
with rising crime rates, had led to a political momentum during the period that could 
13 
generate institutional change in accordance with the informatizing objectives of the 
CCCJS (ibid., p67-68). However, these objectives and those of subsequent initiatives 
would prove difficult to achieve and, despite renewed attempts to improve data quality 
within, and interconnectivity between the arms of the criminal justice system in the e- 
government era (discussed in the first case study), progress had been slow 
(HMIC, 1999; HMIC, 2000; 2002; Audit Commission, 2002b). 
Critical Public Administration: The institutional approach 
In their later collaborations Bellamy and Taylor were categorical in their use of 
an institutional approach in answering key questions under the auspices of the 
information polity. Institutions had received attention and rich treatment in wider 
political science (see Hall/Taylor, 1996; Pierson/Skocpol, 2002); broadly, institutions 
are taken as 'formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organisational order of the polity' (Hall/Taylor, 1 996, p6). These 
institutions guided activities through providing continuity, rationalities and ordering in 
public sector organisations yet, although institutions could demarcate organisational 
boundaries, they were not necessarily restricted or defined by them 
(Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, pl57); multiple institutions could co-exist and interrelate 
within one government organisation, or a single institution could extend across many 
organisations, representing policy networks and communities (ibid; Lowndes, 1996). 
Considerations of the role of institutions led Bellamy and Taylor to view information 
and its communication in a way that 'reduces to sterility the antonymical discourse 
between utopian and dystopian approaches to understanding ICTs' and to look at the 
power of institutions in the shaping of information processing in government 
(I 998a, p 157). Their approach rejected alternative perspectives on understanding the 
information polity as overly technicist but also avoided viewing the shaping of ICTs in 
government as a result of 'free and conscious choice in the exploitation' of neutral 
technologies (ibid, p 150-15 1). Whereas they did not see ICTs driving change alone, 
they also argued that technologies are not 'infinitely malleable and portable artefacts 
which can be bent at will' (ibld, pl 5 1), thus seeking to reflect a balance between the 
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power of information technologies and the contextual environment in which these 
technologies would operate. 
Whilst the capabilities of ICTs could lead to ambiguous outcomes, they were also 
shaped by the social processes, and ultimately the specific institutional settings within 
which they were embedded (ibid., p 152), as shown in earlier work on the Department 
of Social Security and criminal justice system. Thus the 'potentially radical tendencies 
of ICTs' were juxtaposed with 'the inherently evolutionary and incremental nature of 
institutional change' (ibid. ). They conclude that: 
Despite the powerful hyperbole which surrounds the notion of an information age, 
heroic scenarios for reinventing government through the application of ICTs are 
fundamentally misleading. The institutions of governance will mould and fashion 
the revolutionary potential of ICTs into an evolutionary reality ... The heady 
images which are so often associated with ICTs, together with the technologically 
determinist expectations that they will transform the nature of relationships in and 
around governance, are balanced by the relative insusceptibility to change of the 
normative and assumptive worlds which suffuse political institutions (ibid, p170) 
Margetts provided an equally cautionary message in her own book Information 
Technology in Government: Britain and America. Here, she noted that whilst 
information technology had become 'a new fairy godmother for government' 
(I 999, p 1), research indicated that it had not had the expected influence. A primary 
reason was that 'as well as information technology changing public administration, 
public administration has changed information technology' (ibid, p 178). Despite the 
pervasive status of IT, developments were localised, varied and of limited success; 
evidence from four case studies in Britain and America pointed to the enduring 
influence of distinct institutional settings in the implementation of IT systems. Thus 
'the experience of the four organisations involved constitute four distinct stories, with 
social, economic and organisational factors continuing to influence the use of 
information technology, thereby ensuring that the effects of computerisation continue 
to vary' (ibid). Margetts found that organisational decisions taken before and during 
IT system implementation 'dictates the future possibilities for policy innovation, 
creating a new form of 'administrative inertia' within government agencies' 
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(ibid, pl79-180). Thus, applied to the UK e-govermnent strategy, Margetts implied 
that modernisation could be restrained as well as unlocked by ICTs. 
Working from America, Fountain tied ICTs with institutional perspectives on 
governance and organisations, by endeavouring to show how institutions and 
organisational configurations mediated technologies. Fountain rejected the notion that 
bureaucracy was likely to diminish in the face of networked computing (2001, p62-63) 
and set out an institutional theory (tested in case studies) of ICTs in contemporary 
government (ibid, p83-103). Her central accomplishment was to account for 
information technology in institutional theory and to demonstrate that, whilst the 
internet in particular was a 'revolutionary lever for institutional change', the 
machinery of government institutions mediated and altered the actions of this lever 
(ibid., p193-194). 
As e-government strategies developed in governments around the world, including the 
UK, public administration scholars should have found the above literature as 
intellectual heritage, from which closer understanding of IT in public administration 
could develop. Through an interest in the information polity lens, key scholars turned 
to demonstrating the institutional dimensions of government, which provided insight 
into the difficulties of instilling informatization into public service delivery. This 
thesis moves these considerations of institutions on in the study of e-government and 
its role in joining up, providing a rich, and deep examination of multiple organisations 
and institutional arrangements across time. 
However, as noted above there was not a sustained and concerted scholarly effort in 
public administration to consider the influence of ICTs in government processes, 
despite the endeavours, of key scholars, some of whom will be returned to later in the 
Chapter. As a result of the paucity of critical scholarly attention, notions derived from 
wider literature tended to dominate approaches to the understanding and assessment of 
e-government in the new millennium. 
1.3 CONCEPTIONS OF E-GOVERNMENT IN WIDER LITERATURE 
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While the information polity acted as an important focus for key public administration 
scholars, who were able to uncover some of the institutional factors involved in the 
applications of ICTs to government processes, writers from other spheres were seeking 
to understand the role of ICT in other organisations. Some of this work considered the 
role of electronic processes in coordinating the outputs of organisations, and would 
influence dominant perceptions of the purpose and format of e-government. 
In particular, as new information technologies began to be used increasingly in the 
private sector, business and management literature sought to understand how best to 
exploit IT in light of growing investment levels. In the mid 1990s, a strain of this 
thinking developed into the Business Process Reengineering (BPR) movement and in 
1993 Hammer and Champy offered their manifesto for reengineering corporations. 
Part of the mantra was that ICTs needed to be harnessed by thinking inductively; 'to 
first recognise a powerful solution and then seek the problems it might solve' 
(1993, p88). Although BPR was by no means about new technology alone, Hammer 
and Champy argued that ICTs could be utilised to fundamentally alter and improve 
business practices in organisations, to refocus operations to the needs of customers and 
increase profitability. The BPR doctrine held that IT should not be used to 'pave over 
cow paths', to automate existing organisational practices, but instead could be used in 
aggressive obliteration and redesign of business processes. 
Under BPR, information could flow freely across electronic networks regardless of 
traditional functional and organisational boundaries, integrating operations to improve 
the customer experience (Taylor, 1995; Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p5l-53; 1998b, p6). 
BPR emphasised flexible organisational practices enabled by new ICTs, which could 
preclude the need for restrictive command structures and divisions of labour 
(Bellamy, I 998b, p297). Horizontal integration across organisational units and vertical 
integration through supply chains and out to customers or clients was advocated to 
secure a customer-focused modus operandi (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p74-75). Thus, 
BPR turned attention towards joining up the services of the functional silos of business 
organisations around the needs of customers, in part through ICTs. 
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As well as being discussed in public administration literature (e. g. Taylor, 1995; Taylor 
et al, 1997; Anderson, 1999), BPR was officially adopted by the British government in 
the mid-1990s (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b, p6), as seen in the Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency report and other documents (CCTA, 1994b; 
OPSS, 1994a; 1995). However, most of the government projects used as examples of 
BPR at the time were somewhat modest compared to the severe forms advocated by 
Hammer and others (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998b, p6). Still, the sentiments of BPR could be 
seen manifested strongly in ICT-mediated modernisation processes and projects in the 
UK and elsewhere during the 1990s (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p76-86), as well as 
government. direct (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b), Modernising Government and the central 
e-government strategy'examined in this thesis. 
As BPR literature was adopted as a potential tool in policymaking, some scholars were 
cautious of its application in public service delivery. For instance, BPR was said to be 
used to 'explain away' the IT productivity paradox (Bellamy, I 999a, p9O), the uneasy 
lack of evidence of clear links between IT investment and increases in business 
productivity in organisations (Strassman, 1997, p23; Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p5l). BPR 
advocates argued that the lack of apparent success with IT over many spheres could be 
blamed on its common use for supporting failing business methods inst6d of 
appliance to reengineering (ibld., p5l-52). Yet it was argued that BPR style techniques, 
although positioned to transform organisations, particularly through creating new 
information flows, failed to take into account the threats caused to existing 
information domains and the actors that controlled them (ibid., pI53-154). Still, 
arguably the BPR movement and the notions and sentiments therein continued to have 
an influence on the conceptualisation of the role of ICTs in government processes. In 
particular, BPR laid emphasis on creating holistic and seamless responses to clients 
through coordinating information flows across boundaries using ICTs, which parallels 
with the central principle of the e-govemment strategy as outlined above. 
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Conceptions of e-Government in Business and Management Literature: The stages 
model 
Whilst BPR represented a mode of thinking that may have informed early e- 
government policy development, subsequent business and management literature also 
provided input into the required trajectory of e-government across the world. A 
reoccurring theme was that the documents advocated the use of ICTs, particularly 
internet technologies, for the coordination or joining up of public services; indeed the 
realisation of seamless service delivery was promoted as the zenith of e-government. 
Despite the existence of cautionary messages provided by Margetts, Fountain, 
Bellamy and Taylor outlined above, some of the literature resembled the 'intoxicating 
visions of government in the information age' (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p 170) that had 
been warned against. 
Commercial research reports mapped out a projection for public sector adoption of 
new ICTs. For Accenture (2002) the overarching argument was that new ICTs, and 
particularly online applications offered 'faster, cheaper, more personalized and 
efficient service delivery' (Accenture, 2002, p2). The report measured e-govemment 
performance across the world in terms of 'maturity'; governments were expected to 
progress from 'publish' or 'passive' stages (where electronic communication was 
restricted to informational websites), to 'interact' stages (where users could also 
communicate with government agencies through email for instance) and finally to 
'transact' stages where fully two-way communication occurred (ibid. &4). Similarly to 
the Modernising Government white paper, Accenture argued that the ultimate goal of 
e-govemment was to create 'intergrat[ion] across agencies to simplify interaction, 
reduce cost and improve service'. (ibid. &2). Integration across agencies should be 
accompanied by 'true integration between the web front-end and the back office 
systems' (ibid., p 12). 
Deloitte and Touche provided a similar message in its At the Dawn of e-Government 
report, where familiar themes set the tone; 'the explosive entry of technology into , 
every facet of life has changed how people live, how they work, how companies do 
business - and how governments serve their constituents. The result: the emergence of 
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e-Government' (2000, pl). The report, again with an emphasis on online service 
delivery, argued that there was a direct correlation between the 'eminence of web- 
based applications' and the 'degree of enterprise transformation' in governments 
(ibid., p22). A progression through stages of e-govemment maturity was again 
expected; from informational websites, to two-way interaction, clustering of services 
through portals and finally to 'full integration and enterprise transformation' 
(ibid., p24-25). At this final stage 'old walls defining silos of services have been torn 
down, and technology is integrated across the new enterprise to bridge the shortened 
gap between the front and back office' (ibid. &25). Electronic government was seen as 
crucial in facilitating 'customer-centric' governments by 'breaking down obsolete 
structures and the 'silo' thinking that has long characterised the way governments have 
operated' (ibid., p2). 
International public sector organisations had also increasingly turned attention to e- 
government at the beginning of the new millennium. The United Nations Division for 
Public Economics and Public Administration produced a report in 2002 that looked to 
benchmark e-government advancements; it again provided a number of stages through 
which 'e-services' should develop. 'Emerging' governments would establish a web 
presence, 'interactive' facilitated enhanced electronic communication, 'transactional' 
allowed online payments and other transactions. Finally, the 'seamless' stage equated 
to 'total integration of e-functions and services across administrative and departmental 
boundaries' (UNDPEPA, 2002, p2,1 0). The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) argued in the e-Government Imperative that e-govemment 
could lead to 'seamless government, cutting across the boundaries that separate 
different structures and functions in the public administration, to provide seamless 
interface to both users of services and to citizens' (2003, p 17). 
The four reports detailed above, and other similar material, did not usually suggest that 
progress to these higher echelons of e-government service provision would be easy 
and had to be placed within a wider reform process to succeed. Nonetheless, despite 
these caveats the overriding message was that, mirroring Modernising Governmeni, 
uses of new ICTs in public services would be instrumental in achieving a new phase of 
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govenunent where services would be joined up, delivered seamlessly and tailored to 
the needs of the user rather than provider. 
Whilst the 'stages model' was the dominant approach to e-government, there were 
some doubts about its appropriateness for the full breadth of public services 
(NAO, 2001/02d, p 10- 12). The model's emphasis was less on critically assessing the 
underlying assumptions and philosophies behind e-govemment policy and more on 
measuring, benchmarking and league tabling comparative progress, in terms of the 
assumed ultimate objectives of seamless and integrated delivery 
(Taylor/Lips, 2004, p7). Nonetheless, arguments pertaining to the instrumental role of 
e-govemment in acýieving joined up government were relentlessly driven from these 
business and management sources; e-government was set to achieve an advanced 
incarnation ofjoined up delivery through a modernist progression, particular through 
online channels. However, despite the positioning of e-government as a facilitator of 
joining up in business and management literature, there was little in terms of critical 
appraisal of these assumptions in public administration literature. 
However there was, as discussed below, scholarly attention to the notions ofjoining 
up that had figured prominently in the 'stageýs model' and government policy. Yet, the 
role of ICTs in joining up had largely escaped this academic attention, despite their 
close association in policy discussions and business and management literature, 
beginning in the late 1990s. 
1.4 ACADEMIC UNDERSTANDING OF JOINED UP GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UK 
Joined up government is the second key theme considered in this chapter; it received 
academic scrutiny from public administration scholars for a number years. It emerged 
as a popular term in the UK near the beginning of the Blair government from 1997 
(Mulgan, 2002), coming to encapsulate a 'central objective of public sector reform' 
(Ling, 2002, p6l5). The term and associated parlance was said to emerge more from 
'fashionable leftish think tanks' than Whitehall (Pollitt, 2003, p36) but was then 
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discussed and promoted in a number of government policy documents (Cabinet 
Office, 1999; PIU, 2000a; 2000c; Centre for Management and Policy Studies, 2001; 
SEU, 2001). 
Joined up government was seen as a reaction to perceived systemic inadequacies in the 
delivery of public services. Thus, the movement was 'best viewed as a group of 
responses to the perception that services had become fragmented and that this 
fragmentation was preventing the achievement of important goals of public policy' 
(Ling, 2002, p6l6). Kavanagh and Richards argued that the traditional departmental 
structure and policy-making model, based in part on the Haldane Committee's 1918 
recommendations for vertical functional departments organised by service, created 
unintended and unforeseen pathologies in service delivery (2000a, p 1 -2). This point 
was discussed further in particular by Perri 6 (1997, p 16-25), who argued that many 
contemporary problems with government derived from 'the failure to challenge the 
functional principle of organisation' (ibid, p25). By the late 20th century there was a 
growing view that government functions were contributing to societal problems rather 
than alleviating them; 'public services were perceived to have grown, to become 
ossified consumers of resources and sources of obstruction to reform' 
(Lawton/Rosej 999, p2O). 
However, before joined up government rose to prominence, public service reform took 
an alternative course which, as well as providing solutions to the perceived problems, 
also created an environment where coordination became a more significant issue. This 
course was the Next Steps reforms under Margaret Thatcher, who believed the civil 
service was bloated and bureaucratic and required restructuring. She demonstrated her 
intentions in the employment of Lord Rayner as head of her Efficiency Unit in the 
early 1980s, charged with eliminating waste in departments (Butcher, I 995, p63). 
Following the precursory Financial Management Initiative, Thatcher contracted Sir 
Robin Ibbs to produce a report in 1987 that recommended that many government 
departments shoitld be divided into smaller policy units. The ensuing reform in the 
departmental structure was perhaps the most fundamental change of the 20th century, 
and continued under Prime Minister John Major with 74% of the civil service 
22 
operating in 130 agencies by. 1997 (Greenwood et al, 2002, p33). The agentification of 
the civil service had arguably increased the effectiveness and efficiency of service 
delivery through a 'greater clarity of purpose' (Foster/Plowden, 1996, pl66), but may 
have also magnified the perceived problem of fragmentation 
(Kavanagh/Richards, 2000a, p8; Richards, 2001, p62; Rhodes, 2000d, pl56). Ling noted 
that whilst Next Steps and subsequent reforms 'intended to break up what was held to 
be a monolithic, inward-looking public sector', it also 'exacerbated the difficulty of 
co-ordinating multi-agency responses to complex problems' (Ling, 2002, p6l8). 
Joined up government had thus been viewed by scholars as a response not only to 
'weaknesses in conventional delivery processes' but also 'perceived problems 
associated with fragmentation during the 1980s' (ibid). In particular, this 
fragmentation had left government less able to deal with the so-called 'Wicked' issues 
related to crime, unemployment, welfare, education and so on (6,1997, p9-1 0). There 
was agreement in the literature that one way that joined up government could be 
understood was as a response to these enduring wicked issues that the reforms of the 
1980s failed to resolve (Kavanagh/Richards, 2000a, p8; Pollitt, 2003, p46; 
Richards, 200 l, p63 -65). This point was echoed in the Modernising Government white 
paper and other central government publications cited above. 
However, further context to the rise of joined up government could be found in an 
appreciation of 'governance' rather than government. From the 1990s, there was 
increasing acknowledgement that, as well as fragmentation in and between 
government organisations, an increasingly complex and heterogeneous society had 
provided challenges for public service delivery. Thus, government should seek to 
govern flexibly, acknowledging and using partnerships, co-operatives and networks 
beyond the purview of traditional hierarchical models of delivery (Rhodes, 1997; 
2000a; 2000b; 2000c; Kickert, 1992). This view struck a chord with j oined up 
government, and thus provided a frame within which joined up government policies, 
and academic discussions thereof, emerged. 
23 
Joined Up Government: Parallels with the past 
Some scholarly attention to joined up government focused on demonstrating 
the similarities between the Blair Labour government's emphasis on joining up and 
previous policy and strategy responses through the decades. Kavanagh and Richards 
described a series of government responses to perceived organisational deficiencies 
(which they termed 'departmentalism') including Winston Churchill's 'overlords' 
experiment, attempts to create super-departments through mergers in the 1960s, 
Edward Heath's Think-Tank style Central Policy Review Staff and the Programme 
Analysis and Review (2000a, p3-5). Thegeneral consensus was that these initiatives 
largely ran out of steam (Theakston, 1995a, p84,86,113; Hennessy, 1 989, p244-245; 
Pollitt, I 984, p 154-5 5; Greenwood et al, 2002, p4 1). Similarly, the Civil Service 
Department, created in 1968 following the Fulton Committee report, aimed to address 
pathological obstacles to service delivery but ultimately failed (Greenwood et 
al, I 992, p 144; Hennessy, 1989, p2O6). Kavanagh and Richards pointed out that previous 
initiatives had similar objectives of creating coordination across departments as the 
joined up government movement of the late 1990s and beyond. 
Writing as a contribution to a National Audit Office report on Joining Up to Improve 
Public Services (NAO, 2001/02e), Richards took a different line in pointing out 
continuities between joined up government and previous attempts to deliver 
coordinated services. She argued that joined up government was precisely what had 
occurred during the post-war period up until the late 1970s, through planning and 
professional consensus (2001, p62). Richards suggested that this paradigm was 
replaced by one based on economy and efficiency until the late 1990s, where a third 
paradigm in public policy aimed at countering a legacy of fragmentation from the 
1980s and 1990s through tackling 'wicked problems'. Clark noted that, looking at 
previous attempts at joining up, 'it is remarkable how much in common the past now 
has with the present' (2002, pl 11), citing similar examples to that of Kavanagh and 
Richards noted above. Pollitt concurred, adding that John Major's Conservative 
administration laid considerable emphasis on partnerships, a prominent aspect of 
j oined up government (2003, p3 6). 6 (2004, p 103) noted that strategies from as far back 
as the 1830s, such as those instigated by Edwin Chadwick, were essentially an 
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exercise in improving coordination not dissimilar to the notions underpinning j oined 
up govermnent. 
The two case studies in this thesis pick up on the continuity between the joined up 
thrust of the Blair Labour government and previous policies and strategies to improve 
coordination and integration between government organisations, of which there were 
many in both cases. The case studies will trace not only the history of IT use in the 
government organisations concerned but also the policy history of coordination, 
partnerships and integration within the two service delivery areas under scrutiny 
(crime prevention and welfare), as well as any points where IT and joined up 
government have been associated in the past. This will provide a closer understanding 
of the institutional and organisational landscape within which the e-government 
projects and tools under scrutiny operated. 
Joined Up Government under the Labour Governmentftom 1997 
Another strong theme of literature considering joined up government was 
attempts to unpack and categorise the constituents of the Labour government's 
approach to joining up from 1997; to understand the 'group of responses to the 
perception that services had become fragmented' (Ling, 2002, p6l6). This had been in 
part because government documents had often failed to provide definitions of joined 
up government (Pollitt, 2003, p34). This haziness may have been the result of a 
'deliberate decision to experiment with a range of different forms' with joining up 
(Mulgan, 2002, p5). However, some official guidance on the term's meaning was 
published in a PlU policy document entitled Wiring it Up. Building from Modernising 
Government the PIU recommended more effective leadership, flexible funding, cross- 
cutting policyrnaking, a more skilled civil service, powerful and timely audits and a 
more appropriate role for the centre of government (PIU, 2000a, p7-8) as a means of 
improving joined up service delivery. The report also noted that joining up could take 
different forms depending on requirements; sharing information, objectives, measures, 
budgets or creating joint teams, customer interfaces and management arrangements 
were among the options listed (ibid., p 18). 
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Despite Wiring it Up, scholars continued to provide characterisations and 
recommendations for joined up government. Pollitt's review of government literature 
proposed that joined up government denotes 'an aspiration to achieve horizontally and 
vertically co-ordinated thinking and action' (2003, p35). However, this could equate to 
a variety of different approaches and objectives including joined up policy formulation 
and joined up implementation, vertical joining up (between central and local 
government), horizontal joining up (between departments) and joining up for groups 
(e. g. older people), regions, localities or policy sectors (e. g. transport or healthcare) 
(ibid., p37). Ling also described the multiple dimensions ofjoining up government 
using a fourfold 'pragmatic typology' incorporating new ways of working across 
organisations (pooled budgets, joint teams etc), new methods of delivering serviýes 
(e. g. shared customer interfaces), new types of organisations and new accountabilities 
and incentives (e. g. joint targets and performance measures) (Ling, 2002, p625-626). 
In striving for 'holistic government', 6 provided a series of recommendations in 
'achieving greater integration across the public sector' (1997, plO). He advocated 
holistic budgets, integrated information systems, organisations defined by outcomes 
rather than functions and other measures to achieve integration (ibid., p44-69). In later 
work, 6 would seek to explain the relative take up ofjoined up goverm-nent in the UK 
and elsewhere, resting on a Neo-Durkeimian institutional approach to demonstrate the 
influence of constraints and bonds (6,2004, plO9-117). 
Richards argued that joined up government responded to both 'intractable' problems 
without obvious remedies and 'tame' problems with known solutions. She endorsed 
decentralised strategies to allow local resolutions to generate best practice generally 
for the former (2001, p64). For the latter, Richards argued that known solutions had not 
been applied as 'tame' problems 'lie on the boundaries between different 
jurisdictions'; thus national strategies, cross-sector leadership,, pooled budgets and 
systems of evaluation and learning were required (ibid, p65). Clark referred in 
particular to the PIU Wiring It Up (2000a) report to list joined up working methods as 
including joint customer interfaces, merged structures and budgets and sharing 
information (2002, p 109). Rhodes agreed that joined up government took various 
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forms, citing area-based and citizen group-based programmes (2000d, pIS5) but 
reminded us that ultimately joined up government was there to 'build bridges between 
the organisations involved in designing policies and delivering services' Qbid). 
The above review of the literature indicates that joined up government was a diffuse 
phenomena that included a raft of measures, tools and strategies, which all shared a 
common goal of encouraging coordination, collaboration, partnerships and integration 
between organisations and sectors that had previously delivered services discretely. 
Furthermore, joined up government had often targeted the 'wicked' issues of service 
delivery such as crime, employment, health, social care, education and so on. The 
thesis takes this broad definition as the basis for research and in case study selection. 
Understanding ofJoined Up Government: The omission ofICT considerations 
However, to return to the argument noted above, there was evidently a paucity 
of consideration of the question of ICTs in scholarly literature discussing joined up 
government. This paucity remained despite the clear association between ICTs and 
joining up in the Modernising Government white paper and the subsequent orientation 
of the central e-government strategy. In terms of the literature on joined up 
government mentioned above, Rhodes (2000d), Mulgan (2002), Clark (2002) and Ling 
(2002) had no or negligible discussion of e-government strategies specifically, or ICTs 
generally. Furthermore, the PIU report (2000a) provided little discussion of the e- 
government programme, despite alignment with the Modernising Government white 
paper. Some other central policy documents considering the prospects for joining up 
where neglectful of ICT issues to a similar extent (e. g. SEU, 2001). This was less the 
case in two independent reports produced from enquiries of purported policy failing in 
government. The Bichard report recommended that, to ensure that police forces and 
social service organisations were nationally coordinated enough to prevent dangerous 
individuals working with children, ICTs would need to be improved to enable better 
intelligence and information sharing (Bichard, 2004). Larning recognised that better 
collaboration was needed to protect vulnerable young people and that effective 
information sharing, supported by ICTs and a national database for children, would 
facilitate this to an extent (Laming, 2003). I 
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Other sources did consider the role of ICTs in passing. Kavanagh and Richards 
(2000a, p9) briefly noted that the 'primitive state of IT provision' held back joining up 
whilst Pollitt listed the use of common IT systems and databases as a potential tool for 
joined up government (2003, p44). Richards provided more depth, discussing the role 
ICTs had to play in joining up services around clusters of citizen needs and the 
implications of the reconfigurations needed to create such a change (2001, p63- 
64,66,70). The National Audit Office report, to which Richards contributed, did 
consider the role of websites in the operations of the joined up initiatives under review 
(NAO, 2001/02, p39) but did not discuss the role of the e-government strategy as a 
whole. 6 (1997, p42-43) was published before the e-government agenda in the UK had 
gathered significant momentum but did discuss the government. direct green paper, the 
potential of an integrated electronic citizen interface and increases in flows of 
information across functional boundaries. 
In his later work, 6 briefly noted a trend in the use of government web portals aimed to 
join up related services around common 'life events' or 'distinct clienteles' 
(2004, p 120-122). 6 also pointed out the potential tensions between the increased data 
sharing often associated with joined up government, and data protection and privacy 
(ibid., pl2l). As 6 argued, this became a major issue that scholars (e. g. Bennett, 1997; 
Raab, 2001) and government organisations (PIU, 2002) addressed. The government 
maintained that privacy and data protection were reconcilable with the increased data 
use and sharing implied in the central e-government strategy; the PIU argued that it 
was possible to pursue 'the twin objectives of enhancing privacy and making better 
use of personal data' (ibid, p5). 
Despite these brief considerations, the overriding sense was that attention to ICTs and 
e-government had been neglected in joined up government literature. Many of the 
common components identified, including sharing information, joint teams, shared 
customer interfaces, organisational integration and partnerships would logically 
2 Academic research; particularly that which was still ongoing in 2004 by Bellamy, Raab and 6, was set 
to provide insight into this claim. 
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require ICTs, informatization and electronic processes at their heart. Nonetheless, 
without the benefits of the information polity lens, the authors discussed above largely 
missed these considerations; a significant failing in light of the importance placed on 
ICTs in government policy and elsewhere. 
This thesis will help reconcile scholarly considerations of ICTs and joined up 
government, to provide critical appraisal of the role of new technologies in achieving 
joining up with reference to the central e-govemment strategy. Achieving this 
reconciliation entails building upon some important existing academic work, some of 
which has been referred to in prior sections of this chapter. This work did recognise 
the function of ICTs in the coordination of service delivery, particularly as discussions 
around this issue arose in government policy publications. 
As noted on p 12 above, informatization had become an important scholarly concept in 
discussions around the application of ICTs in service delivery. Whilst the concept had 
been used generally to point to the tendency of ICTs to produce information that 
could be utilised in a reflective sense by organisations (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p26- 
27), informatization can also be employed specifically to indicate the potential to 
exploit technologies to enable new flows of information (ibid, p46-47,84). In this 
sense, informatization is used in this thesis as a concept to denote innovative uses of 
ICTs beyond that of automation, where new technologies imitate existing 
informational processes, for efficiency and staff savings purposes. In contrast to 
automation, references to informatization in this thesis point to instances where ICTs 
have been applied creatively, particularly to enable new uses of information across 
pre-existing boundaries. Thus, informatization has a strong link with the use of ICTs 
in joining up service delivery; this link is borne out in discussions throughout the 
thesis. 
1.5 ICT-MEDIATED JOINED UP GOVERNMENT: CONSIDERATIONS OF THE 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION VANGUARD 
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A major thrust of UK e-government strategy documents and the commercial research 
reports of Accenture and others-was the close intertwining of ICTs and electronic 
service delivery with integration, seamless provision and joined up government. 
Despite the prominence of the association in policy documents, there was less by way 
of critical academic commentary on this matter in public administration, although 
related work. that considered the use of new technologies in surveillance did bring 
some g6neral attention to the powers offered to government through joining together 
citizen data. Still, in particular the work primarily focused on joined up government 
had neglected a consideration of ICTs and e-government. 
However, arguments that ICTs may have a prominent role in forging integrated or co- 
ordinated service delivery, particularly between traditionally distinct government 
organisations or policy fields, had had a small but important voice, even well before 
the emergence of e-government in Britain. One of the objectives of this thesis has been 
to trace the derivation of the idea in policy discussions, and this original research will 
be related in Chapter Two. However, in terms of critical academic work, Taylor and 
Williams began to think about the potential for ICTs to bring about coordination in 
service delivery in the early 1990s, using the information polity lens. In considering 
the potentially transformational capacities of information technologies, they noted that 
the ability of 'agencies to bring together services at the point of the customer is made 
more possible through the use of common information bases, themselves made 
available via networked computing' (Taylor/Williams, 1991, pl 88-189). 
Scholarly considerations of informatization in the information polity led to further 
discussions on the potential benefits of ICT-mediated public service coordination. For 
instance, Bellamy observed that intrinsic to efforts in the informatization of social 
security benefits towards 'whole person' capabilities during the 1980s was the 
integration of computer systems (Bellamy, I 996, p 167). Although whole person was, 
unsuccessful, the subsequent emphasis on one-stop services in Benefits Agency policy 
required a convergence of technical systems (ibid, p169). Despite barriers and 
difficulties, Bellamy argued that such potential informatization could portend 'holistic 
administrative systems in which traditional barriers to capturing and exploiting 
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information would be increasingly irrelevant, including those between different parts 
of public bureaucracies' (ibld., p177). Similarly, Bellamy and Taylor observed that 
efficiency and effectiveness benefits were identified in creating electronic links across 
criminal justice agenLes by policyrnakers embarking on the CCCJS programme 
(1998a, p59-60; 1996; Bellamy, 1 998b, p3O2-303). The inference was that, in the shift 
away from policy emphasis on automation and towards unlocking the potential of 
information through ICTs in public services, establishing electronic links between 
government organisations as a means to proffer holistic delivery would be a 
commonly held aspiration. 
Considerations of the 'governance' concept in public administration also led some 
scholars to reflect on the potential role of the integrative power of ICTs. Whilst it was 
suggested above that governance and networks were important contextual concepts for 
joined up government, Bellamy asked why ICTs had not figured prominently in 
scholarly attempts to understand the governance phenomena (Bellamy, 1998b, p294). 
This was more surprising, Bellamy noted, as other areas of social science, such as in 
the work of Castells (1996), had highlighted information technology as a conspicuous 
factor in the shift towards networked organisations (Bellamy, I 998b, p294). It was 
argued that ICTs could unlock the essential resource of information in organisations, 
bringing 'co-operation across the hitherto impermeable boundaries' (ibid, p298). 
Using the case of the CCCJS, Bellamy pointed out the dangers in the assumption that 
the introduction of ICTs Would readily improve information flows across government, 
as technological barriers, professional and commercial interests, and political power 
may prove hardy obstacles (ibid, p298-306). 
Elsewhere in Europe, ICTs were being earmarked as facilitators of new forms of 
government organisations and public service delivery. For instance Bekkers argued 
that the networking power of ICTs were blurring, altering, redefining and integrating 
government organisations in the Netherlands (1998, p57-77). Zuunnond discussed the 
emergence of 'infocracies', where traditional government boundaries were 
disappearing as information flowed through electronic networks (1998, p269), Killian 
and Wind (1998) examined inter-organisational. ICT systems, exploring the extent to 
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which these might be enabling coordination and co-operation between government 
organisations in Germany. Salza and Mecalla noted that the creation of a 'unified 
network' for Italian government had been a priority for policyrnakers to encourage 
connectivity, interoperability co-operation and database integration (200 1& 13 9- 
140,147). In America, Fountain considered the role of the internet and associated, 
technologies in facilitating bureaucratic coordination and inter-organisational networks 
(2001, p5l-52,79-81). 
The Vanguard in the e-Government Era: Reviewing government. direct 
Thus, for some time. a select group of public administration scholars were 
discussing the relationship between ICTs and coordination, networking and integration 
in service delivery, often within wider debates pertaining to informatization and 
governance. In the UK, the emergence of government. direct sharpened the focus on 
this relationship in some key public administration texts; the green paper brought to 
the fore the role of ICTs in prominent central public service reform policy for the first 
time (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b, pl) and suggested a more holistic approach to delivery, 
less limited by traditional organisational boundaries and enabled by new technologies 
(Margetts, I 999, p47; Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p77). Scholars noted that the green paper 
suggested a focus on vertical information flows between government and users, 
through for instance 'one-stop' citizen access via new electronic channels, and an 
emphasis on horizontal flows of information between service sectors. Here, improved 
electronic data capture and efficient sharing between back office systems could 'allow 
government agencies to redesign their business processes, enabling them to streamline 
bureaucracy, rationalize provision and breakdown organizational barriers to the 
provision of 'seamless' public services' (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998b, p4). 
Whilst the green paper remained largely unnoticed in mainstream public 
administration academia, a select group of scholars had observed the links made in 
policy discussions between ICTs and a radical path for public service reform 
(Bellamy, 1999a) aimed at holistic, client-focused provision, as sketched out in 
embryonic form in government. direct. Bellamy and Taylor argued that the ICT- 
enabled reform outlined in the green paper might best be understood in terms of BPR, 
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which held that, using the networking power of new technologies, business processes 
would be 'technically integrated across organisational boundaries' to aggressively 
reassert the 'hierarchical power of managers' (I 998b, p5). Although 'a seductive 
methodology' for the implementation of e-government Bellamy and Taylor contended 
that BPR overstated the ability of managerial authority to overcome evident barriers 
(ibid, p5-8,15). 
The scholars also considered the utility of the 'governance' concept in characterising 
the implications of government. direct. They concluded that the prominent use of the 
'network metaphor' in the governance literature tended to overestimate the role of 
autonomous individuals and underestimate the importance of wider institutional 
configurations on networks (ibid, p 10). It was suggested instead that a useful approach 
was to consider distinct 'information domains' in government organisations, over 
which legitimate control was held by specific groups of actors (ibid., p 11-12). 
Government. direct should be understood as providing several sets of challenges to the 
information domains embedded in institutions (ibid, p 11-15). 
By 1999 'joined up government', both in terms of horizontal links between 
departments and vertical links with citizens, was becoming a popular mantra in policy 
circles. Although public administration scholars largely neglected the issue, Bellamy 
noted a clear association between joined up government and the 'information age' 
agenda emerging from government. direct. Underlying this association, she argued, 
was a 'widespread assumption that it is the power of new technology that will enable 
governments to be reconfigured around customer needs' (1999a, p89). As seen in the 
Modernising Government white paper published following Bellamy's work here, this 
power was intended to focus on moving beyond departmental silos to integrate and 
streamline public services. However the reputed problem with the putative role ICTs 
were to play in joined up government was: 
in the real world of government, organisational silos do not simply dissolve under 
the weight of the business logic of ICTs. On the contrary, there are many reasons 
why the functional segmentation of service delivery has become deeply embedded 
in the institutions of government. Each part of government possesses it own 1 
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mission statement, its own business aims, its own information and business 
systems ... its own sets of clients, its own clusters of suppliers, its own external 
partners and its own budgetary and stewardship responsibilities (ibid, p90) 
Despite the bold plans that were emerging from central government during the mid to 
late 1990s, a small core vanguard of critical public administration literature warned 
that in the 'vast intricate webs of incompatible legislative frameworks, data standards, 
legacy systems and business relationships lie some of the most difficult issues 
involved in joining-up public services with ICTs' (ibid, p9l). 
Although government. direct held back from the severe BPR advocated by some 
quarters, pilots to join up information systems and provide integrated electronic portals 
were nonetheless instigated during the late 1990s off the back of the green paper. 
Although perhaps initially masking rather than obliterating fragmentation, the 
association in the emerging e-government agenda between ICTs and joining up was 
very clear. Whilst the need for service redesign towardsholistic delivery was acted 
upon previously in criminal justice (with the CCCJS) and social security (Operational 
Strategy and subsequent work), with both cases revealing profound problems, the 
'political salience' bestowed upon joined up government (ibid, p93) had led to 
renewed or fresh attempts to lever integration and coordination in these and other 
sectors of delivery. 
Researching e-Government: The thesis approach 
Following the publication of Modernising Government and several other policy 
documents, the central e-government initiative was in full swing soon after the passing 
of the millennium (see Chapter Three), with a variety of projects aimed at joining up 
using new technologies (Bellamy, 2002, p2l4-216; Holliday, 2001, p3l9-323; 
Hudson, 2001, p520). Nonetheless, it was only a minority voice that applied critical 
scrutiny to the e-government, often arguing that institutional influences needed to be 
factored in to understand the role and performance of ICTs in public service delivery. 
The aim of this thesis is to add to the critical voice in public administration; it will 
research the history of attempts to coordinate government IT and study'the role of e- 
government in facilitating joined up government in practice, both in terms of the 
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central, Cabinet Office based e-govermnent strategy and activity, and the two case 
studies. It will provide a deeper understanding of e-govermnent, bringing insight into 
the complex relationship between institutions and ICTs over time. 
Even by 2004 the verdict was that public administration had failed to provide a 
comprehensive body of critical literature spotlighting the motives, designs and 
strategies behind e-government (Taylor/Lips, 2004, p4), including its application to 
joining up. The study of e-government had, according to some critics, largely accepted 
the formal intentions of governments in designing and implementing electronic service 
delivery, subjecting them to little critical appraisal (ibid., p6). Thus the emphasis was 
on the techno-centric, positivistic and comparative approaches (ibid, p7) as seen in the 
'stages model' of Accenture reports and other management sources discussed above. 
However, by acknowledging the benefits of an information polity lens, this thesis is 
able to take a more critical view. E-government 'potentially undermines the rationale 
for existing departmental structures and government jurisdictions' as well as 
challenging other responsibilities and relationships (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b, p4). Whilst 
the assumption by some commentators and policyrnakers may have been that the 
flexibilities associated with new ICTs would lead to the desired information flows and 
changes in the business of delivery, it was argued that in fact 'the scale and complexity 
of government is such' that one would not effortlessly follow the other (ibid, p4-5). 
Rather, electronic service delivery was 'inevitably shaped by the institutionalization 
within government of existing business processes and information flows ... these flows 
can be understood as legacies of earlier business and technological paradigms, serving 
simultaneously to legitimate existing ways of doing business and to provide a buttress 
against pressures for change' (ibid, p5). 
It is this notion that informs the work found in this thesis, as it enables an intimate 
examination of the application of e-government to joined up government. In 2003 
Bellamy commented that there were 'obvious gaps' in our knowledge about the 
implementation of e-government (2003, p8). In particular there were few richly 
qualitative empirical works which tackled the specific social dynamics, organisational 
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struggles and personal involvement in e-government implementation. Furthermore, 
Bellamy argued there were little meso or macro-level studies examining the e- 
government policy community or offering a contemporary history of e-government 
and its role in the wider modernisation project (ibld, p9). This thesis contributes to the 
rectification of these shortcomings in the study of e-government; it will provide insight 
into the institutional, organisational and individual actor dynamics involved in the 
development and use of e-government and its application to joining up. 
1.6 METHODOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The messages of key policy documents such as Modernising Government made it 
clear that electronic service delivery was being positioned to help provide joining up 
across traditional organisational boundaries, which in turn would improve the users' 
experience. This thesis will examine the role of ICTs in joined up government within 
e-government practice, using critical tools developed through scholarly attention to 
the information polity and bringing a broad institutional perspective, with historical 
components, to bear on the subject matter. 
This broad institutional perspe&tive draws on key observations derived from scholarly 
attention to institutions, bringing them to bear on the subject matter of the thesis to 
provide focus to the research. Key to institutional perspectives is that procedures, 
customs, traditions, rules and routines embedded in organilSational structures can 
govern collective behaviour, shape options, allocate resources and generate particular 
outcomes (Hall/Taylor, 1996, p6; Pierson/Skocpol, 2002, p7O6). These institutions can 
provide long-term stability and impose elements of order (March/Olsen, 1984), and are 
often not liable to rapid or constant change over time. Although institutional 
perspectives do not generally argue that profound change cannot occur in institutions, 
rather they suggest that change is more likely to be the result of a variety of factors 
coming together (Thelen/Steinmo, 1992; Orren/Showronek, 1994). This point gives 
some indications on the likely reaction of some areas of government to the central 
policy emphasis on joining up through ICTs, for instance where institutional norms 
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and traditions have not included much by way of joint working, data sharing, 
technical interoperation and information flows in the past. 
Building from observations into the stability of institutions, some branches of 
institutional thought have placed emphasis on empirical inquiries on path analysis, 
where there is an acknowledgement that actions, developments and processes in 
institutions will be partially dependent on decisions and factors from earlier in their 
trajectory (Pierson, 2000). This concern for path analysis is another key element from 
institutional perspectives, which guide the thesis towards considering how a variety of 
institutional factors across time can be brought to bear on understanding of e- 
government in public service organisations and sectors. Drawing from broad 
institutional perspectives then, the thesis takes history seriously, looking at processes 
and institutional interactions over time (Pierson/Skocpol, 2002, p698,706), to provide 
illumination of contemporary e-government. In this sense, the thesis places emphasis 
on investigating the historic development of ICTs in government, capturing the often 
long-term development and interaction of an array of factors over time. In this way, 
the thesis is able to avoid attributing 'misleading' revolutionary powers to new ICTs 
(Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p 170) by placing them in the context of the complex and 
evolutionary nature of institutions. Furthermore, using this historical approach also 
enables the thesis to uncover how ICTs take on and crystallise institutional traits and 
boundaries, particularly in the case studies, which. can influence the trajectory of 
subsequent ICT-mediated joining up across government departments. 
The remainder of this section briefly states the methodological parameters and 
approaches adopted to achieve this research objective. Full methodological details 
including evidence base, case study selection and interview techniques, can be found 
in Annex One. 
As stated above, the decision was made to study e-government in the UK because of 
the high profile nature of the e-govemment strategy that emerged in the late 1990s, 
that was accompanied by high levels of investment. The policy emphasis on joining 
up in e-government and wider modemisation plans, juxtaposed with the historic 
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functional separation and agentification of service delivery organisations, made the 
UK a relevant case for research. Whilst parts of the thesis consider policy, 
institutional and technological histories across the post-war period, a demarcation is 
made at 1996, the year when the government published the government. direct green 
paper just as the internet had begun to reach the attention of society at large. The 
thesii considers events up to summer 2004, when the empirical phase of the research 
was concluded. 
Drawing from Bellamy's observation stated above (2003, p8-9), the thesis utilises a 
case study based approach to produce empirical data to accompany historical and 
policy literature based research. Scholarly and some policy context f6r this research is 
found in Chapter One, whilst Chapter Two sets the stage for the exploration into e- 
government by providing original research into the history of government computing. 
Chapter Three examines the development of the central e-government strategy and in 
particular the activities of the Office of the e-Envoy in introducing measures and tools 
to encourage joining up through ICTs. The two case studies, found in Chapters Four 
and Five, research the role of e-government in facilitating joining up in different 
service delivery settings. The concluding chapter brings the themes discussed across 
the chapters together in providing a final assessment of the e-government strategy 
under the terms stated. A more in-depth depiction of the rationale used and objectives 
set for the preceding chapters is presented below. 
It was judged that the case studies, and the thesis as a whole, would benefit from a 
fuller understanding'of the policy and institutional histories involved in government 
computing, to look at the notion of ICT-mediated joining up across time. In particular 
it was beneficial to uncover more in terms of the adoption of computers in public 
service delivery and patterns of central government thinking and policy on this issue. 
This work, comprising of Chapter Two provides new insights into a hidden world of 
post-war government IT, demonstrating that notions pertaining to the transformational 
powers of computers existed in policy circles throughout the decades. The chapter 
finds that the perceived benefits of the coordination and interoperation of computer 
systems across departments and the use of IT to coordinate and integrate service 
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delivery had often been identified during the post-war period. At various points, 
government units had been charged with IT coordination across departments; the 
story of these units is a theme of the chapter as it points to the institutional and 
organisational factors and difficulties associated with this task, which remained 
relevant to the study of e-government. ' 
Chapter Three narrates the emergence and progress of the central e-govenu-nent 
strategy outlined above. It takes the publication of the green paper government. direct 
in 1996 as the beginning of the e-government era in the UK, as this paper brought 
ICTs to the fore of central service delivery reform for the first time 
(Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b, p I) and the ideas and proposals put forward in it were 
generally taken forward in the e-government strategy subsequently. The publication 
of the green paper also coincided with a period where the internet had begun to gain 
popular attention, grow in size and reach more people (e. g. 
Anderson/Tracey, 2002, p 144). - Chapter Three provides an in-depth exploration into the 
activities of the Cabinet Office's Office of the e-Envoy in particular, as this was the 
unit charged with steering e-government strategy, in parallel with previous 
government IT policy organisations; described in Chapter Two. Not only concerned 
with policy, the Officeof the e-Envoy also introduced and managed a number of 
central internet portals and technical infrastructure tools through which, it was 
envisaged, significant amounts of joined up e-government transactions and 
interactions between departments and out to citizens could be channelled. Thus, not 
only did the Office of the e-Envoy develop policies and strategies for joining up 
through e-government, it also created the tools through which some of this was to be 
achieved. The development and implementation of these tools will also be covered in 
Chapter Three. Furthermore, the chapter provides indications of the development and 
implementation of e-government projects and tools across the public sector, set 
alongside the evolution of the central strategy and the work of the Office of the e- 
Envoy, and to provide sketches of the state of play in departments and service sectors 
other than those discussed in the case studies. Building from Chapter Two, Chapter 
Three provides a detailed, rich focus on the central e-government strategy that was 
constructed around government direct and Modernising Government. , 
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Chapters Two and Three then narrate the history of government IT, picking up 
relevant themes, and profile the central e-govermnent strategy and associated 
infrastructures; both serve as contextual tools for the empirical case study work found 
in Chapters Four and Five. As Yin notes, the case study approach is most appropriate 
when asking the 'how' and 'why' (2003, p5-8). Its use derives out of the need to 
understand complex social phenomena, to retain a fuller and more meaningful 
understanding of real-life events and to take account of an array of evidence 
(ibid, p2,8). It was judged that the case study approach was most fitting to uncover the 
complex and long term processes expected with the amalgam of actors, organisations, 
policy, technology and institutions involved in e-govermnent. The case studies are 
able to uncover the way in which information flows, crucial to the joining up 
orientation of UK e-government strategies, were enmeshed in the public organisations 
and institutions that surrounded them. Although essentially explorative in approach, 
the task was augmented by the scholarly heritage charted above, which acknowledged 
and observed the power of institutions in the application of ICTs in government. 
Further methodological details can be found in Annex One. 
To conclude this initial chapter, it should be reiterated that this thesis illustrates and 
tests the central premise of the electronic government strategy as expressed in 
government direct, Modernising Government, subsequent documents and the 
activities of the Office of the e-Envoy; this premise is that new ICTs and electronic 
methods can be used to foster joined up service delivery for the benefit of citizens. 
Ultimately, the research objective is to demonstrate if and how joined up e- 
government works in practice, and to illustrate the barriers and enablers that exist. 
To achieve this, the thesis will look back at previous patterns of government IT 
policy, provide an in-depth profile of e-govermuent policy and activity from 1996, 
and investigate how the premise was being played out at service delivery level, in two 
case studies. The groundwork for this task has been achieved in this chapter; firstly it 
has provided an outline of e-government policy and the perspectives that underpinned 
it, which will be fleshed out as the thesis progresses. Secondly it has sketched the 
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scholarly heritage of studies into government IT and joined up government. It argues 
that a general lacuna had existed within public administration for these issues and 
specifically, academic considerations of joined up government had largely failed to 
account for the role of ICTs. Conversely, business and management literature 
(Accenture, 2002; Deliotte and Touche, 2000) promoted seamless, joined up service 
delivery as the zenith of e-government under the 'stages model'. This literature tended 
to take an uncritical approach to the general policy perspectives of e-goverm-nent and 
its role in joined up government. As a result, there was a lack of critical appraisal of 
the notions and practices associated with e-government in the UK. 
However, using an information polity lens, some key authors developed an 
institutionalist argument to help provide critical insight into the manner in which ICTs 
and government organisations interacted. Using this, the thesis will contribute to 
filling a void of academic understanding regarding the association between e- 
government and joined up government, which appeared so prominently in 
government policy from the late 1990s. In doing this, the concluding sections of this 
thesis will move from exploration, observation and examination, towards providing 
some critical reflections and recommendations on the UK e-government strategy, 
based on the empirical evidence amassed and the insights gleaned from an 
appreciation of the role of institutions. 
t, 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF COMPUTERS IN THE UK 
GOVERNMENT - 1945 to 1996 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The e-government strategy discussed in government. direct and embodied in Modernising 
Government associated ICTs with profound transformations in public service delivery, 
through their application to joined up government. Research conducted for this chapter 
provides a historic focus to this notion by presenting a chronological history of 
government computing, concentrating on themes, patterns and developments in IT policy 
in the post-war period up to the publication of the government. direct green paper in 1996. 
The chapter goes beyond previous research in uncovering a hidden world of government 
computing, where the notion that the steering of IT across departments could lead to 
enhanced coordination of service delivery existed in policy and was manifested in the 
activity of centrally positioned units. Certainly, automation perspectives were dominant 
across the post-war period (see Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p39-40), yet computers and 
computer networks had, from an early stage and at various points, been considered by 
some significant sources as capable of achieving or contributing to transformations in the 
delivery of public services and the configuration of the organisations charged with their 
provision. Thus, even in the 1950s and 1960s there were discussions that highlighted the 
potential informatizing capabilities of information technology, largely within the context 
of internal back office reform. 
In providing a policy history, the chapter will demonstrate that, analogous with the 
central e-govemment strategy that emerged from 1996, arguments were made at various 
points previously that coordinating IT systems within and across departments would 
facilitate increased integration in service delivery. However, the policy history depicted 
here indicates that various attempts to coordinate equipment procurement, IT systems, 
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data sharing, project managment etc, often by government organisations placed in the 
Treasury or Cabinet Office, seemed onerous, complex and not obviously successful. 
Furthermore, IT development will be shown to largely have occurred discretely within 
the purview of departments and service delivery areas, as government organisations; quite 
reasonably sought to apply technology to their own specific needs. In concurrence with 
Margetts (1999, p 179), the research indicates that information technology itself, often 
applied with the perfectly rational business logic of automating procedures and processes, 
became seen as a barrier to forms of coordination, as it reflected and reinforced the 
institutions and organizations in which systems were located. The chapter also accounts 
for broad yet shifting political paradigms as important factors in dominant approaches to 
IT policy; it observes that changing and evolving governments and political environments 
influenced approaches to IT and IT coordination. Not least, some of the administrative 
reforms of the 1980s worked against the specific objectives of the government units 
charged with the coordination of computing across departments. 
Consideration of these inter-related political, institutional and technological factors and 
patterns portray the landscape in which the e-government strategy eventually emerged 
and operated. The chapter provides an understanding of the history of government IT, 
paving the way for the profile of central e-government strategies and activities found in 
Chapter Three and for the case studies that follow,. The short history sections found in the 
case study chapters are grouped with the broader work in this chapter, which provides a 
wider perspective on the specific histories found in the two cases. This chapter begins by 
describing the first developments and uses of computing in public service delivery in the 
post war period. 
2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT COMPUTING: AUTOMATING 
OPERATIONS 
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The early post-war period saw computer technology largely developed in scientific and 
military arenas being applied firstly to 'clerical' back office processes in government 
organisations. The automation of administrative processes, incorporating time and labour 
saving computer mediation, became a major focus of government laboratories soon after 
World War Two, in conjunction with some government departments. 
Before World War Two however, the British government had had experience with 
mechanical punched-card apparatus, as early as 1911, when such machines were used in 
the census (Agar, 2003, p 155); by 1948,26 departments were using or planned to use 
punched-card systems (ibid., p295). One example was the Ministry of National Insurance 
(later the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance) which was created in the mid- 
1940s following Beveridge's recommendations to administer the newly created national 
insurance system, taking contributions from the working population to fund 
unemployment payments, pensions and other benefits (Beveridge, 1942; King, 195 8). The 
public service was based around the National Insurance Number, a unique code given to 
each citizen registered (MPI, I 950, p 15,32); the original format was still used in 2004. By 
1950 there were 25 million citizen records held centrally, supported by hundreds of local 
benefits offices (ibid., p 15-16); the system generated the need for vast amounts of record- 
keeping, communication and information flows. Correspondence between these local 
offices or labour exchanges and the headquarters near Newcastle would use machine-read 
punch cards (King, 1958, pl 13-115; MNI, 1950, pl5-16). 
The use of punch-cards may have given some departments a certain predilection towards 
automation, whether mechanical or electronic, that would later help the proliferation of 
computing systems. For instance, as discussed below, the renamed Ministry of Pensions 
and National Insurance (MPNI) was experimenting with automatic data processing by the 
mid- I 950s. There were a number of developments that facilitated this experimental 
phase. During the war, the Colossus (according to some, the first computer) was 
constructed at Bletchley Park, to help crack the German Enigma code (Agar, 2003, p2O8- 
09 ). Although early post-war developments in computers were occurring in academic 
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institutions simultaneously at, for example, the University of Pennsylvania (ENIAC), 
Cambridge University (EDSAC) and Manchester University (Mark 1), the most 
significant developments for British government use were found at its National Physical 
Laboratory (NPL), in Teddington, Middlesex. 
The NPL and Government Computing 
Soon after the war, the government's Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (DSIR) arranged an interdepartmental technical committee meeting to discuss 
the need for a computing unit. Such an organisation was considered vital, particularly in 
military settings, following advances during the war; most famously Alan Turing et al 
and the Bletchley Park code breaking operations (see Hodges, 1983), as noted above. The 
committee provided the Mathematics Division, created within the laboratory following 
pressure from the Admiralty Computing Service and the NPL itself, with a remit to 
develop and provide computing services and consultation to government departments, 
industry and universities (Croarken, 1990, p75-78,8 1). The NPL came under the 
jurisdiction of the DSIR, whilst the National Research Development Corporation 
(NRDC) had a supervisory role. For ten years after the cessation of World War Two, 
these were the dominant instruments of computer policy in Britain (Hendry, 1989, p 1). 
Work in the NPL was initiated in the mid- I 940s on an early prototype, called the 
Automatic Computing Engine (ACE); this was to prove important to the development 
and application of computing to departmental administrative tasks in the future. 
The ACE section team initially consisted of Alan Turing and James Hardy Wilkinson 
only, and Turing submitted a proposal to build the ACE to the NPL Executive Committee 
in 1946. It was decided that a smaller pilot model should be built first, through 
collaboration between the newly established Electronics Division, and the Mathematics 
Division; later the two groups were merged to support work on the, pilot ACE 
(Pyatt, I 983, p 150). Alan Turing, however, was never in favour of building a pilot, and he 
left the NPL in October 1947 (Croarken, I 990, p94). He never returned, tragically 
committing suicide in 1954 after prosecution for an alleged indecency. During this period 
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however, computers, or 'electronic brains' as they were known in journalistic argot at the 
time, were said to have captured the popular imagination through their 'astounding feats 
of arithmetic' (Bowden, 1953, page vii). 
The 1948/49, the NPL annual report promised the pilot ACE to be 'one of the largest and 
most powerful machines in the world' (p68) but did not provide details of its uses. It was 
not until late 1951 that the pilot was completed, by which point military organisations 
had become increasingly interested in the benefits computers could offer to defence 
(Agar, 2003, p269-274). At this time the ACE was used for complex scientific problems in 
the Ministry of Supply, such as aircraft wing pressure distribution and missile trajectory 
(NPL, I 951/52, p75). However, during this period of development, the NPL reports 
provide illumination of the growing realization of the potential of computers beyond 
military and scientific applications and towards automation in public services. Agar noted 
that this realization was partially due to the influence of the Advisory Committee on High 
Speed Calculating Machines, set up in 1949 as the first working group devised to address 
government computing issues (Agar, 2003, p3Ol). The 1952/53 NPL annual report 
provided one of the first references to the use of computing in administrative processes; 
The application of digital computing machine techniques to administrative and 
commercial purposes, i. e., the mechanization of large scale clerical operations, may 
prove to be even more important economically than their use for computation (p97) 
By large scale Clerical operations, the report refers in part to the vast administrative 
processes involved in public service delivery, such as those associated with taxation, 
pensions and benefits payments, for instance with national insurance. Processes within 
the national insurance system and elsewhere were becoming increasingly complex in 
supporting the developing welfare state, as government responsibilities towards 
healthcare, education, childcare, pensions and sickness and unemployment benefit 
expanded rapidly during the Attlee government in the latter part of the 1940s. 
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The possibility of computer technology use in government administration also clearly 
stimulated several departments; as the NPL continued to widen its expertise and 
experience in the field, working towards the completion of the full-scale ACE in 1958, a 
number of government departments commissioned its technology for clerical 
applications. Furthermore, the DSIR set up a Departmental Working Party to investigate 
'the possibilities of applying electronic and other high speed mathematical equipment to 
the problems of large-scale clerical work' (NPL, 1952/53, p78). A major stumbling block 
to clerical applications, that of lack of memory in computers, was being tackled through 
the development of magnetic storage tapes by the English Electric Company in 
conjunction with NPL (NPL, 1951/52, p8 1). This company, which began work with the 
NPL in 1949, engineered a marketable version of the pilot ACE in 1955, called DEUCE. 
Between 1956 and 1961 nearly 30 DEUCEs were supplied to customers 
(Hendry, I 989, p2O4). 
i 
The progress in computer development by English Electric and other fledgling 
technology companies proved to the DSIR that interest had been sufficiently stimulated 
in computer design (Pyatt, 1983, p 152). The NPL Electronics Division was effectively 
closed in 1960; the annual report by the NPL noted with regard to the division that, 
The whole of our work in this field of application of computers has been re-evaluated, and it 
hasbeen decided that it can be done more effectively within industry and by departments 
directly concerned. It has, therefore, been closed down (NPL, 1959, p56) 
However, before this date, work within the NPL successfully stimulated government 
interest in computers as a clerical tool, in a variety of departments 3. An important 
collaboration began between the NPL and the MPNI in 1955, which sought to research 
the possibilities of using computers initially in large-scale waje accounting and payroll 
3 In the first ten years of its existence, the Mathematics Division of NPL was employed in some manner by 
many government departments, including; the Admiralty, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, UK 
Atomic Energy Authority, Board of Trade, Civil Service Commission, Home Office, Inland Revenue, Post 
Office, Ministries of Civil Aviation, Agriculture, Education, Pensions and National Insurance, Supply, 
Works and Health (Croarken, 1990, p 13 8-140). 
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output. A payroll working group was drawn together from NPL, the MPNI, the Treasury 
-and Royal Ordnance Factories to steer the project (NPL, 1954/55, p88; 1955, p28) with the 
automation of wage accounting becoming the flagship early application of computers in 
government. 
Developments centred on the MPNI headquarters in Newcastle, where 25,000 staff were 
to have computerized payrolls by 1960 (MPNI, 1959, para. 240). The focus was on 
automation to yield staff savings (NPL/DSIR, 1956); by the beginning of the 1960s, 
MPNI claimed to be using 63 fewer staff than with the equivalent manual payroll system 
(MPNI, 196l, para. 332). Automatic Data Processing was also being used to speed up 
statistical computation during this period (MPNI, I 964, p75). Originally the working 
group produced a report which discussed using DEUCE computers for the automation of 
payroll at the MPNI (NPL/DSIR, 1956). The computer that was installed was, however, 
not produced by the NPL or even the English Electric Company; instead it was a LEO Il 
(MPNI, I 960, p 159), produced by a technical team at Lyons Bakery, that had first applied 
computers to its own payroll system as a early as 1953 (Caminer et al, 1996, p4). The 
move to use LEO 11 symbolized a new attitude in government IT policy, where private 
British computer companies were to be supported rather than government research 
laboratories. 
Despite the emphasis on automation, there were examples of the application of 
computing for innovative purposes that could be considered closer to concepts of 
informatization. For instance, due to a growing shortfall in welfare finances, graduated, 
rather than flat-rate contributions to national insurance were needed (MPNI, I 960, p2 I- 
22). A decision was made by the MPNI to use the Inland Revenue's existing 'Pay as You 
Earn' (PAYE) system to collect graduated contributions, as well as income tax, from 
employees in large firms (MPNI, 1960, p22-24; 196 I, p34-3 5). There was a need for large 
scale data sharing to occur between the two departments involved here; the Inland 
Revenue would send an enormous 30 million PAYE records to the MPNI every year, for 
staff to update national insurance records (ibid. ). The Ministry chose to microfilm the 
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PAYE records and ordered an EMIDEC 2400 computer to convert the information to 
'magnetised spots on magnetic tape' to facilitate easier processing (MPNI, 196l, p76). By 
the mid-1960s the EMIDEC was also being used to flag up records of citizens 
approaching pension age so that invitations could be sent out to claim the benefit. 
Furthermore, it was used to identify potentially erroneous, fraudulent or excessive 
national insurance contributions for closer inspection'(MPNI, I 965, p6 8). Although the 
administrative processes above may have been carried out manually had the technology 
been unavailable, the example here does show that relatively innovate computing 
applications, which in part facilitated essential data sharing between departments, were in 
use at this early stage. 
A common perception during this period was that 'the welfare state can only be run 
effectively on a diet of numbers' (Bowden, 195 3, page vii) and computing could provide a 
means to lessen the administrative burden. Although by 1955 there were only seven 
computers installed in government organisations (Agar, 2003, p3OO), the new technology 
was being heralded as providing added efficiency in the emerging large service provider 
state, through automation. From the late 1990s, the e-government strategy as expressed in 
Modernising Government and subsequent output suggested ICTs should be applied to 
informatize service delivery, for instance by using, sharing and integrating information 
flows across traditional boundaries to improve service delivery. However, not 
unsurprisingly or unreasonably, the main focus of IT remained largely on the automation 
of some departmental processes during the early post-war decades, notwithstanding the 
example of inter-departmental data flows between the MPNI and the Inland Revenue. 
By the beginning of the 1960s the NPL's role in government computing development 
began to diminish, as technology advanced rapidly (the pilot ACE was already in 
London's Science Museum in 1956) and commercial high-speed computers were 
becoming available. In spring 1957 the industry-led British Computer Society was 
established, with its long-running journal appearing the following year; 'an indication of 
the rapid development of the fledgling industry. Henceforth, the pioneering laboratory 
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took to an advisory role, and researched numerical analysis, software, cryptography and 
'packet switching' (Pyatt, I 983, p 157-15 8); the latter contributing to the body of work 
which developed the modem intemet (Agar, 2003, p3 8 1). Had the NPL's role endured, 
with its unique expertise and experience, perhaps to act as a central hub for computer 
development and implementation in the years to come, the trajectory of government 
computing may have been significantly altered. Potentially, e-govemment protagonists 
may have found less of what was described in Modernising Government as 'incompatible 
systems' across departments (Cabinet Office, 1998/99, p45) if the NPL had tarried to 
instill a certain level of orchestration across departmental IT (Organ, 2003, p22). 
The Proliferation of Computing across Government Organisations 
Partially as a result of the stimulation provided by the NPL, British computers 
continued to be adopted by most government departments throughout the early 1960s, 
against the backdrop of the struggles of the industry. In the early years of the decade the 
Ministry of Defence continued to be the most prolific computer user, maintaining its 
interest from before the war (Agar, 2003); its applications were limited though, restricted 
to new payroll and stores computers in the Army, Navy and Air Force 
(Hansard, 1964/65a, cols. 209-10 (W)). For instance the Royal Army Pay Corps had 
commenced the transfer of pay records to an IBM 705 computer system by 1961 
(Slater, 1960). Outside of the military, the MPNI remained at the forefront; it embarked 
on a project to digitally store pensions, family allowance and short term benefits records 
(MPNI, 1965, p69-70). These projects and other computer applications continued to 
progress over the next decade, with dedicated MPNI computer centres opening in 
Reading and Worcester (ibid. &70; MPNI, I 966, p62; DHSS, I 970, p8 1; 197 I, p8 1; 
1972a, pl0l; 1973, pl39; 1974, p96; 1975, p98-99). 
Further examples of early computerization can be found across the wider public sector 
during this period. The City of Norwich Treasury installed an Elliot 405 for payroll and 
bookkeeping in 195 8 (Bernard, 195 8). In the same year, the Ministry of Public Building 
and Works had forwarded 'a very ambitious proposal for a computer-based system 
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embracing all the routine work of the department, involving linking payroll, bill payment, 
stock control and vote and repayment accounting' (Lamb, 1973, p 125); this system was 
installed in April 1963 (Hansard, I 964/65a, col. 2 10 (W)). The Ministry of Labour and the 
Central Statistical Office were using the NPL's DEUCE for a Family Expenditure Survey 
in 195 9 (Refearn, l 960). In 1961 the census employed computers for the first time, 
admittedly in a limited capacity (Thorby/Benjamin, 1962). Universities were also using 
their computer research in clerical applications, for instance Leeds University was 
experimenting with computerized student registrations by 1957 (Windley et al, 1960). 
LEO was also being used widely during the late 1950s and early 1960s; Customs and 
Excise and the Board of Trade employed the computers. At the local level, a consortium 
of London boroughs and the Manchester corporation were using LEO by 1963 (Caminer 
et al, I 996, p 10 1). 
The Fulton Committee report stated (in a memorandum from the Treasury) that the first 
computers for payroll work were installed in the Ministry of Aviation and the National 
Assistance Board in January 1958 (Fulton Committee, I 968, vol. 4, p634), although the 
MPNI payroll system was at an advanced developmental stage at a similar time. Other 
early computer installations for administrative work could be found in the Inland 
Revenue, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Stationary Office, the Ministry of Labour and 
the General Post Office (ibid., p636; Hansard, 1964/65a, col. 210(W)). Uses were largely 
for payroll, accounting and statistics; installations found justification in the number of 
staff positions saved, although some were identified as carrying out completely new 
work. 
The Organisation and Methods section of the Treasury: Early concepts of computer- 
mediatedjoining up 
Following the initial work of the NPL, various attempts were made later to imbue 
a corporate approach to computing across departments well before the emergence of the 
e-government strategy. For instance, since World War Two, the Organisation and 
Methods (O&M) section of the Treasury had shown an interest in the use of computers in 
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conjunction with the issues pertaining to departmental reform (Agar, 2003, p293). The 
O&M was wary of computing in public administration initially, but by 1957 it was keen 
to promote its use in clerical operations, not least because of advice given by the NPL 
(ibid. &305). 
Originally, the section promoted awareness of computers to departments through lectures, 
courses and pamphlets (ibid., p308), however, a report in 1957 signified a step-change. In 
it, the O&M section analysed Whitehall data-flows, and recommended a ten-year 
programme of computer installation (ibid., pM). Of specific interest, the latter stages of 
the programme were to include the development of 'integrated processing systems, 
possibly on a supra-departmental scale'. Furthermore, it was considered that departmental 
boundaries might be of 'waning significance' because of potential new data systems 
(quoted in ibid., pM). This radical suggestion, appearing in the late 1950s, was 
reminiscent of some of the ideas expressed forty years later in Modernising Government 
(e. g. Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p5,45; PIU, 2000b, p6) regarding the application of 
information technologies to joined up government. 
Following the 1957 report, the O&M contributed to the stimulation of interest in 
computers by departments, taking a fuller role following the reduction of the NPL's 
involvement. It contributed to a project to automate payroll for government employees, to 
the increased role of computing in the national census in 1961 and, along with the NPL, 
the automation of administrative procedures connected with national insurance 
(Agar, 2003, p3l8-324). However, its attempt to unify the IT-enabled production of 
government statistics was scuppered by 'strong departmerital interests' (ibid., p321), 
providing early evidence of the difficulties of orchestrating technological initiates with a 
corporate, cross-departmental component. Similarly to the NPL, the influence of the 
O&M ebbed in the mid- I 960s; its 'remit was whittled away and it gradually lost its 
potential as an overall shaper of government mechanization' (ibid., p339). Yet it was still 
the case that it contributed, as did the NPL, to the stimulation of computer use across 
government and provided an early attempt to instigate control and coordination to the 
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new technologies. Although its more ambitious plans were never carried out, the O&M 
stood as testament to the long standing association between computing and 
transformations in the delivery of public services; a sentiment later conveyed in the 
central e-government strategy. During this period, departments were largely left to 
determine their own levels and applications for computing, which was a logical approach 
considering the functional configuration of departmental service delivery. However, the 
ideas expressed by the O&M and perhaps the experiences with data sharing between the 
MPNI and Inland Revenue, had begun to germinate the idea that IT could be used across 
departments, and that some form of coordination across government might be useful. 
2.3 GOVERNMENT IT POLICY IN THE 1960s: SUPPORTING A FLEDGLING 
INDUSTRY 
Despite the activities of the O&M section of the Treasury, central government IT policy 
during the 1960s became dominated by growing concern for the fledging British 
computer industry, which arguably took emphasis away from attention to the application 
of computing to departmental processes. The 1960s saw the ascendancy of commercial 
'Plessey, English Electric and computer companies, such as Ferranti, Elliott Brothers, 
ICT; some of these companies would eventually become the conglomerate ICL. Support 
was provided by the NRDC, which was extremely keen to promote British firms to 
compete against American manufactures, most notably IBM. Part of British policy was to 
employ domestic technology for use in government wherever possible. Government 
departments did at first generally support this policy in their piecemeal adoption of 
computers 4, but the relationship between the computer industry and government soon 
became punctuated by difficulty. 
Historians have identified the apparent failure of government policy to incite commercial 
success (Hendry, 1989, p 173-174; Camineretal, 1996, p84). By 1964 the new Prime 
4 from 1959 to 1964,56 computer were installed in government departments, only 8 of them were of 
foreign origin (Hansard, 1963/64, cols. 205 (W)). 
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Minister, Harold Wilson, was concerned that if drastic action was not taken, 'the British 
computer industry would rapidly cease to exist' (Wilson, 197l, p9). Statistics exemplify 
the extent of the problem that quickly emerged; in 1958 US manufacturers had no share 
of the UK market, but by 1965 they had a5 1% share (Hendry, 1989, pl97). 
Despite this situation, the importance of the commercial success of UK computer 
companies was being emphasised from the highest political levels in the mid-1960s. In 
1963, Harold Wilson delivered his 'White Heat of Technology' speech in Scarborough. 
The speech was seen by some historians as a 'rhetorical albatross' in light of the 
declining British computer industry, and wider economy in the mid- I 960s 
(Coopey, 199 l, pI 15). Its content mixed science and socialism in a modernist vision of 
progress through technology, using rhetoric that was echoed in subsequent political 
output on IT policy, including that pertaining to e-government. Despite criticism, the 
speech provided the blueprint for modernisation, which crystallized around the Ministry 
of Technology (ibid. ), created shortly after to give the speech purpose 
(Edgerton, I 996, p65). 
The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was subsequently disbanded and 
Frank Cousins (the first Minister of the new Ministry) announced in parliament on I't 
March 1965 that he would form a Computer Advisory unit to advise on computer 
requirements for the whole public sector. (Hansard, 1964/65b, col. 924). The Technical 
Support Unit, previously operating in the Treasury, was incorporated into the Ministry of 
Technology in April 1965 to bolster its expertise in computing. In the same speech 
Cousins also mooted the creation of a National Computing Centre (NCQ, an autonomous 
body to be set up in partnership with government to promote computing nationwide 
(ibid, col. 927). The NCC funded computer training and established a national program 
bank (Vig, I 968, p 148), and survived as a consultancy company. Throughout the mid- 
1960s computer policy continued to concentrate on industry, which it was argued had 




However, the goverm-nent would find supporting the industry so troublesome that it took 
up most computer policy resources and attention for several years. According to Harold 
Wilson the Ministry of Technology ('MinTech' as its second Minister, Tony Benn 
christened it) saved the computer industry by creating the consortium company ICL in 
1968; he commented that ICL became 'the biggest computer enterprise in the world 
outside American ownership' (Wilson, 197 l, p63). Government departments were still 
adopting computers largely for clerical purposes, with ICL the most popular choice in 
1968 (Fulton Committee, 1968, vol. 4, p636-638). However, American systems were seen 
as superior and were often preferred despite MinTech's directive for departments to use 
domestic technology (Benn, 1988, pl6 I). The departments retained autonomy in computer 
policy as MinTech did not have sufficient power to force protectionist procurement of 
British technology across the board; departments were able to bypass official procedure 
(Lamb, I 973, p73). 
Particularly since the White Heat speech, successive governments had concentrated on 
supporting the British computer industry but had ultimately failed; the government aided 
ICL was continually on the verge of collapse (SS&T, 1969/70, p246). Part of this failure 
was in attempts to enforce a restrictive procurement policy as departments had seemingly 
often retained the right to choose computer systems in accordance to their needs. During 
the late 1960s, departments such as the Royal Army Pay Corps, the Meteorological 
Office and the Home Office selected American equipment over ICL 
(SS&T, 1969/70, P447-453). Nonetheless the relationship with government was always 
crucial for company; 90% of computer orders for central government were for ICL 
technology in 1970/71 (SS&T, 1970/7 I, p76). Still, ten years later the company was 
teetering on the brink once again, but relied heavily on the enormous computerization of 
the Inland Revenue system amongst other methods of government support 
(Margetts, 1999, p 116-117). 
55 
During the late 1960s MinTech adopted the motto 'profit through technology' as it 
attempted to be seen as having 'gone commercial' (Edgerton, I 996, p72-73). However, at 
the beginning of the 1970s MinTech was completely altered to form part of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (S S&T, 1970/7 l, page xxxvi). Although the 
relationship between government and the UK computer industry, particularly ICL, would 
continue for some time, the close bonds created. during the White Heat phase were 
loosened in the 1970s. 
2.4 TOWARDS COORDINATION: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMITTEES AND THE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT 
Despite some policy discussions on the need to inject levels of coordination in 
government computing, there were little signs of activity to encourage this by the 1970s. 
In part, cross-govemment coordination measures were less likely to emerge due to 
pervading views of the role of information technology. The feeling, was that computers 
were nothing more than mechanical office machines and therefore a responsibility for 
departments (Lamb, I 973, p6 8), firmly rooting computer applications within the 
automation perspective. In 1969 many departments had successfully but independently 
automated payroll and other clerical operations (SS&T, 1969/70, p428). However there 
was also the sentiment that computing could have a pan-government role to play, which 
would require steering and coordination to germinate. 
By 1970 there growing discontentment regarding the discrete use of computers in 
government; the first full decade of government IT was being characterized by 
incompatibility and fragmentation: 
A wide variety of computers of differing manufacture was bought which, while 
suited to the applications then envisaged, resulted in a degree of incompatibility 
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which impedes the easy transfer of data, programs, and staff between installations 
(Subcommittee on Science and Technology5,1969/70, vol. I, p429) 
Although made within a parliamentary setting, this statement represented a burgeoning 
feeling in and around policy circles during the 1970s that computers could be used to 
qualitatively improve service delivery, through unlocking information flows and enabling 
flexible working. However, the opinion was that government was missing an opportunity 
to transform its operations. 
To correct this missed opportunity, the SS&T began in 1970 with the publication of an 
investigation into the UK Computer Industry; a clear message from the witnesses called 
to participate was that the use of computers needed to be coordinated across government. 
Effective guidance and steering of computer policy was required to improve 
compatibility, connectivity and coordination between the disparate computer systems that 
had developed. But this enduring theme was overshadowed by what was considered to be 
an urgent need for the automation of more administrative systems in the public sector. 
First and foremost it was perceived to be vital for there to be a 'rapid increase in the use 
of computers', as the public sector share in the UK computer population was decreasing 
rapidly (down to 25% by 1968/69). 
Judging by the subcommittee's arguments, there was a strong commitment to the 
transformational powers of computing. ýAlthough somewhat preoccupied by the need for 
rapid computerization, the committee was advised repeatedly that greater coordination 
and integration was needed to fully realize the potential computing offered to the 
improvement of public services, to the extent that a corporate, government-wide 
approach was called for. For example, ICL advised that: 
Further centralisation of departmental operations and inter-departmental relationships 
where departments could be linked though related computer systems and common data 
5 From here referred to as SS&T. 
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011- 
bases, would be important developments ... One would look for proposals for developing 
and monitoring an overall plan for implementation of computer-systems in government 
(SS&T, 1969/70., p2) 
The suggestion ofdata sharing and ICT-mediated departmental interoperation was not 
dissimilar to the proposals contained in e-govemment strategy documents, published 
some thirty years later. ICL went on to caution that 'too much information is duplicated' 
and 'interdepartmental barriers' were erected to obstruct the flow of information 
(ibid., p19). The British Computer Society echoed these caveats and recommendations; its 
memorandum complained that 'there has been little evidence to suggest that any 
substantial progress has been made towards such a national policy' and called for 'greater 
coordination' (ibid., p 113). Adding to the evidence, Systems Programming Limited noted 
that 'there are 23 [computerized] payrolls in the various ministries... all doing virtually 
the same job, each of which has been developed separately' (ibid. &218). 
The protests by industry were certainly mirrored by the government bodies responsible 
for computer policy. MinTech (which was about to be dissolved under Edward Heath) 
admitted that 'the peculiarities of individual systems have resulted in a departure from 
standards in the interests of efficiency, and there has been a general lack of coordination' 
(ibid. &362). The emphasis on increased connectivity and coordination formed a central 
tenet of e-government strategy (see Cabinet Office, 1998/99; PIU, 2000b), just as they 
appeared strongly here, in the early 1970s. However, as discussed below the mechanisms 
that were put in place to work towards coordination in the 1970s encountered problems 
not only of a technological nature. 
Although apparently a logical aspiration for observers, private sector representatives and 
policymakýrs alike, the coordination imperative, in terms of procurement, compatibility, 
electronic data sharing, IT integration and so on proved difficult to effect. A key 
institutional explanation can be offered that holds that historically computers had largely 
been used to automate existing departmental procedures, therefore reflecting the 
functional, hierarchical and discrete configuration of service delivery organisations 
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(Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p 169-170). The coordination of IT across these functional 
segments, potentially offering new informatizating capabiliti'es, could threaten and meet 
impediments within the institutional order of departmental service delivery. For instance, 
data sharing could unlock information hitherto confined to systems housed in 
autonomous departments, potentially destabilizing the organisation that previously acted 
as the sole custodian to this data. The transfer of 30 million PAYE records between the 
Inland Revenue and MPNI in the early 1960s demonstrated that, where appropriate, 
sharing and coordination could occur. However, as the imperative to coordinate IT grew 
and evolved over the post-war decades, not least through the output of the SS&T, 
institutional factors were increasingly brought into sharper relief. 
The Creation and Wbrý of the Civil Service Department 
By 1970, MinTech had been dissolved, and although its computer policy 
functions had been retained and transferred to the DTI, it was the new Civil Service 
Department (CSD) that had been given responsibility for central government computer 
policy. This was significant, as IT policy had been refocused again to civil service 
management issues, a similar approach to the O&M section of the Treasury some years 
before. The CSD was created on the I't November 1968 on the recommendation of the 
Fulton Committee; although its broad remit was to create a more efficient and 
professional civil service, this included the concept of IT coordination. 
Following the Fulton Committee, it was perceived that a new impetus had to be given to 
computer policy to initiate some form of interdepartmental coordination, particularly in 
terms of common procurement processes. Therefore the CSD adopted some of the 
operations of the Technical Support Unit (TSU), which had begun life in the Post Office 
but was seconded to the Treasury in the early 1960s (SS&T, 1969/70, p371). The TSU was 
then shared between MinTech and the CSD before MinTech's demise, when the DTI 
took on MinTech's portion of the TSU. This unstable history contributed to the 
significant confusion in procurement policy in central government, which received 
criticism from select committees. Departments wishing to procure a new computer 
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system would establish communications with the CSD, Treasury, DTI and, due to the 
'office machinery' approach still prevalent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Her 
Majesties Stationery Office (HMSO) for the actual purchase of the computer equipment 
(Lamb, 1973, p97; SS&T, 1969/70, p442,443). A further objective of the CSD concerned 
the standardization of computer languages and equipment across government. This task 
was off iciallY assigned to the CSD, yet the National Computing Centre was heavily 
involved in standards but reported to MinTech/DTI rather than the CSD; progress with 
standardization policy was thus impeded by this confusion (ibid., p74). The CSD admitted 
to implementing only one successful universal standard across government, for the use of 
magnetic storage tape (SS&T, 1969/70, p473). 
The CSD was charged with providing coordination and cohesion in the uptake of 
computers across central government; it was involved in sponsoring public service wide 
computer projects and long term planning (Lamb, 1973, p6 8). Its PRISM endeavor aimed 
to draw together all the payroll systems across government (with 500,000 files) to guide 
personnel policy and other management concerns (SS&T, I 96gnO, p43 1; 
Lamb, 1973, p83). However, although payroll received much attention beginning at the 
start of the post-war period, the coordination of systems across government would 
ultimately fail. In a 1979/80 parliamentary report, it was noted that attempts to instigate 
interdepartmental standardization of payroll systems had encountered unsolvable 
difficulties at the first obstacle; over five years only three of the targeting six departments 
had even agreed in principle to coordinate their systems (PXC, 1979/80, page x). By 2004, 
government departments and other organisations still largely operated with discrete 
payroll systems, despite the enduring belief that significant efficiency savings could be 
made with unified accounting. 
The CSD also turned attention to long-term planning, with the Computers in Central 
Government: Ten Years Ahead publication (197 1), which strived to introduce an 
overarching framework for computer policy. The department was also involved in 
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reseýrch and development, for instance with explorations into data-banks, information 
retrieval and computer communications (SS&T, I 969/70, p43 1). 
The CSD was also keen to promote the use of computers to transform and inforinatize 
service delivery, hoping to transcend the automation and tangible cash savings model. As 
advised by the Fulton committee (I 968, vol. 4, p28 1) computers were upheld by the CSD 
as a tool to quantitatively alter departmental operations and service delivery 
(SS&T, l969n0, p429; Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p33-34). By the early 1970s it was claimed 
that innovative computer projects, under the observation of the CSD, were running in the 
Ministry of Transport (vehicle registrations), the Home Office (Police National 
Computer), the Lord Chancellor's Department, the CSD itself and several other 
departments (SS&T, 1969/70, p43 0-43 1). Arguably, the transformational ethos promoted 
by the CSD, holding that computers could be used to profoundly improve service 
delivery, was beginning to percolate into departmental thinking in these examples. 
Following government. direct and Modernising Government, the central e-government 
strategy promoted the strong transformational powers of new ICTs. Despite the 
dominance of automation perspectives in the first decades of government computing, the 
roots of this ethos in policy can perhaps be detected in the work of the CSD and the 
O&M section before it. 
The CSD was, however, an ailing department,. struggling to progress with its wider remit, 
which stretched well beyond computing. Although it aimed to 'coordinate computer 
policy and encourage departments to take full account of the developing capabilities of 
computers' (SS&T, I 969/70, p433), the reality of influencing departments consistently 
was more difficult, despite some positive examples. Looking at the departmental mission 
as a whole, Chapman identified three main reasons why the CSD was, in Lord Crowther- 
Hunt's words, 'an enormous disappointment' (Chapman, I 983, p53). Firstly'the economic 
difficulties of the late 1960s and early 1970s channeled resources away from the 
seemingly ancillary endeavors of the CSD (ibld. &41). Secondly the civil service 
remained unconvinced of the new management ethos which the CS6 embodied (ibid. ), 
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and which computer policy formed a part of. Finally, departments vehemently prized 
their autonomy, and defied attempts to change operations (ibid. ). These observations give 
indications of how departments may have reacted to any attempts by the CSD to 
influence their own IT practices. 
During this period, computers remained largely an internal automation tool for individual 
departments (Lamb, I 973, p7 1), with the coordinating aspects of the CSD remit proving 
difficult to apply. In some departments, innovative computer applications (such as the 
Police National Computer or the Vehicle Licensing system) were arguably transforming 
some aspects of service delivery. However, these projects were few and far between. 
The CSD battled throughout the 1970s to encourage professionalism and efficiency in the 
civil service. A new SS&T was appointed under the Heath government in 1970, with the 
same remit. The changes it implemented in the CSD and computer policy are discussed in 
the next section. - 
2.5 THE CENTRAL COMPUTER AGENCY: REINVIGORATING COORDINATION 
in the first of the new subcommittee reports, the CSD suggested that it had given up 
trying to directly influence departmental computer policy, noting that it wished to 
'devolve responsibility to all departments [and] should reduce the support role of our 
computers division' (SS&T, 1970/7 I, p326). Thus, the CSD had withdrawn from fulfilling 
the original remit that had been set. 
Before returning to the issue of coordination, it should also be noted that the 
subcommittee covered a number of other relevant areas. Firstly, it recommended that 
departments should 'substantially increase their. use of external service organisations' for 
the installation and maintenance of their computer systems (ibid., page Ivi). It was 
beginning to be recognized that, whilst British government was at the fore of computer 
innovation in the 1950s and 1960s, its position had ebbed considerably since 
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(Margetts, 1999, p3 1). Computers were no longer accepted as one of government's core 
competencies, and outsourcing to private companies was seen as the solution. 
In 1970-71 the CSD spent L88,000 pounds on external consultants (SS&T, l970nI, p345). 
Shortly after, CSD were predicting yearly expenditure on external service organisations 
to be E2 million, with some 200 contracts (SS&T, 1971/72, p3). This was to become a key 
feature of government IT; by 2004 the e-government environment included a labyrinth of 
contracts, partnerships and outsourcing for ICT systems. Commercial impetus became a 
crucial component of ICT-mediated public services, yet Dunleavy et al have argued that, 
across seven countries including the UK, the power of the IT industry in each case was 
correlated with the perfon-nance of government IT (Dunleavy et al, 2004). Thus, apparent 
poor performance of government IT in the e-governinent era could have been attributable 
to the powerful position commercial IT companies enjoyed in terms of th6 contracts 
awarded to them by government (ibid. ). The imperative of impelling IT systems to 
6converge and inter-connect' across the publ. ic sector (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p46) could 
have been complicated as well as enabled by myriad powerful incunibent suppliers of 
these systems. 
Secondly, the subcommittee also identified a recurrent theme of growing importance and 
intricacy; the concern that civil liberties would be impaired due to the increasing power 
of computer technology, most prominently in databases such as the Police National 
Computer (SS&TJ 970/7 l, p8 1). A major NCC conference in 1971 demonstrated the 
general fear of the 'spectre of the ultimate record-keeping society' (Westin, I 972, p5 3), 
and included participation from Tony Benn (Benn, 1972). The civil liberties problem did 
not become any easier to address over the decades, despite considerable attention from 
academia (e. g. Bennett, 1997; Raab, 200 1) and policymakers. In essence, e-government 
attracted similar criticisms and concerns as database technology in the early 1970s, and e- 
government policymakers were keen to show that they had addressed issues of privacy, 
confidential ityJairriess and justice sufficiently in their strategies (see PIU, 2002; 
OeE, 2001 b; 2001 c; 2001 g). Although policy documents insisted that privacy issues were 
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a prime objective of e-government strategies, a key question was whether the 
attractiveness of ICT-enabled data sharing, matching and mining across previously 
discrete data sets, with the objective for instance ofjoining up to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of services or national security, may have proved too alluring for such 
privacy issues to be properly considered. 
Putting these issues to one side, the SS&T also readdressed the issue of IT coordination; 
it recommended that a dedicated agency be created charged with IT procurement, 
development and coordination across central government. More focused on IT issues than 
the CSD, the creation of the new agency was an indication of the strength of the notion, 
expressed frequently by a variety of protagonists over several decades, that government 
computing required some form of steering and coordination across departments. The 
1971/72 report contained a statement from the DTI that read: 
The Government agree with the Committee on the need for greater co-ordination in the 
use of computers and for purchasing policy and procedures to take account of this and 
for a single, strong, technically competent agency to purchase computer equipment and 
services and to develop and co-ordinate their use in Central Government 
(SS&T, 1971/72, p3) 
The Central Computer Agency (CCA) was created and placed under the CSD in 1972 to 
fulfill this need, inheriting some of the old functions of the O&M section of the Treasury 
(Agar, 2003, p37 1). An early task was to simplify procurement procedures by incorporating 
sections of the TSU (from DTI), the Management Services (Computers) Division from the 
CSD and the Computer Bureau in the HMSO. As one interviewee noted 'CCA was placed 
in the position of buying all central government IT, regardless of the department making 
the request' (personal correspondence - 6). Controversially, this also signaled the return of 
a protectionist procurement policy that favoured the government backed ICL conglomerate. 
ICL had 50% of the central and local government market in the mid-1970s 
(S S&T, I 974, p 1), and the DTI promised extra funding (f 14.2 million during 1972 and 
1973) to help ICL cope with a global recession (SS&T, 1972/73, p28). 
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The Heath government had introduced a policy of 'preferential public purchasing' with 
ICL (Moon et al, I 986, p69), which was channeled through the central control mechanism of 
the CCA. As one thesis interviewee noted, during the approximate period of 1975 to 1980 
4any government department could buy any mainframe computer it liked as long as the box 
had ICL on it' (personal correspondence - 6). It may have been hoped that interoperation 
between different IT systems might have been easier to achieve through a policy of 
coercing departments to purchase compatible systems from ICL, although there is little 
evidence that increased interoperation occurred during the period. The tactic certainly did 
not work for ICL; in 1981 Kenneth Baker noted that the company was 'hanging on by its 
teeth' (Baker, 1993, p59), having never managed to conquer its industry. 
The CCA operated throughout the mid-1970s under the CSD, working with its remit to 
purchase, develop and coordinate IT use across central government. In the late 1970s, as 
the Thatcher government came into power, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and 
the Audit bodies began to take a serious interest in computers in government, an interest 
that continued into the e-government era. It is this attention, the shifting political patterns 
of the 1980s and the role of the CCA that is discussed in the next section. 
2.6 GOVERNMENT COMPUTING DURING THE THATCHER ERA: 
DEPARTMENTAL AUTONOMY AND THE STRUGGLE TO COORDINATE 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Comptroller and Auditor General began 
their interest in computers in 1974/75 through looking at the implementation of three 
major computer projects. Reports appeared in the late-1970s that were damning of the 
way departments went about developing their systems: 
they found shortcomings in system specification, implementation time-tables, project 
planning, monitoring and control and that parts of the projects had been abandoned because 
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plans were too ambitious and because the complexity of the tasks had been under-estimated 
(PAC, 1979/80, page v) 
The PAC complained of a profound lack of cooperation between the CCA and 
departments, which preferred to implement computer systems in isolation (ibid. ); the 
opinion of the committee was that some of the perceived failures in departmental IT 
could have been obviated through closer consultation with the central agency. One 
interviewee agreed with this notion, arguing that the CCA had amassed enough 
experience by the late-1970s to be able to advise and guide most departmental endeavors, 
yet departments were reluctant to listen to it (personal correspondence - 6). Certainly 
audit scrutiny deemed many computer projects as failures; the Ministry of Defence's 
Royal Navy Supply and Transport Service computerization was seen as over ambitious, 
with an under-estimation of the complexity of implementation. It was calculated that the 
project wasted fl. million (PAC, 1979/80, page vi). Secondly, the Inland Revenue's 
Accounts Office project was subject to massive delays throughout the 1970s, and the 
CCA contracted consultants to examine the project in 1976. The PAC expressed grave 
concern that in both cases the CCA had stressed to the departments in question that their 
projects had fundamental problems, and in both cases the advice was ignored until it was 
reiterated to them by external consultants (ibid., page vii-viv). 
By the late- I 970s, the CCA altered its approach by abandoning previous levels of 
involvement in departmental IT procurement and use it attempted in its infancy. 
Departments were given more financial responsibility for the pu rchase and maintenance 
of systems (PAC, I 978/79, p2), partially in the hope that this might stem the flow of 
audited 'failures'. Inevitably this enfeebled the coordination that the CCA initially hoped 
to instill across departments. An interviewee involved at the time noted that the changes 
in policy 'meant that they [departments] buy what they want and they take responsibility 
for it. Of course the CCA was there to advise and guide if required but there was no 
mandatory requirement for departments to seek CCA help"(personal correspondence - 
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6). Thus, the stronger incarnation of the CCA as a central agency closely involved in 
departmental IT had disappeared. 
Observers had previously argued that public service delivery would benefit from IT 
orchestration across departments. Government had apparently bought into this 
perspective with the creation of the CCA, through which coordination was to be 
achieved. Evidence from the 1970s suggested however that, in terms of procurement and 
advice services, departments had preferred to act with the utmost independence, despite 
criticisms from audit and parliamentary bodies. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher abolished the CSD, and the CCA 
(renamed the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency because 
telecommunications procurement and policy had become an additional responsibility in 
19796) was put in the Treasury. Thatcher began to instigate wholesale administrative 
reform in the public sector during this period, beginning with her use of Derek Rayner 
and his efficiency scrutinies, and culminating with the Next Steps transformations of the 
late 1980s. - Rayner's efficiency probes and scrutinies mutated into the Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) in 1983 (Cmnd. 9058,1983/84). FMI was a move to embed 
efficiency through decentralization, with the creation of discrete units, where 
performance could be more easily measurable and quantified (Carter et al, 1992). 
Computer systems were pushed up the agenda with FMI because management 
information systems (MIS) were seen as an excellent solution to the requirements of the 
Initiative, and the CCTA saw its workload temporarily increase as departments sought 
advice regardiný them (CCTA News, 1983ap I; 1983b, p3). MIS systems such as MINIS 
gained currency as they were championed by Michael Heseltine, and also represented a 
6 The Agency was given the responsibility for interdepartmental telephone networks, but it only formed a 
small part of the operation; a mere 32 staff worked in the division (CCTA, 1984, p29) compared to hundreds 
in the computers divisions. 
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renaissance of sorts in the uses of IT advocated by the O&M section7 of the Treasury in 
previous decades, ý although much of MINIS was paper-based (Agar, 2003, p370). 
However, there was a general drive towards computerized MIS across government, 
which included plans to introduce coordinatedand integrated horizontal and vertical 
flows of information to benefit the management of service delivery; to 'informatize' 
government (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p44). 
At the same time, the centrifugal forces which underpinning FMI and subsequent Tory 
policies favoured departmental autonomy and extensive private sector involvement in 
computer use, rather than central steering. Thus, despite the enduring notion that 
coordination of IT should occur across departments, as crystallized in the original remit 
of the CCTA, this was pushed further to the periphery due to the political climate. A 
major review of the CCTA in 1984, conducted by its own director, found that it was in 
keeping with political trends that departments should be 'given clear control over the 
choice of systems' (CCTA, 1984, page iii). Additionally, the ambitions of MIS failed to 
materialize as systems were confined to the existing restrictive structures of mainframe 
computing but also because profound tensions were embedded in the politics of the MIS 
information systems; there was concern in government organisations about the character 
of the management reforms associated with MIS (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p44-45). For 
instance the Treasury was fearful that management reforms possible through the plans for 
MIS might undermine its control over expenditure (ibid). For both the CCTA and the 
MIS movement, attempts to instill coordination across government were being 
challenged by these wider political factors. 
Nonetheless, as commercial technology developed during the 1980s, IT would remain a 
prominent policy concern for government. According to Kenneth Baker, Thatcher ' 
became an enthusiast for computer systems seeing potential in new technology as a tool, 
particularly in education (Baker, I 993, p59). However, whilst central agencies were given 
7 As Agar noted, IT as a management tool had already had a long history, with the O&M promoted the 
PERT system being used in government departments during the mid-1960s (Agar, 2003, p333-337). 
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a role in departmental IT coordination in the 1970s, the 1980s saw the balance swing 
firmly towards departmental control (NAO, 1999/2000a, p49). During this decade, IT 
systems continued to be implemented with only the departmental or agency purview in 
mind. Although this was a logical and reasonable approach considering the functional 
separation of service delivery, it was this approach which the Modernising Government 
white paper took particular issue with, arguing that whilst the 'decentralised approach to 
IT development' allowed departments or agencies to 'meet their own needs', it led to 
'incompatible system and services which are not integrated' (Cabinet 
Office, I 998/99, p45). Thus, the inference for the e-goverriment era, mirroring previous 
observations depicted in the sections above, was that government computing had to 
transcend the confines of narrow departmental objectives, if, as the white paper puts it, 
twe are to obtain the real benefits of information age government' (ibid). However, 
despite much interest in IT coordination and integration during the post-war decades, the 
political emphasis in the 1980s allowed institutions to continue to adopt IT systems to 
suit and reflect discrete processes and needs. 
Still, in 1981 Kenneth Baker was appointed as Minister of State for Industry and 
Information Technology within the Department of Industry 8, after proposing a ten-point 
plan to promote IT to the Industry Secretary of the time, Sir Keith Joseph 
(Theakston, I 987, p 163). Thus, Baker was considered to be the world's first IT Minister, 
having attained credentials for the position through his business links with the computer 
industry (Baker, I 993, p57). Under Baker there was a recognition that IT 'posed complex 
interdepartmental problems' (Theakston, 1987, pl63), indicating that the aspiration of a 
coordinated approach was not lost during these years. 
Scrutiny ofDepartmental Computer Projects in the 1980s 
Despite the emphasis on departmental control of IT in 1980s, the National Audit 
Office (NAO) would continually find flaws in the project management skills of 
8 The DTI was split up into the Department of Industry and the Department of Trade in 1974, and reunited 
in 1983 by Margaret Thatcher. 
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individual government organisations and their IT programmes; this trend was set to 
continue. During 1982 the NAO undertook an investigation into the progress of four 
ma or computer projects in four separate departments. The research produced a report j 
that found 'a number of areas of common weaknesses in planning and control' in all four 
computer projects, in the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), the HMSO, 
the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Manpower Services Commission 
(NAO, 1983/84, pl). The DHSS had abandoned its enormous CAMELOT project, with a 
reported wastage of E12 million. CAMELOT, conceived in 1977, was set to computerize 
over 5000 DHSS local offices across the country from 1981 to 1986. In 1977, many 
offices were still operating with paper-based administration alone, and the pockets of 
computerization that had developed, although innovative in the late 1950s, were 
considered outdated (Margetts, I 999, p53). Yet it was recognized in 1981 that expected 
staff savings and economy improvements from CAMELOT were mythical 
(NAO, 1983/84, p5). 
The abandonment of CAMELOT in 1981 was followed by the DSS Operational Strategy; 
the NAO was reasonably optimistic its early progress (NAO, I 983/84, p5-6). As Margetts 
(1999, p53) noted, the Operational Strategy received unprecedented academic attention 
(e. g Margetts, 199 1; Bellamy, 1996; Margets/Willcocks, 1993; Margetts, 1999). As 
documented in the first chapter, although aimed at informatizing benefits systems around 
the needs of claimants, this was not attained (Margetts, 199 1), as academics began to 
explore the institutional, political and organisational factors involved in government IT. 
For instance, it was found that parts of the Operational Strategy were abandoned in an 
attempt to reach Treasury and Public Accounts Committee rules on efficiency savings; 
essentially potentially informatizing elements were eschewed in favour of dominant 
concerns for automation (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p42). 'Although initially involved in the 
Operational Strategy, the CCTA lost overall financial control for the project in 1984 and 
became increasingly ostracized (Margetts, 1999, p62). 
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The other three departments scrutinized in the NAO report, HMSO, the Lord 
Chancellor's Department and the Manpower Services Commission,. experienced similar 
difficulties to the DSS on a smaller scale (NAO, 1983/84, p6-10). The NAO report 
finished by comparing the perceived failures of the four projects examined with patterns 
across the rest of government computing, finding further cause for concern within its 
terms of reference (ibid, p6). 
During the 1980s, departmental computer projects were repeatedly portrayed as the 
epitome of bureaucratic ineptitude and waste by audit and parliamentary bodies. Other 
than the aforementioned, examples included the alleged wasting Of E40 million on the 
Ministry of Defence's Trawlerman project (PAC, 1999/2000b, annex, p5-6), and the 
accounting system of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which collapsed in 1989; 
without back-up the Office had to face an imbalance of E54 million 
(Margetts/Willcocks, 1993). However, some large projects could be considered a success 
overall; the Inland Revenue serves as an example. Its relationship with computers 
followed a similar initial pattern to the DHSS, where early innovation in the late 1950s 
and 1960s led to the installation of computers which became seen as outmoded and in 
need of overhaul by the late 1970s (Margetts, I 99ý, p 109). However, unlike the DHSS, the 
overhaul and expansion (named the Computerization of PAYE - COP) was seen as a 
considerable achievement', with 6800 staff savings through only a 9% increase in 
budget (ibid, p 112). COP was not without its difficulties, precursory overhaul plans were 
continually scuppered from 1970 onwards by political tax reforms and changes of 
government, and even after COP was proposed, political wrangling prohibited genuine 
progress throughout the early 1980s (ibid., p I 10- 111; Matheson, 1984, p92). 
Despite this the project was deemed a success, not least because of the highly influential 
director, Steve Matheson, and the modesty of the prej ect (Margetts, 1999, p I 11,120). In 
his own version of events with COP, Matheson stressed flexibility as fundamental to 
large computer projects (I 984, p94). He noted that 'in the past, computer systems, 
particularly big computer systems, have been pretty monolithic, not easily susceptible to 
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change' (ibid. ). COP had to cope with 'about a thousand changes to the requirements 
since 1980' (ibid. &103), yet had the in-built organizational and technological flexibility 
to manage, unlike many other of the large scale projects in the 1980s and in previous 
decades. ICL was the main supplier of COP, winning the contract because the DTI put 
pressure on the DSS to draw up a specification for the project which the company could 
comply to (Margetts, 1999, p 116). Yet despite this dubious procurement process, both the 
DSS and ICL benefited from the relationship that developed (ibid. ). 
The Politics of Government IT in the mid-1980s: The diminishing role ofthe CCTA 
Computer projects and systems proliferated across government during the 1980s, 
as hardware became cheaper and microchip technology expanded the potential of IT 
applications. Largely, the approach was to automate existing processes, with the explicit 
objective of reducing the number of staff that government organisations, needed to 
employ (Margetts, I 999, p 18). Also, the CCTA was continuing to diminish in its 
prominence as an orchestrating force; one senior staff member acknowledged it could not 
achieve the overarching coordination originally desired (PAC, 1983/84, p6), whilst the 
Agency newsletter made the position clear; 'CCTA does not challenge a department's 
authority to identify, manage and control its own projects' (CCTA News, 1982, p3). 
Instead, the Agency was settling for an optional consultancy role, whilst departments 
unsurprisingly concentrated on computerization attuned to their needs and practices. Still, 
the belief that coordination was desirable was not lost during this period; although the 
government had an IT Minister in Kenneth Baker, the feeling was that it did not, but 
should have a coherent IT policy (Theakston, I 987, p 163). 
Although the CCTA was not in a position to be a strong body for IT procurement, 
development and coordination across government, as envisaged in the early 1970s, it was 
providing advice and guidance to many departments. However, one observer felt that 
CCTA was being used unwisely by departments, disrupting accountability and holding 
back IT development: 
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I felt that it [the CCTA] served as a wonderful alibi for departments. If they went to the 
CCTA and said, "Shall we do this? " and the CCTA said, "Yee', then even if it ended up in 
total disaster, they would say, "But CCTA told us to do if'. Apd if the CCTA said, "No", 
then they would say, "Well, we don't have to think about it any more because the CCTA 
has told us that it is not a good idea. " So that was a terrible alibi (Trade and Industry Select 
Committee, I 987/88, pl 07) 
Conversely, the comprehensive Freeman Review provided an indication of the desire of 
departments for even greater autonomy from the CCTA, despite, the gradual retraction 
from its original remit over the previous decade. The review invited feedback from 
departments and nearly all asked for the Agency to be less 'overbearing' in its 
involvement (CCTA, I 984, p 15). An interviewee supported this, pointing out that often, 
the 'CCA was accused of second guessing requirements; departments would say ---ý'you 
do not understand our business, so how can you challenge our requirements? "' (personal 
correspondence - 6). The CCTA was considered as an intrusion by departments, but was 
also used to transfer blame; either way its position appeared perilous considering the 
opinions of departments toward it and the prevailing political environment. 
Soon after the Freeman Review, the CCTA was moved to Norwich, and occupied an even 
more distant advisory capacity; the feeling in the larger departments was that the Agency 
was out of touch, as one DHSS official remarked after the CCTA move that 'we don't go 
them for advice' (Margetts, 1999, p62-63). The CCTA received further criticism for over 
involvement in departmental computer projects (Margetts, 1996, p73) and for being slow 
and cumbersome in delivering advice to departments (Trade and Industry 
Committee, 1987/88, p 165-68). From April 1987, departments were permitted to 'untie' 
themselves further from CCTA procurement services (ibid., p 159). The importance of 
departments being able to control all aspects of their own projects had become 
paramount, perhaps preventing any aspirations the CCTA may have had about 
coordination, common technological infrastructures or data sharing projects that spanned 
across government organizations. Whilst in the 1970s and early 1980s the CCTA had 
actually 'owned' all computers in government and had exercised close control over 
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departmental IT budgets, by the mid-1980s departments had reclaimed responsibility for 
procurement whilst other. financial controls were fed back into other Treasury divisions 
(Margetts, 1996, p73; 1999, p44) 
Still, the sentiment of coordination lived on; the then chairman of Logica commented that 
he would like to see 'a much-strengthened consensus process with Government' through 
enabling the CCTA to adopt a stronger lead (Trade and Industry 
Committee, I 987/88, p 10 1). However, the CCTA continued to recede and was unlikely to 
be able to revitalize efforts; there were continual rumours that the Agency would be 
privatized orabolished (Margetts, 1996, p73). Whilst coordination was an initial objective 
of the CCTA, by 1988 its director at the time, Paul Freeman, was making it clear that 
individual departments were in control of IT, and that there was no 'super-strategy' 
across government (quoted in Margetts, 1999, p44). 
According to one long-serving member of CCTA staff, interviewed for this thesis, the 
feeling within the Agency was that government departments had disregarded much of its 
advice over the decades. His opinion was that departments ignored recommendations and 
by the new millennium were having 'chickens coming home to roost' in terms of their 
inability to deal with the joining up aspects of the e-government strategy (personal 
correspondence - 6). The feeling from within the CCTA was that there was a 'huge silo 
mentality' in departments that 'did not want to see what they were being shown by an 
organisation that could, and was required, to stand back and see the wid-er picture, and 
they certainly made a collective case ... for not having a third part tell them what to 
do' 
(personal correspondence - 6). 
Conversely, departments clearly felt their own IT projects would often not be improved 
by interference from an external body and preferred levels of autonomy. Despite negative 
audit scrutiny, this decentralized approach was judged to be optimal as the CCTA 
gradually lost power. This thesis does not argue that departmental deference to a stronger 
CCTA would have meant that projects would have been more successful, or that the . 
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strategic issues of informatization and coordination would have been better addressed. 
However, the thesis does note that the experiences of the CSD and CCTA do provide 
some indications of the potential difficulties in steering, supervising and orchestrating a 
more coordinated approach to ICT applications in the e-government environment. 
Although under different political and technological circumstances, the history presented 
here assists understanding of the e-government strategy and the difficulties faced. 
As the 1980s began to draw to a close, the approach to government IT policy was 
dominated by automation, where a powerful managerialist logic held that computers 
should be applied to generate staff savings (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p4 1). To illustrate this, 
Bellamy and Taylor pointed to the publication Efficiency in the Civil Service, from 198 1, 
which discussed computers purely in'terms of monitoring workloads and staff economies 
(ibid. ). Similarly, a Cabinet Office paper revealed much when it was noted 'technical 
improvements have generally been introduced to improve the efficiency of working 
procedures and to make resource savings. Improvements in service to the public have 
tended to be a welcome but indirect by-product' (OMCS, 1988, p2O). 
This approach did have its critics, for example a parliamentary committee complained 
that departments tended to vindicate IT spending by 'a spurious arithmetic calculation 
that produces a pounds, shilling and pence justification at the bottom of a piece of paper' 
(Trade and Industry Committee, 1987/8 8, p 108). Although IT applications which sought to 
informatize service delivery operations were still discussed and considered, the climate of 
the period provided a propensity for departments to concentrate on efficiency 
opportunities pertaining to existing operations, rather than to explore other possibilities, 
including links with other departments. In the e-government environment there was more 
emphasis on ICT-mediated joining up across organisations, although departments still 
had a clear responsibility to improve efficiency, particularly since the Gershon Review 
identified a potential E20 billion in savings across the public sector for government 
organisations to work towards (Gershon, 2004). 
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The narrative will now explore the government computing landscape following the 
introduction of the Next Steps programme, where centrifugal pressures further influenced 
the position of IT in public service delivery. 
2.7 NEXT STEPS AND MARKET TESTING: INCREASING THE COMPLEXITY OF 
GOVERNMENT IT 
Before the Next Steps programme, which began in the late 1980s, the decade saw the 
gradual reduction in the role of the CCTA (although the Agency would continue to 
produce advice, reports and procurement services) and, to some extent, a continuation of 
the dominant automation perspective in IT applications in government. However Next 
Steps, discussed briefly in Chapter One, was set to significantly alter the government IT 
landscape, an observation which did not escape the attention of key public administration 
scholars; academic attention to government IT increased during this period. The ethos 
behind Next Steps was to break down centralisation and hierarchy in favour of a looser, 
delegated managerial environment; a belief, borrowed from modem business analysts, 
that 'small was beautiful' (Zifcak, I 994, p74). Following on from the FMI, the Next Steps 
programme eventually created hundreds of agencies, within which 74% of the civil 
service were operating by 1997 (Greenwood et al, 2002, p33). 
The introduction of agencies to provide services, accountable to central departments, 
generated significant upheavals and changes in the public sector, not least with IT. For 
instance, at the beginning of the 1990s the Benefits Agency, Contributions Agency and 
several other smaller units were formed from what was the bulk of the DSS. As the 
agency responsible for providing payments to the young, sick, poor and old, the Benefits 
Agency took on the computerization of the social security (Margetts, I 999, p52). As 
discussed in Chapter One, the phase of the programme during the early 1990s placed 
emphasis on client orientated one-stop services, suggesting an informatization of benefits 
operations through connecting information systems to provide consistent assistance for 
citizens (Bellamy, I 996, p 168-177). Writing about the experiences with computerization 
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of social security up to the mid- I 990s, Margetts argued that, whilst the achievements 
were a considerable feat, none of the key objectives were met (1999, p68; NAO, 1989). 
Whilst the project was not likely to ever be cost-justified and there were doubts that 
accuracy levels and overall service quality had improved (Margetts/Collingridge, 1994, 
p70; Wyatt, I 989, p9 1), it was also the case that innovations such as 'whole person' and 
one-stop services were unlikely to materialise. A major reason for this was innovation 
was obstructed by the institutionally embedded technological infrastructure developed in 
the previous decades; thus 'computing and policy innovation in the Benefits Agency will 
be shaped by the systems in place' (Margetts, I 999, p7O). 
However, Next Steps provided more than a political backcloth for these events. The - 
initiative led to the unification and hiving off of DSS IT units, to form the Information 
Technology Services Agency (ITSA), from which other DSS agencies would bid for IT 
services (ibld. &59). A situation arose as a result of Next Steps reforms where authority 
over IT was held within the core DSS, whilst knowledge and expertise were located in 
the ITSA and Benefits Agency (ibid. ). Furthermore, the creation of the ITSA widened the 
division between IT and administrative staff (Willcocks, 1994, p2O) and divorced 
information issues from wider management concerns (Muid, 1994, p 117-119). 
Contractualization 
Informatizing innovation such as 'whole person' and one-stop services were 
hampered because the co-operation and central management needed across DSS agencies 
to move service based on delivery by benefit to unified provision for each citizen was 
against the grain of Next Steps (Margetts, I 999, p6O). The managerial rationale that 
informed Next Steps required a separation between political and operational . 
responsibilities, with an emphasis on contract-based relationships between the two 
(Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p47). What emerged from Next Steps and the managerial agenda 
sitting behind it, was an increased emphasis on networks of independent and quasi- 
independent organisations delivering services based on contracts, rather than traditional 
bureaucratic, hierarchical delivery (ibid, p48). Whereas the traditional functional format 
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for service delivery had received substantial criticism for the limitations it placed on 
effective service delivery (Lawton/Rose, 1999, p287), including c6ordinated IT, the Next 
Steps reforms aimed to remedy these limitations also created new divisions. 
Part of the significant shift to contiactualization was an increase in informational 
requirements, as purchasers and myriad contractors required new flows of data to deal 
with performance levels, procurement, budgets, customer requirements, finances and so 
on (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p48-49) .. Thus, whilst the creation of devolved agencies may 
have introduced new types of fragmentation in service delivery, creating coordination 
problems (Kavanagh/Richards, 2000a, p8; Richards, 2001, p62; Rhodes, 2000, pl56; 
Ling, 2002, p6l8) the implied rapid increase in contracts stimulated a need for increased 
data flow s between organisations (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p49). This requirement could 
be seen not only in the plans for one-stop services in the Benefits Agency, which were 
difficult to attain, but also in the e-government era, where government organisations 
needed to interface with each other and commercial bodies if they wish to provide 
seamless services to citizens. Margetts argued that in particular, Next Steps had created 
further difficulties with fragmentation and incompatibility of computer systems across 
departments; she provided one example of an attempt to improve coordination across 
DSS agencies using information technology; a 'joint screen' showing common customer 
information shared between the Benefits and Contributions agencies failed to materialize 
as there was no agreement on the design (Margetts, 1996, p79). ý 
Market Testing: Privatization and outsourcing 
The emphasis on contracts borne in part out of the Next Steps initiatives 
contributed to another, related pattern. In principle, whether core central departments 
were contracting public sector agencies or commercial firms to provide services was 
irrelevant in the new climate (BellamyfFaylor, 1998a, p47). Next Steps caused IT 
functions of several major departments to be grouped together as agencies and referred to 
'Prior Options' regulations, which was a method of considering whether the operations of 
agencies could be privatised. The operations of the IT agencies of the Department of 
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Transport and Inland Revenue were indeed privatised in the early 1990s, with large 
contracts going to the American company, Electronic Data Sytems (EDS) 
(PAC, I 999/2000b, p4; Margetts, I 999, p 147-149). With social security, the ITSA engaged 
in a 'bewildering array of contracts', many of which were not successfully concluded and 
some of which ended in legal action Qbid., p6l); again EDS took a lucrative share of what 
was offered (ibid. ). This change was not always welcomed within departments, the' 
involvement of EDS in Inland Revenue IT caused departmental staff to take a one-day 
strike and embark on a year long policy of non-co-operation with management 
(ibid, p 115). 
The Market Testing approach, instigated by the government in 1991, held that an array of 
government operations should be considered for contracting out to commercial 
organisations, with the objective of improving quality through competition 
(Rhodes, 1997, p48). Informational Technology was generally accepted as being the most 
apt aspect of operations to consider for outsourcing, and it was the most commonly cited 
element in departmental Market Testing plans (Margetts, 1999, pl5O; 
Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, pl55). By 1995 central government departmerits had contracted 
out 30% of IT operations (Margett, I 996, p76). Although the sections above indicate that 
government had a long history of close collaboration with commercial IT companies, and 
Market Testing specifically was followed less closely after 1994 (Margetts, 1999, ý 152), 
the outsourcing instigated after Next Steps was a watershed period. The contracts 
proliferated in number and grew in size, whilst government departments lost competency 
in dealing with IT operations without being dependent on external agents such as EDS 
(Margetts, I 999, p 15 9). As Market Testing fell out of favour, the Treasury began to prefer 
the use of Private Finance Initiatives (Margetts, 1999, pl52), where private firms would 
take on more financial accountability for government projects. Margetts argued that the 
approach was in fact very similar to Market Testing in that larger companies tended to 
capture contracts. She also noted the criticism that the long term, large scale 
characteristics of the most Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) tended to freeze existing 
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departmental demarcations and precluded coordinated or integrated IT development 
(ibid., p 153). 
Next Steps and related developments had had a significant impact on the government IT 
landscape, particularly through the increased role of private companies. Next Steps also 
directly affected the CCTA as it was made into an executive agency in 1996 (as was the 
NPL in 1990). The Agency continued to publish a variety of guidelines at a prolific rate, 
on management and planning in IT projects, the nature of information and the potential 
use of new technologies, including the internet and email. It existed in its distant advisory 
role, relying on selling some services and guidance on a commercial fees basis 
(NAO, I 990/2000a, p5 1). The Agency did experience a period of rejuvenation at the end 
of the decade however, when responsibility for running the rapidly expanding central 
government web portal and pan-govemment email infrastructure remained with it for 
some time (NAO, I 999/2000a, p5 1). This despite the move to Norwich, and drastic staff 
cuts (ibid. ). However, responsibility for e-govemment went to the Office of the e-Envoy 
via the Central IT Unit (see Chapter Three) and the CCTA's thirty-year history finally 
came to 'an end on April I't 2001, when it was subsumed into the Office of Government 
Commerce. 
2.8 GOVERNMENT IT IN THE EARLY 1990s: THE PERCEIVED FAILURES IN 
DEPARTMENTAL PROJECTS 
Despite the oft-stated need for coordination across government computing, as embodied 
in the CCTA, the Next Steps era underlined a decentralised approach, which permitted 
departmental autonomy with IT policy, although considerations of commercial impetus 
and market sensibilities were emphasised. Thus, a vacuum had gradually developed as 
the CCTA altered its role; as indicated below, a new government organisation emerged in 
the mid- I 990s that provided fresh support for the enduring issue of IT coordination. 
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However, continuing a historic pattern, departmental computing during the 1990s was 
also blighted by negative audit and press scrutiny of initiatives, to the extent that the 
project management skills of government organisations were being characterized as 
endemically poor. Furthermore, the role and performance of involved commercial IT 
firms, and the relationship between these firms and departments would increasingly come 
under pressure. In the mid- I 990s the Public Accounts Committee found that departments 
were 'embarking on ambitious computer projects on the basis of inadequate appraisal, 
and failing to ensure that the system delivers what is required' followed by 'inadequate 
re-appraisal of computer etc projects in response to changing circumstances and 
requirements' (PAC, I 993/94a, page viii). Later the same committee would identify 25 
cases during the 1990s where it judged that IT projects had run seriously over budget or 
failed to match specifications (PAC, 1999/2000b), and cases were discussed widely in the 
national press (Islam, 200 1). According to the PAC, the failures had resulted in 'delay, 
confusion and inconvenience to the citizen and, in many cases, poor value for money to 
the taxpayer' (PAC, 1999/2000b, p2). 
Examples cited by the PAC included the update of the National Insurance Recording 
System in the Contributions Agency, contracting Andersen Consulting (later known as 
Accenture). The company was accused of underestimating the size and scope of the 
project, and serious delays were experienced. The PAC reported on the problem in the 
early stages, and reexamined the situation a year later, only to find its advice was 
unheeded and the problems had increased. Compensation of 08 million was paid out to 
personal pension scheme holders due to the delays, yet in 2000 the Labour government 
abandoned efforts to seek further compensation off Andersen Consulting, allegedly in 
case it jeopardized other contracts (PAC, I 999/2000b; Agar, 2003, p376-377). 
The Home Office also suffered negative audit scrutiny during the 1990s. Its Immigration 
and Nationality Directorate Casework programme was intended to improve the speed and 
fairness with which people could apply for citizenship or asylum. However, Siemens 
were reported to have made errors in the design of the IT system, discarded its 
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subcontractor and started afresh when the implementation was already severely delayed. 
The PAC found in this case that hardship and frustration was experienced by those reliant 
on the Home Office, with a backlog of 76,000 asylum cases (PAC, 1998/99b; 
PAC, 1999/2000b). Asylum was already a hot issue for the press, so the delays were 
highly publicized; the Guardian estimated the cost of failure as E76 million when the 
project was forsook (Left, 200 1). 
A third example of PAC criticism was centred on the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency, which decided to replace the Northern Ireland vehicle system in the early 1990s. 
The project was unable to cope with the unforeseen privatization of the IT department of 
the Department of Transport. The project was revised by EDS but the NAO concluded 
that E3.7 million had been written off during the period (PAC, 1996/97; 1999/2000b). As 
well as the infamous Trawlerman project, eventually terminated in 1996 with E41 million 
written off (Agar, 2003, p378), the Ministry of Defence also had negative coverage of its 
management and administration IT system; the contractor SEMA made significant 
misjudgments about the size of the project and it ran over budget before eventually being 
cancelled without being used (PAC, 1991/92; 1999/2000b). Finally the Department of 
Employment attempted to implement an integrated system into its regional and area 
offices in 1988, yet the creation of the Training and Enterprise Councils created 
confusion which was not managed sufficiently, and f. 48 million was spent without any 
improvement in performance (PAC, I 993/94b; 1999/2000b). 
These examples serve to illustrate an aspect of the government IT climate within which 
the e-government strategy operated, where projects were often negatively scrutinized by 
auditors. After the publication of Modernising Government the PAC wholeheartedly 
supported the policy of instilling coordination in government IT. However, although the 
PAC acknowledged that it was often only negative cases that were drawn to its attention 
and that private sector IT frequently also performed badly, the committee was concerned 
that the promise of the e-government strategy would not materialize as a result of the 
perceived poor track record of departmental IT projects (ibid. &6). Although this thesis 
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does not argue that the joining up sentiments of the e-government strategy were doomed 
due to this perceived endemic weakness, it was a factor worthy of consideration. This 
thesis takes evidence of perceived IT project failure into account, as it contributes to 
understanding the role of ICTs in joining up. However, it is argued that this is by no 
means the only factor; the thesis points in particular to the role of institutions in providing 
insight into ICT-mediated joining up in the e-government era. The NAO and PAC 
continued to find fault in projects in the e-government era, as discussed in the next 
chapter. I 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
A small number of public administration scholars subjected the assumptions behind the 
information age government notion of the 1990s to critical scrutiny. One observation was 
that the configuration and nature of the institutions of British government were 
unconducive to an inter-agency emphasis to IT that was being promoted during this 
period (Margetts, I 996, p74). The evidence presented in this chapter allows the 
identification of a number of important points, patterns and themes that help assess this 
observation. 
The history of government IT demonstrates the prevalence of the automation perspective 
across the decades. Since the early developments in the NPL and MPNI, the 
mechanization of paper-based administrative tasks, with the objective of offsetting rising 
costs and staff levels of a large provider state, had been an understandable goal. 
Departments applied information technology with varied success, to existing, discrete 
operations to reduce costs within their own purview. Computing systems were largely 
designed to serve individual departmental objectives, budgets, client groups and 
procedures, whilst central government policy interests were dominated by concern for the 
UK IT industry, particularly in the 1960s. Although the political environment of the 
1980s and early 1990s was very different to the 1950s, bringing managerial techniques 
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and an influx of private initiative into public sector IT, there was still a strong emphasis 
on automation as departments searched for efficiency in their operations. 
Thus, at one level the history presented in this chapter would indicate that automation had 
been the dominant mode. It could be argued here that only under the e-government 
strategy had central government come to terms with the informatizing potential of ICTs 
and the virtue of coordination, integration and interoperation of departmental computing 
in creating joining up. However, the history of government computing indicates that the 
informatizing potential of ICTs had been recognised at an early stage particularly in the 
context of internal back office reform, and indeed became one of the motifs of the post- 
war period which existed alongside the more dominant departmental automation 
perspective. The ephemeral O&M section of the Treasury discussed supra-departmental 
integrated processing systems which could render departmental boundaries insignificant 
(Agar, 2003, p3l3), whilst the MPNI was using new computing technology to facilitate 
large scale data sharing with the Inland Revenue in the early 1960s (MPNI, 1960; 196 1). 
The CSD was tasked with providing computer strategy and coordination from the late 
1960s whilst the SS&T was, amongst other things, a forum for discussions on technical 
compatibility and the need for greater coordination. Although the success of the CSD in 
-its role was questionable, as it preferred to devolve responsibility for computing back to 
departments by the early 1970s (SS&T, 1970/7l, p326), the notion that the existing 
arrangements for government IT were inadequate, and that computing offered 
opportunities beyond departmental automation, seemed to endure. 
The SS&T perspective that there should be a dedicated central unit to coordinate 
computing procurement, development and use eventually influenced the government 
enough for it to create the CCTA (SS&T, 1971/72, p3). Admittedly, most of the CCTA 
activities may have been supporting, or at least not challenging dominant departmental 
automation perspectives. The Agency often offered procurement services (initially to 
support preferential purchasing of ICL equipment), advice and recommendations to 
departments rather than anything that stimulated them towards interoperation or 
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collaborative IT strategies. Despite increases in perceived computing project failures, 
departments gradually enjoyed more and more independence from the CCTA, which was 
an organisation that they often viewed as an interfering force. Nonetheless, despite the 
changing role of the CCTA towards an optional advice service, its existence in part was 
testament to the enduring notion that some form of IT coordination across government 
organisations, whether in terms of procurement or the actual operations of departments, 
was seen as necessary. The sentiment that computing could help transcend the 
departmental delivery of public services and to informatize operations was present as a 
minority voice during the post-war period, and the activities of the CCTA (and CSD 
before it) in part embodied this sentiment, even though arguably little was achieved. By 
the 1990s the Treasury was the only central organisation with any level of control over 
departmental IT; it was said to have a 'hands-off approach, in part due to its lack of 
expertise in computing issues (Margetts, 1999, p44-45). 
Using the evidence presented in this chapter, the experiences of the CCTA and its 
relationship with departments puts weight behind Margetts' (1996, p74) argument that the 
institutions of British government were unconducive to interdepartmental coordination in 
some instances. Drawing parallels with the scholarly observations on the informatizing 
efforts of the computerization of social security and the CCCJS in criminal justice 
(Bellamy, 1996; 1998; Bellamy/Taylor, 1996; 1998a; Margetts, 199 1; 1999), it can be 
argued that institutional factors had a part to play in the apparent difficulties the CCTA 
met with inducing any level of coordination across departments. 
The concept of coordination, whether pertaining to procurement, common standards, 
compatibility, computer use, interoperability or integration, was ordained as a desirable 
aim by observers and the government; in particular the CCTA was set to provide a wide 
range of coordination and steering. However, by the birth of the CCTA in the early 
1970s, departmental IT was embedded in existing operations. Despite criticism from 
audit and parliamentary bodies, which concentrated on overspending and weak project 
management, departmental IT systems largely automated suitable operations to fit the 
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specific objectives of the incumbent actors, organisations and institutions. The potential 
involvement of the CCTA in departmental IT policy threatened the autonomy 
departments had over existing information systems, domains and flows. Although the 
Agency gradually retreated from the original remit given to it, towards an advice service 
and away from any pretensions of a corporate, coordinated IT strategy across 
government, significant opposition and animosity was felt towards it according to one 
interviewee (personal correspondence - 6). 
Thus, despite the continual calls for coordination and inter-organisational information 
flows that appeared at various points during the history of goverment computing, there 
was strong evidence to suggest that the service delivery institutions of government had 
largely adopted IT for their own discrete and functional requirements. Although the CSD 
and CCTA had played an active part in the history, departments did seem capable of 
using the services available on their own terms, if at all, in pursuing particular objectives 
and absorbed audit criticism. The political movement towards managerialism. during the 
1980s and 1990s appeared to increase the independence with which government 
organisations would act whilst providing an additional dimension to the challenge of 
coordinating IT. 
As a related issue, it should also be noted that the configuration of the public sector and 
the power wielded by its core executive and central agencies was likely to have directly 
influenced the impact of the CCTA. Traditionally, the centre of government; the Cabinet 
system, Prime Minister's Office and Treasury, had struggled to attain the desired general 
levels of orchestration and steering, whereas departments had considerable power with 
which to pursue objectives (Macintosh, I 977, p546; Hennessy, I 989, p3O 1; Greenwood et 
al, 2002, p64; Hogwood/Peters, I 985, p4O). Following Next Steps and the emergence of 
European governing structures, an argument gained credence that the centre of 
government had been 'hollowed out' whilst networks of service delivery agencies and 
other organisations increased in autonomy (Rhodes, 2000a, p257-258; Smith, 2000, p4O). It 
may have been that the CCTA was unable to pursue coordination and other objectives to 
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the extent envisaged in part because of the weak institutional position of central agencies 
operating outside of departmental umbrellas. This point could also be applied to the main 
central unit that was charged with steering the e-govemment agenda, the Office of the e- 
Envoy (see Chapter Tbree). 
Despite the historical patterns outlined above and the gradual change in the CCTA's 
approach, the mid-1990s saw the creation of a new centrally placed strategic unit with a 
remit to look at the use of IT across government. This, the Central IT Unit (CITU), 
placed within the Cabinet Office in 1995, represented arejuvenation of the concept of 
coordination, and was accompanied by a rise in interest in new information and 
communication technologies associated with the internet. Whereas the focus was 
previously often on the application of IT to internal back office processes, the internet 
and associated technologies brought also a new interest in coordination at the interface 
with citizens. As discussed in the next chapt6r, the creation of the CITU was followed by 
the government. direct green paper and the e-government strategy itself, which placed 
emphasis on achieving joined up government through ICTs. However, this chapter 
uncovers a hidd 
' 
en world of government IT, which demonstrates that there was an 
enduring interest in coordination, yet central bodies were largely unable to incentivise 
departments, not least as the administrative reforms of the 1980s made orchestration 
more difficult. Armed with this insight, the thesis moves to consider the role of ICTs in 
facilitating joined up government, under the central e-government strategy. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE UK &GOVERNMENT STRATEGY - 
1996-2004 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the previous decades had seen the application of computers largely to internal 
departmental back office operations, by 1996 the growing popularity of the internet 
meant that governments were also able to consider utilising the medium to reach out 
and interface with citizens directly to a greater extent. During the 1990s, the PC 
revolution had brought cheap and accessible computer hardware to many homes and 
businesses, and internet technology had rapidly become a genuine mass medium 
across many parts of the globe. By 2002 nearly half of all UK households and most 
businesses and schools were connected to the internet through PCs, whilst other 
channels such as digital TV and mobile phone internet access were developing 
(NAO, 2001/02d). By October 2004 it was estimated by the Office for National 
Statistics that only 34% of adults in the UK had never used the internet (ONS, 2004a). 
In households, 13% of homes had personal computers in 1985, compared with 54% in 
2002, whilst in terms of telecommunications (often needed for internet access) 42% 
had telephones in 1972 compared with 98% in 2000 (ONS, 2004b). The surge in the 
intemet's popularity was reinvigorating the notion that ICTs could further transform 
aspects of work, leisure, learning, commerce, 'government and other sectors. After 
decades as the tool of specialised communities, the internet was 'to catch fire in 
business and in society at large' (Castells, 2002, pxxxi), becoming embedded in 
everyday life (Wellman/Haythomthwaite, 2002) and creating a new capacity for 
information flows (Castells, 2001). 
For government however, there was a strong sense by the late 1990s that the use of 
ICTs had not lived up to high expectations, despite fifty years of experience; this 
perceived failure was even acknowledged by Cabinet Office publications (Cabinet 
Office, I 998/99, p45; OeE, 2000; PIU, 2000b). The ubiquity of ICTs, and particularly 
the rise of the internet, magnified the failures of the government to reap the perceived 
benefits of new applications; indeed Patrick Dunleavy cited major computer project 
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disasters as one of the chief policy failures of the late 20 th century (Public 
Administration Committee, 2000/Olb, pl49). However, this thesis has also highlighted 
that there had been shortcomings not only in the management of departmental IT 
projects but also in terms of the failure to instil the desired levels of coordination in 
computing across departments. 
Yet, within the context of a growing interest in the reinvention of government (e. g. 
Osbome/Gaebler, 1992) and the emphasis on the reengineering of organisations 
around the needs of customers (e. g. Hammer/Champy, 1993), the internet and other 
new technologies led during this period to an optimism that new ICTs would 
transform delivery (Holliday, 200 1, p315), by 'revolutionising how government 
operates and interfaces with the citizens it serves' (Nixon, 2000, p28). Thus, the allure 
of pursuing transformations in government through ICTs took on a new dimension, 
that of reaching out to citizens, through the properties of the internet. For instance, 
two of the key features of the internet that were emerging around 1996 offered new 
possibilities for joined up service delivery; websites could act as a hub for information 
and services to be drawn together and accessed at a single point 
(NAO, 1999/2000a, p I) whilst electronic mail could furnish departmental officials with 
a new method of communication with other government organisations and with 
citizens. 
This chapter will chart the rise of e-government and the Cabinet Office's approach, 
against the backdrop of the history of computing, beginning with the first 
developments and infludnces on the inchoate 'information age government' policies 
and strategies. It will demonstrate how, drawing on the long-standing emphasis on 
coordination in various guises and the availability of new technologies that lent 
themselves to flexibility, communication and networks, the emerging e-government 
agenda became associated with and guided by the context ofjoined up government. 
The Chapter will provide assessment of the e-goverriment strategy and the activities 
and output of the Office of the e-Envoy as the body charged with its development and 
steering, to pave the way for the case studies in subsequent chapters. 
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3.2 E-GOVERNMENT UP TO 1997: STEERING'INFORMATION AGE'" 
GOVERNMENT 
By the mid- I 990s John Maj or's'government was well established and had spent 
several years developing the perspectives and policies, which, it was argued, was an 
attempt to assert a political identity external to Thatcherism (Pollitt, 1993, pl8O). The 
Major government emphasised the role of contracts, competition and markets in 
service delivery but with the imperative of empowering and improving the citizen 
experience (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p68). This, along with the Citizen's Charter 
movement (see Chandler, 1996b) and Open Government created a further need for 
new information resources and flows to fuel a new genre of empowering 
consumerism in service delivery (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p68). 
As for Information and Communication Technologies in government during this 
period, the UK initially took the lead from the United States. There, partially as a 
result of embracing the Toffler vision of an IT-enabled society (Margetts, I 999, p 172), 
the American government perspective brought ICTs on board as a means to help 
achieve the reinvention of government (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p65) in light of the 
developing internet and associated technologies. 
Al Gore, the then vice-president, became an early champion of new ICTs in 
government, particularly with the National Performance Review of the early 1990s, 
which aimed to reengineer some government services and placed some forms and 
other information on the internet. Gore coined the phrase 'Information Superhighway' 
to describe the National Information Infrastructure which he wished to build, partially 
to instigate electronic service delivery to citizens. The Review's strategies promoted 
inter-organisational electronic data flows to drive up the efficiency and quality of 
internal processes and services to business and citizens (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p55). 
From the mid- I 990s, other developed nations such as Canada, Australia and the 
Netherlands began to associate new ICTs with improved efficiencies, choice and 
quality in holistic service delivery (Heeks/Davies, I 999, p24-25; 
Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p64). News of these developments filtered across to the UK, 
and it was seen as urgent that the Conservative government generated a comparable 
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plan of action, which detailed how Britain would be able to take full advantage of the 
internet and other ICTs in improving business, commerce and public service, delivery. 
In parliament, as internet and web technologies began to capture the imagination, 
opposition MPs saw the perceived lack of activity as an opportunity to pour scorn on 
Conservative government ICT policies. In March 1995 Graham Allen described the 
government's response to what was often referred as the Information Superhighway 
as 'piecemeal and uninspiring', whilst he praised Al Gore's attempt to coordinate 
strategy and vision and called urgently for a similar reaction in Britain 
(Hansard, I 994/95c, col. 24 1). Interest was also mounting in the press, where Al 
Gore's proposals were discussed along with the possible applications of internet 
technology in Britain9. Waiting in the wings, the Labour party seemed keen to express 
an interest in the internetlo. Further pressure for action came from a G7 ministerial 
meeting in February 1995, where it was agreed by participants that more government 
information would be disseminated online, and GOL (Government On Line) pilot 
projects were begun (G7,1995). 
The Birth of Government Online in the UK Open. gov. uk 
The Conservative government's reaction to the internet in particular was 
orientated around wider political movements of the period; encapsulated in the 
Citizen's Charter (199 1), the Open Government white paper (OPSS, 1 993) and 
William Waldegrave's Code ofPractice on Access to Government Information 
(OPSS, I 994b - updated in 1997). Two CCTA reports were produced on the 
Information Superhighway during this time. Although the Agency lacked 'political 
clout' (Bellamy, 2002, p2l4) the reports did have some influence in that they paved the 
way for Open Government projects (Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p 10 1) that sought to 
publish information over the internet; the full text of many of the charters were 
quickly posted onto the internet and the Citizen's Charter Unit was one of the first 
government organisations to develop a website (Hansard, 1994/95a, col. 53(W. )). 
9 Significant articles in the Guardian: 7 April 1994,12 May 1994,4 July 1994,28 August 1994 and 19 
November 1994. 
10 Examples of the 'internet according to Labour' articles in the Guardian: 28 November 1994,12 
December 1994,24 February 1995,18 July 1995 and 9 October 1995. 
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The government had created its own server, which became live in November 1994, 
marking the beginning of a consistent government web presence in Britain. The main 
government portal was found at open. gov. uk, and generated significant interest; it was 
said to be accessed 100,000 times in its first month (Hansard, I 994/95b, col. 340(W)). 
In 1995 a 'Government Information Service' was launched over the open. gov. uk 
portal, which posted contact details, ministerial speeches, press releases, performance 
targets and consultation papers for different government organisations 
(Bellamy/Taylor, 1 998a, p 10 1). The significance of open. gov. uk was that central 
government was making some attempt in principle to coordinate and centralise its 
internet presence, by drawing together information from across departments to present 
to citizens from a unified location. The judgement was that the flexibilities of internet 
technology offered new possibilities for coordinated service delivery, at least in terms 
of posting information. 
By February 1995,18 departments had posted information on the portal site, and half 
a milli 
' 
on requests for information had been received through it 
(Hansard, I 994/95a, col. 53 (W)). A National Audit Office survey in 1999 found that 
many departmental officials saw the creation of this central web portal as crucial early 
encouragement for government bodies to develop an internet presence 
(1999/2000a, p5l). 
The Steering Mechanismsfor 'Information Age' Government: The Central IT Unit 
In terms of high level political steering, the Conservatives appointed Ian 
Taylor, as Minister for Science and Technology at the DTI, to coordinate 'information 
age government'. Leading by example, he claimed to be the first Minister with an 
email address (Hansard, I 994/95d, col. 248). In fact, there had been a long-standing 
public sector interest in email applications, which by 2004 was as a cornerstone of 
digital communication in both general society and government. The Post Office had 
been investigating various processes that combined telecommunications with 
computers for decades, and the CCTA had been interested in email since the 1980s. In 
March 1985 its CCTA News bulletin noted that 45 'mailboxes' were in use across 
government, although the main problem with take-up was the unwillingness of civil 
servants to use keyboards, specifically senior ranks; 'with a few exceptions, the higher 
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the management grade the greater the reluctance' (1985, p21). Still, email had a 
natural asset of being cheap and efficient once a suitable infrastructure had been put in 
place, and was able to traverse departmental boundaries and provide a channel for the 
public to interact with government. In the American National Performance Review, a 
government-wide electronic mail service was recommended 
(Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, p55). A similar email infrastructure across government was 
also a preoccupation, of British central government in the years to come, as discussed 
later in the Chapter. 
Parliamentary committee scrutiny examined Ian Taylor's role briefly, and when 
pressed on his intentions he replied that he would: 
shy away from the thought that I was presenting myself to you as the Government 
coordinator of all information superhighways ... [but] I think you will accept that I am trying 
to pull it together in a way that it has not been previously pulled together and after six 
months I am beginning to see things taking shape (Trade and Industry, 
Committee, 1994/95, p4) 
Although stopping short of accepting overall responsibility for new internet 
technologies in government, Ian Taylor attempted to add coherence and coordination 
in government policy for the new technologies. 
Shortly after this, a definite commitment by central government to adopt a more 
strategic approach to internet and general IT policy occurred. Michael Heseltine had 
reportedly been alarmed that departments were permitted to develop computer 
systems independently without orchestration (Margetts, I 996, p74). He and the then 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster" Roger Freeman, involved in machinery of 
government questions at policy level, created a central steering body for IT, the 
aforementioned Central Information Technology Unit (CITU). This was set up in 
1995 within the Office of Public Service at the Cabinet Office; it had a remit to 
analyse potential ICT-mediated links between departments and the use of internet 
11 A historic non-departmental position usually given to a Cabinet minister who took on a coordinating 
role for a variety of issues; from the mid-1990s onwards this included e-government. 
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based central portal between government and citizens (Margetts, I 996, p73; 
CITU, I 996/97, p 12). It initially housed around ten staff, largely seconded from the 
private sector and run using a company board model (Margetts, I 999, p44). The CITU 
was intended to 'take a strategic view of the way IT is used across government' and 
to 'ensure that the opportunities that IT offers are exploited to maximize efficiency 
within government and its dealings with businesses and the citizen' (Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, I 996, para. 3.42). Thus, issues of 
coordination, networking and integration would be addressed anew through the 
CITU, particularly in light of new internet technologies. 
The creation of the CITU ultimately symbolised the demise of the CCTA. Some 
members of the Agency agreed that it would be prudent to establish a fresh, centrally 
positioned body to steer internet development in government; they helped persuade 
Heseltine and Freeman to set up the CITU (Bellamy, 2002, p2l4). Others were less 
sure; one source, working inside the CCTA at the time, commented that the feeling 
in the agency was 'how the hell did we allow this to happenT (personal 
correspondence - 6), as the CITU initially took away some of the responsibilities of 
the CCTA. Using the strategic focus of the CITU, Roger Freeman was given 
responsibility for the day-to-day operations of IT in the civil service, and, along with 
Ian Taylor, he was the major protagonist in political steering of e-govemment 
activity. 
Freeman gave an indication of the political thinking about the role of central IT 
policy in the mid- I 990s; he gave the perceived shortcomings of the CCTA as the 
motive to create CITU. In November 1995 he told parliament that the CCTA 'does 
not have a sufficiently central place to influence or coordinate the strategy of 
government in relation to information systems ... to improve coordination across 
government and the effective delivery of services to the public' 
(Hansard, 1995/96a, col. 859). This indicated that coordination was again seen as an 
imperative in political circles, yet the CCTA was not viewed upon as the 
organisation suitable to provide such a function. The solution was to create a 
completely new body, which soon began to overshadow the CCTA, even though it 
was stated that the two organisations were supposed to 'work in close co-ordination' 
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(Roger Freeman in Hansard, I 995/96b, col. 750). However, although the life of the 
CCTA was drawing to a close, it was briefly given control of both the 
interdepartmental Government Secure Intranet in 1998 and the open. gov. uk website 
in 1994,, although the CITU did have overall responsibility for e-govemment and 
sponsored both projects. Nevertheless, the CCTA did play a central role in early e- 
government development, and continued to do so well into Blair's term as Prime 
Minister from 1997. 
By the end of 1995, interest and discourse surrounding internet technologies were 
reaching fever pitch; this was reflected in increases in parliamentary activity centred 
on what was termed 'information age government' 12 . The House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology organised an investigation into the 
application of new ICTs in society and government (1996). Witnesses felt that there 
was a fragmentation of responsibility for ICTs across departments, whilst 
government use of internet applications was variable (ibid., para. 4.176-4.177). Calls 
for improved coordination did appear to be taken on board by government; as well as 
the CITU, in 1996 a Ministerial Group was set up to 'identify and take forward 
significant cross-departmental initiatives in information technology' 
(CITU, 1996/97, pl2). 
The Emerging Central Strategy: e-government to achievejoining up 
In November 1996 the CITU produced the seminal government. direct 
prospectus, discussed in Chapter One. This paper was heralded by ministers as a 
'new phase of public service reform' (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, pIO) and marked the 
beginning of the e-government era, providing the first indication of what an 
information age government strategy might entail (Bellamy, 2002, p2l4). Not only did 
government. direct associate new ICTs with profound transformations in the business 
of government but also argued that a coordinated approach to the technologies across 
government would help deliver holistic and seamless services to citizens. There was 
a clear commitment to reach out to citizens through intemet-based mediums 
(Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p82). Government. direct began to crystallise the association 
I. 2 At the time this was the preferred generic term for new ICT applications in government; the 
Information Superhighway used less often whereas e-government was yet to be a common phrase. 
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between e-government and joined up goverment in this way; an association that 
would become clearer in the years after its publication. 
The green paper promised to use information technology to 'change fundamentally 
and for the better the way that government provides services to citizens and 
businesses' (CITU, 1996/97, p I). By way of achieving this, the paper set out policies 
for delivering central goverm-nent services through IT that emphasised 'new ways of 
working and sharing information between government departments and agencies' 
(ibid., p3). Looking at governments around the world, the green paper identified the 
universal need for a 'strategic approach which looks across the whole of government' 
(ibid, p 12) in taking full advantage of the new technologies. It also recommended the 
'streamlining and integration of processes across the boundaries between government 
departments and agencies ... The strategy should also enable those dealing with 
government to obtain near instantaneous responses wherever practicable' (ibid, p 13). 
In Government Computing magazine, Freeman provided further information regarding 
the philosophy behind the green paper; he identified that new ICTs should ensure that 
&our dealing with citizens and businesses are structured around their needs and these 
will not necessarily align with - or even recognize - the divisions between agencies' 
(quoted in ETHOS, 1996, p4). 
In parliament Roger Freeman said that the government. direct paper: 
envisages a time when people will no longer have to queue up, fill out paper 
forms and send off cheques for Government licences; instead, they will be able 
to link directly into government ... Services will be more accessible, more 
convenient, easier to use, quicker in response and less costly to the taxpayer ... as 
a means of raising the quality of services and making them customer-driven 
(Hansard, 1996/97, col. 625) 
Thus, the green paper brought to the fore the association between new ICTs and the 
streamlining and coordination of service delivery. The proposition inferred in the 
paper was that a coordinated approach to ICT, particularly new internet technologies, 
could aid the transformation of service delivery away from the restrictions of a 
functional departmental format and towards a more holistic, citizen-centric mode. This 
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proposition was crystallized further in the subsequent Modernising Government white 
paper as the fundamental premise of the central e-government strategy. 
As discusses in Chapter One, a select group of academics (see Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b; 
Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, p84; Margetts, I 999, p47; Bellamy, I 999a) recognised the 
potential salience of the proposals, which suggested a movement towards 
informatizing service delivery by redesigning business processes to include inter- 
organisational. data sharing and integrated processes. Arguably, the approach in the 
green paper was aligned with the BPR movement that was gaining credence at the 
time. The Conservative government certainly saw ICTs as a tool for serious change in 
public sector business practice; Roger Freeman boasted to a parliamentary council 
that the proposals in government. direct 'have got Sir Humphrey terrified' 
(Sarson, 2000, p2) because of the emphasis on new ICT-mediated modes of delivery 
divergent to traditional methods. 
However, despite the compelling logic of transformation offered by new 'information 
age' technologies and the enthusiasm shown by government, a key message offered 
not only by select scholarly attention, but also the history of government computing 
presented in this thesis, was that the changes suggested in government. direct would be 
difficult to achieve within the institutional landscape of government. With its 
suggestion of inter-organisational links and coordination, the green paper challenged 
the existing information domains found in service delivery 
(Bellamy/Taylor, I 998b, p I 1- 15). The institutions of government had discrete 
information processes, client-groups, legislative environments, cultures, semantics 
and objectives, which were reflected in existing IT systems (ibid., p4,7,8). These 
institutional patterns were threatened by some of the inferences of the green paper. 
Nonetheless, the premise of ICT-mediated coordinated delivery, and the growing 
association between e-government and joined up government, continued and gathered 
pace subsequent to the green paper, as described below. 
The green paper was published at the end of John Major's administration; Blair's 
incumbency began a few months later. The period before spring 1997 did however 
provide a lasting legacy in terms of the initial response to the information age. Firstly, 
97 
the creation of the open. gov. uk website had provided a tool through which 
departmental information could be found at a unified point, using the Open 
Government movement as a focus. Secondly, the green paper had established the 
blueprint for what would become an e-government strategy, although one interviewee 
argued that this was published too close to the 1997 election for it to have a chance to 
be 'bedded into government practice' (interview - 9). Thirdly, and despite this 
remark, a number of pilot projects had been instigated, applying some of the ideas put 
forward in the paper (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b, p2). For instance; an Intelligent Form 
project converted six paper forms for the notification of self employment to one 'e- 
form', for distribution to Customs and Excise, the Inland Revenue and the 
Contributions Agency; a rural post office internet based kiosk scheme for benefits 
information in Broadclyst (near Exeter); a kiosk project involving Customs and 
Excise, the Inland Revenue and the Contributions Agency to provide information on 
different taxes; and another kiosk project to make Citizen's Charter data available on 
a network of 200 Touchpoint screens around the M25 (Hansard, I 997/98a, col. 239- 
40(W)). 
The e-govemment agenda emerged following this short yet important phase, where, in 
part spurred on by pressure for action by politicians, parliamentary groups and 
activity in other governments and business organisations, the administration under the 
Conservative government pushed on with putting in place a plan for information age 
government. The policies and activities of the period carried in them not only the 
Open Government values but also the sentiment that governments and their services 
could be reinvented and reengineered through ICTs. As a result, the oft-discussed 
notion of coordination, particularly through high-level political involvement at this 
stage, had become a resurgent and revitalized issue within the new context of internet 
related technologies. 
3.3 &GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 1990s: THE MODERNISING 
GOVERNMENT APPROACH 
Modernising proponents within Labour had long been convinced that new ICTs may 
play an integral part in public service and economic reform, and had mooted these 
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interests (Bellamy, 2002, p2l4; Labour Party, 1995); Blair himself was firmly in this 
camp (Bellamy, 2002, p2l4), along with MPs John Battle and Chris Smith. In 
November 1994 Blair set up a commission to investigate the creation of an 
Information Superhighway in the UK (Wintour, 1994). Furthermore in 1995, at a 
Labour conference at Brighton, Blair linked reform and social change with ideas 
connected to the Information Superhighway, in a way that reminded some of Wilson's 
'White Heat of Technology' speech in 1963 (White, 1995). In his New Britain book, 
Blair criticised the Conservatives for being 'passive' in internet development, and he 
expressed embryonic ideas about online 'interactive public services that put the user 
in control' (Blair, I 996, p98,106), despite being a self-confessed ICT novice 
(Blair, 1999). 
Once in power, Labour set about reviewing new ICT processes in government. As 
with Roger Freeman, Dr David Clark was given responsibility for e-government 
issues as the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, indicating that ICT strategy was 
seen as a responsibility for the centre of government. The first policy document of 
relevance under Labour firmly allied the use of ICTs with profound reform in public 
service delivery. Our Information Age (OCI, 1998) offered arguments regarding a 
fundamental shift towards an information society that were reminiscent of the 
writings of Daniel Bell and Alvin Toffler (Hudson, 2001, p5l6). 
The document emphasised that 'information age government' entailed providing 
6 services in ways geared to the convenience of citizens and business rather than the 
boundaries of government departments and agencies' (OCI, 1998, p28). The report 
recommended enhanced interdepartmental coordination to enable the provision of 
public information and other services over the internet, and confirmed that a white 
paper, first promised in by CITU in early 1997 as a follow up to government. direct 
(Bellamy/Taylor, I 998b, p2), would be published as soon as possible. Furthermore, in 
1998 the government produced results of a survey of citizen views on electronic 
interaction with government; this was circulated as Electronic Government: The View 
from the Queue (NAO, 1999/2000a, p5O). 
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However, despite this, unrest was beginning to be conveyed from within the Labour 
Party's own parliamentary ranks, centred on a perceived lack of political steering and 
understanding of information age opportunities. Derek Wyatt, a Labour MP 
commented in parliament that: 
Because no single Department is in charge of the internet, it falls into the black 
hole of cyberspace. Few Cabinet Ministers understand it: many still have no 
email addresses, and they clearly do not look regularly at their own departmental 
websites, which are woefully inadequate and make us look Me bumbling 
amateurs (Hansard, 1997/98c, col. 1201) 
However, despite the existence of the open. gov. uk central portal, David Clark argued 
that it was 'the responsibility of individual departments' to encourage and develop an 
internet presence (Hansard, 1997/98b, col. 499-500). Thus, whilst the notion that 
coordination was desirable, particularly with governmental websites, it was not clear 
exactly what format this would take and whether a strong centralised model should or 
could be adopted. 
There were indications that common technological architecture would be a clear aim 
however; the Government Secure Intranet (GSI) service was launched in April 1998, 
in partnership with Cable and Wireless. It provided a secure means of communication 
between civil servants across departments and access to the internet (OCI, I 998, p29); 
it was claimed to be the first secure government-wide network in the world (Petrie et 
al, I 999, p9). David Clark saw the GSI as a vital tool in information age government, 
he once commented that he was 'staggered on coming to office to discover that 
Government Departments could not communicate with each other electronically; nor 
could they even email each other. One of my key priorities was to put that right' 
(Hansard, 1997/98e, col. 1063). By 2004, after significant efforts over several years, 
vast amounts of emails were sent via GSI between departments and out to citizens and 
businesses, yet many health organisations for instance used a separate system. Still, 
GSI could be considered a considerable success as an architectural tool; it brought a 
common platform to many government organisations, contributed to the adoption of 
email by public sector workers and provided a useful tool for inter-organisational 
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communication and data exchange. However, despite these claims, it could also be 
claimed that GSI did not live up to expectations, as observed later in the chapter. 
Certainly, government actors identified the GSI as a tool for ICT-mediated 
coordinated service delivery, a notion that was being rejuvenated close to the end of 
the millennium. Peter Kilfoyle, parliamentary secretary for the Office of Public 
Service (where the CITU was located), commented during a Commons debate that 
GSI was created to facilitate 'a more coherent, customer-focused and integrated 
electronic service delivery' (Hansard, 1997/98d, col. 135-138). This was by now 
familiar rhetoric, which would be found in subsequent reports and speeches; a mantra 
that bound new ICTs to a joined up approach to service delivery. 
The Modernising Government "ite Paper: Crystallising thejoined up approach in 
e-government 
It was judged that a strategy document was needed quickly to clarify the e- 
government vision, despite previous publications. As promised in the Our Information 
Age report, a project known as 'Better Government' was instigated, to flesh out the 
approach to the perceived opportunities that new technologies offered. The scheme 
was sponsored by Dr David Clark and overseen by a Ministerial Group 
(Holliday, 2001, p320), and was due to publish in the summer of 1998. Yet serious 
delays were experienced when Clark was pushed out of his position during a 
reshuffle 13 , and the report was revised to ensure that 
it conformed to other government 
priorities. 
Jack Cunningham replaced Dr David Clark as Cabinet Office Minister and Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster in July 1998. Although the much-anticipated report was to 
be called 'Better Government', this was changed to the more moderate Modernising 
Government during the delay. This was published as a white paper in March 1999 
(Cabinet Office, 1998/99) and included a wide range of statements and strategies 
pertaining to a broad spectrum of policy areas, setting out the modemising approach 
of the new government. Yet there was little by way of a significant reaction in the first 
13 
, Allegedly because his Your Right to Know White Paper (1997/98), which detailed plans for the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, was too radical. 
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few months of its circulation. Peter Hennessy noted that it had initially been 'largely 
ignored' as a general roadmap of reform, and criticised the tone of the report for being 
'evangelical' in style (Hennessy, 1999). Still, the white paper did appear to have 
credence with civil servants; the NAO found that 82% of surveyed agency and 
department heads thought the paper was at least of 'some importance' as a driver for 
e-government development, whilst half thought it was 'quite important' or 'very 
important' (1999/2000a, p2O). 
As discussed in Chapter One, the Modernising Government white paper associated the 
use of ICTs with profound transformations in government and public service delivery. 
To recapitulate, the paper proposed to reform government away from introspective, 
provider centred organisational forms towards citizen-focused, coordinated and 
corporate models (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p23). To achieve this, new internet 
technologies in particular would be used to converge, align and integrate the 
information systems and flows of government, which would lead to seamless service 
delivery that disregarded functional departmental boundaries. The white paper 
conveyed the perception that government had failed to keep 'sufficient pace' with 
developments under the rubric of the digital, networked, information age and that, 
whilst previously IT systems were developed separately by government organisations 
under a decentralized model, there was a need to 'converge and inter-connect' them 
(ibid., p44-46). This would provide the desired levels of joined up working to attain 
efficient, responsive and effective service delivery. 
To achieve this, the paper recommended a corporate IT strategy, including a 
coordinated approach to procurement, mandatory participation in the use of the GSI to 
'boost cross-departmental working' as a 'platform for management of electronic 
government'records', the designation of senior officials to 'champion' information 
age government within departments and continuing partnerships with the private 
sector (ibid., p46-47). The paper also argued that the development of new information 
age government services would require impetus by 'stronger central co-ordination' to 
promote technological compatibility and bring different government bodies together 
(ibid., p55). Nothing more was said on this issue in the paper, although it was the 
Office of the e-Envoy that emerged shortly after its publication to provide the 
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perceived levels of steering. In 1997, the Prime Minister announced that by 2002, a 
quarter of all transactions between citizens and government should be possible 
electronically (NAO, I 999/2000a, p2). The white paper added to this that 50% of 
'dealinp with government' should be available to the public in electronic format by 
2005 and 100% by 2008 (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p53); these targets, which would 
later be put forward, would be the subject of considerable attention in the coming 
years. 
A key emphasis of the paper was on electronic interfaces with the citizenry; it set a 
target that by 2002 citizens should be able to electronically book driving and theory 
tests, search for jobs, submit self-assessment tax returns, receive benefits and health 
advice, apply for training loans and access a National Grid for learning (ibid, p5O). 
The most obvious way to provide such services would have been through the internet. 
Furthermore, the paper recognised that a more 'coherent approach' to government 
websites should be adopted and that 'gateways' or 'portals' that draw information 
from the 'widest possible range of government services' should be developed 
(ibld. &52). These gateways would be organised to cluster government functions 
around citizen-focused 'life episodes', coordinating information to one source rather 
than users having to interact with several departments or agencies separately 
(ibid. &54-55). Thus, many of the proposals under the new strategy centred on 
modernising and orchestrating the front-end interface with citizens through internet 
websites and portals. However, there were also proposals that hinted at back-office 
coordination; the paper conveyed plans to examine the role of greater data sharing 
between government organisations in improving financial dealings with citizens and 
noted that new technologies were bringing closer integration between complex tax 
and benefits arrangements (ibid. &52). 
Although there were still further details yet to emerge, the white paper clearly 
positioned ICTs as a central tool in modernised, integrated service delivery; the 
application of ICTs to joined up government. ICTs were set to 'give effect to the 
vision in this White Paper' yet the 'incompatible systems and services which are not 
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integrated' would need to be amended for the new aspirations to materialize 
(ibid., p45). 
It was argued that Modernising Government 'endorses and significantly extends' the 
content of government. direct (Bellamy/Petrie, 1999, p2), written and published under 
the Conservatives. However, one Labour MP interviewed for this thesis questioned 
this notion in arguing that government. direct was not particularly taken into account; 
'to be deadly honest we wouldn't study each other's documents ... we weren't allowed 
to meet the civil service. We could read a green paper but we could never get behind 
it' (interview - 9). A civil servant close to e-government activity at the time concurred 
by arguing that government. direct 'became a non-paper; we had huge piles of CDs of 
it lying around. By the time I arrived in 1999 you couldn't possibly refer to it - it was 
just some previous administration work' (interview - 1). Despite these arguments, 
there is a clear lineage from green paper to white paper (Hudson, 2001, p5l8); the 
development of the central e-government strategy and its underlying notions and 
assumptions can be seen in both. 
Shortly after the white paper emerged, Jack Cunningham retired to the backbenches 
(in October 1999) and Mo Mowlam took up the mantel of Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and the e-government responsibilities that came with it. The paper was 
debated in parliament, and in Mowlam's absence, Ian McCartney (Minister of State 
for the Cabinet Office, appointed in July 1999) was left to defend it. Both Tory and 
Liberal MPs (Andrew Lansley and Andrew Sewell) conveyed their doubts that 
information age government could be delivered (Hansard, 1999/2000, cols. 285-300). 
Mo Mowlam was, however, present at the first Public Administration Committee 
investigation of the modernisation agenda; yet because she was newly appointed, she 
was unable to answer many of the questions, confessing that she was still 'ploughing 
my way through a lot of detail' (I 999/2000c, p3). The white paper carried with it bold 
proposals (Hudson, 2001, p5l6) and inferred strong political leadership would be 
required (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p46,55). Yet, four different individuals (including 
Roger Freeman) had occupied the key Cabinet Office post in the space ofjust over 
two years, and Lord MacDonald would replace Mowlam herself in June 2001. In 
2003 Lord Macdonald was replaced by Douglas Alexander only to be supplanted by 
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Ruth Kelly in 2004, who herself left shortly afterwards to leave David Miliband as the 
Cabinet Office Minister with e-govermnent responsibilities. 
The transience of ministerial personalities steering e-governinent from within the 
Cabinet Office may not have been judged as ideal, yet nonetheless government 
organisations were beginning to embrace some of the messages of government. direct 
and Modernising Government. For instance public sector websites began to appear 
during the late 1990s, whilst the CCTA and CITU were both involved to varying 
degrees in strategy, policy and technical developments across government. The 
contents of Modernising Government suggested that coordination, networking, data 
sharing, integration and orchestration would be key watchwords in information age 
government. Applied to governmental internet presence in particular, it was indicated 
that this would mean portals drawing diverse information and services together under 
clusters aimed at citizen 'life episodes'. To encourage departments to pull together for 
this objective, the white paper proposed the use of champions, common platforms 
such as the GSI and the setting of targets. Further than this however, it was not 
precisely clear how information age government, or e-government as it became 
known as at the end of the 1990s, would be achieved and with what levels of success. 
The audit and parliamentary bodies, which historically had close involvement in 
government IT, proved to be a useful medium through which the e-goverriment 
strategy would be expressed and scrutinized more clearly. 
3.4 E-GOVERNMENT UNDER SCRUTINY: GOVERNMENT ON THE WEB 
By 1999, internet and web based tools were deemed to be of sufficient importance 
that the NAO devoted a large study to the government's use of the new technologies; 
the Office commissioned Helen Margetts and Patrick Dunleavy at the London School 
of Economics to conduct the research. The NAO reasoned that, as internet access in 
the UK increased, then citizens would expect to interact with government 
electronically. Furthermore, the report agreed with the sentiments of Modernising 
Government in that web-based technologies had the asset of being able to 'facilitate 
'joined up' government' and that the internet could provide a centralised access point 
to an 'otherwise organisational arrangement, allowing citizens to transact with several 
departments and agencies and across different tiers of government Simultaneously' 
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(NAO, 1999/2000a, pl). Whilst managerial and budgetary responsibilities for features 
such as websites and intranets essentially lay with departments, it was also the case 
that because of the emphasis on joining up, government organisations were looking to 
the centre for guidance (ibid&49). Furthermore, the changes required for the 
corporate IT structure recommended in Modernising Government implied an 
important strategic role for the centre of government, despite the historic pattern of 
decentralisation in IT policy (ibid), as discussed in Chapter One. 
However, a key finding of the report was that, regardless of important early work with 
the open. gov. uk portal, central impetus into coordination had flagged and as a result 
government websites appeared 'disconnected and relatively hard to navigate' 
(ibid., p2). Whilst most government organisations had developed a web presence (60% 
of those surveyed appeared to have a web site), many of them did not provide links to 
other relevant government sites, which the NAO took as a rudimentary signal that 
simple joining up conventions had often not been adopted by departments 
(ibid, p12,13). 
The CITU attempted to remedy this situation through a variety of measures. In 1999 it 
created a 'Government on the internet' working group to consider bringing coherence 
to websites through the production of guidelines. Secondly, the working group 
assessed the open. gov. uk portal which, although important in stimulating early 
internet use by hosting the sites of organisations new to the internet (ibld, p5 1), had 
more recently come in for criticism. The website had not been redesigned at any point 
from 1994 to 1999, the search engine did not function effectively and there had been a 
drift of departments away from open. gov. uk and towards there own discrete sites 
(ibid, p52). In late 1998 the decision was made to relaunch the portal to improve its 
role in orchestrating a corporate government web presence. 
Furthermore, CITU had grand designs for the GSI, which had already stimulated -, 
many departments into email use and was being managed by the CCTA. It was hoped 
that the GSI would become a pan-government portal through which citizens could 
interact with departments and the CITU envisioned that all government data would be 
compatible with the GSI architecture (ibld, p53). Additionally, it was recognised that 
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departmental e-government strategies could be coordinated through more traditional 
means as well as through providing unified technological platforms. Each Whitehall 
department had nominated a senior Information Age Champion to ensure, through the 
support of the Cabinet Office, that the organisation was aligned with the emerging 
central e-government strategy (ibid., p54). The CITU (contracting the services of 
CCTA) had also taken on the role of monitoring progress towards the overarching 
25% electronically enabled target for 2002, which was said to have provided 
stimulation to many departments (ibid., pH). 
However, the NAO were detected difficulties in the coordinating activities of the 
CITU. It was generally the case that 'central machinery for co-ordinating and 
promoting the development of government on the Web is rather weakly developed' 
(ibid., p58). There were doubts that the GSI would become anything more than an 
expensive email system whilst it was argued that the central collating powers and 
definitions associated with the overarching 25% target were inadequate (ibid., p55,58- 
59). Whilst the Government on the internet working group was important, it had 
limited membership, whilst the Central Office of Information's Government Internet 
Forum offered a wider range of viewpoints (ibid., p54). The CITU had a limited 
capacity to influence departmental policies; its budget was small and the unit's staff 
had seen its role to be to spot future trends or conduct research rather than provide a 
regulatory role. Departments with large IT budgets did not see either the CITU or 
CCTA as 'significant players' with any right to regulate website design for instance, 
although the CITU could involve Cabinet ministers in initiatives (ibid., p50). 
Government on the Web was crucial in that it provided some of the first critical 
insights into the development of the e-government strategy, in particular by the CITU. 
However, the report also provided a useful sketch of the adoption of information age 
government in the DSS, which had been the subject of notable academic scrutiny, as 
described in previous chapters. The NAO argued that existing IT systems, deployed 
often by private contractors under the Operational Strategy and other initiatives, 
would prevent the adoption of web-based facilities unless significant investment Was' 
forthcoming. The existence of nearly 200 mainframe computer systems across the 
DSS contributed to a fragmented, often paper-based service but the department 
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planned a solution, likely to cost billions, to integrate the mainframes (ibid., p25-26). 
The different agencies and units under the DSS had developed websites with their 
own distinctive design and branding, which had limited functionality. It was judged 
that there would be considerable savings and improvements in service by shifting 
some interactions, such as simple enquiries and forms, online. However, progress in 
the DSS had been slow, not least because of organisational. barriers such as complex 
and fragmented administrative and budgetaryarrangements for IT policy (ibid., p32- 
34). 
Government on the Web had acted as an important foil to Modernising Government; it 
provided a reminder of the institutional realities that came to bear on attempts to 
orchestrate ICT policy across government. Whilst Modernising Government had 
helped to focus departments on the clear opportunities involved in intemet-based 
applications, Government on the Web brought these aspirations into context. The 
CITU had put efforts into providing a central technological architecture, in 
conjunction with the CCTA, in the form of the GSI and open. gov. uk, to join up 
departmental activities and services online. However, despite notable successes the 
NAO provided indications of difficulties and complexities with bringing government 
organisations in line in the manner envisaged. 
A key message of the seminal scholarly works on government computing discussed in 
Chapter One was that, as Bellamy puts it, the 'functional segmentation of service 
delivery has become deeply embedded inthe institutions of government' (1999, p9O) 
and this would still be an important factor as applications developed under the 
emerging e-government strategy. Although the flexibilities and capabilities of 
internet-related technologies, which offered new tools such as email and web portals, 
leant themselves to the possibility of coordination, interoperation and integration, 
Government on the Web helped alert readers to the context within which e- 
government would operate. 
For instance, the back office fragmentation across the DSS was likely to remain for 
some time regardless of the use of internet tools, eith6r unilaterally or via a central 
portal, by the Department. Despite the availability of new ICTs, the history of 
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government IT and the cautionary messages of, for instance, Bellamy and Taylor 
(I 998a, pl 68-170), would still be relevant. Nonetheless, Government on the Web also 
provided some positive examples of internet use in departments; thý Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions was found to have a well-designed and 
helpful website, whilst the HM Registry, Employment Service, Inland Revenue and 
Customs and Excise all experienced an increase in the volume of electronic 
transactions (NAO, I 999/2000a, p23,57-5 8). The report also found examples of 'good 
practice' in government websites, such as the provision of 'clickable' links to other 
agencies (ibid., p 15). 
Parliamentary Committee Reports: Scrutinizing the steering of e-government 
A Public Accounts Committee (PAC) investig4tion, published in July 2000, 
was conducted using the NAO report; in particular, it provided illuminations into the 
philosophies underlying strategic thinking regarding the coordination of e-government 
in the Cabinet Office. Members of the committee were in consensus with government 
and the NAO regarding the role of new ICTs in the coordinated delivery of public 
services. The report noted that new technologies should be 'more integrated' and 
4compatible' so services could be delivered in a more 'joined up way' 
(PAC, I 999/2000a, p5). The PAC also had conviction that the Cabinet Office had an 
important role to play in this objective and committee members questioned witnesses 
on this basis. 
In answer to the accusation that central impetus into the orchestration of govermnent 
web presence had 'flagged', Brian Bender, as Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet 
Office, stated: 
I think we recognised a year or so ago that the pendulum of decentralisation to departments 
that happened over the last decade ... has swung too far in the area of IT. For that reason the 
Modemising Government White Paper and a significant number of actions that have been 
set out since then foresaw the pendulum swinging back a little bit, not to take power away 
from departments but to coordinate, set frameworks and then drive the programme from the 
centre (ibid., Q2) 
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Thus, although the Cabinet Office acknowledged the importance of departmental 
autonomy, it still wanted 'a coordinated framework to ensure that what departments 
did individually was properly joined up' (ibid., p7). Mechanisms and architecture, 
such as the Information Age Champions (later renamed 'e-champions'), GSI and 
website guidelines were being put into effect with this underlying approach in mind. 
During PAC examinations, the witnesses indicated that the approach by the Cabinet 
Office would be to take closer command in some circumstances. The CITU 
considered adopting 'greater control' over website development, possibly by central 
checking of departmental websites to monitor compliance to issued guidelines 
(ibid., Q9). Furthermore, finely-grained data standards had been produced to 
encourage technical integration (ibid., Q22). However, witnesses were very keen to 
emphasise the point that the intention was not to re-centralise but to ensure that, for 
instance, a common platform was provided to 'draw together information from 
different departments' at a single point such as a web portal (ibid, Q72-73). 
Still, changes were required in the operations and business of departments to move 
towards this fon-nat of e-governinent. A representative of the DSS was questioned 
during the examination and provided indications of the department's intentions to 
comply with the sentiments expressed in Modernising Government and echoed by the 
Cabinet Office witnesses. Whilst the NAO report referred to the department's 
administrative arrangements as 'complex and fragmented', a key imperative was to 
bring together the agencies within the DSS online. A new website was to be launched 
which was 'helpful to people out in the real world rather than along the organisational 
boundaries of the DSS' (ibid., Q 133). However, a more coordinated approach to the 
transactional elements to benefits operations was likely to remain an aspiration for 
some time as the DSS was 'very heavily constrained by our mainframe computer 
systems' (ibid., Q5 9) that made more significant changes to joining up across benefits 
agencies difficult. The case studies found in subsequent chapters of this thesis will 
provide illuminations into similar issues encountered as government organisations in 
the service fields of criminal justice and welfare began implementing e-governinent 
projects with joining up attributes. 
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Other early audit scrutiny of the e-government strategy came from the Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry, which investigated the issue of 'electronic 
government' as part of a wider report on e-commerce in Britain. The committee 
argued that the e-government agenda had been 'characterised by hyperbole [and] 
over-optimism about the capabilities of management to implement novel 
technological systems on a large scale, and repeated failures to learn from past 
mistakes' (TIC, 1998/99a, para. 96). Committee members identified a gulf between the 
policy documentation that was largely positive about the potential for new ICTs to 
transform service delivery and the realities of the government's track record in 
implementing new technologies. The report argued that 'ambitious cross-departmental 
projec. ts and 'one-stop-shops' are of no use to man or beast unless they can be 
delivered on time, in budget, and in full working order' (ibid. ). The issue of the 
project management capabilities of government organisations would continue to be a 
major concern for not only the organisations themselves but also audit bodies and, as 
it was seen as a sufficiently crucial and cross-cutting topic, the centre of government. 
3.5 THE E-ENVOY: FACILITATING &GOVERNMENT FROM THE' CENTRE 
Partially, no doubt, as a result of thought-provoking output from the NAO and , 
parliamentary committees, central government appeared committed to providing 
added political and strategic steering to the e-government strategy, to accompany the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the CITU within the Cabinet Office. The 
influential Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), which worked close to the Prime 
Minister in the Cabinet Office, published a report entitled e-commerce@its. best. uk. 
For e-government, in the words of the PIU director, Geoff Mulgan, it: 
defined Government thinking and policy development ... It led to the establishment of new 
mechanisms to coordinate and drive forward policy-making, including the appointment of 
an e-Minister and e-Envoy to lead work on the Information Age agenda across 
Government (Public Administration Committee, 1999/2000b, PIU memo, para. 3.1) 
The main corollary of the report was twofold: firstly an e-Minister was appointed 
from the DTI, to share e-government responsibilities with the Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster; Patricia Hewitt was given the job in July 1999, and unlike the 
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ephemeral Chancellors'. she retained e-government responsibilities for a number of 
years. Secondly, the report reiterated the importance of the appointment of an e- 
Envoy to help drive the e-government and e-commerce agenda. The idea of an e- 
Envoy was first announced in parliament when Peter Mandelson, then Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, declared plans for a 'high-ranking digital envoy' on 25 th 
November 1998 (Hansard, I 998/99, col. 217); his turn of phrase drew laughter from 
the opposition. However, there was no appointment for over a year but both the Trade 
and Industry Committee and the PIU recommended that the post should be assigned. 
Despite the apparent tardiness, the e-Envoy would quickly become a central 
component of the e-governinent strategy. 
The idea of an e-Envoy was said to be modelled on the post created for the US 
presidential advisor Ira Magaziner (TIC, 2000/01, page vi); however, the first e-Envoy, 
Alex Allan, was not appointed until January 2000 despite Mandelson's announcement 
of November 1998. Allan was formerly a High Commissioner to Australia, senior 
civil servant in the Treasury and John Major's principal private secretary, and early on 
he proved not afraid to criticise departments for past mistakes, specifically the 
Passport Agency crisis in 1999 (Kable, 2000a). However, Allan lasted only matter of 
months before returning to Australia; 'he didn't want the job' noted one interviewee 
(interview - 1). Later, Andrew Pinder filled the position, first of all temporarily, and 
then on a permanent basis. 
Despite the delay involved in the appointment of the e-Envoy, an office of staff 
quickly emerged to support the work involved; the Office of the e-Envoy (OeE). The 
OeE had three broad policy objectives fashioned around the exploitation of the 
internet and related technologies; to induce a fertile environment for e-commerce in 
Britain, to make the internet available to anyone who wanted access to it, and finally 
to achieve the electronic service delivery target of 100% by 2005 14 . It was the last 
section of this remit that would embody the OeFs efforts to realise the 
recommendations of Modernising Government on joining up service delivery through 
new ICTs. 
14 The Modernising Government white paper set the target at 2008, but the PIU's e- 
commerce@its. best, uk (1999) report brought it forward to the more challenging 2005. 
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Because of the third policy objective, the OeE began to operate in a similar territory to 
the CITU, j eopardising the existence of the Unit in its own right, which had itself 
begun to overshadow the work of the CCTA only a few years previously. Ironically, 
the CITU was absorbed into the OeE in September 2000 after a brief period acting 
under the direction of the e-Envoy whilst it completed its outstanding commitments; 
this was a few months before the CCTA was subsumed into the Office of Government 
Commerce (OGC). One interviewee, involved at the time, provided some illumination 
into the reasons for the termination of the CITU, noting that the thinking Was 'well 
we've got the e-Envoy and we've got the CITU and of course the CITU was a 
previous administration thing - so the CITU would have to become aligned with e- 
government, and become part of the OeF (interview - 1). Still, there were briefly 
three bodies involved in the development of e-government at the end of the 
millennium. 
The CITU still produced policy and strategy reports after the creation of the OeE. In 
April 2000 its e-government: A strategicframeworkfor public services in the 
Information Age was published, building from an assessment of the government's 
handling of the 'Millennium Bug' (Cabinet Office, 1999/2000). The e-government 
report was presented explicitly as the strategy document to fulfil the commitments 
proposed in Modernising Government (CITU, 2000, p I). The strategy was to be 
applied to the whole of the public sector, including central government, local 
government and the NHS (ibid, p9). Unsurprisingly, the report held a matching 
approach to the white paper; it argued that much needed to be done for government to 
d play a full part' in the 'radical transformation of society' that the 'information age 
revolution' was bringing (ibid. ). Four guiding principles were set to help achieve this 
goal; citizen-focused government, accessible services, inclusiveness and better 
managed information (ibid, pl-2). The strategy described distinct (but closely related) 
roles for CITU and the e-Envoy (ibld. &3), and, although arguing that no monolithic 
model for e-government existed, provided detailed guidance on a range of issues. The 
imperative was, to continue the theme established in previous policy documents, that 
new ICTs could be used to coordinate, integrate and join up delivery to provide 
significant improvements to services. Whilst the strategy was owned by the e-Envoy, 
113 
CITU was given the task of coordinating and monitoring it (ibid., pN), although a few 
months after publication the Unit was subsumed in the OeE. 
The strategy put emphasis on web portals, developed in local government and specific 
service areas beyond the central open. gov. uk website. The approach was that CITU 
should provide technical and architectural standards or guidance on issues such as 
security, authentication and privacy, so that government organisations would be 
facilitated to develop portals (ibld., p 16-20). However, the strategy went beyond the 
use of web technologies providing a more unified 'front end' to citizens that could 
access government via electronic channels. It also described plans to increase 
interoperability and data-sharing capacity across the public sector, through increased 
use of the existing GSI and the introduction of a 'middleware service' called the 
Government Gateway. The strategy held that government organisations would be 
required to migrate their IT systems to support IP standards and, using a CITU 
produced interoperability framework, communications and data could be exchanged 
between departments to facilitate joined up services (ibid, p20-2 1). The Government 
Gateway would join up many existing information systems and, through a process of 
authentication, would allow citizens and businesses to interact directly with relevant 
back office systems through an online portal (ibid, p2l). This then was a key 
component of the strategy; CITU (and soon after the OeE) would provide guidelines, 
technical standards and architecture through which public sector organisations would 
not only be able to provide unified web portals but would also begin to integrate and 
join up back office information systems where appropriate. 
However, there was a further role for the e-Envoy in particular, as the feeling was that 
there was considerable scope to create new cross-cutting services using internet 
technology and ICTs. As 'launching joined up services will call for innovation which 
may not be within the scope of a single agency' the e-Envoy was charged with 
'identifying candidates forjoined up services' (ibid, pU). In particular, the report 
warned against governmentorganisations developing 'separate systems' to be joined 
up at a later point (ibid, pN). 
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The report e-government: A strategicframeworkfor public services in the 
Information Age had fleshed out the approach of central government to e-government 
policy, adding to the detail provided by Government on the Web. However, CITU's 
final significant output before being subsumed into the OeE turned attention away 
from the strategic direction of coordinated e-government services and towards 
concern with a more established issue. This final phase in the life of the CITU as a 
separate entity, along with surrounding events, is discussed in the next section. 
3.6 SUCCESSFUL IT? THE FINAL OUTPUT OF THE CITU 
During last decades of the 20'h Century, audit, parliamentary and press scrutiny of 
individual departmental IT projects had found project management skills lacking in 
some cases. The CCTA had provided advice and controlled procurement in an attempt 
to obviate such perceived disasters, although its role became increasingly distant from 
the 1980s. However, central government actors saw major government IT projects as 
a sufficient risk to address anew in the context of the e-government agenda. The 
CITU was therefore charged with producing a review of major IT projects, published 
as Successful IT., Modernising Government in Action, otherwise known as 'The 
McCartney Report' (OeE/CITU, 2000). Using observations of previous audit and 
parliamentary committee scrutiny, the report provided guidelines and suggestions on 
the successful implementation of IT projects; the imperative was that 'mistakes of the 
past' had to be avoided (ibidp4). Suggestions inchided placing IT projects in the 
context of the wider business change, strong leadership, risks assessments, 
performance measurements and indicators, improved relationships with suppliers and, 
in line with strategic thinking, that ICTs must be used to enable work across 
traditional departmental boundaries. The report acknowledged that there were no 
simple and clear solutions to project management difficulties and therefore 
recommendations, rather than prescriptions, were offered. 
However, it was clear that compliance to the recommendations was being strongly 
promoted; success in the 'Information Age Government vision' would only be 
achieved if they were incorporated into the implementation of the e-governrnent 
strategy (ibid. &60). The report advised that 'implementation of the recommendations 
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in this report cannot be considered optional if improved practices and greater success 
are to be achieved' (ibid, p6l). The e-Envoy was given the task of supervising and 
managing the implementation of the recommendations, with permanent secretaries of 
departments reporting progress up to the e-Envoy (ibid. ). A few months later the 
government indicated that -the recommendations were indeed being utilized; in 
December 2000 Ian McCartney claimed that two thirds of the measures detailed in 
Successful IT had been successfully applied to new IT projects (Kable, 20000. 
Successful IT also proposed that the OGC (which the CCTA become part of shortly 
after the report was published) would have a prominent role in central involvement in 
departmental IT project management. In particular the OGC was asked to subject 
departmental e-government projects to a 'peer review' at certain 'gateway points', 
should the e-Envoy decide that such inspection was required (OeE/CITU, 2000,61). 
This mechanism would become a notable tool with which the OGC, operating in the 
Treasury, would assess many projects in subsequent years. Thus, although a Cabinet 
Office unit had led the Successful IT report, it was'a Treasury unit that would provide 
central testing and advice to e-govemment project managers in departments. 
The OGC had conducted over 60 reviews of IT projects by February 2001. The aim of 
these 'Gateway Reviews' was to curb failure rates by 'testing projects at five crucial 
stages in their life cycle', and Peter Gershon, ihen head of the OGC, thought that the 
scheme could save the taxpayer E500 million (Kable, 2002v). However, the OGC did 
not have any power to cancel projects, and the review reports themselves were kept 
secret. Questions were asked in parliament regarding the effectiveness of the Gateway 
Reviews (Hansard, 2002/03a, col. 315(W)). One MP, interviewed for this thesis, noted 
that the problem was that departments could disregard the reviews, and the relevant 
information was not in the public domain. Hence, 'if they want to ignore the Review 
and go ahead but it's in the public domain then fair enough, on their heads be it - but 
what I wouldn't want is for them to ignore it and for it not to be in the public domain 
- we need to know' (interview - 4). 
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However, it was argued that the OGC saw the Gateway Review process as more of an 
advice service than anything more proscriptive. A civil servant involved in OGC 
activity in this area clarified the position: 
I don't think that the OGC or anyone else is best suited to understand 
every departments' business strategy, some of that responsibility has to 
stay with departments ... You have someone coming in and assessing a 
single project, looking at how that project works but you can't see how 
that project fits with everything else, so we wouldn't be in a suitable 
position to make a be-all-and-end-all judgment (interview - 8) 
Nonetheless, it was clear that, using mechanisms of the OGC and strategy of the 
Cabinet Office, central governinent had energized its interest and involvement in 
project management processes in department and agencies, spurred by the e- 
government agenda and Modernising Government programme. 
Departmental IT Failure in the e-government Era: Detractingfrom the facilitation of 
joined up government 
Simultaneously however, away from the development of websites, audit and 
press scrutiny continued to point the finger at departmental IT projects for failing to 
deliver improvements in service delivery. Arguably, this took attention away from the 
ambitions of e-government policyrnakers, and acted as a reminder of the departmental 
track record with IT project management, which constrained the ambitions of ICT- 
mediated joined up government. 
A prominent example was the case of the National Probation Service Information 
Systems Strategy (NPSISS) managed by the Home Office's Probation Unit, with Bull 
Information Systems being the main contractor. As the NAO and the PAC found, the 
main problem was the case record and management system (CRAMS), which had 
proved to be difficult to use and failed to keep up with the requirements of the 
Probation Service (NAO, 2000/01; PAC, 2001/02e). 
Work on CRAMS was suspended in 1999, when the NPSISS was substantially over 
budget (NAO, 2000/01, summary para. 3; PAC, 2001/02e, paras. 2,3). CRAMS was 
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initially expected to cost E4 million, but was reassessed at El I million after the 
problems (NAO, 2000/01, summary para. 11). The Home Office management team 
was found to lack consistent leadership and resources, responsibilities were unclear 
and communication was weak (ibid., para. 3). The relationship with Bull also drew 
criticism; the NAO found that 'the performance of Bull was not managed effectively' 
and the Home Office made unnecessary purchase orders to the company, leading to 
'duplication and overlap, and a risk of overpayment' (ibid, paras. 13,14). Harry 
Fletcher from the National Association of Probation Officers, commented that 
CRAMS had been 'a complete waste of the taxpayers' money' 
(Maguire/Hencke, 2001). 
Another example was the Benefits Payment Card project, conceived during the 
Conservative government in 1995, which drew considerable attention from the NAO 
(1999/2000b) and the PAC (2000/01; 2001/02g). A partnership between the 
Department of Social Security and Post Office Counters awarded a contract to a 
subsidiary of ICL, known as Pathway, in May 1996. The project was set to 
computerize the benefit payment system in Post Offices across the country, and 
replace paper-based methods with a magnetic stripe payment card. The project's 
contract was one of the first examples of the PFI (Private Finance Initiative), where 
the supplier would take more financial responsibility for the scheme. The project was 
found to be disastrous by audit examination; it cost the involved parties and the 
taxpayer over El billion in abortive expenses (PAC, 2001/02g, para. 2) and effectively 
signaled the end of ICL (Gibbs, 2001). Even though the Treasury expressed grave 
doubts about the viability of the project (Watt, 1999), the NAO found that all parties 
underestimated the difficulties involved in the enormous scheme 
(PAC, 2001/02g, para. 3). The project was dropped on the 25th May 1999 and, overall, 
the PAC found it to be 'one the biggest IT failures in the public sector' (ibid., para. 
4v). Sir John Bourn, the Comptroller and Auditor General, blamed 'organisational 
myopia' for the disaster, which caused mistakes in IT projects to be made 'time and 
time again' (Hencke, 2000). 
A third eminent example of perceived failure was found in the scandal at the 
Passports Agency at the end of the millennium. From early 1999 the agency was 
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experiencing major problems in meeting demands for new passports, the root of the 
problem being the new computerized passport systems at the Liverpool and Newport 
offices. Siemens, the supplier for the project, failed to successfully roll out the new 
systems on time due to unforeseen problems, and without sufficient contingency 
plans, significant delays were experienced (NAO, 1999/2000c, summary paras. 3,4). 
The delays cost the agency an estimated; E12.6 million, and Siemens; E9 million 
(ibid., para. 11). The PAC considered the breakdown of service to the public to be 'a 
deplorable departure from the high standards of service the public has a right to 
expect' (PAC, I 999/2000c, paras. 3,4). It was also concluded that the relationship 
between the supplier and the government body was unsatisfactory; the agency found 
itself unable to hold Siemens liable for anything near the full costs of the disaster 
(ibid., para. 48). 
There were also continuing problems in the Contributions Agency, with the National 
Insurance Recording System and the Home Office, with the Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate Casework programme. Both of these programmes, instigated 
in the mid- I 990s, were discussed in Chapter Two but had remained as ongoing 
difficulties well into the e-government era (see PAC, 1997/98; 1998/99b; 1999/2000b; 
Kable, 2002w; Travis, 1999). 
ICL was taken over by Fujitsu and renamed Fujitsu Services during this period. One 
of its most prominent contracts was with the Libra project, which aimed to cut delays 
in processing criminal cases by electronically transferring case files between 400 
magistrate courts, the police, prisons, the probation services and other governmental 
bodies. However Route to Justice, an Audit Commission (AC) report, found that, by 
summer 2002, the Lord Chancellor's Department was fighting to save the project, 
which had experienced major IT problems since its inception in 1998 (AC, 2002b; 
Cross, 2002a; Kable, 2002x). The Public Accounts Committee were damning of the 
actions of both the department and the private supplier in the programme, 
commenting that it was 'one of the worst PFI deals that we have seen' 
(PAC, 2003, p4). Fujitsu Services were dropped from the project, and the ensuing 
search for a new supplier would cause further delays in the ailing venture (eGov 
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Monitor, 2002c). Nonetheless Fujitsu Services were soon involved in a E300 million 
project to upgrade the DVLA's IT system (eGov Monitor, 2002e). 
Finally, in August 2002, the Child Support Agency announced that its IT system 
would not be ready for 'another year or so' despite already being E50 million over 
budget andwell behind schedule (Kable, 2002o). The government had already held 
back new child support reforms in March 2002 because the system was not in a 
sufficient condition; the agency and the supplier (EDS) both apportioned blame to 
each other (ibid). The table below provides further details of perceived IT project 
failures, according to audit investigations. 
TABLE ONE 
MAJOR GOVERNMENT ITTAILURES'IN THE &GOVERNMENT ERA 
PROJECT DEPT(s) IT SUPPLIER DATES NOTES 
NAME 
NPSISS-Case Probation Bull 95-99 Suspended in 1999 L6 million over 
Record and Unit/Home Information budget 
Management Off ice Systems 
System 
Benefits DSS/PO ICL PM-hway 96-99 Suspended in 1999 with ZI billion in 
Payment counters LTD abortive expenses. Resurrected in 2002 
Card 
Passports Passport Siemens 97-99 Technical problems cost f. 12.6 million 
Agency New Agency and 40-day delays in passport turnover 
IT System 
NIRS2 Contributions Andersen 95-99 Continuing problems led to a 
Agency compensation payment of L38 million 
to pensioners 
immigration Home Off ice Siemens 96-99 Delays and hardship were experienced 
and through a 176,000 backlog of asylum 




LIBRA Lord ICL/Fujitsu 98- Collapsed in 2002 at E136 million over 
Chancellor's Services the initial budget and no improvements 
Department in service. LCD bought itself out of the 
old supplier contract and sought a new 
solution 
Childs CSA EDS 02- Huge delays in a new IT system, E50 
Support million over budget. Contributed to the 
Agency IT CSA failing to collect L200 million 
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E-Revenue Inland Revenue EDS and others 01- Problems led to slow take up in online 
tax services. Security breaches and a 
major error (where f 15 million of debts 
were wiped) tarnished this flagship e- 
government project 
Disclosure Criminal Capita 01- Delays and frustration experienced by 
Records Bureau users. The project received significant 
negative press attention 
10 V. A. T Online HM Customs Microsoft/EDS Ol- Pilot project had 66% dropout rate, as 
and Excise users were not attracted to filing VAT 
online 
11 Government Office of the e- Compaq 01- Following project problems relations 
Gateway Envoy between with the supplier broke down, 
allegedly at a cost of L4.77 million 
12 Individual Department for Capita 00- Allegations of security breaches and 
Learning Education and fraud led to its suspension. The 
Accounts Skills relationship between DfES and supplier 
was criticised 
13 Census Public Records ESS/QinetiQ 00- Service was overwhelmed and 
Online Office suspended for months after four days. 
Relations between supplier and 
department were criticised 
14 CPS Tracking Crown (PFI contract) 90- Over budget and delayed, the project 
System Prosecution was downscaled in 1997, to the 
Service detriment of the intended service 
improvements 
15 Housing DSS/Benefits EDS/IBM 99- Delays in the roll out of the system 
Benefits IT Agency exasperated attempts to combat 
Svstem I widespread benefits fraud - 
SO URCE- ORGAN. 2 003. n32 
Thus, the perception was that there were often severe shortcomings in the IT project 
management skills of government organisations. A PAC report that identified 25 
major IT project disasters during the 1990s (1999/2000b) was still pertinent in the 
new millennium as similar problems were reoccurring. David Davis, the chairman of 
the committee at the time, commented: 
such projects are too often delivered late or not at all; they come in over budget or fail to 
work as intended from the outset. The consequence of such poor performance is that the 
citizen loses out. Basic errors are repeated time and time again, but lessons do not seem to 
have been teamed (quoted in Travis, 1999) 
This track record, along with continued negative audit scrutiny, put much emphasis on 
the imperative of improving levels of successful IT project implementation by 
fulfilling set objectives on time and on budget. Central government had put energies 
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into helping to improve the situation through recommendations and peer reviews. 
However, thishad arguably taken attention away from the application of e- 
government to joining up, as the focus on project management issues -appeared largely 
to operate in the purview of discrete departmental IT operations. 
Yet, the publication of the PIU's Wiring it Up document, as discussed in Chapter One, 
demonstrated that joining up, through a variety of measures (PIU, 2000a, p 18), was 
very much on the agenda for central strategists. Although there was virtually no 
mention of ICTs in Wiring it Up, the OeE would quickly espouse the association 
between e-government and joined up government communicated in other policy 
documents. With the OGC accepting the primary role in renewed efforts to offer 
project management scrutiny and assistance to government departments, the OeE 
(having subsumed the CITU) concentrated more on addressing some of the issues 
surrounding the strategic direction of e-government, as departments moved to reach 
the overarching 2005 target for electronic service delivery. 
3.7 CONSTRUCTING &GOVERNMENT TOOLS AND MEASURES: JOINING 
UP FROM THE CENTRE THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE E-ENVOY 
Just as the CITU was merged with the OeE, the PlU published a further major report; 
e. gov: Electronic Government Servicesfor the 21" Century, which covered similar 
ground in terms of the central policies and technical architecture found in the previous 
CITU Strategic Framework document. However, some significant departures and 
embellishments did feature in the PlU report that provided indications of the modus 
operandi of the enlarged OeE. For instance, e-government, it argued, should not only 
be joined up but should be delivered through a range of electronic channels, by 
private and voluntary sector actors as well as government organisations 
(PIU, 2000b, p3). The central message of the report was, however, familiar and clear, 
that electronic methods'would transform service delivery into a more joined up 
model, to the benefit of citizens. 
As with previous policy documents, the PlU report put particular emphasis on how 
the vision for e-govemment would be realised with the aid of central steering. It 
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recommended that six-monthly Cabinet meetings to discuss and monitor progress 
with e-government would be useful, and argued that the OeE should have some 
control over the release of funding for projects (ibid., p 10). Technical standards, 
developed by the OeE should be adhered to on a 'mandatory' basis across the public 
sector whilst common functions such as the Government Gateway should be used by 
departments as a key tool for integration (ibid., p88). The report discussed the 
proposed 'UK Online' portal (which replaced open. gov. uk in December 2000) as an 
instrument of joining up, with online services drawn together from different 
departments and organised as clusters around citizen 'life events' (ibid, p 12), a 
concept originally discussed in Modernising Government. Initially, the UK Online 
portal was to create joined up services around 'Having a Baby', 'Going Away', 
'Dealing with Crime' and 'Moving Home'; the report recommended that all 
government services to the citizen should be available through the UK Online portal, 
unless the OeE gave a 'specific exemption' (ibid, p5 1). 
Thus, as with previous policy documents, the PlU report gave much prominence to 
the role of the centre in providing common architecture, technical standards, progress 
monitoring and web portals; the OeE was placed at the heart of the e-govemment 
strategy. However, the PIU expressed concern that the centre of government 'has had 
few levers with which to influence progress' and discussed how it could become more 
effective. The report recommended a 'carrots and sticks' approach to incentivise 
departments to innovate and join up services where possible. Whilst the centre should 
ensure that government organisations were not acting in isolation from each other, it 
was also made clear that 'departments and agencies must have sufficient freedom to 
serve their customers' and that the centre should not 'second-guess' service providers 
in many circumstances (ibid, p72,87). 
Thus, the role for the OeE and surrounding central mechanisms was to be 
sophisticated and balanced according to the report, not least because the PlU 
recognised the challenge which lay in creating the necessary institutional and 
organisational changes for joining up through electronic means. The report warned 
that the scale and complexity of government, along with the size of client groups, 
volume of transactions and number of different back office systems would make 
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coordination difficult, not least as there was little incentive for departments to deliver 
electronic services in partnership (ibid, p70,79). Key institutional factors were 
therefore acknowledged in the PlU report, although much of the subsequent output by 
the OeE itself indicated a wariness to discuss such issues in public documents. 
Certainly, the PIU report devoted considerable energy to independently exploring 
desirable future scenarios and possible options for the direction of e-government (e. g 
ibid., p 16-3 1) rather than more immediate, wholly concrete issues. Still, the PIU was 
influential and close to the OeE in the Cabinet Office; the e-Envoy sat on the advisory 
group for the report. Much of the recommendations can be seen in the subsequent 
work of the OeE, which was just beginning to increase its activity in implementing 
and steering the emerging e-government strategy as the report was published. 
However, there was a question as to whether the PlU report should have been seen as 
accompanying or succeeding the CITU strategy document published a few months 
before. Although the CITU report was mentioned by the PIU, confusion abounded as 
the Prime Minister's introduction commented that 'government must set out a clear 
vision of what it is trying to achieve' (ibid&3); this despite the existence of the CITU 
strategy for some months. Although the two reports contain similar themes and ideas, 
some divergence in contents could be considered to have detracted from the 
coherence of the central e-govermnent strategy. Nonetheless, both documents, 
informed by Modernising Government, contributed significantly to the direction of 
the OeE and firmed up the components the e-government strategy. With a number of 
strategy documents to draw from, the OeE, as the leading central body with strategic 
responsibilities for e-government, was set by late 2000 to step up its activity in 
helping implement the proposals. 
UK Online: Facilitatingjoining up on the web and in departmental back offices 
The work of the OeE, orientated around encouraging e-commerce, making the 
internet universally accessible and getting all government services online by 2005, 
was organised around the general programme of 'UK Online'. Progress with the 
programme was expressed in annual and monthly UK Online reports by the OeE. 
According to the first, and indeed subsequent annual reports, the key imperative of 
coordination in e-government to produce joined up service delivery, expressed in 
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Modernising Government and subsequent policy documents, was taken to heart by the 
Office. Furthermore, the specific recommendations on how to help achieve the joined 
up model were taken forward by the Office; these included technical architecture and 
standards, a more sophisticated central portal, improving data sharing across 
departments, departmental e-government project budget allocations, identifying 
opportunities for joined up services, championing private and voluntary sector 
involvement and monitoring departmental progress with e-government projects. 
In the immediate months and years after autumn 2000 it was the OeE run central UK 
Online web portal that received most attention. The portal ukonline. gov. uk replaced 
open. gov. uk on the 4th of December 2000, and was billed as 'a single point of entry to 
all online official government information and services' by bringing information 
together 'from over a 1000 public sector websites' (OeE, December 2000 'Monthly 
Report"'). The UK Online portal was intended to represent an 'overarching brand' to 
present e-government in 'a coherent and coordinated manner' (OeE, 2000, p6O). In 
particular, the Life Episodes project was to feed into the UK Online portal to procure 
this coherence for users, who would for instance be able to notify government online 
of a change of address or arrival of a new baby once, with the necessary agencies 
being automatically informed and services provided in a unified manner. However, by 
2000 the appearance of the UK Online portal and Life Episodes had already been 
delayed (Kable, 2001 a) and was seen as 'very much work in progress' (OeE, 
December 2000 MR). Nonetheless, it was claimed that the portal received 1.5 million 
hits in its first month, despite the 'deliberate lack of publicity' surrounding the site 
(OeE, February 2001 MR). 
The Government Gateway was a second key component to the UK Online 
programme; it went live in January 2001, with Microsoft being the main contractor. 
As discussed previously (CITU, 2000, p2O-21), the Gateway represented 'middleware' 
that would authenticate, sort and redistribute data to relevant back-office systems and 
individual online service users. Users would be able to register and log on to the 
central Gateway portal and transact with multiple government agencies at a single 
point. It was claimed that it was the first of its kind in the world, and that it would 
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enable 'true joined up transactions for the first time' (OeE, February 2001 MR). 
According to the director of the project, by September 2002 the Gateway was 'used 
by the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, Dept of Trade and Industry, Dept of 
Environment and will soon add the Dept of Work and Pensions, some of the 
Devolved Administrations and others' (Mather, 2002). 
Thirdly, the OeE was also making efforts to develop technical standards to which 
government agencies would adhere to encourage data sharing and integration between 
back offices, in certain instances. The Office launched the e-Government 
Interoperability Framework (e-GIF) in October 2000 (OeE, 2000, p46) and in 
subsequent years many technical amendments were made. A year later no less than 11 
documents were released (some were revised versions of older documents) which 
largely provided technical frameworks and standards that dealt with security 
specifications, registration issues, the minimum requirements for the validation of a 
user's identity and other issues. For instance, the e-Services Development Framework 
(2001d) was produced to help establish standards for interoperability betw6en 
departmental IT systems. 
Fourthly, the monitoring of departmental progress with e-government projects 
appeared as an important responsibility for the OeE. All main central departments had 
produced initial e-government business strategies by October 2000 and submitted 
them to the OeE for assessment; a second round of documents was submitted in July 
2001 by departments. This reporting process was promoted as a facilitator for 
'transforming the quality of services offered to individuals and businesses' 
(Hansard, 2000/01 e, col. 78 1) and as 'the foundation for ensuring that the government 
will meet its target that all key services should be available by 2005' (OeE, December 
2000 MR). The OeE would use the submitted documents to monitor and aid 
departments in reaching the general 2005 target. 
It was through these four tools and measures in particular that the OeE was steering 
the e-government strategy; more would be added following the appointment of the 
second e-Envoy, as discussed in the next section. 
13 Referred to as MR forthwith. 
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3.8 E-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY UNDER ANDREW PINDER 
Following the departure of Alex Allan, Andrew Pinder had occupied the position of e- 
Envoy for three months as an independent IT consultant, having previously spoken at 
CCTA and other public sector events in this capacity (Kable, 2000b; 2000d). Pinder 
made it clear that he was not interested in the permanent position. However, by 
December 2000 the pressure was on to find a permanent q-Envoy, as Richard Wilson 
(then Cabinet Secretary) had already stated that he wanted to make an appointment by 
the end of November (Kable, 2000e) and questions -were being asked in parliament 
(Hansard, 2000/0 I b, cols. 327-328). Yet an internal memo revealed that the quality of 
applicants had been 'very disappointing' and therefore, bizarrely, Pinder appeared to 
be the favourite even though he had insisted that he was not applying for the job 
(Kable, 2000d), and he was officially assigned on 31 st January 200 1. 
Pinder was immediately positive about the UK Online central portal, describing it as 
'a bureaucracy-busting website which is designed to dramatically cut the hassle of 
dealing with government' (Pinder, 2001a, p I). Elsewhere he promoted the familiar 
aspiration that 'services should be packaged in a tailored, customer-focused 
fashion ... so that the citizen or businessperson is offered real benefits by transacting 
online' (Pinder, 2001 c). As for his own role, he saw it as 'an energy source, a focal 
point' that needed 'someone with a sense of vision ... who can help pull things 
together and make connections' (Pinder, 2001b). Pinder also indicated that reform in 
the business operations of government would be required to realise his aspirations: he 
wanted 'a cultural revolution to turn the behemoth of bureaucracy into a slick e- 
business machine' (Pinder, 2001ý, pl). 
A few months after Pinder's appointment there were further changes to the ministerial 
personnel with responsibility for e-government. Lord Macdonald took up the mantle 
of Minister for the Cabinet Office and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
replacing Mo Mowlarn. However, while Ian McCartney was moved to the new 
Department for Work and Pensions, there was no clear replacement for him as a 
Minister with some e-govemment responsibility. Within the Cabinet Office, 
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Christopher Leslie was given some responsibility for IT in government, and also 
answered some questions in parliament (Hansard, 2001/02b, col. 898(W); 
2001/02c, col. 383(W)). Blair had spurned calls for the appointment of a dedicated e- 
Minister at Cabinet level, instead promoting Douglas Alexander to the post of Minster 
for e-commerce and competitiveness at the DTI (Kable, 2001e) to support Patricia 
Hewitt, who retained overall responsibility for the e-agenda, despite heading her 
department. Some observers believed the ministerial situation was confused and 
unlikely to lead to effective coordination. In parliament, Derek Wyatt asked why a 
high-level Cabinet 'internet Minister' had not been appointed but Ian McCartney 
retorted that Tony Blair himself fulfilled this role (Hansard, 2000/Olb, cols. 327-328). 
Departmental Projects During Pinder's Tenure: e-government in silos 
As Pinder began his term as permanent e-Envoy in early 2001, it was clear 
that a number of government agencies had begun instigating e-government projects 
and online services, largely within the purview of existing organisational boundaries. 
In December 1999 Tony Blair launched the NHS Direct online service, which 
provided extensive health advice to aid 'self-help' style diagnosis. The service 
received over a million hits on its first day (OeE, January 2000 MR) but later leveled 
out to an average 100,000 hits daily (Bosely, 2000). A more in depth online 
consultation service, the National Electronic Library for Health, was also being 
developed with the objective of enabling citizens to access the same information as 
their doctor (Kable, 2002t). Another major welfare initiative was to ensure that 
citizens would have electronic patient records in place of paper documentation (OeE, 
June 2000 MR), accessible across health and social service agencies and drawing 
together personal data from a variety of sources (see Chapter Five). 
The Inland Revenue was also launching e-government schemes during this period. 
From March 2000 it was possible for businesses and individuals to file self- 
assessment tax-returns online (OeE, March 2000 MR), and by January 2001 these 
taxpayers could pay tax online using a debit card (OeE, February 2001 MR), said to 
be the first example of a central government body offering citizens the option to pay 
debts online (NAO, 2001/02c, summary para. 7). Also, and internet PAYE service was 
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introduced, to allow employers to send and receive tax information over the internet. 
Ultimately it was hoped that there would be universal 'e-filing' of PAYE returns 
(OeE, May 2002 MR). Some aspects of the Inland Revenue's e-government services 
used the OeE's Government Gateway system. 
In July 2000 the Lord Chancellor announced that a National Land Information Service 
(NLIS) would be launched to develop an online gateway to property information 
(OeE, July 2000 MR), and the Land Registry was computerizing 45 million records to 
allow citizens to view records online (OeE, February 2001 MR). 'Land Registry 
Direct' also appeared, offering electronic access to more than 17 million registers, 
title plans and deeds on the Land Register; it aimed to speed up house buying and 
selling though 'e-conveyancing' (NAO, 2001/02d, p2-4). In November 2000 the 
Employment Service had extended its contract with EDS to include the installation of 
new computers and touch screen kiosks in a thousand Job Centres and a new website 
(OeE, December 2000 MR). A few months later worktrain. gov. uk was instigated, a 
website which drew from several different departments to offer information on jobs, 
careers and learning for jobseekers (OeE, March 2001 MR). A National Statistics 
website was launched in June 2000, arranged around 13 themes such as 'crime and 
justice". 'population and migration', 'social and welfare' and so on (OeE, June 2000 
MR). Similarly, the Public Records Office was developing an online database of eight 
million records, to enable a faster and more convenient service (NAO, 2001/02d, p 15- 
16). The Court Service launched an e-court pilot to enable solicitors to issue interim 
applications by email, where possible for judges to resolve without the need for a 
court hearing (OeE, February 2001 MR). Later, further services were implemented, 
where citizens' owed money could issue an online claim, and progress with court 
cases could be followed over the internet (Dyer, 2002). The NAO found that the e- 
court pilot speeded up the issuing and serving of court applications by 16 days on 
average (NAO, 2001/02d, p 13). 
Her Majesties Customs and Excise (HMCE) was developing online transactional 
facilities; this included updating its existing electronic customs declaration system and 
a new internet-based Value Added Tax (VAT) service (NAO, 2001/2002d, p 18). The 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Post Office signed a contract with 
129 
SchlumbergerSema to convert the payment and order book system, used by 13 million 
citizens in Britain, to an automated service. From October 2002, claimants were being 
informed of these reform plans, which represented the successor to the ill-fated 
Pathway project. Pathway was identified as 'Whitehall's most expensive single IT 
disaster', and therefore the new project had considerable pressure on it to perform 
(Kable, 2002s). 
All of the discussed along with many other examples were bona fide evidence that in 
particular, web-based services, as an integral component of the central government 
model for e-government, were being developed enthusiastically by many departments. 
Although it was the case, in keeping with an enduring pattern, that audit scrutiny was 
identifying many perceived failures within individual projects (discussed below), the 
proliferation of e-government projects could be seen as a notable success. The 
impetus of the centrally set 2005 target, with support from Cabinet Office units (the 
CITU, PlU and OeE), would have been partially responsible for stimulating and 
guiding departmental e-govemment activity. However, evidently, most of the 
projects, despite using new internet based technologies, were firmly rooted in 
departmental settings. Although the internet and associated ICTs had been embraced 
as a new channel for departmental service delivery, there were few indications that 
government agencies were using technologies to help coordinate or integrate 
appropriate services by the end of Pinder's first year as e-Envoy, although central 
infrastructural tools had some influence. 
The Second Annual UK Online Report: Further e-government tools and measures to 
facilitate joining up 
However, the OeE's second UK Online report, published in December 2001, 
indicated that central government would continue to attempt to guide and develop 
measures to encourage joining up through e-government. The report noted that the 
UK Online portal, whichwas receiving over a million hits per week, had developed 
an engine to search 700 government websites and had added further Life Episodes 
('death and bereavement', 'learning to drive', 'looking after someone', 'looking for a 
job' and 'pensions and retitement') to accompany the existing four (OeE, 2001a, p53). 
The intention was to 'integrate many of the presently separate Government sites' 
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under the UK Online portal (ibld., p54). Still, despite the expansion of the Life 
Episodes, therewas concern in the report that not enough progress had been made 
with joining up. As a result an 'inventory of joined up projects' had been produced to 
take forward to departments for potential development (ibid, p47). Furthermore, the 
Government Gateway was promoted as 'an exemplary piece of infrastructure' that 
would hide the complexity of dealing with government for online users and provide a 
platform for departmental back office systems to share data. The aim was to increase 
the functionality of the Gateway, not least by closely tying it with the UK Online 
portal, to increase the transactional capabilities of the government's central web 
presence with a single online payments engine, secure email and downloadable 
personal documents (ibid., p54-55). 
The OeE had also been developing a new service; the Knowledge Network was set to 
deliver 'a unified cross-Governinent communications infrastructure to enable officials 
in all Government departments and associated bodies ... to communicate electronically 
with each other and share common, secure access to databases, discussion forums, 
web-based community sites and 'knowledge pools" (ibid, pW). The report argued 
that, whilst previously civil servants were 'effectively trapped in technical and 
organisational 'silos", information and knowledge could be shared freely across 
government following the emergence of the Knowledge Network, thus facilitating 
joined up working (ibid. ). 
Coordination, integration and joining up remained the key mission of the OeE and the 
central e-government strategy. The measures were intended to not only bring together 
government services online, but also to help 're-engineer departmental business 
processes' and instigate 'a major programme of change' (ibid, p46,48). The applied 
logic was that new ICTs were closely associated with profound transformations in the 
organisations and processes of government. Not only would e-government transform 
the mode and methods of service delivery but also, government organisations would 
have to change and adapt to be able take advantage of new ICTs. Either way, the OeE 
philosophy was clearly that e-government had transformation at its heart. 
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By 2002 there had undoubtedly been a significant reaction to the internet and other 
new ICTs across many areas of government. Specifically as a response to the OeE- 
driven central e-government strategy, many government organisations had submitted 
e-business plans and were working towards the overarching 2005 target for 100% 
electronic service delivery. Many also had contributed to the UK Online portal 
through the Life Episodes functions and a few were using the Government Gateway 
to provide transactional services to citizens and businesses. By then the public could 
apply for a passport, buy a TV licence, nominate someone for an honour, book a 
driving theory test and get a fishing licence through the UK Online portal. The GSI 
infrastructure was used quite pervasively for email by central departments. 
Funding was certainly available for e-governinent projects at this time; during'2002 
there were 100 new IT investments in central government, with a cost nearing E10 
billion. Of this figure, the allocation of El billion was the responsibility of the OeE in 
conjunction with the Treasury (NAO, 2001/02d, plO). Although still a significant 
portion, it was clear that tight budgetary control was not the primary means through 
which the OeE would oversee and steer the departmental response to the e- 
government strategy; other measures would be relied on to encourage an emphasis on 
joining up. It was during this period that many departmental e-government projects 
were critically scrutinised by audit, parliamentary and press observers. This scrutiny, 
a useful indicator of the wider e-government landscape beyond the activities of the 
OeE, is related in the next section. 
3.9 DEPARTMENTAL E-GOVERNMENT AND AUDIT SCRUTINY 
The Inland Revenue's e-Revenue programme won some audit praise, with a 
sophisticated website and innovative transactional services for self-assessment and 
PAYE, using the Government Gateway architecture (NAO, 2001/02c, summary paras. 
3,7). The Office of the e-Envoy had offered this as proof that e-government was 
moving towards more transactional rather than solely informational services (OeE, 
February, March, May 2002 MRs). However, audit scrutiny from the NAO found that 
there were problems with some aspects of e-Revenue. For instance, with the 
submission of tax returns, four out of five internet submission attempts by citizens 
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failed (NAO, 2001/02c, summary para. 8). Although some of these failures may have 
been due to errors on behalf of the user, there were still clearly some inadequacies in 
the system. Many of these were improved, and by December 200170% of first-time 
submission attempts were successful (ibid), although only 39,000 taxpayers used the 
Self-Assessment service in 1999/2000, compared with a projected 315,000 (ibid, 
summary para. 14). 
The NAO did identify successes in the business use of the PAYE online service 
(ibid. ) and other ICT projects. Nonetheless, it was the technical problems and levels 
of take-up of e-Revenue services that made the headlines (e. g. Ward, 2002), and 
prompted questions in parliament (e. g. Andrew Lahsley in Hansard, 2000/2001 d, col. 
330). The Liberal Democrats conducted their own research on the costs of self- 
assessment, which they concluded cost E212 annually per user with e-Revenue rather 
than E60 for the old paper based system (eGov Monitor, 2002a). Also Silcock claimed 
that, when the Inland Revenue first introduced the online self-assessment service, 
staff had to take the counterproductive measure of keying data sent over the internet 
by hand as the technical infrastructure was not yet complete (2000, p9O). 
Answering questions for the follow-up PAC report (2001/02a), Nicholas Montagu, 
chairman of the Inland Revenue, argued that a 'build and learn' approach had been 
adopted, which inevitably led to 'teething problems' that could subsequently be 
overcome (ibld, Q4-1 1). Still, on the issue of security fears (the danger of fraud and 
loss of privacy for users through hacking or computer error), Montagu offered a 
'categorical and copper-bottomed reassurance' (ibid., Q71). Ironically, one month 
after the hearing, the Inland Revenue withdrew its Self-Assessment service after 
reports that users could see information about other taxpayers on certain web pages, 
and snippets of information which they had not inputted themselves were appearing 
on their online forms (ibid, summary para. 29; Inman, 2002). This: coupled with a less 
publicised mistake made in February 2002, where f 15 million of taxpayers' debts 
were wiped from its computer system (Kable, 2002d), led to a confidence-building 
television advertising promotion to encourage citizens into using e-Revenue services. 
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A further example of internet security failures prompted concern about the 
trustworthiness of government online services; there were alleged security breaches in 
the Individual Learning Account (ILA) system. Accounts were opened with the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) by 2.5 million people, to help improve 
their skills and training, not least by af 15 0 grant for the first million people to apply 
(MacLeod, 2001). The system was suspended when it was revealed that confidential 
data could be accessed online by some a: ccount holders, leaving open the possibility of 
fraud (Kingston, 2002). This generated an Education and Skills committee report 
(2001/02) and a House of Commons debate (Hansard, 2001/02d, cols. 1033-1062) that 
scrutinised the relationship between the DfES and supplier Capita. In July 2003 it was 
announced that the ILA system would not be resurrected and the PAC deemed the 
DfES's relationship with Capita 'wholly inadequate' (Kable, 2003j). 
Despite security problems, by 2003/04 the uptake of key e-Revenue services had 
improved and a sharp rise in take up meant the service had received one million 
online tax returns (Upton, 2004; Kable, 2003a); the programme had successfully 
offered a viable alternative to traditional tax transactions and had attracted many 
users. Although a notable achievement, the Inland Revenue's premier e-government 
service did largely mimic existing paper based methods and there was less evidence 
that, for instance, joined up services offering tax, pensions and benefits services from 
across departments were being developed. However, in March 2004 it was announced 
that HMCE and Inland Revenue would be merged in the coming years to form Her 
Majesties Revenue and Customs. By summer 2004 it remained to be seen if relevant 
interoperation and integration between the back office systems of the two departments 
would occur (Morgan/Rae, 2004) and whether joined up services for citizens and 
businesses would emerge as a result of the merger. 
During 2002, critical scrutiny was being applied to other e-goverrunent projects. The 
Criminal Records Bureau vetting service, Disclosure, was launched in April 2002 to 
provide organisations with background checks on new employees set to work with 
children or vulnerable adults. The checking involved consultation of police, DfES and 
the Home Office databases to ascertain the suitability of each individual submitted for 
vetting. Disclosure was initially delayed because of computer difficulties, and this led 
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to a backlog of applications, which numbered 100,000 by August 2002 
(Kable, 2002q). An emergency plan included employing clerks in India to help process 
applications, the temporary suspension of the new system, and a hundred new staff 
(Curtis, 2002; Kable, 2002q). 
Whilst the Home Office threatened the IT supplier, Capita, with legal action, the 
murder of two children (Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman) by a school caretaker and 
the imminent return to term-time after the summer holidays meant that the Disclosure 
backlog was receiving constant attention in late summer 2002. The service was 
suspended in March 2003 whilst the problems were reviewed (Kable, 2003b). In 
February 2004 the NAO provided a definitive appraisal of Disclosure, finding fault in 
the decision to go ahead with the service despite questioning of its readiness by the 
OGC's Gateway Review team (NAO, 2003/04, summary p3). A key issue was that 
Disclosure found it difficult to glean information from different government 
databases; information was either gathered too slowly or, in the case of HMCE and 
British Transport Police, not at all (ibid, p6,4). 
One of the most eagerly awaited and lauded e-government projects, the online 1901 
census, also ran into problems very early into its existence. The website went live in 
January 2002, and offered the chance for the public to find lost relatives, conduct 
research and trace histories. 32 million records from the census conducted in 1901 
were digitised by QinetiQ, which subcontracted transcription work out to Enterprise 
Supply Services, a commercial arm of the Prison Service; much of this work was 
carried out by inmates (Rayner, 2002). However, the main problem emerged the day it 
was launched, when over one million hits were being received per hour, swamping 
the site enough to block entry for most users. The site was suspended after four days 
and its pla6ed relaunch was delayed by several months; the 1901 census project was 
said by the press to have become 'a byword for inadequate attempts to deliver e- 
services' (Kable, 2002h). However, the service was nonetheless in the favourable 
position of having high levels of latent demand from users and would become a 
successful e-government project once the volume of requests were accommodated 
(NAO, 2002/03). 
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Whilst many departmental e-government projects were considered successful, often 
after a challenging period where problems were addressed, the critical scrutiny during 
this period brought home a point that government IT would be as difficult and 
complex in the e-government environment as previously. Project management skills 
were an enduring cause for concern; the OGC's Gateway Reviews f6und that 76% of 
e-government projects inspected had three or more weak aspects around 2002 
(PAC, 2001/02c, para. 18). Elsewhere, it was announced that only 10% of IT projects 
passed through the Review at the highest level (Kable, 2001b). Thus, whilst e- 
government was being embraced by many departments and agencies, the emphasis 
appeared often to be on successfully managing the implementation of internet and 
new ICT-based services and tools within existing organisational boundaries. 
Nonetheless, the OeE continued to promote measures to join up service delivery 
through e-government even as the Office began to wind down in 2002 and 2003, as 
discussed in the next section. 
3.10 THE FINAL PHASE OF OFFICE OF THE E-ENVOY ACTIVITIES: 
SUSTAINING AND RENEWING ATTEMPTS TO FACILITATE JOINING UP 
THROUGH E-GOVERNMENT 
During 2002 there was a number of changes and developments to the wider 
operations of the OeE and the political steering of e-government. There was concern 
that the citizenry were reluctant to access and use the internet, whether for the 
purposes of interacting with government or other reasons. The OeE used the 
endorsement of minor celebrities, dubbed 'online ambassadors', along with the 
creation of a free phone hotline and a new website (letsallgeton. gov. uk) to encourage 
e-government and general internet use. There was also still considerable optimism 
from the highest political levels for the role of ICTs in public service delivery. For 
instance, in late 2002, Prime Minister Blair spoke at a highly publicised 'e-summit', 
where he stated a commitment to wire up every school, GP practice, hospital, police 
building and pension department to broadband by 2006 to help provide joined up 
services (Gibson, 2002). 
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Also some appointments in a mini-reshuffle in May 2002 could have been taken as an 
attempt to inject youth and enthusiasm into the e-governinent agenda. The young 
Douglas Alexander was moved from his e-commerce post in the DTI to the Cabinet 
Office, to take up e-governinent responsibilities there as Minister of State, and was 
replaced by Stephen Timms, who took up his position in the DTI armed with more 
industry experience than Alexander. Christopher Leslie lost his Cabinet Office 
position, which included some e-government responsibilities; he moved to the new 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. Finally Lord MacDonald had his role tweaked 
slightly to put him closer to the Prime Minister, but left soon after. 
Otherwise, the OeE continued to produce annual UK Online reports (OeE, 2002b; 
2003) which traced progress and developments of the measures set out in previous 
publications. Further measures, initiatives and policy directions were however 
announced during 2002 and 2003 that aimed to improve Jýoining up. Firstly, the 2002 
report noted that rather than concentrating on putting all possible services online to 
attain the overarching target, government agencies should also focus on those areas 
(taxation, health, education and land/property ett) where customer benefits were 
likely to be greatest. With this focus in mind, the OeE launched a cross departmental 
e-Government Delivery Programme to coordinate the development of high impact e-. 
government services (OeE, 2002b, 46). 
Secondly, the same report described the OeE's efforts to build a central infrastructure 
designed to host and provide content management for multiple government websites 
(ibid, p65-66). The infrastructure, known as 'Delivering on the Promise' (DotP), was 
being designed to encourage content syndicationand sharing across central 
departments' websites that would be housed and managed by OeE. In conjunction 
with the Office, the Treasury was set to require proof that alternative website 
provision was value for money if government organisations chose not to subscribe to 
DotP (ibid, p66). 
Thirdly, the OeE planned to introduce a 'pan-government toolbar' that would provide 
a common search facility available on all government websites (ibid, p64). This was 
an attempt to add levels of coherence and consistency to the government's web 
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presence, in addition to UK Online and DotP. Fourthly, Project True North was an 
E83 million programme to develop two resilient (and secret) data centres to 
consolidate and house central e-government infrastructures (OeE, 2003, p34). Plans 
were made to bring the hardware for the Government Gateway, Knowledge Network 
and UK Online portal together, to provide efficiency savings and security 
(OeE, 2002b, p68); the government felt this would provide 'a firm planning basis for 
the delivery of joined up government' (OeE, 2003, p34). 
Furthermore, the OeE appeared to be exploring new areas and de 
* 
veloping additional 
measures and projects for existing responsibilities. For instance during 2002 and 
2003, the Office launched an interactive digital TV service, drove forward a smart 
card programme, led on e-democracy and electronic voting policy and initiatives, 
developed a policy framework for the use of private and public sector 'intermediaries' 
in electronic service delivery, and participated in considerations on the use of Open 
Source Software in government (OeE, 2002b, p5O-63). 
During this period, the OeE continued to develop existing tools and measures; the 
Government Gateway was upgraded to allow local authorities to offer services 
through it, the Knowledge Network took on new facets and the e-GIF was updated 
every six months to 'ensure that departmental systems are interoperable' (ibid, p64- 
65; OeE, 2003, p33). Meanwhile, the GSI, a secure email service available to central 
government departments which it was hoped would develop into a sophisticated 
information sharing tool, was being led jointly by the OGC and OeE 
(NAO, 2001/02d. p53). The OGC had commenced a procurement exercise for an 
updated GSI during 2002 (OeE, 2002b, p66). 
The Decline of the Office of the e-Envoy 
However, despite continuing OcE activity and the introduction of new 
measures, there had been some debate about the longevity of the Office beyond 2005; 
the deadline for the overarching 100% target. In 2002 it was reported that some OeE 
officials felt that the Office 'would not (or should not) exist beyond 2005' 
(NAO, 2001/02d, p45); thus the organisation arguably carried with it a sense of 
transience. However, in March 2003, rumours began to surface that the OeE might not 
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reach 2005 as it was said to be subject to serious cutbacks. The head of the civil 
service at this point, Sir Andrew Turnbull argued in a PAC meeting that the OeE still 
had an important role to play, although some cuts were looming and Pinder himself 
was likely to leave at the expiration of his contract in April 2004 (Kable, 2003c), some 
months before the deadline for the 100% target. Furthermore, the OeE lost the 
responsibility for the provision of broadband to the DTI, and the Monthly Reports to 
the Prime Minister began to peter out, often with many months between each briefing. 
By December 2002 the 100% target was pushed back from March 2005 to the end of 
that year, indicating that there were doubts about its achievability. In fact, in the same 
month a director at the OeE, Dr Chris March, was quoted widely as remarking that a 
cmiracle' was needed to reach the target (Blincoe, 2002). In Spring 2004 the OeE had 
announced that 76% of services earmarked by departments were available 
electronically (OeE, 2004b). However, the full list of e-enabled services indicated that 
most of them were informational (e. g. posting information and reports online), rather 
than transactional in nature (ibld). Many of the more difficult transactional services 
earmarked, that required back office reform, were to be dealt with last by departments 
(Cross, 2004e). 
During a review of government communications (the Phillis Review) during 2003, 
rumours resurfaced that the OeE was nearing the end of its existence, at least in part 
because the title 'e-Envoy' was beginning to be seen as an embarrassing anachronism 
from the late- I 990s 'dot com' era. On the 15'h of December 2003, Douglas Alexander 
announced that the e-Envoy would be replaced, as part of a natural 'evolution', by a 
head of e-government (Cabinet Office, 2003). Thus, the OeE looked certain to be 
terminated, or at least reformed beyond recognition in April 2004, to coincide with 
the departure of Andrew Pinder, although he had agreed to stay in some capacity to 
help with the changes. The Office had a life span of little more than four years, shorter 
than either the CCTA or CITU. Its termination provided fuel to the speculation that 
the e-government programme as a whole was being derailed. The Conservative Party, 
which had remained relatively silent on e-government issues for years, was beginning 
to voice concern. Michael Fabricant MP remarked that 'the e-Env6y's office is dying 
of death and UK Online just stutters forward', believing that departmental opposition 
had hindered progress (Say, 2004, pl 1). During the same periods, a high-profile 
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efficiency review (Gershon, 2004) indicated that less money would be available for 
departments to spend on e-government projects following the end of 2005 and there 
Was a sense that, in terms of investment, the party was over (Cross, 2004a, p6-8). 
Nonetheless, the breaking up of the OeE did not single the end of central interest in 
steering an e-government agenda. The new Cabinet Office e-Government Unit, 
headed by Ian Watmore, continued the drive to apply ICTs to joined up delivery from 
2004 but with some changes in emphasis, as discussed at the end of this Chapter. 
First, the next section of the Chapter will provide an assessment of the achievements 
of the OeE and its handling of the central e-government strategy. 
3.11 ASSESSING THE STRATEGIES AND OUTPUTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
E-ENVOY 
The first e-Envoy was appointed in January 2000 and the CITU was merged with the 
growing OeE in September of that year. The OeE's mission, to facilitate e-commerce, 
make the internet accessible and reach electronic service delivery targets, was guided 
by the objective of exploiting the internet to optimum levels, which ministers of the 
Labour government had seen as an imperative. By April 2004 the OeE had been 
replaced with the Cabinet Office e-Government Unit, which concentrated on 
electronic government services alone rather than the wider remit of e-commerce and 
internet access. From 2000 to 2004 the OeE drove the central e-goverriment strategy, 
with the key imperative of joining up permeating much of its activity and outputs, as 
laid down by Labour government ministers and the e-envoy. This Chapter has 
fulfilled a central objective of the thesis in profiling the approaches and practices 
which government had offered to reach and develop the objectives set out in 
Modernising Government and related policy documents. 
Since its creation, the OeE had as part of its remit a responsibility to introduce, 
promote and enthuse about the possibilities of the internet and associated technologies 
in public service delivery and beyond. The second e-Envoy, Andrew Pinder, saw his 
role as an energetic, evangelical visionary (Pinder, 2001 a, p 1). The OeE, along with the 
CITU and CCTA, contributed to animation and stimulation of interest in e- 
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government in departments and agencies; for instance with the request for the 
submission of e-business plans to the e-Envoy and the creation of the overarching 
electronic service delivery targets. Also the OeE had been largely responsible for 
establishing or developing a number of key architectural tools such as GSI, the 
Goverment Gateway and the UK Online portal. 
The role of the OeE in providing concrete initiatives, tools and guidance to help 
realise the strategies put forward in Modernising Government should not be 
underestimated. However, the four annual UK Online reports tended to be markedly 
positive and optimistic in style and content, contrasting with the complex and difficult 
task which OeE protagonists were well aware that they faced in helping steer 
electronic service delivery towards ajoined up format. This reporting style drew 
criticism from the Trade and Industry Committee, which argued that there was a 
4slight whiff of unreality about the electronic government agenda' (2000/01, page xiii). 
There was a similar argument from an academic point of view; Bellamy pointed out 
that 'the rhetoric of information-age government has outstripped its achievements and 
governments still have a long way to go in fulfilling the radical promises made for the 
transformatory powers of information and communication technologies' (2002, p2l3). 
Although discussed by the PIU (PIU, 2000b, p7O, 79), the institutional, organisational 
and technological challenges involved in effecting joining up in many instances were 
not a common topic for OeE publications. Nonetheless, it is possible to provide some 
assessment of the key measures that the OeE put in place. 
The Government Gateway was promoted as a crucial tool in joining up departmental 
back office systems at a single point for users (PIU, 2000b, p88; OeE, 2001a, p54-55). 
There were early difficulties for the project; it ran into financial and contractual 
problems (NAO, 2001/02a, p6) as the OeE lost E4.77 million to Compaq when 
negotiations to continue work on the Government Gateway broke down. Previously, 
Compaq had been involved in the decision to downscale the Gateway (Kable, 2000c) 
and when relations deteriorated, the government paid for work already carried out by 
the company, but decided to take the management of the project back in-house 
(NAO, 2001/02a, p7)., A raft of companies took over the project, headed by Microsoft, 
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SEMA and Cable and Wireless. Later, the project director managed to recoup some of 
the associated loses (interview - 3). 
Despite these problems, the Government Gateway developed from 200 1, tackling 
intricate and difficult issues such as the online authentication and authorization of 
users wishing to access multiple transactional services through the internet. Although 
several government organisations had subscribed to the service, most notably the 
Inland Revenue, in 2002 the NAO noted that 'it is unclear how many other central 
departments in Whitehall will agree to use it' (2001/02d, p53). The initial five 
Gateway service pilots (using services from three different departments), four of 
which were aimed at business-type customers, were found to be 'disappointing' by 
the NAO due to low take up (ibid. ) 
By summer 2004 there were indications that the central premise behind the Gateway 
was unlikely to translate into practical reality. Although being billed as a single sign 
on portal for citizens to transact with several departments, the enrolment process for 
users was cumbersome. To register, a citizen would need to fill in an online form and 
provide an existing unique identifier, ranging from national insurance numbers, tax 
reference codes or departmental codes given in previous communication with 
departments, depending on which service was being applied for. The citizen would 
then receive a 12-digit user number and set an alphanumeric password that could be 
used as a single sign on for multiple services. However, each service had to be 
registered for separately and in every case users would need to receive an activation 
PIN via post that would need inputting online before services could be accessed. This 
was because government agencies were unable or unwilling to trust and share each 
others authentication data; thus, although the OeE had made inroads into solving 
intricate questions of identity and verification, the benefits of this were less obvious in 
Gateway operations. 
Although eventually dozens of central government services were available on the 
Government Gateway, many of these were for businesses and some had negligible 
take up. By 2004 the majority of Gateway enrolments were for the successful Self- 
Assessment service for online tax submissions of the self-employed. Yet, only a 
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handful of local authorities participated (OeE, 2004a) and the sense was that 
transactional e-government services, where they occurred, largely took place away 
from the unified point of the central Gateway infrastructure. 
The UK Online portal was promoted as the centre piece of the government's joined up 
and coherent web presence (PIU, 2000b, pl2,51; OeE, 2000, p6O; 2001a, p53-54) from 
December 2000 until it was replaced in 2004. The NAO found that the initial change 
over from open. gov. uk was not handled well and criticised the 'static' design of the 
portal homepage (2001/02d, p47-48). The portal was redesigned and relaunched in 
January 2002 and represented a concerted effort to bring together useful departmental 
information and online services accessible at a single point. However, there was some 
considerable doubt that government organisations were participating in the UK Online 
portal to the extent desired (ibid., p65). 
Despite the upgrades to the UK Online portal, there still a sense that more could be 
achieved through it. The OeE acknowledged as much in the fourth UK Online report, 
where it was noted that the portal fell 'a long way short of providing a single delivery 
point for government services and the joining up of services' (OeE, 2003, p3 0); the 
imperative was to reengineer the central government portal to something closer to the 
original aspiration for a single joined up platform for citizens to transact with 
government. The 'online government store' project was set to be effectively a 
replacement of the UK Online portal, but with more functionality by way of offering 
transactional services in a single location, rather than users being redirected to 
departmental sites. The online government store did not materialise for some time 
however and eventually was manifested as the 'Directgov' portal in spring 2004. This 
was indeed a replacement for UK Online and was described by Andrew Pinder as a 
'world beater', as it aimed to answer most queries within its own site, rather than 
redirecting users to myriad government websites. However, it fell short of the vision 
of the online government store project, as citizens still had to visit separate 
departmental sites for most transactions, with Pinder blaming 'the complexities of 
joining up systems at the back end of government' (Cross, 2003b) as the cause of this 
shortcoming. 
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The Life Episodes aspect of the UK Online portal had originally been discussed in the 
Modernising Government white paper (Cabinet Office, 1998/99, p54-55) and promoted 
as a means of clustering services from different agencies around the needs of the user 
(OeE, 2000, p6O; 2001a, p53). Despite some initial delays, the Life Episodes 
component remained and expanded to feature nine functions in total 
(OeE, 200 1 a, p5 3). However, there were criticisms that the Episodes lacked substance 
and did not deliver the holistic services expected (Jeffery, 2001); much of the Life 
Episodes service offered simple (albeit useful) links to the websites of other relevant 
government agencies. As with the Government Gateway, there were institutional 
complexities apparent that made the required joined up working difficult. For 
instance, the 'Moving House' Life Episode encountered difficulties as, embedded in 
different government agencies, there were said to be '56 different statutes and 186 
different regulations dealing with the simple matter of changing an address [and] 
people usually have to tell at least eight different agencies that they've moved' 
(Holmes, 2001, p66). The difficulties were not easily solved, and in 2004 the Life 
Episodes approach was dropped, although similar tools were developed in Directgov 
thereafter. 
The UK Online portal, as well the successor (Directgov) and predecessor 
(open. gov. uk), were intended to unify and coordinate the government's web presence, 
to enable users to find information and services easily and to integrate separate 
government websites (OeE, 2001a, p53). Although the central web portal, in all three 
guises, had provided a focal hub of sorts for government online, it had not succeeded 
in creating a definitive central point through which all sites were listed or ordered. As 
a reflection of the large number of public sector organisations in the UK, there was 
still a confusing labyrinth of 3000 government websites in existence in 2003 
(Mathieson, 2003) with varying URL logic and domain names. Central government 
alone had 900 websites (OcE, 2003, p3O). Although the OeE had continued to develop 
website guidelines and standards (OeE, 200 1 a, p49), there was no common format, 
channel or portal through which all government online information could be accessed. 
It was the case that many central government websites had been found by the NAO to 
have improved rapidly between 1999 and 2002 (NAO, 2001/02, p62), by which time a 
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clear, well-designed and information rich website was an expected mandatory feature 
of departmental activities, arguably as a result in part of the OeE efforts in providing 
guidance and advice. However, it was also the case that some websites were found to 
be inadequate. Research published in November 2002 found that out of 20 'flagship' 
government websites, three-quarters needed a significant overhaul, ironically with the 
10 Downing Street portal rated the worst of all (Interactive Bureau, 2002). A similar 
report a year later found some improvements (Interactive Bureau, 2003). Although the 
OeE had played a role in adding coherence to the government web presence, the 
dominant model unsurprisingly appeared to be for departments and agencies to 
develop their own websites rather than solely concentrating on contributing to central 
platforms. Although some sites were found to be lacking according to some observers, 
government online was seen to have grown and improved by 2002, yet had not been 
drawn together to the extent envisaged by the OeE. 
Arguably, central government had not succeeded in achieving the desired levels of 
coherence and commonality in web presence integral to the sentiments of the e- 
government strategy. Perhaps partially as a reaction to this, the OeE tried a different 
approach with the pan-government toolbar, to bring joining up to online search 
facilities if not government sites themselves. However, a common search facility did 
not emerge and most government organisations used their own search tools specific to 
individual websites. 
The Delivering on the Promise (DotP) infrastructure had been developed to centrally 
house and manage the content of government websites, with the aim of reducing 
duplication and sharing resources (OeE, 2002b, p65-66; 2003, p33). In part, this had 
been another attempt by the OeE to bring a sense of commonality to the government's 
web presence, in this case by bringing departmental websites together under a single 
infrastructure. However, whilst it was envisaged that 'significant numbers' of central 
government departments would enrol on DotP and that agencies and local authorities 
could also participate (OeE, 2002b, p66), few seemed to take up the offer. In early 
2004 the Department of Health website became the first to join the DotP, whilst soon 
after the new Directgov portal was launched through it (OeE, 2004a). However, there 
were very few additions to this and there was some doubt as to whether DotP would 
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be continued, despite the OeE's insistence that the organisations not wishing to 
participate would need to justify their decision to the Treasury (OeE, 2002b, p66). 
Most central departments appeared to prefer to make their own arrangements for 
websites content and housing. 
During 2002 the OeE had initiated Project True North to provide a secure location to 
house the Government Gateway, the central portal and the Knowledge Network. 
However, True North reportedly ran into difficulties, and was running months behind 
in its implementation (Cuddy, 2003), before the contract was finally awarded to a 
supplier, ITNET. By summer 2004 the head of the new Cabinet Office e-Government 
Unit said publicly, that he was considering cancelling True North (Cross, 2004b); the 
cancellation was announced shortly afterwards (Amott, 2004a). 
The Knowledge Network fared better however; by 2004 55,000 civil servants had 
access to briefing information on the Network via the GSI (Cross, 2004c) and the new 
e-Government Unit appeared keen to maintain and develop the service. The GSI, 
through which the Network operated, had also enduring and had continued to attract 
government organisations. By 2004 it was claimed that there were 280,000 users 
across 140 public sector bodies (Coates, 2004), providing significant support for the 
argument that the Intranet service 'underpins e-government by providing secure, 
resilient network services' (OeE, 2002b, p66). However, GSI largely provided email 
and directory services only, whilst the plans to provide methods of data integration 
and sharing proved to be slow to germinate (NAO, 2001/02d, p53). Furthermore, many 
of the major public sector organisations, such as the Ministry of Defence and NHS, 
were not using the GSI network directly. Nonetheless, in early 2004 the OGC 
contracted a new supplier that promised to improve the functions of the GSI to bring 
it closer to the original conception (Coates, 2004). Regardless of whether these added 
functions did eventually emerge, the GSI represented a significant triumph for the 
OeE and OGC, as a working infrastructural tool that was said to provide a secure 
method of communication for many public sector staff. 
The e-GIF had also remained to provide the minimum specifications for data flows, 
interconnectivity and data integration (OeE, 2002a); it had been updated several times, 
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particularly with the help of the Cabinet Office-led 'govtalk' forum. The e-GIF was 
described as mandatory (OeE, 2002b, p6O) although there were no available statistics 
to suggest how widely the technical specification was used. However, e-GIF was 
adopted for use in some of the key technological infrastructures discussed in the case 
studies (see Chapters Four and Five) as well as elsewhere in the public sector. Thus, 
e-GIF appeared to be a success in, at the very least, contributing to the potential for 
interoperability and data sharing for many government organisations that had 
complied. 
Conversely, the overarching target for electronic service delivery by the end of 2005, 
a central plank of the OeE e-government strategy, had received criticism. It was not 
only considered unlikely that the targets would be attained, even according to some 
OeE staff (Blincoe, 2002) but there were also accusations that they were ill conceived. 
Although initially a useful stimulation, arguably the overarching targets had taken 
emphasis away from the crucial factor in engaging with citizens on online, that of the 
willingness of users to participate (NAO, 2001/02d, pl). In 2003 a survey quoted by 
the OeE found that 29% of adults had visited government websites during a 12-month 
period and 8% of internet users claimed to have transacted with government online 
(OeE, 2003, p29). Although it was significant that the OeE and government 
departments had built this figure up from nothing in the space of a few years, the low 
take up figures were a cause for concern for the e-govenunent agenda 
(Margetts/Yared, 2003, p3-4). 
For the specific question of joined up government, the overarching targets could also 
be criticised as they measured electronic service provision in a way that was largely 
restricted to departmental purviews. The monitoring regime for the targets were tied 
into departmental Public Service and Service Delivery Agreements supervised by the 
Treasury which, although containing some cross-cutting elements, were largely 
applicable to individual departments (see Treasury, 2000). The OeE did also ask 
departments if they had any plans to integrate or link electronic services with other 
government organisations or if they were considering using a central web portal 
(OeE, 2000o) in reaching the overarching target; nonetheless, this requirement was not 
a central aspect of the monitoring regime. Despite the emphasis on developing 
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departmental collaborations and cross-government services in e-goverm-nent, a major 
mechanism for measuring progress with electronic services did little to take this 
emphasis into account; the anomaly had been noted by some sources 
(Walsh, 2001; Naylor, 2004). 
There were also calls for the 2005 target itself to be scrapped, as it was argued that it 
was ultimately a provider-focused incentive, and failed to account fully for the needs 
of the citizenry in the e-government environment. The Institute of Public Policy 
Research was a prominent voice in the 'bin the 2005 deadline' campaign 
(Kable, 20031), which called into question the viability of the OeE itself as supervisor 
of the targets. The break up of the OeE before the 2005 deadline arrived was perhaps 
an indication of the attitude to the overarching targets in high level policy and 
political circles. It suggested that the opinion was that a change in emphasis, 
embodied in the new e-Government Unit, was required. 
The conclusion of this chapter will draw together the above observations and other 
evidence to provide an appraisal of the e-government strategy up to summer 2004. 
3.12 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis finds that the OeE had experienced mixed results in its attempts to provide 
the strategies, measures and technical architecture to instigate joining up through e- 
government. The platforms for communication between the back offices of 
departmen ts, namely the GSI, Knowledge Network and e-GIF, had appeared to be 
successfully implemented in many instances. However, other measures which 
attempted to use the internet to reach out to the citizenry had arguably met with less 
success, this despite the interfacing powers the web offered. 
The Government Gateway, UK Online portal and Life Episodes, pan-government 
toolbar and DotP epitomised the OeFs attempt to draw together and improve services 
on the web but all had met with problems and received criticism. Whilst the intention 
was to integrate many public sector websites through UK Online, drawing services 
together at a single location (OeE, 200 I a, p54), this had not occurred even under the 
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OeE's admission (OeE, 2003, p3O). Thus, despite the longevity of policies to 
coordinate government online, fragmentation had remained and increased, although 
UK Online and Directgov did often provide a useful first port of call for users. Whilst 
the flexible, networked attributes of the web encouraged central policyrnakers to steer 
government organisations towards a unified and consistent web presence, departments 
had actually largely preferred to develop online services independently. 
The OeE had also intended to identify and help incubate entirely new cross- 
departmental e-governinent services where appropriate (CITU, 2000, pl2; 
OeE, 2002b, p46) and to drive deeper ICT-mediated joining up between the back 
offices of departments, to 'support the integration of services across organisational 
boundaries' (OeE, 2001 a, p50). To the OeE, e-govemment offered 'a unique 
opportunity to break down the barriers within government' (OeE, 2002b, p45). Despite 
progress made with the GSI, Knowledge Network and e-GIF, it was difficult to argue 
that barriers between service delivery organisations had been overcome to the extent 
envisaged, although such a mission was likely to be long term. Also, it was difficult to 
detect much impact from the OeE's digital TV, smart card, e-democracy, 
intermediaries and Open Source Software projects (see OeE, 2002b, p5O-63). 
Furthermore, although a useful early stimulator, the 100% electronic service delivery 
target was later seen as a hindrance by some policyrnakers and observers (interview - 
5; NAO, 2001/02d, p 10; Kable, 20031; Blincoe, 2002), and did little to encourage 
joining up across dep, -irtments (Walsh, 2001; Naylor, 2004). 
With reference to the above, some interviewees provided opinions on what they 
considered to be weaknesses within the OeE approach and the central e-govemment 
strategy. Most commonly, some interviewees voiced concern that the OeE 
management and ministprial protagonists had apportioned too much emphasis on the 
transforming power of new ICTs and the need to evangelise to departments on their 
uptake. One upshot was that technical infrastructures and tools offered by the OeE 
were not always seen as appropriate or attractive by departments; 'there is a "let's 
build it if we can" attitude in e-government ... industry got over this about ten years 
ago but we still seem to like new kit around here' observed one OeE employee 
(interview - 2). 
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Another official conveyed similar feelings regarding the importance placed on the 
construction of technological systems in the OeE approach; 'so they put the 
infrastructure there but it doesn't mean its going to be used, it's a bit like the Humber 
bridge - you can join up these points but it doesn't mean anyone is going to drive 
over it' (interview - 1). Elsewhere in central government an interviewee noted 'a big 
problem is that you implement an IT system and say 'look this is going to change 
everything' but six months down the line people stop using it' (interview - 8). These 
comments led to arguments resting on whether policyrnakers and ministers 
understood the nature of the relationship between new ICTs and public service reform 
in a complex institutional environment, and how e-government could help achieve the 
desired changes. One OeE employee observed with derision of his own organisation 
and the political thinking beyond its creation, 'no-one understood it [ICT] but 
everyone thought it might be used for change ... so you had half-baked 'techy' people 
going around encanting' (interview - 1). The same interviewee was equally caustic 
about the development of the link between e-government and joined up government at 
central policy levels; 'people thought "well IT, wires and stuff, yes? Wires join up 
don't they?... (interview - 1). 
Put another way, interviewees mooted that 'there seemed to be some missing step 
around "do we understand what kind of organisational change are we trying to 
achieve as a result of using e-govemment? "' (interview - 1). Whilst it was recognised 
by all protagonists that the reforms implied in the joining up emphasis in e- 
government would be challenging and difficult,. some interviewees and other 
observers believed that the OeE management and their political masters may have 
overplayed the power of new ICTs in levering the necessary changes. There was a 
sense that this detracted from important goals in e-government; one senior civil 
servant remarked 'I think [the OeE] have tended to overplay the importance of getting 
government departments using technology ... as opposed to majoring on what it means 
in tenns of the individual citizen' (interview - 21). Another interviewee commented 
that the mentality in some government circles was that new information technology 
was a 'magic wonder dust' that could be 'sprinkled all over government' to achieve 
joining up (interview - 1). 
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Regardless of these arguments, the OeE had performed a central role in shaping the e- 
government strategy and embedding the joining up sentiments within it. Along with 
the targets themselves, the Office's requirement for departments to complete e- 
business plans obligated central government organisations to consider e-government 
issues. These e-business plans were scrutinised and linked into Public Service 
Agreements, which central departments had to negotiate-with the Treasury 
(NAO, 2001/02d, p 10). However, the OeE did not have an iron grip over government 
IT spending, contrasting with the intentions of CCTA policy of the early 1970s. 
Although such tight budgetary control could perhaps have been a powerful tool to 
encourage joined up e-government projects that spanned departments, as the CCTA 
found, such control would have been a difficult and controversial policy to pursue. 
The threat to use the Treasury to encourage departments to subscribe to the DoTP 
infrastructure (OeE, 2002b, p66) appeared to have had little impact. The OeE, as with 
the OGC, did not exercise the power to withhold funds or cancel e-government 
proj ects. 
Whilst Modernising Government and the annual reports of the OeE tended to focus on 
the positive force ICTs could offer in providing seamless service delivery, particularly 
online, it is not proposed that the OeE and the Cabinet Office assumed that its 
strategies, measures and tools would be accepted and diffused across the public sector 
easily. Efforts were made to encourage dialogue, persuasion, communication and 
collaboration with departments (NAO, 2001/02d, p56; Hudson, 2001, p523) for instance 
through e-champion networks and Cabinet committees. Generally, although some of 
the measures the OeE instigated may have been strongly enforced behind the scenes, 
for instance e-GIF compliance, many of the measures aimed to encourage joining up 
in e-government relied on government organisations actively participating. Whilst the 
GSI and Knowledge Network appeared to be successful in this sense, other OeE 
measures such as the Government Gateway and DotP appeared to attract less 
departmental interest. Although these measures, along with the central portal (UK 
Online succeeded by Directgov) and other OeE initiatives and tools had provided the 
technical infrastructure and platforms for departments to contribute to central 
electronic delivery channels and the means for inter-departmental collaboration 
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through new ICTs, participation by a large volume of government organisations was 
not guaranteed. In essence, as with the preceding history of government computing 
presented in the last chapter, IT had remained a concern for autonomous government 
departments that, in the case of much of the measures and tools introduced by the 
OeE, needed to see a clear benefit before participating. Despite some powers given to 
the OeE as a result of concern that the 'pendulum of decentralisation' had swung too 
far in favour of departments before the late 1990s (PAC, 1999/2000a, Q2), persuasion 
may have remained the Office's primary weapon (Hudson, 2001, p523) in encouraging 
joined up government. 
For this persuasion, the OeE had carried forth a system whereby central government 
departments appointed senior officials to meet together and champion e-government. 
Through this 'e-champions' mechanism, it was hoped that the sentiments of the 
central strategy would be instilled in departmental operations. Therefore, the 
importance of participating fully in central online initiatives such as the UK Online 
portal, using available technical architecture and developing joined up services though 
new ICTs would be realised. The e-champions network drew membership from a 
wide array of central government organisations, including areas relevant to the case 
studies; appointed champions from the criminal justice system, Department of Health, 
local government and the Ordnance Survey were a feature of the network. Through 
the e-champions network, explorative OeE work such as identifying potential new 
joined up e-government services that fell between the scope of any one department 
(CITU, 2000, pl2) could be carried forward, with the e-champions being used to create 
dialogue. However, although a stated objective, there was little evidence that these 
new services had developed. 
Furthermore, the e-champions mechanism was discontinued in central government in 
2004, indicating that there was uncertainty with regards to the value of the network. 
However communication, dissemination, coordination and dialogue concerning e- 
government would have also occurred through ministerial channels and Cabinet 
committees such as MISC 7 (Holliday, 2001, p320) and PSX(E). Whilst MISC 7 
worked on the issues arising from the general Modernising Government agenda, 
PSX(E) was driven by the Treasury and focused more on the use of electronic - 
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processes to improve efficiency. Thus, the e-champions network had a more focused 
role in the specific objective of stimulating and coordinating the OeE-led e- 
government agenda, in comparison to the ministerial committees. The network was an 
important channel through which persuasion rather than coercion to participate in the 
technical infrastructures and web portals offered by the OeE, as well as the general 
sentiments of the e-governinent strategy, could be achieved. The OeE had recognised 
the importance of bilateral discussions (NAO, 2001/02d, p56) to stimulate and advise 
departments on the Office's preferred direction for e-government. However, there 
were some doubts about how successful this had been considering the levels of 
departmental involvement in some of the infrastructural tools that were designed to 
help join up services and the lack of development of collaborative inter-organisational 
e-government services and tools generally. 
Many government/ organisations that had instigated e-government projects had close 
contact with the OGC which, through Gateway reviews, advice and guidance 
packages, were intent on strengthening the project management, efficiency and 
supplier relationship skills of departments and agencies. The OGC had grown in 
prominence and it would have been expected that close relations between the OeE and 
OGC would have assisted the communication and development of the central e- 
government strategy. However, one thesis interviewee noted that 'the OeE had very 
bad relations with the OGC' (interview - 1), indicating that there could have been 
very little orchestration between the agendas and operations of the two organisations; 
a situation that may have been debilitating for, the e-government strategy. 
Despite some significant work by the OeE, this Chapter concludes that, to borrow 
from Bellamy (2002, p2l3) the rhetoric of e-government appeared to have outstripped 
the achievement, up to summer 2004. Whilst from 1996 in particular the internet and 
related technologies had brought new possibilities for joining up, both in terms of 
back office coordination and in presenting a unified front to citizens, the tools and 
measures of the OeE had not facilitated fully the desired changes to service delivery 
from its position in the Cabinet Office. On reflection, by 2004 it seemed that what the 
OeE had supplied in practice, aside from stimulation, strategy and guidance, was a 
number of infrastructural tools, some of which were adopted on a wider scale than 
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others. Although the OeE may have been instrumental in putting e-government on the 
agenda for departments and encouraging dialogue and collaboration through e- , 
Champions networks, it was much more difficult to say that the concept of deeper 
ICT-mediated joined up government, with the OeE at the hub, had come to fruition. 
The Changing Approach to e-government in 2004: Towards a consensual modelfor 
joined up government 
As noted above, in April 2004 the OeE was replaced by a new e-Government 
Unit in the Cabinet Office; the move signalled a change in the e-government strategy. 
The initial activities of the e-Government Unit and its head, Ian Watmore, provided 
some evidence for speculation on the perceived frailties in the OeE and the changes 
that were likely to ensue. Whilst the e-Government Unit would retain the ultimate 
mission of the e-govemment strategy, 'joining up electronic government services 
around the needs of customers' (as posted on website in summer 2004), its work was 
to be restricted to Whitehall in contrast to the wider evangelical role of the OeE 
(Wakefield, 2004). 
Furthermore, Watmore himself appeared keen to publicly distance the e-Government 
Unit from the approach of the OeE which, it could be inferred, he felt had at times 
been overbearing in imposing technologically orientated measures, targets, tools and 
ideas on departments. Watmore stated that 'it is not practical to completely rebuild 
government' 
ýGovemment Computing, 2004, p 11) and instead wished to engage more 
with senior departmental officials to move towards a collaborative and consensual 
'team culture' across Whitehall with 'buy in' from senior protagonists (Amoq, 2004b). 
He wanted to entrust departmental players with making progress to 'recognise areas 
where they would do better by working together rather than in individual silos' (ibid, ) 
instead of, it is inferred, having solutions and strategies suggested to them from a 
central position. Watmore's rationale was that 'departments respond better to 
reasoned argument than central diktats' and preferred to encourage departments to 
'develop an agenda for themselves' (ibid. ). Whilst the e-Government Unit still aimed 
to help develop holistic tools 'to present one j oined-up government service to a citizen 
regardless of which agencies are involved' (Watmore, 2004, p9), the 'pendulum of 
decentralisation' (PAC, 1999/2000a, Q2) did appear to be swinging back towards 
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greater departmental empowerment, although the e-government strategy never 
intended that the Cabinet Office would have complete control. 
Some interviewees felt that the moves towards a modification in the approach to the 
central e-government strategy as seen in the e-Goverm-nent Unit was a reflection of 
institutional realities and the inability of the centre to steer policy across government 
convincingly. Thus, as e-government was 'still very much driven by departmental 
perspectives' with an emphasis on 'making those silos more efficient' (interview - 
21), the Cabinet Office shifted more towards acknowledging and nurturing that drive. 
One parliarn entary interviewee suggested that activity behind closed doors had led to 
this acknowledgement: 
The perception is that there has been an internal struggle and the departments have 
won. The model has now shifted towards the strong accountable chief IT officer 
within the departments ... that is the new model and the 
OeE has been cut down on 
that basis (interview - 4) 
Whilst another parliamentary interviewee saw this development as the 'forces of 
darkness ... winning back the power that the Modernising Government white paper 
took away' (interview - 5), this thesis takes a more neutral position. Whilst 
interviewees that were wary of a fixation on the power of new ICTs within the OeE 
incarnation of the e-government strategy may have favoured an approach more 
aligned to enable departments to decide how and when to employ new technologies, 
there were also potential drawbacks. Most clearly, the informatizing potential of ICTs, 
particularly to create joined up data links, interfaces and unified services to citizens 
could have been undermined without strong central steering and strategy, perhaps 
leaving departments more likely to remain content with automating existing 
operations. Nonetheless, Watmore was clear that he felt that bringing senior players 
together was the most prudent approach. 
The evidence drawn from the case studies bring a refocus on e-government beyond 
that led by the Cabinet Office. The following two chapters provide the rich qualitative 
detail that help trace the role of e-govemment in achieving joined up government 
within the complex institutional arrangements found in service delivery. Although 
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both case studies will consider the use of OeE measures and technical architecture in 
the government organisations and services concerned, the main objective is to judge 
how the core premise of the e-government strategy was played out on the ground 
beyond the immediate influence of the OeE. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY ONE - CRIME MAPPING AND 
&GOVERNMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Modernising Government white paper, subsequent policy documents and the 
activity of the OeE in particular linked joined up government with the application of 
new ICTs to service delivery, under the auspices of e-government. The case study 
phase of the thesis looks at how this notion was played out within the institutions, 
organisations and technological processes involved in service delivery. This chapter 
charts the development and application of ICT-mediated Crime Mapping tools, 
designed to bring about insights into crime prevention through joining up different 
datasets. It begins by providing organisational, policy and technological context 
before tracing the development of digital maps, crucial to the evolution. of Crime 
Mapping. It then considers efforts to coordinate geographic data before discussing the 
roots, facilitators and barriers to multi-agency Crime Mapping. The Chapter finishes 
with a rich analysis of Crime Mapping in action, to examine the role ICTs were 
playing in realising joined up government in this case, up to summer 2004. 
Geographic Information and e-government 
At a general level geographic information was identified by practitioners and 
academics as a key element to government operations and public service delivery 
(Morad, 2002, p483-484; Tumer/Higgs, 2003, pl5l-152). It had been frequently argued 
that an estimated 80% of government data could be represented geographically or 
spatially in some way (Pollard, 2000, p 186). Furthermore, it had been pointed out that 
geographical information and supporting technology could play a crucial role in 
facilitating joined up government, if data and tools could be shared across 
organisations (Tumer/Higgs, 2003, p252; Pollard, 2000, pl85; Morad, 2002, p484; 
interview - 12). However, to an extent the OeE and other e-government policyrnakers 
had treated the specific issue of geographic data with little importance; it had not been 
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highlighted as a central plank in the e-government strategy (Pollard, 2000, p 190; 
Tumer/fliggs, 2003, p 152). Nonetheless, it was not neglected entirely; during a speech 
at the September 2002 'geosolutions' conference Andrew Pinder emphasised the 
importance of geographical data and supporting technology in the e-government era, 
and cited some links between the OeE and the Ordnance Survey (PITCOM, 2002). 
This message was subsequently re-iterated by Pinder in a number of specialist press 
articles and press releases. Furthermore, the OeE and its successor, the e-Government 
Unit were involved in work on technical standards for geographical data, particularly 
in connection with e-GIF. 
However, most of the impetus and strategic lead with geographic information policy 
in the e-government era had come from the government organisations that had 
traditionally been concerned with geographic issues. The Ordnance Survey, local 
authorities and the police held and used significant amounts of geographic data 
(Morad, 2002, p483-484) and had, along with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(ODPM) and Home Office, taken a specific interest in developing policies and tools 
pertaining to such data. Although the activities of these government agencies will be 
discussed throughout, the key focus is on multi-agency Crime Mapping within Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), local partnership bodies operating 
across England and Wales which were given a legislative footing from 1998. CDRP 
initiatives that used Crime Mapping tools often enlisted participation from a number 
of government partners (e. g. police forces, local authorities, probation, health, 
education organisations and more), and endeavoured to join up data that had 
previously been separate (for example crime, housing, education, fire, probation, 
deprivation, census and gazetteer information) to generate insights into crime and 
disorder patterns through the use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The 
case study will concentrate on the bringing together and analysis of data for Crime 
Mapping, rather than the dissemination and use of analysis results in CDRP partner 
organisations such as the police or local authorities. Although the second area is 
worthy of further study, the influence over time of analysis derived from Crime 
158 
Mapping in CDRP partner organisations was difficult to trace within the confines of 
this case study. 
By the 1990s GIS become an extremely popular tool in many aspects of business and 
government processes and GIS software increasingly appeared on desktop PCs as a 
standard application; as one interviewee commented 'GIS is beginning to permeate 
society' (interview - 14). The principles of GIS revolved, unsurprisingly, around the 
use of data that applied to place and space. GIS enabled storage, representation, 
manipulation and analysis of geographic data that could be applied to a specific 
physical location (Bernhardsen, 2002, pl). Crucially, GIS provided analytical 
capabilities that transcended simple map production, and offered sophisticated data 
manipulation, evaluation and analysis (Maguire, 199 I, pl 3), which went beyond that 
offered by paper maps, for instance pins in wall-maps historically used by police 
forces. GIS-mediated Crime Mapping tools overlaid socio-economic, crime and other 
data on digital maps, enabling the representation and analysis of this data in new 
ways. As a result then, Crime Mapping had a strong informatizing thrust, facilitated 
by the joining up of geographically expressed data. 
However, before the returning to multi-agency Crime Mapping in action, the Chapter 
will first demonstrate the historic technological, organisational and policy 
developments that led to the emergence of the tool within CDRPs, beginning with the 
digitization of the base maps of the country. These digital maps were crucial to GIS- 
mediated Crime Mapping as well as other public sector applications in that they 
provided the basic geographic template on which further geocoded data could be 
overlaid. 
4.2 THE ORDNANCE SURVEY AND THE JOURNEY TO DIGITIZATION 
The idea of applying computer technology to the production of maps emerged during 
the late-1950s. Through research for an atlas from 1958, cartographer David 
Bickmore recognised that a computer would enhance the editing, classifying and 
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checking of data involved in map making (Coppock/Rhind, 199 l, p23). The general 
concept of using computing in mapping processes in the public sector was picked up 
years later in some parliamentary and government circles. According to Coppock and 
Rhind, there were proposals to develop the use of computers in mapping aimed at the 
Natural Resources Advisory Committee in 1964, however the committee was 
terminated soon after. Secondly, a 1972 Department of the Environment publication 
entitled General Information Systemsfor Planning (GISP) advised local authorities to 
develop computers to help with geographic concerns (ibid. ). There was little reaction 
to GISP however, not least because the proposals were said to be 'far too ambitious 
and unnecessarily complex' (Chorley/Buxton, 1991, p69). Following the lack of 
reaction, a period of inertia ensued in government on the general application of 
computing to mapping and geographical issues (Coppock/Rhind, 199l, p23). 
However, British public sector organisations did begin looking at the applications of 
early GIS in an urban setting, partially because of the limited scope in the country's 
natural environment (Martin, 1996, p35). For instance the Urban Planning Directorate 
of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government established a system that utilized 
pioneering technology, known as LINMAP, to produce digital maps and overlay 
census data obtained from local authorities (Gaits, 1969). The project was one of the 
first examples of expressing socio-economic data through GIS technology, and 
introduced the concept of using GIS to convey information other than that related to 
topographical or architectural information (Martin, I 996, p 15). 
However, it was realised that, to operate with sufficient levels of accuracy, efficiency 
and effectiveness, early GIS systems of all kinds would benefit greatly from access to 
a full catalogue of detailed digitized maps, with which to overlay data upon. This 
realisation brought in the Ordnance Survey, which was formed circa 1791 to map 
parts of southern England in preparation for the expected invasion by France. From 
the 19'h century it became the national mapping agency, responsible for creating and 
maintaining a master map of the country. Key to the development of GIS in both the 
160 
public and private sector was the digitization of the Ordnance Survey's 230,000 base 
maps; such a task would however be expensive and time-consuming. 
Observers argued that a major protagonist in instigating such a process was, again, 
David Bickmore; in 1967 he persuaded the Natural Environment Research Council to 
fund an Experimental Cartographic Unit (ECU) at (bizarrely) the Royal College of 
Art in London. This unit produced digitized maps and addressed GIS issues, but also 
built links with the Ordnance Survey and gained the interest of key protagonists 
within the organisation. Coppard and Rhind suggested that, without the work of the 
ECU, the Ordnance 
, 
Survey would have begun the process of digitizing maps much 
later (1991, p33-34). The ECU therefore had acted as a stimulator for the Ordnance 
Survey, in not a dissimilar fashion to the early role of the NPL in pioneering general 
government computing development. Like the NPL, the ECU's initial influence ebbed 
quickly. 
The Ordnance Survey had demonstrated an interest in computer technology at early 
stages. It was involved in the NPL's ACE computer from 1952, and purchased the 
commercial DEUCE product for the 'production of statistics in fieldwork' 
(OS, 1955/56, p8). It even took responsibility for its own programming in 1956, with 
programmers cycling between locations with saddlebags stuffed with punched cards 
for the DEUCE machine (Owen/Pilbeam, I 992, pI 5 1). Furthermore, by 1956 the 
Ordnance Survey was also employing IBM equipment (OS, 1955/56, p7), and by 1959 
it had purchased an ICT (later to be ICL) 'Jerie analogue computer' 
(OS, 1958/59, pl3): although, perhaps as a portent to ICL's ultimate failure as Britain's 
premier government supported computer company, the Ordnance Survey had dropped 
the 'Jerie' machine by 1963 (OS, I 962/63, p5). The organisation diversified its use of 
information technology during the 1960s, using computers for payroll, technical 
computation, sales and later for management information (OS, I 968/69, p7; 
Owen/Pilbeam, I 992, p 15 1). However, the enormous task of digitizing the maps of 
-1 Britain, although mooted, had not been attempted at this stage. 
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The Digital Mapping Programme: Faltering steps 
The familiarity in the Ordnance Survey with administrative computing may 
have been beneficial as the ECU engaged with the organisation about new 
applications of information technology in its services. In 1966 the ECU and Ordnance 
Survey began conducting a research project to examine the possibilities of digital 
mapping, and links between the two organisations existed for a number of years 
(OS, 1966/67, p5; 1968/69, p7). By 1970 the Ordnance Survey had concluded that 
experiments were 'encouraging for the future, although the accuracy required has not 
yet been achieved' (OS, I 969/70, p9). However, in the same Annual Report, an early 
recognition for the informatizing potential that digitized mapping could offer was 
given; it was postulated that there may be greater 
potential requirement for large scale maps in digital rather than 
printed form as a data base to which customers may add other 
digitized information from their own computer data banks (ibid. ) 
Thus, the importance of digital maps to future applications such as Crime Mapping 
was predicted within the Ordnance Survey at this early stage. However, the following 
year the joint experimental project between the ECU and Ordnance Survey was drawn 
to a close. The conclusion was that digital mapping was 'unlikely, at the present time, 
to show an economy over current methods' (OS, 1970/7 l, p7). Thus, the old paper- 
based methods of map making and representation endured, arguably because the 
directors at the Ordnance Survey felt that efficiency, rather than unproven theories 
about digital map use in public services, should be the primary incentive to develop 
the technology. 
The efficiency imperative may have become more prominent following' the ripples 
sent through government departments by the Fulton report, and so during the 1970s 
the Ordnance Survey felt increasing pressure to operate with economic independence; 
it had even been identified as a prime candidate for 'hiving off 
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(Owen/Pilbeam, I 992, p 148). Whilst the organisation was decidedly unsure of the 
immediate financial repercussions of digitizing, nonetheless it had managed to 
produce the first commercially available digitized map (of the British coastline), made 
available on magnetic tape for sale in 197 1, and had plans to produce maps of mdj or 
roads and larger towns in digitized form (OS, 1970/7l, p7). 
Throughout the 1970s the Ordnance Survey persevered with digital map experiments 
despite continual fears about costs, magnified by a Department of the Environment 
report in 1971 that imposed a requirement to recover an increasing proportion of its 
expenditure (Sowton, 1991, p25). Ferranti 16 machines were used in digitization 
processes, despite teething problems with equipment installation (OS, 1972/73, p 11). 
By the mid-1970s, the Ordnance Survey became more convinced of the worth of 
digitization; hundreds of digital maps were being produced every year at this time 
(OS, I 973/74, p9) and thousands a year by the late- I 970s (OS, I 977/78, p 13). The 
interest shown in digital mapping by professional bodies, utility providers and local 
authorities doubtless encouraged the Ordnance Survey to continue its efforts. The 
Director General at the time, Brian St G Irwin commented after the first digital maps 
were produced that he believed 'this to be an event of the greatest possible importance 
in mapping of Great Britain', and he envisaged 'a vast data bank ... capable of 
producing an almost limitless variety of outputs to suit the needs of users' 
(Owen/Pilbeam, 1 992, p 160). Thus, despite initial tentativeness, the Ordnance Survey 
put its weight behind what it believed would be a technological revolution in 
mapping. 
This faith was dealt a blow however, as it was discovered that the many expressions 
of interest by public and private organisations were converted into 'few concrete and 
substantial proposals' (Sowton, 199l, p26) to purchase digital map data. Digital maps 
had been developed, but had not been used by public sector organisations to the extent 
envisaged. One obvious inhibitor was that in the 1970s, most potential customers did 
16 Ferranti merged with English Electric and others to form ICL in 1968. 
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not have the equipment to use the maps (ibid), a problem that continued for many 
years; in the late 1980s it was still the case that most organisations had little 
experience with using GI S (Heywood, I 997, p 18). Still, the Ordnance Survey was not 
ignorant of the needs of potential clients as in 1974 a study was conducted to 
investigate 'the different needs of potential users of OS large-scale digital map data in 
local authorities, public-undertakings, central government and elsewhere' 
(Sowton, 199l, p27). The Ordnance Survey did in fact instigate a development scheme 
with key partners (known as the 'Dudley Project') which SoixAon suggests represented 
a 4precursor to GIS' and allowed the Ordnance Survey to tailor its digital data for use 
outside of the organisation (ibid, p27-28). 
As well as this 'hands on' approach to -stimulating interest in digital mapping, the 
Ordnance Survey was receiving external justification for the continuation of the 
digital mapping despite low levels of interest. The 'Serpell Committee' concluded in 
1980 that digital mapping had to be expanded, and that the organisation had to 
become less inward-looking, more customer-facing and able to look to the future 
(Owen/Pilbeam, I 992, p 160). Thus, changes were made to allow more input from map 
users, enabling the opportunity for progress with more innovative applications such as 
nascent Crime Mapping projects. In the Ordnance Survey had finally terminated its 
manual map production line, it had started contracting out digitizing processes to 
reach full digitization at a faster rate and boasted that its sales for digital data had 
doubled since the previous year (OS, 1 984/85, p4-8). 
Digital Maps and the Market Approach: Holding backpublic sector GIS applications 
However, the digital map programme was suffering from conflicting views 
on its value; on one hand, simple internal efficiency had primacy, and it was noted in 
the late-1980s that digital mapping was still not reaching the government-set targets 
for cost-recovery (OS, 1986/87, p9; 1987/88, plO). On the other hand, the Ordnance 
Survey received criticism for 'holding up the growth of the GI market' 
(Heywood, I 997, p 18). Thus, the organisation was stuck between two priorities, and 
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there was confusion as to whether digital mapping was supposed to be making money 
or improving service delivery. 
The Ordnance Survey had an unusual position of being an independently positioned 
department that placed it apart from other government organisations 
(Owen/Pilbeam, 1992, pl48). This coupled with the political climate of the 1980s 
arguably produced an overemphasis on selling rather than sharing geographical data 
amongst other public sector organisations (Pollard, 2000, pl 89). Later, the market 
approach remained to provide problems for government organisations that wished to 
use Crime Mapping tools, as funding had to be supplied in some form for the 
Ordnance Survey to release digital mapping data. 
The Ordnance Survey became an Executive Agency in 1990, which reinforced the 
market-based approach to its geographical data (Owen/Pilbeam, I 992, p 177). In 1995 
full digitization was achieved; the project was generally recognised as a commendable 
achievement, and the quality and accuracy of the maps themselves were 
unquestionable (Heywood, I 997, p 19; Pollard, 2000, p 18 8). Arguably, the completion of 
the project may have been achieved earlier without the continual doubts about the 
economic viability of digitization. Still, many interested public sector bodies were 
unable to adopt GIS until affordable software, offered by ESRI, Mapinfo and other 
vendors, became commonly available to operate the digital maps in the late 1990s 
(Chainey, 2001, p97). In 2004 the Ordnance Survey claimed that 80% of its turnover 
came from electronic data (OS, 2004). 
By the late 1990s, the Ordnance Survey offered, at a price, sophisticated digital 
mapping products which had the potential to provide the basis to many GIS 
applications in public services, including Crime Mapping. However, the cost-recovery 
based position of the organisation remained problematic; some criticisms were 
levelled during the 1990s that centred on the costs involved in GIS projects attaining 
the necessary underpinning map data. Local Authorities and other government 
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organisations had to invest considerable amounts to purchase digital maps, and 
evidence suggested that this seriously hindered progress with innovative schemes 
such as GIS-based Crime Mapping. In 1997 Heywood observed that, whilst high 
quality digital maps were obtainable, 'availability, accessibility, cost and licensing' 
had severely restricted their use (p20). 
One example of this was at the Metropolitan Police, where moves to replace manual 
mapping (with floor to ceiling maps mounted on office walls) for road accidents with 
a GIS system were hindered by the absence of an agreement from the Ordnance 
Survey to supply digital data to them. Without this 'the cost of supplying map data at 
that time (1993) would have effectively prevented the system from being viable' 
(Stoneman, I 996, p8.1.2). The Metropolitan Police resorted to exploiting a loophole by 
using geographic data from local authorities for this particular, application, whereas 
elsewhere in the organisation 'the cost of data supply had stifled demand for GIS' 
(ibid., p&1.5). 
In 1993 a survey conducted by the CCTA found that '0 S policies were cited by 
interviewees more often than any other barrier' to GIS development in government 
(p48), and it was felt that digital maps were simply too expensive. There was a similar 
story seven years later, where a government survey of 36 public sector organisations 
found that data licensing issues were the top ranked obstacle to the use of geographic 
information (IGGI, 2000, p6). The survey notes that 'high charges for topographic data 
levied by the OS is a constant cause for criticism' (ibid). 
Still, a solution of sorts was found when Service Level Agreements with the Ordnance 
Survey were signed jointly by nine central departments and some local authorities in 
1999 (after three years of negotiation) to allow cheaper access to digital geographic 
data (IGGI News, I 999, p 1 -3). However, in general, government departments were 
regarded as individual customers up until May 2003, when it was announced that a 
pan-government agreement signed with the ODPM gave 500 departments and 
166 
agencies comprehensive access to digital mapping (Kable, 2003e). This decision, 
although no doubt welcomed by government organisations, wishing to use GIS in 
Crime Mapping and other applications, could be considered to have come late 
considering the evidence above. One interviewee voiced anger, noting that: 
Ordnance Survey have only just starting allowing local authorities to use OS 
maps. As far as joe public is concerned OS is a government department, and 
they made such a big thing about this deal they struck with OS but it was 
only last year - this was just'too recent. We should have been using OS 
maps for years (interview - 10) 
Whilst observers had recognised the potential worth of the creation and dissemination 
of Ordnance Survey mapping data, the market realities that the organisation felt had 
proved to be a barrier to sharing with other public sector bodies once the digital 
corpus had been completed. Before then, the j ourney to digitization was influenced by 
David Bickmore, Brian St G Irwin, the ECU and Serpell Committee, but also the 
position and modus operandi of the Ordnance Survey and the emphasis on mapping 
data as a commodity within the public sector. However, as agreements facilitated 
better access to the digital data and GIS software became increasingly available, the 
basic components for prevalent public sector use of GIS, including in Crime Mapping, 
appeared to be in place. Yet, the development of public sector GIS applications 
involved a wider range of actors, organisations and factors than the Ordnance Survey 
alone. The next section will broaden the focus to consider the creation and role of 
geographic information guidance organisations, technical standards and geographic 
data repositories in the shaping of public sector GIS, providing further insight into the 
institutional backdrop to Crime Mapping. 
4.3 THE COORDINATION OF DIGITAL GEOGRAPHIC DATA: FORUMS. 
STANDARDS AND REPOSITORIES 
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During the years in which the Ordnance Survey was working on the digitization 
programme, other actors independent of the organisation were vocal about the 
perceived potential of increased use of geographical information. In 1983 the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology stressed the importance of 
developing general GIS systems in the public sector, and noted that applications may 
well induce or require extensive data interchange between different departments 
(1983, p54). The idea of using GIS to help map crime was not explicitly identified, 
whereas more traditional applications, such as planning, geology and transport were 
acknowledged. The Select Committee's most lasting contribution was the 
recommendation that a committee be set up to steer GIS in the public sector, with the 
intention that certain levels of coordination would be required. This led to the 
establishment of the Chorley Committee, which produced an influential report on 
Handling Geographic Information in 1987 (Chorley, 1987). 
The Chorley Committee Recommendations: Steering government GIS use 
The Chorley Committee reviewed GIS activity in government as it stood in 
that year (Heywood, 1997) and found some levels of maturation in land and property 
services, the Manpower Services Commission (Chorley, 1987, p22,33) and other areas 
of the public sector. However, overall the Chorley Report judged that there were 
disappointing levels of GIS activity in government, commenting that 'many 
organisations ... who might have expected to have adopted Geographic Information 
Systems, have not yet done so' (ibid. &53). The Chorley Committee saw extraordinary 
potential in using GIS to overlay different data sets, for instance for crime and fire 
information; a lasting legacy was the extent to which the report discussed the socio- 
economic, rather than purely physical geographic applications of GIS 
(Martin, 1 996, p 15), thus bringing the potential for innovative GIS uses such as Crime 
Mapping to the fore. 
Whilst the report recommended that public sector GIS could draw together data from 
different sources, it also noted that a number of institutional, procedural and technical 
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barriers to this approach existed. Inter-working was handicapped by the variety of 
spatial units and boundaries used by different organisations, by poor data 
documentation, incompatibility of software and the unwillingness of some 
protagonists to release data through 'fear of misuse' or the 'narrow attitude' that the 
data was owned by them (Chorley, 1987, p49,55). The Committee also found that GIS 
data within local authorities might not be effectively shared amongst the departments 
of the authority, let alone with other councils (ibid., p54). The solution according to 
the Committee was that a 
central body, independent of Government, is set up to provide a focus and 
forum for common interest groups in the geographic information area, 
undertake promotional activities and review progress and submit proposals 
for developing national strategy (ibid,. pl 18) 
The government agreed and the Association for Geographic Information (AGI) was 
formed on the 18 th January 1989. The Thatcher government at that time held that the 
new body should be 'ultimately self supporting' whilst many protagonists in the 
growing geographic information sector felt that the government should have provided 
more sustenance for the endeavour (AGI, 1989, p3-5). Still, the AGI provided a forum 
for debate, discussion, technical standards and research for the GIS community, 
including government ýctors (Pollard, 2000, p 18 7). It served as an important 
independent figure, brokering deals and negotiations between private and public 
sector representatives. 
Several years later (in 1993) the Intra-governmental group on Geographical 
Information (IGGI) was formed as a direct result of the Chorley Report. In contrast to 
the AGI, the IGGI was smaller and was established specifically to stimulate interest in 
GIS in central government, rather than to serve the wider public sector and GIS 
community as a whole. Still, it is perhaps surprising that the IGGI only emerged six 
years after the Chorley committee published its report. Nonetheless, as with the AGI, 
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the IGGI was usually considered in favourable light by Crime Mapping protagonists 
as a forum for knowledge, advice and discussion. 
Standards and Repositories: Joining up digital geographic data 
The Chorley report also highlighted the possibility of combining large 
geographic data sets, produced for instance by the Ordnance Survey, Land Registry 
and local authorities (Pollard, 2000, p 188). To this end, the potential benefit of 
technical standards, applied to geographic data to encourage data sharing through GIS 
was raised (Morad, 2002, p484). Standards would become an important issue; in the 
1990s a consortium of central and local government organisations, the Ordnance 
Survey and the Royal Mail developed the BS7666 standard for the format in which 
addresses were expressed and stored, as endorsed by the AGI (ibid, p485). The 
BS7666 complied with e-GIF standards for general data sharing and interoperability 
across the public sector (NLPG, 2004). Also, the technical specifications used by the 
Ordnance Survey formed a de facto standard for organisations wishing to use its data, 
which indicated the importance of the'organisation to those that required digital maps 
(Pollard, 2000, pl88-189). The use of technical standards was seen as beneficial to 
multi-agency Crime Mapping (interview - 12,15; Radbum, 2002, pl. 06). 
The application of standards for geographic information was accompanied by the 
concept of national geographical data repositories and infrastructures, which could be 
used by public and private organisations for their own purposes. In particular this 
concept was applied to data on the properties, land and streets of the country. 
Although closely related to Ordnance Survey data, property, land and street 
information was not the exclusive domain of the organisation. Her Majesties Land 
Registry, the Royal Mail, the Valuations Office and local authorities also generated 
and kept such data. As a result, there was for instance no complete or compatible list 
of addresses in Britain (Cross, 2004d). Attempts to draw together this geographical 
information demonstrated the institutional complexities ofjoining up data from a 
variety of sources at a national level. 
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In the early 1990s plans were made for a National Street Gazetteer, which aimed to 
create a referencing system for any length of road or highway in Britain, complying to 
the BS7666 standard (NLPG, 2004). Local authorities had a statutory responsibility for 
street naming and numbering and therefore a National Street Gazetteer system 
required their co-operation (Morad, 2002, p485; NPLG, 2004). The Ordnance Survey 
however was the de facto custodian of the National Street Gazetteer project 
(Morad, 2002, p487). 
In the late 1990s plans for a National Land and Property Gazetteer (NLPG) were 
announced, which would form a structured geographical data repository for all land 
and property in the country. It would draw from local government gazetteers, conform 
to BS7666 and incorporate aspects of the National Street Gazetteer 
(Tumer/Higgs, 2003, p 152; Morad, 2002, p487). The objective was that the NLPG 
would be available for use in GIS in all public sector organisations that required it, 
including criminal justice bodies. In facilitating consistent property and land 
referencing, the NLPG was identified as a potential important enabler for Crime 
Mapping (Radbum, 2001, para. 3.05), as well as e-government generally 
(Tumer/Higgs, 2003, p 152). 
However, constructing the NLPG was said to be a difficult task due to data 
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in local gazetteers (Morad, 2002, p484). Furthermore, 
there was controversy associated with the development of the national repository; the 
Ordnance Survey took up leadership but there were differences of opinion developed 
between it and other stakeholder organisations on the role of BS7666 and other 
technical issues (Pollard, 2000, p 191-192). Although some progress was made with the 
NPLG, it was clear that a definitive set of address, street, property and land data for 
use in GIS had not materialised. In 2002 the Acacia programme was established by 
the Ordnance Survey, Royal Mail, Land Registry and local government 
representatives as a renewed attempt to create such a repository, building on the 
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NLPG. The repository was going to comply to BS7666 and feed into Ordnance 
Survey base maps (AGI, 2002). 'However, by late summer 2004 Acacia was said to be 
floundering as commercial and intellectual property issues proved to be complex 
barriers to progress (Cross, 2004d). 
Census Data: Demographic data repositories 
The National Census was identified as another potential enabler for Crime 
Mapping; census information was used to provide insights into the links between the 
socio-economic background and crime levels of areas (Radbum, 2001, para 1.03; 
interview - 12). Also, census data contributed to other data sets that were important 
for some Crime Mapping tools used by CDRPs. For instance, the ODPMs Index of 
Deprivation used census frameworks and data, along with statistical information from 
health, education, income, crime, unemployment, housing and other domains. A 
deprivation index was created for England, assigning a score and rank for 32,482 
geographic areas of England (ODPM, 2004). The Index of Deprivation had been used 
in Crime Mapping analysis (Chainey, 2001, pl 16) to help understand links between 
criminality, poverty, homelessness and so on. 
The Office for National Statistics, an executive agency created in 1996, collected and 
published national statistics related to populations, the economy, industry, education, 
health, demographics and other issues. In particular the National Census, conducted 
every ten years, provided an important repository of geo-coded demographic data 
about populations, families, gender, religion, housing and so on, which many 
organisations used in GIS for various purposes. 
However, the census programme was criticised as, despite numerous 
recommendations (including the Chorley Committee's), it allegedly used unhelpful 
geographical boundaries in its collection of statistics. Whereas it was suggested that 
the census adopted postcodes for its design, thus making it considerably easier for 
census-generated socio-economic data to be used, census-specific enumera tion 
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districts were still preferred in the 1991 collection. These districts were said to 'vary 
widely in geographical size and shape, population size and density, and social 
composition' (Martin, I 998, p 199) and were less amenable to GIS applications. In 
general, the 1991 census received criticism for a neglect of digital data and GIS 
considerations (Openshaw, 1995). Changes were said to have been made to help the 
situation (Rees/Martin, 2002, p35) and Martin noted that the 2001 census was designed 
so that it made it 'much easier to relate socio-economic data' based on postcodes with 
census data (2002, p45). 
Although not consistently expressed in central government literature, elsewhere it was 
recognised that compatible geographic data could help facilitate the joining up that the 
e-government strategy aspired to (Tumer/Higgs, 2003, p252; Pollard, 2000, p 185; 
Morad, 2002, p484). However, progress with standards and particularly national data 
repositories appeared to be difficult; local government had historically collected and 
recorded street, land and property data in different ways without knowing that the 
imperative would be to merge data sets in the future. Similarly other organisations 
that held geographic data had discrete practices, thus challenging the aspirations of 
the national data repositoriýs. Furthermore, the Ordnance Survey in particular had a 
commercial interest in base maps and other geographic data, whiýh evidence 
suggested had been detrimental to GIS development (IGGI, 2000, p6; 
Heywood, I 997, p2O; CCTA, I 993, p48). 
Whilst problems with the national geographic data repositories and the economic 
costs of base maps acted as enduring barriers, they did not prohibit new uses of geo- 
coded digital data in the public sector. As discussed in the next section, GIS based 
tools, including Crime Mapping, did develop in the 1990s. However, similarly to the 
experience of national data repositories, projects that sought to bring data together 
from different sources or required partnership working often experienced difficulties. 
4.4 THE ROOTS OF MULTI-AGENCY CRIME MAPPING 
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By the beginning of the 1990s GIS was a tool used in some public sector 
organisations, particularly those with requirement for or custodianship of geographic 
data. For example, a comprehensive survey conducted in 199 1, five years after the 
Chorley Report, concluded that one in six local authorities had purchased some kind 
of GIS software (Campbell/Masser, 1992). However, investment in GIS software did 
not necessarily equate to successful use of the technology as intended. Studies of local 
government demonstrated that GIS applications strained to get off the ground; 
Campbell found that after two years or more, only three out of the twelve local 
council GIS under investigation were fully operational (I 994, p3 14). Nonetheless, 
some local authorities were successful in the implementation of GIS. For instance, 
Brent Council had had considerable experience with geographic- data, having kept a 
database of geocoded information for properties and land since the late-1970s, like 
many other local authorities. The council purchased GIS software in 1987, developing 
initiatives to use it in urban renewal, schools catchment and transport policies 
(Allison, I 998, p 18-22). 
During the mid-1990s hospitals and health authorities were also beginning to develop 
GIS for use in mapping admissions, mortality statistics, GP registrations, diagnosis 
clusters and general health patterns (Walls/Crawley, 1996; Paliwoda, 1996). In terms of 
the criminal justice system, in 1988 the Home Office was involved with Staffordshire 
Police in a project to develop simple GIS to plot crimes by beat (Ekblom, 1988, p27). 
Ken Pease pointed out that the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre developed the 
'Crime Analysis Package' in the late-1 980s. Pease himself succeeded 'with massive 
effort' in plotting crime and disorder data in Liverpool (Pease, 2001, p225), which 
provided some rudimentary insights for the police force. However, despite having a 
senior police officer assigned to the dissemination of the GIS technology to other 
government bodies, it transpired that there were no other instances of it being 
employed; soon after the system 'clunked its way to oblivion' (ibld&226). The idea 
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of applying GIS to mapping crime was put on hold somewhat, certainly in terms of 
Home Office impetus. 
The Metropolitan Police were using GIS to pinpoint road traffic accidents from 1994, 
and to help prepare large-scale public events such as the London Marathon, state 
visits and New Year's Eve celebrations. Furthermore, progress was being made with 
basic Crime Mapping initiatives to help tackle burglary and street crime, established 
circa 1995 (Stoneman, I 996, p8.1.3). Stoneman estimated in Autumn 1996 that there 
were 300 GIS systems in the Metropolitan Police (ibid. &8.1.5), although thesis 
interviews suggested most police forces across the country were not using GIS 
beyond rudimentary applications during this period (interview - 11,12). 
The Barriers to Multi-Agency Crime Mapping Development 
Despite difficulties, GIS technology had become a viable option for a variety 
of public services during the mid-1990s; nonetheless some observers still felt the 
potential for GIS was being overlooked, particularly in central government. In a 
speech to mark ten years since the Chorley Report, Lord Chorley argued that GIS 
development had been hindered by 'the culture of Whitehall, of separate departments 
who saw themselves as fortresses whose main aim was to repel boarders' (in 
Heywoodj 997, p8 1). Campbell pointed out that in the mid-1 990s, 'active interest in 
GIS has not yet permeated the often large community service type departments of 
housing, education and social services' (I 994, p313). A CCTA report made a similar 
point, noting that GI S remained an untapped resource in the mid- I 990s and arguing 
that 'GIS technology is often either not considered or is regarded as not yet practical, 
and passes by as a lost opportunity' (CCTA, I 993, p42). 
Furthermore, the distinctive multi-agency, joining up element to GIS, as seen in many 
CDRP initiatives using Crime Mapping tools, had not developed pervasively by the 
mid-1990s. This despite the AGI, IGGI, parliamentary bodies, actors from the 
Ordnance Survey and other observers having recognised during this period the 
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potential informatizing benefits of sharing geo-coded data between organisations. 
Widening the focus from infrastructural and data repository projects and techmical. 
standards discussed above, similar barriers appeared to exist to the sharing of 
geographic data between service delivery organisations. 
As noted above, the Ordnance Survey operated with a policy of cost recovery, which 
was criticised for holding back the use of GIS in the public sector, as base maps were 
expensive to acquire. However, it should also be noted that general government policy 
during the 1980s and early 1990s arguably made it much more unlikely that 
geographic information held by departments and government organisations other than 
the Ordnance Survey would be shared freely in terms of, amongst other tools, GIS 
applications. Aside from the Data Protection Act, which protected information 
pertaining to identifiable individuals, there was also a Tradable Information Policy. 
Following activity by the Prime Minister's Information Technology Advisory panel in 
1983, the DTI produced the 'Government-Held Tradable Information' guidelines in 
1986. This policy document embodied the view that, considering the vast amount of 
data collected by departments, including geographical or geographically related 
information, government should do more to systematically exploit markets by selling 
information to the private sector. This policy retained a vein of influence for years to 
come, and seemed to have particular relevance to geographic data, with the 
government having a virtual monopoly through the Ordnance Survey, local 
government and some holdings in central departments. 
It can be contended that the enduring Tradable Information policy, in its several 
guises, was conducive to an environment where departments, as a rule, would not 
share data within the public sector. Many departments 'prefer to treat their dealings 
with other government bodies as comparable with private sector business, and charge 
accordingly' (IGGI, 2001, p9). Tradable Information policy then, had according to 
some arguments, contributed to a milieu which had been unlikely to encourage 
176 
sharing of geographical information between departments as well as the Ordnance 
Survey. 
During the late 1990s, ten years after the influential Chorley Committee reported that 
sharing of geographic information had enormous potential in improving public 
services, the AGI and IGGI were working with departments to encourage the 
unlocking of geographic data (Heywood, I 997, p28). As well as involvement in the 
development of standards and data repositories by key organisations, the AGI and 
IGGI were hoping to illicit an understanding of the benefits of geographic data 
sharing across the public sector. However despite some progress, the two 
organisations concluded that 'the opportunity value of sharing geographic information 
is not understood at senior levels in government' (quoted in Heywood, I 997, p4O). In 
2000 the IGGI found that there were many barriers to the effective sharing of 
geographic information, including staff and skills shortages, lack of policy or 
procedure, insufficient senior management involvement and data inconsistencies 
(IGGI, 2000, p4-7). 
Despite the apparent barriers, multi-agency sharing of geographic data did begin to 
become a common phenomenon in CDRPs close to the millennium. Certainly, 
technological developments aided this process; affordable desktop GIS software was 
key, as was the development of middleware technology. Middleware technology was 
able to 'clean' some geographical data, such as addresse's that could come in different 
formats, to facilitate greater compatibility between shared information (interview - 
11). However, technological advancements were accompanied with a variety of other 
factors and influences, which made criminal justice and other government institutions 
more amenable to Crime Mapping tools. In particular, long-term trends in 
criminological thinking influenced the direction of crime policy, which eventually 
contributed to the creation of many CDRPs, many of which took on GIS-mediated 
multi-agency Crime Mapping tools. 
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Trends in Criminology and Crime Mapping 
Following the work of Goldstein (1979) and others, preventative or problem- 
solving policing gained kudos in crime policy. This was where specific and localized 
crime was addressed rather than a concentration on general reactive policing 
measures. According to Ekblom, preventative policing was directed towards 
particular, local crime problems and involves obtaining detailed 
information; analysing the information to identify patterns, for example, in 
time and place in the occurrence of crimes; devising preventive strategies in 
the light of analysis; putting the measures into practice; and evaluating their 
impact on crime (1988, pl) 
This information intensive approach partially rested on the assumption that 'crimes 
arehot totally random, isolated and unique events, but can be combined into sets 
sharing common features and showing distinct patterns' (ibid, p4); it lent itself well to 
the plotting and analysis of crime and other statistics on maps. 
The academic roots for this kind of approach could be traced back to the Chicago 
school of criminological thought, where crime rates were analysed in relation to 
geography in an attempt to understand underlying patterns (Mawby, I 989, p262). 
Indeed, a classic study of mapping crime was conducted during the early- I 940s 
(Shaw/McKay, 1942). The plotting of other data on maps can be traced even further 
back; John Snow famously mapped cholera cases in the disastrous outbreak in 
London's Soho in 1854, proving that the disease spread by water rather than air 
(Richardson, 1965). In the digital era, it can be asserted that the movement towards 
preventative policing, with the emphasis on analysis of local crime trends, lent itself 
well to the use of GIS. As protagonists searched for tools with which to enable or 
guide preventative methods of this kind, it is likely that increasingly accessible GIS 
software became an obvious option, despite the problems and costs associated with 
obtaining and using digital maps and geo-coded data. 
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The rise of GIS and Crime Mapping may also be partially attributed to the fact that 
policing, and indeed CDRPs were primarily organised spatially, with organisations 
taking responsibility for different areas of the country (rather than, for instance being 
organised through crime category or victim type). Thus, crime prevention and control 
were locked into a spatial framework (Pease-, 2001, p232-33) that placed an intrinsic 
emphasis on the geography of crime. 
Further examination of criminology and crime policy trends provided additional 
insight into the development of an environment conducive to the distinct multi-agency 
approach to Crime Mapping. For a number of years the Home Office had been 
pursuing the potential of a multi-agency approach to crime prevention. According to 
Hope and Shaw, this approach originated in the mid-1970s when police forces began 
to try to establish links with other agencies, demonstrating the belief that the 'Wicked 
issue' of crime and disorder straddled a variety government organisations and would 
benefit from ajoined up approach: 
Inasmuch as crime within local communities is likely to be sustained by 
a broad range of factors - in housing, education, recreation, etc. - the 
agencies and organisations who are in some way responsible for, or 
capable of, affecting those factors, ought to join in common cause 
(Hope/Shaw, 1988, pl3) 
However, Crawford detected earlier strains of thinking akin to the partnership 
approach, with some discussion of multi-agency crime prevention in a report from 
1965 (Home Office, 1965). Following the publication of this report, some ad hoc and 
informal panels were established, (Crawford, I 997, p26-27), with an emerging 
conviction that 'crime prevention lies beyond the competency of any single agency' 
(Crawford, 2001, p59). According to Crawford, this assumption grew from a shift in 
criminology; in the face of increasing crime levels and cycles of deprivation during 
the 1970s, it was felt that faith in the rehabilitation of offenders and a solely reactive 
approach to policing were both outmoded and erroneous (Crawford, 1997, p26-27). 
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Laycock and Heal pointed out that research during the period indicated that reactive 
policing had become ineffective, whilst it was emphasised that much crime was 
casual and could be prevented by blocking opportunity (1989, p3l7). 
The Crime Prevention Partnership Approach in Policy and Practice 
Influenced by the movements in criminology, the Home Office took the step 
of producing an inter-departmental circular on the crime prevention in 1984 (Home 
Office et al, 1984), drawn up after announcements of a collaborative approach to crime 
by the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw. During the period, it was recognised 
that there was scope for crime prevention sentiments to percolate into housing, 
education, social services, transport policy and other, traditionally discrete areas of 
public services (Laycock/Heal, 1989, p3l8-321). The Home office implemented the 
Five Towns Initiative in 1986/87 and the Safer Cities Programme in 1988, both of 
which looked to increase joined up approaches to crime prevention in specific 
localities. Although, as Sutton (1999, p29) noted, there were many difficulties and 
challenges involved in succeeding with the initiatives, the partnership approach 
gained credence. Patterns in criminology and crime prevention implied a swing away 
from focus on offenders and criminals (and concentrating on capture and 
rehabilitation) to offences and crimes (Crawford, I 997, p3 1). The shift towards a 
preventive and multi-agency approach to crime control logically placed emphasis on 
geography, making GIS a more pertinent and appealing candidate to assist crime 
prevention. The Labour Party had also endorsed the partnership approach to crime 
whilst in opposition (Labour Party, 1987; 1994). 
In the early -I 990s, a second inter-departmental circular (Home Office et al, 1990), a 
Home Office partnership document (Home Office, 1990) and the Morgan report 
(Home Office, 199 1) all advocated a multi-agency approach to crime prevention. 
However the first Home Office policy outputs were said to have 'provoked a 
relatively patchy response across the country' (Liddle/Gelsthorpe, 1994a, p I). The 
Morgan Report recognised as much and, in advocating increased joined up working in 
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crime prevention, it judged that local authorities would be best placed to coordinate 
partnership work. Eventually, the Crime and Disorder Act was introduced to embody 
and coagulate such an approach and to create CDRPs 17 . However, during the mid- 
1990s and before this Act, the Home Office continued its support for inter-agency 
work (Liddle/Gelsthorpe, 1994b). 
As Crime Mapping benefited from input from a variety of data sets, some level of 
involvement and participation from a number of public sector organisations was seen 
as useful. Thus, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act was particularly relevant in that it 
stipulated a requirement for police, local authorities, fire authorities and local health 
bodies to form partnerships with a number of other appropriate organisations. 
Certainly, statistics suggest that CDRPs quickly became a suitable environment for 
Crime Mapping to incubate. By 2002, there were 376 such partnerships 
(AC, 2002c, p6) of which 74% were said to be using Crime Mapping as part of their 
strategies for tackling crime and disorder (Radburn, 2002, p4O). 
CDRPs, which intrinsically brought together organisations involved in crime and 
related issues, provided a foundation for multi-agency Crime Mapping tools to 
develop in a partnership environment. Clearly the legislation was instrumental in 
creating this foundation, whilst the pan-government agreement with the Ordnance 
Survey (Kable, 2003e) provided easier access to base maps. But fuller historic 
investigation demonstrates that trends in criminology and penology, that filtered 
through to some Home Office, police and other criminal justice agency policies, 
helped embed a multi-agency and geographically focused approach to crime 
prevention, crystallised in CDRPs. 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
17 Although many similar crime and public safety partnerships predated 1998 and were given a 
statutory footing under the Act henceforth I 
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The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) placed a statutory requirement on the 
police, local authorities, fire authorities and local health bodies to form partnerships, 
which could also include probation, Drug Action Teams, voluntary organisations, 
courts, education bodies, transport authorities and others if appropriate. Once formed 
CDRPs 18 were charged with conducting an audit of local crime every three years and 
would then formulate a strategy to tackle crime within the area. In England, the 
CDRPs were overseen by Regional Crime Reduction Teams and a Regional Crime 
Director, housed in the Regional Government Offices and accountable to the Home 
Office. 
The Home Office, with the assistance of the Regional Crime Director, would monitor 
and assess performance as well as allocate some funding and provide guidance to 
partnerships. Furthermore, Public Service Agreements fixed for the Home Office in 
conjunction with the Treasury, which in 2002 set targets to reduce vehicle crime by 
30% and domestic burglary by 25% (Treasury, 2002, p83), broadly informed the 
activities of the CDRPs. The partnerships could also be tasked by the government to 
lead on specific strategies; for instance in early 2004 it was announced that, under the 
Prolific and Other Priority Offenders Strategy, core criminals (responsible for half of 
all crime) would be subject to enhanced supervision and attention across the criminal 
justice system. CDRPs were asked to set up and supervise these schemes (Home 
Office, 2004c). However, the local partnerships retained certain levels of autonomy; 
each CDRP developed a local strategy to tackle the specific nature of crime in the 
locale (AC, 2002c, p29). The partnerships adopted a number of different techniques, 
approaches and projects to tackle local crime through the membership organisations. 
Various CDRPs helped install CCTV, improved street lighting, removed graffiti, 
tackled drug misuse, raised awareness on crime prevention, provided victim support 
and assisted partners, particularly the police, with crime prevention and detection 
(interview- 10,13). 
18 Sometimes known as Community Safety Partnerships, particularly in Wales 
182 
Crime Mapping and CDRPs 
A key procedure in many of the above initiatives was the analysis of crime 
patterns, to understand when, where, how and why crime and disorder might occur. 
Such analysis could study for instance incidence, prevalence and concentration of 
recorded crime, the movement and behaviour of known offenders, the households and 
areas where crime occurred, the methods of burglary or robbery and the temporal 
patterns of disorder (Hough/Tilley, 1998). Although many CDRPs conducted a variety 
of crime analyses, the use of GIS software to overlay geo-coded data, drawn from a 
variety of agencies, was a common strategy. 
The philosophy behind the use of Crime Mapping tools by many CDRPs was that, by 
joining up data from a variety of sources, new insights could be gained to feed into 
more effective crime detection, prevention and public protection. This was neither the 
only crime analysis technique employed by CDRPs or exclusive to the partnerships 
(other public organisations had some interest in the use of GIS to map crime). Crime 
Mapping was largely a back office pursuit, where CDRPs and partner organisations 
used GIS technology to feed into wider crime prevention activities. There was less 
scope for Crime Mapping to interface directly with the public through, for instance, 
onlineaccess to geographical presented crime data. However, the Office for National 
Statistics had by 2003 offered some geographical expressed crime and safety 
information through its website, whilst some local authorities, such as Leeds City 
Council, were providing similar services. 
The Barriers to Multi-Agency Working in CDRPs 
CDRPs became a cornerstone to multi-agency crime prevention, spurred by 
Home Office policies and, from 1998, crystallised in legislation. However, it was by 
no means the case that successful collaborative working was easy to effect once the 
partnerships 
had been created. There remained many institutional'challenges in 
operations that traversed organisational boundaries, including Crime Mapping. 
Firstly, police officers were said to often feel that the joined up approach to crime 
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prevention held up police work, and partnership participation was seen as a 'soft job' 
reserved for officers close to retirement (Liddle/G, elsthorpe, I 994b, p 13). Audit reports 
found that the prevalent police attitude was that 'partnerships do not prevent crime: 
They talk about it' and despite considerable efforts much partnership work was 
(misdirected and ineffective' (HMIC, 1998, p4O). Academic scrutiny found that in the 
crime prevention arena 'multi-agency initiatives can, and do fail; and unintended, and 
unfortunate consequences often occur' (Sampson et al, 1988, p491). Koch found that 
Home Office activity itself had lacked consistency, a number of committees addressed 
crime prevention issues had been ephemeral and misdirected (Koch, I 998, p4l-5 1). 
Interviewees were clear that partnership working entailed much more than merely 
bringing partners together: 
One of the failures has been that in the motion towards joined up 
government, and I've seen this in the CDRPs, people on high have just 
presumed that you identify partners, put them together and they'll just 
engage. You can't just get people in a meeting room and say, 'we are now 
working as a partnership' - it doesn't work like that (interview - 13) 
Local Authority involvement in multi-agency crime prevention partnerships was 
hindered at times; one source provided the observation: 
People attend the meetings, but very little comes out from their 
participation. There is a resistance to corporatism almost - people are 
parochial (Liddle/Gelsthorpe, 1994b, pl5) 
Or, on the issue of police and probation service collaboration, an interviewee 
commented from another source: 
Because each agency has its own priorities and aims, each is generally 
suspicious of the other's intentions and the final result they are searching for 
(from Crawford, I 997, p I 10) 
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Wider studies pointed to similar problems experienced in sharing data in a partnership 
enviromnent (e. g. Craglia/Signoretta, 2000; 2002; Evans, 1997; Nedovic-Budic, 2000), 
an indication of the potential difficulties with multi-agency Crime Mapping. 
The rich and complex institutional environment depicted above demonstrates that, 
over a number of decades, government organisations were being brought together to 
tackle crime prevention, particularly through CDRPs from 1998. Yet evidence 
suggested that it was not easy to make a success out of partnership working, which 
was required at least at some level for CDRPs to obtain the necessary data from 
partner organisations for use in Crime Mapping, and to feed analysis back to them. 
Still, multi-agency Crime Mapping did emerge as a significant tool for CDRPs in the 
late 1990s. Whilst this emergence was stimulated by the availability of affordable GIS 
and base maps as well as the a predilection towards an interest in the geography of 
crime in crime policies and strategies, CDRPs had also crucially found ways to access 
data from the police and a variety of other sources, and to join this data up through 
GIS-mediated analysis. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
4.5 CRIME MAPPfNG IN ACTION: ACHIEVING JOINING UP THROUGH 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS 
Although there had been some examples of Crime Mapping as early as the late 1980s 
(Pease, 200 1), it was a partnership in the London Borough of Brent that pioneered the 
multi-agency approach even before the Crime and Disorder Act; from 1996 a 
collaboration was formed between the local police force and the local council, aiming 
to bring together crime and socio-economic data (interview - 11,12; 
Allison, I 998, p 18-22). The partnership used GIS to generate crime 'hotspots' to 
provide new insights into patterns of offending (Chainey, 2001, pIO3). The project 
leader commented during interviews: 
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In the sixth month of the project we began to do analysis on the data - and 
the police were amazed that we could get so much out of it. We invested 
in the time and energy so we were able to effectively exchange data 
between the two organisations and by establishing trust all the cultural 
barriers went. Some of the results that came out actually changed the way 
that the police force did policing - and although its hard to say Crime 
Mapping reduced crime by 35% - they saw it as a part of how policing 
was becoming much more intelligence led - and crime did reduce by 
35%. Other parts of London weren't seeing this decrease (interview - 12) 
The success influenced the approach of other London boroughs, and multi-agency 
Crime Mapping was used 'as the starting point' for Hackney's Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Strategy group (Chainey, 2001, pIO4). 
As Crime Mapping progressed to higher levels of sophistication, information not just 
about crime patterns was offered, but also criminal behaviour, architecture and other 
socio-economic information that facilitated crime prevention (ibid., p 105). In Brent, 
links between deprivation, social class, housing occupancy, population age and crime' 
were being explored through what was described as 'the innovative cross partner 
sharing of geographic information'; for instance, GIS was used to examine the 
relationship between youth offending and habitat (ibid., p 110). In Southwark, police 
data was combined with council noise pollution information using GIS to aid a multi- 
agency taskforce in tackling the problem (ibid., pl 15). In Harr'Ow police, ambulance, 
census, deprivation, educational and other data sets were combined in GIS to help 
tackle drug-related crime problems (ibld., pl 16). The Safer Merseyside Partnership 
had also been somewhat of a pioneer in multi-agency Crime Mapping qndeavours, 
bringing together information from local authorities, police, fire brigade, transport and 
non-government bodies to provide analysis of crime on public transport and juvenile 
disturbances (Hirschfield, 2001). 
From 1998 in particular, Crime Mapping projects sprung up in CDRPs and other local 
and regional partnership organisations; as noted above, by 2002 74% of the 376 
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CDRPs were found to be engaged in some form of Crime Mapping 
(Radbum, 2002, p4O). The Crime Mapping project in Leeds provided a fairly typical 
example; it used information from the local police force (recorded crime and reported 
incidence databases), fire authorities, health organisations, youth offending services, 
drug action teams, the used needle collection service, abandoned vehicles teams, noise 
pollution teams and educational bodies (attendance, truancy and expulsion rates data) 
(interview - 13). 
Certainly, those involved were positive about the insights into the relationship 
between crime and other socio-demographic factors that multi-agency Crime 
Mapping could offer. The reasons given as to the strengths of GIS-mediated Crime 
Mapping were commensurate with the criminological perspectives on locale- 
orientated crime prevention and partnerships that had filtered through to crime 
policies during the decades before the millennium. As Bowers and Hirschfield point 
out: 
The analysis of relations between demography, housing, social conditions 
and crime and the targeting of crime prevention strategies can be facilitated 
greatly by information systems capable of handling spatially-referenced 
crime and incident data and cross-referencing them with contextual 
information on land-use, infrastructure and demographic and social 
conditions ... This is where GIS-linked applications 
have the most to offer 
(Bowers/Hirshfield, 1999, pl6O) 
One senior Crime Mapping protagonist, interviewed for the thesis, provided further 
details on examples of how geo-coded information from multiple agencies could 
benefit intelligent crime prevention: 
Imagine if a car is abandoned burnt out, the police service will not register 
that car as arson unless the fire service contact them and tell them that. If 
you plot on a map where the car was stolen and where it was abandoned, 
then you obtain from probation details of what youths are currently on 
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their books and are subject to orders and are prolific car thieves and likely 
to set fire to cars, and plot where they live, you suddenly have a very 
comprehensive map of who is likely to be stealing what cars and from 
where, and the make of the car, the age of the car they prefer; you can tie 
it to an individual offender. You can look at the distances they are 
inclined to travel and if you know the associates that that individual is 
involved with, girlfriends or the clubs they like going to ... you form a 
whole jigsaw of car crime (interview - 12) 
Proponents of Crime Mapping contended that the tool could change and improve 
crime prevention and policing practice through new insights. For instance, it had been 
assumed in some areas that most crimes occurred late at night; 'the Westminster 
partnership believed crime and disorder increased in the early hours and targeted 
resources accordingly. When crime data was cleansed and mapped this was found to 
be false' (Radbum, 2001, para. 1.04). Further insights were gleaned by combined data 
sets using GIS: 
We could find out what proportion of injuries aren't getting reported to 
the police, because people will go to A+E but nobody will report it to the 
police ... You can identify what routes are particularly problematic, 
for 
instance an underpass near a university. Also, very few women report 
incidents of domestic violence for fear of retribution, but a lot of women 
will go to A+E and to doctors, PCTs [Primary Care Trusts], for their 
injuries, and the doctors could provide very useful information about what 
categories of women are suffering. Without this information you are 
working in a silo as they like to say, a police silo, and you are totally 
unaware of what else is impacting and what the true scale of this is and 
how you might do something about it (interview -11) 
Additional analysis could be gained by CDRPs combining property data with crime 
information: 
You'd say, looking from a crime point of view, where does most crime 
occur, where do most victims live? But to delve in andunderstand that 
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problem you'd look at other layers. If you have a problem of criminal 
damage in an area - you use the knowledge that criminal damage is 
normally connected with alcohol abuse and so you'd look at the licensed 
premises in the area, map those, and see if there are certain pubs causing 
the problem. It's about getting behind where the problems come from. 
Instead of reacting to the criminal damage we can work with those pubs 
and bars on the problems of people coming out of them when they close 
(interview - 12) 
By the first few years of the new millennium it was clear that Crime Mapping tools 
had been deployed in most CDRPs, following the pioneering work in Brent and 
elsewhere. There was a strong argument for the use of data from multiple agencies in 
Crime Mapping, to enable GIS-enabled analysis into crime patterns. However, 
crucially, CDRPs had to be able to access the datasets held by multiple organisations 
to generate this analysis (Radbum, 2001, para. 1.05-1.06). Whilst Ordnance Survey 
digital maps were considered to be of high quality (Heywood, I 997, p 19; 
Pollard, 2000, p 18 8), there had been difficulties with the supply of other useful 
baseline data such as a national repository of land and property addresses, although 
CDRPs could often use local authorities gazetteer information (interview - 12). 
However, the acquisition and use of partner data, used to overlay on maps and other 
baseline data, was a further challenge for CDRPs that wished to take advantage of 
multi-agency Crime Mapping. 
The Criminal Justice System in the e-government Era: Joining up information at a 
national level 
Criminal justice policy thinking had, since the mid-I 980s, stressed the 
potential virtue of improving cross-agency information flows, particularly to provide 
consistent offender case management data (Bellamy/Taylor, 1996); this thinking led to 
the CCCJS programme. As discussed in Chapter One, it was discovered that the 
institutional information domains of existing criminal justice agencies were in many 
ways not amenable to the joining up objectives of the CCCJS (ibid. ); elsewhere over a 
number of years commentators had criticised the criminal justice system as a whole 
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for fragmentation and a lack of cohesion and coordination (Moxon, 19 8 5; 
Raine/Willson, 1993; Crawford, I 997, p5 6; Auld, 200 1; NAO, 1999; Glidewell, 1998; 
Narey, 1997). Following the CCCJS, subsequent attempts to share case management 
information across criminal justice agencies, such as the Libra project, encountered 
well documented problems (AC, 2002b; NAO, 2003). Nonetheless, ministerial pressure 
to improve information flows across criminal justice agencies (Kable, 2003b) secured 
an enduring focus on the use of ICTs to achieve this. 
For instance, a dedicated organisation with ministerial leadership, known as Criminal 
Justice Information Technology (CJIT) was established to oversee a number of ICT 
enabled projects to bring together offender related information from across different 
criminal justice agencies. The broad objective of the CHT was to help modernise the 
IT infrastructure of criminal justice agencies, create national systems for managing 
cases and link case management systems across agencies. Key projects including a 
Secure eMail service, the aforementioned Libra and a Criminal Justice Exchange; the 
latter aimed to allow agencies to share offender case files and other relevant 
information across the criminal justice edifice. Although established some years 
before in 1997 (PITO, 2003), the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) 
worked closely with CJIT in developing a number of related police and criminal 
justice information projects. For instance, the Criminal Justice Extranet was offered to 
police forces and other criminal justice agencies as a secure communication channel 
similar to GSI, with plans for additional functions such as access to the PITO 
managed Police National Computer (PITO, 2004). Some PITO projects fitted into its 
National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS), which aimed to offer 
standard national, integrated IT systems for police forces (ibid. ). 
In early 2004 John Suffolk became director general of CJIT; he was very clear in 
identifying the work of his organisation as part of the 'joined-up agenda'. However, 
he was also keen to stress the difficulties in bringing together the different institutions 
of the criminal justice system (Amott, 2004c). The difficulties within the general 
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principle of joining up information generated by criminal justice agencies were 
indicated by the purported inadequacies of the Police National Computer (PNC). The 
PNC, managed by PITO, held a variety of data sets pertaining to offenders, vehicles 
and stolen property that police forces and other criminal justice agencies could access 
and update. Audit scrutiny found wide variation amongst police forces in crime 
classification and reporting procedures, resulting in criticisms of the accuracy and 
. quality of the 
data inputted by forces into the PNC, particularly the Phoenix national 
intelligence component (HMIC, 2000; 2002). Practitioners and observers felt that 
much of the data in the PNC could be inaccurate, untrustworthy and updated 
infrequently (Criminal Justice Conference, 200 I, point 115; interview - 12; 
Bichard, 2004, pl33). 
Although providing useful context for the institutional complexities of joining up 
information across the criminal justice system itself, much of the policy focus on 
coordination and information flows depicted above rested on offender case 
management. Although potentially useful for some of the other operations and 
responsibilities of CDRPs, such as their supervision of Prolific and Other Priority 
Offender programmes, case management information was less likely to be used in 
Crime Mapping. The work of the CRT and PITO largely operated away from the 
direct concerns of Crime Mapping protagonists, who dealt with data issues at a local 
level. Still, the institutional differences that appeared to be at the root of problems 
with criminal justice case management information flows translated to other 
comparable issues in Crime Mapping. 
Crime Mapping and Local Data Sources 
Amongst other data sets, Crime Mapping specifically required information 
from local police force crime incident information systems more commonly than 
national criminal justice databases such as the Police National Computer. Whilst 
Bellamy and Taylor observed a general reluctance of criminal justice organisations to 
share data (1996, p64), similarly CDRP actors found it difficult to acquire and use data 
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from local partner agencies (interview - 12). For instance, individual police forces 
would normally have 15 to 20 separate IT systems (interview - H), some of which 
could contain recordings of crime types and locations, telephone calls to police and 
other intelligence useful for Crime Mapping (interview - 12,11). Although CDRPs 
often experienced difficulties in convincing partner organisations to relinquish data 
(as discussed below), once acquired information such as that found in local force 
systems was often of varying accuracy and quality (Radbum, 2001, para. 1.05; 
interview - 11). This caused particular problems in the'accurate association of crimes 
with location. Furthermore, the act of comparing and combining crime data with 
information from other partnership agencies that could have also had significant 
levels of inaccuracy, as well as divergent conventions and formats for recording data, 
provided an added dimension for CDUs to overcome. 
As discussed, the strength of Crime Mapping was that it drew information from a 
variety of data sets and allowed CDRPs and other organisations to compare and 
analyse information through geographical expression in GIS software. Although 
seemingly far removed from the work of the OeE, this multi-agency approach still 
embodied the joining up sentiments of the central e-govemment strategy. However, it 
was this multi-agency approach, which brought disparate data sets together under a 
confluence, which proved to be the most challenging and problematic aspect of Crime 
Mapping. This was not least because the data sets represented and reflected the 
institutional and technical idiosyncrasies of the partner organisations that had been 
brought together under the ambit of CDRPs. It was felt that commonalties in 
geography itself would to an extent be powerful enough to provide commonalties to 
the data (interview - 12). However it was still very much the case that information 
collected by police forces, other criminal justices agencies, housing, social services, 
education, health organisations and so on would have largely been collected for 
varying purposes, with different levels of detail and accuracy, regarding different 
clients or subjects, confined to various geographical boundaries and stored in differing 
formats. A key skill in multi-agency Crime Mapping was the ability to acquire data 
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from a variety of sources and then overcome any inconsistencies within that data to 
facilitate useful analysis. How this was achieved represented an important aspect to 
the findings of the case study. 
Joining Up Through Trust Relationships: Going with the institutional grain 
A strong theme from interviewees was that the emphasis in Crime Mapping 
was on building trustful relationships with partner organisations. Although the 
technology involved was clearly crucial, GIS and other applications were seen as 
supportive facilitators rather than the main focus. Rather than developing ICTs that 
required modifications in the information processes of participant organisations, the 
accent was on adopting Crime Mapping activity to the data sets provided and to 
accept the institutional differences inheýent within them. The technology was adapted 
to the institutions involved, rather than vice-versa. 
Crime Mapping protagonists were wary of the need to instil confidence in partner 
organisations; one commented: 
Culture is the key word - I've often said that there have been so many 
artificial barriers put up - there are comfort zones, and people feel that if 
they pass their information over it will be scrutinised more. That 
challenge has to be stood up to (interview - 11) 
Similarly, a Home Office report argued: 
When an external data-sharing project arrives, the line is crossed, warning 
bells often ring out, and barriers may come down. There are also, of 
course, competing home grown data sharing solutions where the wheel is 
reinvented time and time again, expensive projects fail, and political 
cover-ups dent support for further progress (Radburn, 200 I, para. 1.05) 
Another interviewee noted the difficulties, but also the importance of obtaining the 
willing participation of protagonists: 
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The cultural protective attitude of 'this is my data - we can't share this 
data, it's not going to go out to anyone' - that is an issue but if you give 
them the resource, if you gave them an extra few bodies in there to 
demonstrate first of all how their data can be used to solve ýOme of the 
holistic and corporate problems across the authority - and what that 
department could gain in terms of direct cost savings, then they will 
become to get more engaged and the cultural barriers will be removed 
(interview - 13) 
Another interviewee added to this, suggesting that to overcome barriers it was 
necessary to identify key individuals: 
Once you have contact with the person that manages a data set in each 
department then it is only two or three minutes work for that person to 
pop it on a CD and send it to us or email it to us - so it's not difficult once 
you know who's got the data, it's getting to that point that is difficult 
(interview - 15) 
The need to develop trust and support with partnership agencies was a recurrent 
theme in interviews, for instance: 
We held a scoping event and invited partners to look at what we are 
doing, but then we held further events where groups went to see partners 
in their offices, and got them to show us their computer screens and what 
they do ... we've had quite a positive approach from that and people 
seemed to suddenly get quite keen with the idea of sharing information 
(interview - 13) 
The same interviewee provided further evidence: 
A survey was done with existing partners, asking what data_ they kept, and 
they responded and individual owners were identified. We ran a scoping 
event to show them examples of Crime Mapping, to try and engage them 
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a little bit and get them to talk about their data sets because they haven't 
been doing it in the past (interview - 13) 
Although ICTs were not the central theme discussed by Crime Mapping interviewees, 
importance was given to the role of various middleware techniques that could help 
cleanse and reformat data. One interviewee noted that: 
we used middleware software on police systems which automated a lot of 
the data cleaning processes - as it corrected spelling mistakes and looked 
at address fields. If we focused on the geographic element and put the data 
on a map, we could then solve some of the other problems. The focus was 
on cleaning, standardising abbreviations, sorting out where data was 
inserted in the wrong field and the software would correct all that 
(interview - H) 
Another Crime Mapping project leader commented on the advantages that such 
software could lend; when asked how the Crime Mapping project coped with the 
different data formats he replied: 
by building the system around what systems they've got in use - it 
doesn't take much. We've said partners Will provide the data on a CD or a 
whole range of other ways - we've made it so the system can cope with 
the quirks of the way that the agencies provide the data to us. We need all 
the opportunities we can get to get all the information we can (interview - 
11) 
Home Office guidance suggested the potential benefits of cleansing middleware 
technology in terms of efficiency savings: 'For 1000 records, manual processing took 
10 days at fl. 04 per record. Infoshare [a software company] automated this to 20 
minutes at EO. OQ34p per record' (Radbum, 2001, para. 1.05). The drawing together and 
cleansing of address-related data in particular was said to benefit from the adoption of 
the BS7666 standard, used to format relevant information used in Crime Mapping 
tools (interview - 12; Radbum, 2002, pl. 06). 
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Despite the advances of middleware, it was not suggested that all data issues had been 
solved; one interviewee commented on the data sets coming in to him: 
some of them are still ridiculously incompatible, or just ridiculously 
inadequate ... There is still the acknowledgement that data is going to 
come in to us piecemeal, in different formats ... I don't think anyone is 
kidding themselves that they are going to produce some kind of fantastic 
middleware that's the equivalent of a babel-fish (interview - 13) 
Furthermore, some interviewees were aware of weak geo-coding practices in partner 
organisations, which could lead to inaccuracies in Crime Mapping analysis: 
I was looking at crime in Headingley, andI couldn't understand why a 
particular'area in Far Headingley seemed to have a lot of crime even 
though there was nothing much there except for a hotel, with a sports area 
attached; it didn't make sense. And it was only by closer examination of 
the data I discovered that a lot of the crimes in the shops a couple of miles 
away in-Headingley had been given the postcode of this hotel; this 
postcode only has one delivery point and it is the hotel. Someone for some 
reason has been putting in the wrong postcode and thinking 'oh it's close 
enough - it's Headingley', and it displaced these crimes by two or three 
kilometers (interview - 13) 
Despite these issues interviewees felt that, once partnerships and GIS applications 
were in place, success with multi-agency Crime Mapping was by virtue of an 
emphasis on building relationships with partner organisations and accepting data 
contributions in any form. Thus, on the ground the evidence suggests that, in the face 
of long-standing difficulties with partnership working in the criminal justice system, 
Crime Mapping protagonists concentrated on going with the institutional grain of the 
partner organisations. Efforts were made to understand the needs and processes of 
police, local authority departments and other participating agencies, which were not 
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required to profoundly change business practices to contribute and, ideally, benefit 
from Crime Mapping. 
In the instance of Crime Mapping, the particular incarnation ofjoining up rested not 
on the integration of the operations of organisations, or indeed widespread data 
sharing across multiple agencies; instead data was passed bilaterally through to 
CDRPs in a variety of formats and Crime Mapping protagonists would adapt and 
manipulate this data to facilitate analysis. Thus, Crime Mapping processes had a 
strong pragmatic and organic semblance, with protagonists reacting to and working 
with the particular needs and capabilities of partner organisations and the local 
environment. However, central government actors had made some efforts towards 
standardising, orchestrating and centralising GIS and Crime Mapping tools and 
processes, as discussed in the penultimate section of the Chapter. 
4.6 CRIME MAPPING STANDARDISATION: ATTEMPTS TO ORCHESTRATE 
CDRP OPERATIONS 
Government actors had long identified the potential benefits of providing levels of 
standardisation to geographic data across the public sector and beyond; latterly this 
imperative had been associated with the sentiments of joining up, also at the heart of 
the central e-governnient strategy. Efforts had been made to provide technical 
standards such as the BS7666 and data repositories like'the NLPG, which, 
accompanied with base maps from the Ordnance Survey, census data and other 
baseline information, could provide a standardiSed set of geographic tools for public 
sector organisations to utilise in improving the delivery of services in a variety of 
ways. 
As discussed above, these standardisation methods had been a challenge to develop 
but were nonetheless seen as worthy endeavours. Taking this approach one step 
further, policymakers also attempted to develop a standard GIS tool for government 
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agencies to use; a complete package replete with Ordnance Survey base maps, other 
data sets and analysis tools, available as a web based service. One such general 
example of this was the 'Maps on Tap' tool, developed from 2001 by the ODPM and 
therefore operating largely away from direct crime prevention operations. 
The objective of Maps on Tap was to provide a useful mechanism available on 
desktops in wide range of government organisations and to other actors, including the 
public: 
The vision for the Maps on Tap service is that; in the future, policy-makers, 
analysts and other key users, including the public, will have easy access to 
high quality information about places via a range of robust and reliable web- 
based, interactive information services. Licensed users will be able to 
browse, view, analyse and download a wide range of geographic data, 
linked to and displayed with up-to-date Ordnance Survey mapping ... A 
service will be provided that allows users to choose related sets of data to be 
overlaid on a single map (ODPM, 2003, p5) 
The intention was that all public sector organisations could take advantage of Maps 
on Tap if desired (ibid., p9); it was conceivable that Crime Mapping protagonists in 
CDRPs could have utilised the service. However, interviewees suggested that this did 
not occur, in part because Maps on Tap had been delayed and there were doubts as to 
the viability of the service (interview - 15). Furthermore, there were many other GIS 
tools incumbent in central, regional and local government organisations with an 
interest in geographic data by 2001 (interview - 15), making investment in a licence 
for a generic service less attractive. 
Nonetheless, in the arena of crime prevention, central government was keen to 
provide levels of standardisation, orchestration and data exchange for CDRPs and 
their analyse of crime patterns, including for Crime Mapping tools. The Home Office 
was working during 2002 towards a 'Partnership Business Model' (PBM) that aimed 
to help CDRPs improve information data collection procedures, share best practice, 
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improve analysis and drive up the effectiveness of the partnerships in general 
(interview - 11). As part of this broader mission, the PBM had within it plans for 
partnership Information Hubs, to act as 'central data repositories where local 
partnership data can be stored and manipulated' (Radbum, 2002, p5). The objective 
was to provide a conduit for 'information exchange and analysis and problem solving 
for partnerships. So we are trying to standardise, and get the partnerships much more 
engaged in actual problem solving' (interview - I]). Although the wider PBM 
concept and the crime data sharing component was positioned to facilitate the full 
scope of crime and disorder auditing responsibilities of CDRPs and the PBM had no 
mandate to coerce CDRPs to participate in the scheme (Radbum, 2002, p8), Crime 
Mapping was also very much seen as part of the Model (interview - 11). Therefore, 
PBM included within it the notion of orchestrating, coordinating and sharing Crime 
Mapping tools and data in some manner, although it was not clear exactly what form 
this would take. 
However, by 2004 it emerged that the PBM, including any Crime Mapping element, 
was being 'scaled back' as many CDRPs were unable to contribute or exchange data 
with other partnerships to any meaningful level. Thus, the 'all singing all dancing' 
incarnation of PBM, where crime data could be routinely exchanged and common 
tools used across CDRPs, was not achievable at that time (personal correspondence - 
11). Thus, this particular attempt by the Home Office to coordinate the activities of 
CDRPs, including Crime Mapping, had apparently met with obstacles. This suggested 
that, although the very essence of CDRP operations involved partnership working 
with local agencies, attempts to orchestrate and aggregate their work across different 
CDRP areas were difficult. 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The logic of the e-govermnent agenda, as expressed by the OeE and other Cabinet 
Office organisations, reasoned that using ICTs to join up public sector operations 
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could lead to significant improvements in delivery. Broadly, it is observed that the 
criminal justice system had embraced the key components of this logic; resources had 
been put into developing national technological tools to increase flows of offender 
and crime information across the different agencies of the system. However, although 
no doubt latterly influenced by the Cabinet Office e-government strategy, 
policyrnakers within the criminal justice system already had a long-standing tradition 
of partnership working with other public sector bodies, particularly in crime 
prevention policy, where the need for a multi-agency approach had been realised over 
several decades. 
Furthermore, policyrnakers had also attempted to apply ICTs to the coordination of 
operations, for instance with the CCCJS, well before the emergence of the e- 
government strategy. It was likely however, that the institutional barriers shown to be 
problematic in increasing flows across different information domains in the case of 
the CCCJS (Bellamy/Taylor, 1996) would remain as a significant challenge to the 
work of the CJIT. As identified by John Suffolk (Amott, 2004c), director general of 
the CHT in 2004, criminal justice agencies such as the courts, Crown Prosecution 
Service, Youth Offending Teams, prisons, probation and 43 autonomous police forces 
had a range of needs, practices, agendas, data and systems that left contributions to 
and participation in a national case management system problematic. 
This context provides a useful backcloth to the specific case of Crime Mapping, 
which was nonetheless of a different nature to the high-level e-governnient policies 
that were embarked upon through the CJIT. CDRP-based Crime Mapping was largely 
contained, within a local setting and relied on the collection and use of data from both 
within and beyond criminal justice agencies. The centrality of GIS to Crime Mapping 
brought in a number of other protagonists; the role of the Ordnance Survey in , 
providing digital maps, often at a significant cost, was crucial. Elsewhere there were 
stalled attempts to provide national repositories of geographical data that faced 
institutional barriers, whilst other data providers, such as the Office for National 
200 
Statistics, were criticised for a lack of understanding of the needs of the GIS 
community. 
However, spurred on by a longstanding policy emphasis on preventative policing, 
partnership work and the geography of crime, once established many CDRPs saw the 
benefits of pursuing multi-agency Crime Mapping, using increasingly affordable GIS 
software and accessible base maps. In contrast to the emphasis on national 
technological infrastructures, systems, hubs and portals of various kinds as seen not 
only seen with back office CJIT projects but also the often front office initiatives of 
the OeE (for instance Government Gateway, UK Online portal, DoTP), Crime 
Mapping rested on bilateral relationships with local partners. Interviewees 
consistently stressed the importance of trust building and understanding partner needs; 
data was accepted in different formats and, although by no means perfect, middleware 
was employed to correct errors. This implied that Crime Mapping protagonists were 
willing to accept and work with the institutional differences and idiosyncrasies of 
partner organisations, as reflected in the data collected, rather than attempting to 
change operations and processes to suit Crime Mapping requirements from the outset. 
Whilst the extent to which Crime Mapping analysis and recommendations were 
disseminated and acted upon by partner organisations was less clear, interviewees 
appeared to enjoy considerable success in accessing and using the desired information 
in mapping exercises using this approach. It should be noted however that success on 
this front would not automatically lead to what could be considered a successful 
CDRP overall or indeed a reduction in crime and disorder levels, nor is it suggested 
that the partnerships could not be successful without engaging in Crime Mapping. 
Intcrviewees were largely sceptical of the idea of standardisation or extensive data 
sharing for Crime Mapping across CDRPs because of the local distinctiveness of 
crime (e. g. interview - 14,15,28). The scaling back of the PBM provided some 
evidence of the potential difficulties with the general idea of joining up some CDRP 
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operations. However, interviewees were hopeful that standards such as the BS7666 
would be the most useful and appropriate method of coordination for geographic data 
and systems (interview - 15), whilst the majority of Crime Mapping operations might 
best be left to protagonists in individual CDRPs, working with and reacting to the 
specifics of local crime patterns and engaging with local organisations as appropriate. 
Although Ordnance Survey base maps were vital and a national data repository for 
land and property data could have been a welcome convenience, people and processes 
were emphasised more than technology by interviewees. 
Nonetheless it can be concluded that according to the evidence collected for the case 
study, although understated, ICTs had indeed been successfully employed to help 
facilitate joined up government in a local setting through Crime Mapping. In the 
specific case, the role of key actors, operating in a local network of organisations 
appeared paramount. The Home Office largely provided arms-length support with 
funding, toolkits, guidance for Crime Mapping and general CDRP activity whilst the 
AGI and IGGI supplied a forum for discussion and direction; the AGI had a specific 
Crime and Disorder special interest group. The OeE, was understandably distant from 
the Crime Mapping community and most interviewees were not aware of the Office, 
although Andrew Pinder had stressed the importance of geographic information in the 
e-government era. Still, due to the nature of Crime Mapping, focused on back office 
operations in a local setting, some of the keys tools and measures offered by the 
Office of the e-Envoy, such as the citizen-focused central web portal and Government 
Gateway, were not relevant to this particular case. 
However, the OeE had also shown an interest in facilitating back office 
interoperability and had, for instance, been involved in some work on compatibility 
between general and geographical technical standards, with the BS7666 and e-GIF 
(NLPG, 2004). Whilst e-GIF has been described as 'mandatory policy framework' to 
enable a 'seamless flow of information across the public sector' (OeE, 2002, p6O) it 
was evidently not the case that, for instance, all partners were able to electronically 
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transfer data to CDRPs for use in Crime Mapping, using e-GIF standards. Admittedly, 
e-GIF adoption was an ongoing task (ibid., p6l) and it was by no means expected that 
all public sector organisations would be using the specifications within a short few 
years of their introduction. Still, Crime Mapping data sharing practices highlighted 
the size of the task in hand for public sector interoperability in the e-goverriment era. 
Doubtless, the rather ad hoc and organic approach to multi-agency data flows that 
interviewed Crime Mapping protagonists employed carried ýVith it specific 
drawbacks. For instance the inadequate data collection and geo-coding practices 
observed by some interviewees in their local partners might have been set to continue 
without measures to successfully embed standard procedures. Still, this case study 
demonstrated that, considering the institutional complexities involved not only in the 
evolution of Crime Mapping but also its use in a multi-agency environment, the 
approach adopted might be the most favourable in this specific case. Conversely, 
whilst always likely to be complex and challenging, the national infrastructure, 
system, hub or portal approach may be more suitable in other cases across the public 
sector. In the criminal justice system as a whole, policyrnakers had chosen to develop 
a number of national technological solutions to the problem of fragmented case 
management processes, which imply significant levels of interoperation for the 
agencies involved. Whilst the logic of applying such an approach to criminal justice 
and elsewhere is not challenged generically by the findings of this case study, Crime 
Mapping does point to a potential alternative emphasis in the use of ICTs for joining 
up in certain situations. 
With this argument in mind, the thesis will move on to the second case study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY TWO - ELECTRONIC CARE 
RECORDS AND &GOVERNMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As with the previous chapter, this case study looks at how the notions of e- 
government, as expressed in the Modernising Government white paper and the 
activity of the OeE, are played out within the institutions, organisations and 
technological processes involved in service delivery. It investigates how e- 
government practices facilitated joined up government in the case of electronic care 
records. The Chapter begins with providing technological, organisational. and policy 
historical context before delineating the development of the electronic records concept 
in welfare policy, positioned to facilitate joining up within health care and between 
health and social care services. The chapter will finish with a rich analysis of the 
Electronic Care Records programme up to summer 2004. 
Wetfare Information and e-government 
This case study looks at the movement towards Electronic Care Records (ECR), 
and away from discrete paper or isolated computer records in health and social care 19 
institutions. The ECR project was part of the wider National Programme for IT (NPflT), 
supervised by the Department of Health and aimed largely at the modernisation of NHS 
IT systems in England. The NPflT had been identified as having the highest cost, risk and 
ambition, and potentially carrying the greatest benefits of any of the areas of e- 
government; an influential report published in April 2002 recommended that f 13 billion 
be put into health IT over six years (Wanless, 2002), and following this there were 
indications that this needed to increase considerably (Kable, 2002k). As a measure of its 
magnitude, some sources cited the NPflT, with ECR at its heart, as. being 'the largest civil 
IT programme in Europe' (Collins, 2003). Thus, it represented a flagship programme upon 
which the e-government agenda would be judged. 
19 Health and social care will be collectively termed 'welfare' for the purposes of simplicity for this 
case study 
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Whilst the previous case study consisted largely of developments in the back offices of 
organisations involved in crime prevention, this case study also focuses on changes at the 
point of service delivery, as ECR was intended to be used in part by health and social care 
practitioners as they interacted with patients in surgeries, hospitals and offices. 
Furthermore, whereas Crime Mapping proved to be in the main a locally operated tool, 
distinct in each CDRP, ECR was a national project aimed at serving the whole welfare 
edifice. 
Welfare services consisted of GP visits, hospital stays, outpatient appointments, 
pharmacy dispensing, social care and other contact that generated information; since the 
inception of the welfare state after the Second World War in particular, much of this 
contact was kept as formal records to help deliver high quality and consistent services to 
patients. ECR was essentially a way of providing unified electronic records, drawing 
together health and social care information for a single patient, to be accessed and 
updated by welfare practitioners across the full range of institutions and organisations. 
This was clearly a process of ICT-mediated joining up. However, ECR entailed dealing 
with a vast array of institutional and organisational. differences both within the NHS (GP 
surgeries, hospitals and other health service deliverers) and between NHS and social 
service bodies. This was reflected in the fact that medical and social service patient data 
recording systems differed greatly across organisations and in 2002, when NPf[T was 
initiated, were dominated by paper methods or stand-alone patient databases in GP 
surgeries and hospital departments. 
To achieve its objectives, the ECR project had to change and align the patient data 
recording procedures and information systems to an extent, which in turn implied 
alteration of welfare institutions to bring them closer together around the needs of the 
patient. Closer alignment between welfare institutions had long been an enduring 
objective of policyrnakers, well before the application of ICTs to the issue. In particular 
there had been prolonged concern about a perceived disjoint between health and social 
care organisations, which led to fragmented and incoherent service delivery for some 
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patients. The Department of Health, with its responsibilities to both spheres, was best 
positioned to act upon the concern, but agreed with other observers that interfacing across 
the purported gap between health and social care would be not unlike scaling the Berlin 
Wall (DOH, 1998a, p97), such were the institutional barriers. 
With this is mind, providing an administrative history of the structure of health and social 
care institutions provides vital context to the institutional environment within which ECR 
operated. Whereas electronic records aimed to join up patient information, the history 
demonstrated considerable fragmentation between and within the two spheres of welfare. 
Many policies and initiatives had been set to improve interfaces between health and social 
carer before the emergence of ECR and the wider e-government agenda. 
5.2 JOINING UP WELFARE: STRATEGIES TO SCALE THE BERLIN WALL 
It was not until after the First World War that British governments initiated a more 
concerted humanitarian approach to welfare, partially in response to anti-Poor Law 
campaigns by reformers such as George Lansbury and Beatrice Webb. This approach 
culminated in William Beveridge's initial conception of the contemporary welfýre state, 
drawn up during the Second World War (Lowe, 1990; Timmins, 2001). The Beveridge 
Report (1942) had an objective of 'slaying the five giants' of 'want, disease, ignorance, 
squalor and idleness' (Hill, I 993, p IS). It was generally acknowledged that Beveridge 
managed to crystallise pre-existing ideas about welfare that, albeit in diluted fashion, 
eventually heavily influenced the trajectory of the National Health Service, social security 
and pension reforms. Social care was not well recognised in this initial conception of 
welfare. Social care differed from Social Security, a fundamental aspect of Beveridge's 
blueprint, which existed to provide pensions and support for the workforce. Instead, 
social care (often termed 'personal social services') equated to a distinct raft of services 
for the elderly, disabled, young, mentally ill or vulnerable, including day-care, social 
work, residential, counselling and advice assistance (Gladstone et al, I 995, p 162). 
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The separation between health and social care was a result of the post-war welfare 
settlement. Part three of the 1948 National Assistance Act required the provision of 
residential care (home nursing and home help etc) to be placed under the responsibility of 
local authorities (Lewis, 2002, p3l4), and this introduced an administrative divide between 
that and health care. Since that timejunding, approaches, cultures and practices had 
developed separately 20 (ibid). From the 1940s the Ministry of Health attempted to 
coordinate local health services, took on some national functions (Honigsbaum, 1970), 
and survived until 1968 when it was merged with the Ministry of Social Security to form 
a hybrid super-department. Before the Second World War the Ministry of Health 
appeared to have some significant social care responsibilities, but following the creation 
of the National Health Service (NHS), the vast proportion of its energies was devoted to 
setting up the organisation. It can be argued that a 'health bias' was embedded into the 
workings of the Ministry, which continued in its future incarnations as the Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS) and the Department of Health (DOH). The bias 
contributed to a divide between health and social care operations in public services, with 
health rooted in the NHS and social care existing separately. However, the divide was not 
only administrative, but also deeply embedded in the differences in training, objectives, 
priorities, practices of and public attitudes towards the medical and social care 
professions (interview - 21). 
Considering health alone, the creation of the National Health Service did represent an 
attempt to unify the hospital, medicine, General Practitioner, dental, optical and maternity 
services which had been developing in a piecemeal manner over the previous hundred 
years (Allsop, I 995, p 106). The implementation of the National Health Service Act (1946) 
was by no means straightforward however, and Nye Bevan had to battle bitterly to put the 
organisation together (Hill, I 993, p34). Despite this and other significant problems the 
NHS survived and grew under successive governments, and was at least partially 
responsible for the fact that the nation's health had improved since the late 1940s in every 
20 Health care was usually free, whilst social care was often means-tested and could incur a charge. 
Twigg noted the notorious 'health versus social care bath' to point out the difficulties this provided to 
the patient. A bath for an elderly or infirm patient could be given in the home for free by a nurse, but 
was paid for if carried out by a home social carer (Twigg, 1997). 
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age group (Allsop, I 995, p99). Still, the NHS had experienced increasing turmoil and 
uncertainty particularly since the 1980s, with several waves of reform. Furthermore, as 
noted above, it was generally acknowledged that the service had always had a tendency 
towards fragmentation (ibid., p98-123); unsurprising considering that 1.2 million staff 
members were spread across hundreds of NHS organisations. 
Considering social care alone, such services had had little by way of a comprehensive 
policy history, and a 1945 report noted that responsibility for social care, in particular for 
children, was unclearly positioned between education authorities and anachronistic Poor 
Laws (Hill, 1993, p38). Indeed, it was argued that during post-war decades there was 
barely any coherent social care strategy; instead it was 'patchy and ad hoc' (ibid p 13). 
Whilst the NHS was receiving the lion's share of resources and attention from the 
Ministry of Health, social care policy was fragmented across parts of the Ministry, the 
Home Office and local government (ibid., p39-40), and developed in the main separately 
to the National Health Service. The period from 1948-1970 had been identified as one of 
"administrative fragmentation' for social care (Gladstone et al, 1995, pl66). However, 
there was an emerging recognition of 'common identity' between organisationally distinct 
strands of social care during the early 1960s (ibid., plV), and in 1965 the 'Seebolun 
Committee' was formed to review the structure of personal social services and discussed 
some reorganisation. The report, published in 1968, recommended the setting up of 
unified social service departments at local level (Hill, 1993, p81), bringing together many 
of the disparate strands of social care. Despite an early frosty reception, the proposals 
were enacted in 1971 following the 1970 Social Services Act, and there was a general 
feeling of optimism that social care would enjoy an elevated position in public services 
(Gladstone et al, I 995, p 167). However, social care was firmly embedded within local 
authorities, and was isolated from health, despite many observers contending that there 
were natural links between the two spheres. 
The observation that interfaces between health and social care services should be 
encouraged for the benefits of patient led to a number of policies and strategies over 
several decades. Running in parallel to these measures however were political patterns, 
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professional differences and institutional barriers that arguably pulled apart health and 
social care coordination. 
Approaches to Joining Up Weýfare Services 
In 1962 the Hospital Plan was published by the Ministry of Health, and 
included a recognition that health and social services could usefully interface more. In 
the following year, the Ministry published another report that further emphasised the 
need for collaboration, and there was a movement toward comprehensive plans that 
dealt with the divide between the two spheres. These plans were said to be 
unsuccessful and ineffective (Lewis, 2002, p3l4-315). However, according to some 
commentators it was this paper that was behind the merger to create the DHSS in 
1968 (Booth, 198 1 a, p23), brought together at the height of organisational reform that 
occurred during this period (Theakston, 1995a, p83). As with other'super- 
departments', the DHSS was, in hindsight, considered to be too unwieldy and 
complex to be run as a single entity (Hennessy, I 989, p424; Fry, 1979, p229; 
Rayner, 1 994, p5 1). Besides, as a department that amalgamated health and social 
security, the organisation did not include much by way of structural scope for 
bringing social care closer to health. Despite a perceived need to join up some social 
care and health operations, the DHSS proved not to be the conduit through which 
such interoperation could occur; health and social security were separated again in 
1988. 
The Central Policy Review Staff, created in the Cabinet Office by Edward Heath in 
197 1, as a think-tank style unit and was initially seen as successful and powerful 
(Theakstonj 995a, pl 13; Pollitt, I 984, pl 05). Although its force soon ebbed, it set up 
the 'Joint Approach to Social Policy' (JASP) review exercise, which operated for 
several years from 1972. The JASP initially struggled but a diluted form existing to 
encourage 'joint thinking' did later make some impression ' 
(Blackstone/Plowden, 1988, pIO2-115) before its 'life-support' was cut off in 1977 
(ibid., pl 15). The JASP survived as an ideal however, which promoted closer 
engagement between health and social care (Hill, I 993, p 102). To some extent it was 
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picked up again in 1974 when the NHS was restructured partially to increase the 
strategic planning of services for groups such as the elderly and the physically or 
mentally disabled (Allsop, I 995, p 107). 
Although the reforms of the 1970s were said to have essentially failed (ibid, p108), 
they brought an emphasis on community care in health policy, which had the loose 
objective of keeping vulnerable people, such as the elderly or disabled, out of 
institutions and in their existing community (Loader, 1 998, p228). This approach 
would be singled out later by the Thatcher government, which looked to reduce 
pressure on health expenditure with an ageing population (Hills, I 993, p 13 8). 
Community care placed more emphasis on the social care aspects of welfare, and, at 
least in principle, encouraged links between health and social service organisations. 
For example, the community care approach held that the convalescence of an elderly 
person following a spell in hospital was less traumatic in the familiar environs of the 
patient's home. To provide the necessary care away from a medical institution 
entailed coordinated social and health care, whilst discrete provision may have led to 
a disrupted service and frustration on behalf of the patient. 
Joined Up Weýfare: Political influences of the 1980s 
The reforms of 1974 were said to have 'opened up new opportunities for 
closer liaison and greater cooperation' bet, ýeen health and social care 
(Booth, 198 1 a, p23). The community care approach remained a prominent strain of 
welfare policy (Evandrou/Falkingham, 1998, pl94) and some health and social care 
organisations would create a variety of bilateral links and partnerships. 
Another approach during the period was joint planning structures that encouraged 
certain levels of joining up between the two spheres (for example DHSS, 1976). 
Through the NHS Act (1977), joining up was being promoted to achieve effective 
community care, and local authorities and health organisations formed joint 
consultative committees to provide holistic planning (Booth, 198 1 a, p37). However, as 
with the previous case study, partnership working exposed institutional differences 
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between the organisations involved. Through an investigation of Calderdale region 
initiatives, Booth found that such joint committees, although largely populated by 
individuals aspiring to improve coordination, exposed a cultural, administrative and 
resources gulf between health and local authorities (Booth, 198 1 a, p4l-45; 
Booth, 198 1 b, p224). Booth concluded that, after a few years the j oint committee in 
Calderdale was 'now stuck in a rut' (1981b, p224). Widening the focus to the country 
as a whole, the joint planning scheme appeared to be largely unsuccessful 
(Lewis, 2002, p3l6). 
Wider political patterns may also have been working against the policies and 
strategies to bring health and social care closer together. Following Thatcher's 
appointment as Prime Minister in 1979, central/local relations were said to have 
soured. Contact between the Conservative government and the largely Labour-run 
urban councils became increasingly adversarial (Hill, I 993, p 142-145). This may have 
negatively affected the potential for interfacing between-central government health 
organisations and social care departments in local authorities. Thrasher pointed out 
that central/local relations had 'been typified by a mood of despondency and 
frustration as efforts to improve the situation have failed, unable to move beyond the 
most basic of accusations and recriminations' (198l, p455). A further point, borne out 
by Lewis, was that as funding became tighter, the NHS and local authorities would 
constantly be at loggerheads about when health responsibilities ended and social care 
began (particularly in the case of citizens who had frequent hospital visits). There was 
'intractable disputes about responsibilities' (Lewis, 2002, p3l6) that would not have 
helped matters. 
By the mid- I 980s, Thatcher had embarked upon a more concerted effort to impose 
her ideologies on the public sector, shifting the emphasis away from the universalism 
of the post-war consensus and attempting to reduce public spending on welfare. The 
NHS experienced considerable upheaval following a major review in 1989, the 
publication of the white paper Workingfor Patients (1989), and the ensuing 
legislation (the NHS and Community Care Act of 1990). The reforms were intended 
211 
to inject vitality into bureaucratic health organisations by ordering Health Authorities 
to purchase care from the providers (hospitals and other organisations). The providers 
became independent NHS Trusts, which were essentially in competition with each 
other to deliver services via the supervising Health Authorities. This 'internal market' 
was, to say the least, controversial; it was alleged to increase fragmentation and 
duplication of effort, which detracted from any efficiencies and economies it may 
have exploited (for more information see Propper et al, 2003; Anand/Mcguire, 1997; 
Le Grand et al, 1998). It can be argued that the internal market pulled health and social 
care ffirther apart by turning attention to competition rather than a more traditional 
model of service delivery, which itself had retained a functional separation between 
the two spheres. 
In 1986 the Audit Commission published a report identifying increased fragmentation 
of social services and recommended further joint planning between health and social 
care organisations. During the same period however, social care services moved 
towards a mixed economy model, with some funding being siphoned away from local 
authorities towards privately run organisations (such as homes for the elderly), 
particularly following the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act (Wistow et al, 1996). 
Evandrou and Falkingharn added that voluntary and charity organisations aswell as 
private individuals (often close relatives) were acknowledged and promoted as part of 
the new mixed economy of social care (1998, pl99). This, as well as the emergence of 
private social care, changed the face of social services in Britain, increasing its 
heterogeneity considerably (Evandrou/Falkingham, 1998, p229). A parliamentary 
report published in the late- I 990s noted that the reforms of this period brought into 
sharper relief the gulf between the two spheres: it noted that 'the number of people 
affected by co-ordination problems at the interface between health and social care 
services has increased' (Health Committee, 1999, para. 6). 
Considering the above evidence, by 1997 it could be argued that there was little. scope 
for systematic coordination between the two spheres, despite the emphasis on 
community care. Existing institutional and professional differences between health 
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and social care, coupled with the political patterns under the Conservative government 
had seemingly made partnership working across the divide difficult. Academic studies 
support the argument that collaboration between health and social care organisations 
and professionals had often been problematic (Huntington, 198 1; Leathard, 1994; 
Owens et al, 1995). 
RenewedAttempts to Join Up in the 1990s 
However, further investigation reveals that during the early 1990s policies and 
strategies aimed to improve coordination were operating alongside the centrifugal 
forces mentioned above. For instance, in 1990 the Caringfor People document 
advised increased links between two spheres: former Minister Virginia Bottomley's 
foreword noted that 'there must be close working links between all agencies - social 
service departments, NHS bodies, housing authorities and associations, voluntary 
organisations and private sector service providers' (DOH, 1990c, foreword). Similarly, 
in 1994 a multi-agency method was recommended in mental health services (Mental 
Health Nursing Review Team, 1994). Social Services departments also seemed keen to 
push the partnership approach from their end, as seen in the Social Services 
Inspectorate document Partners in Caring, published in the mid- I 990s (S SI, 1994/95). 
Furthermore, a significant project was embarked upon in 1992 under John Major, 
called the Health of the Nation; it advocated a partnership approach to general health 
and welfare, partially to cope with the increased fragmentation caused by the 
involvement of market forces and private sector actors in welfare. In 1993 the Health 
of the Nation project published a paper entitled Working Togetherfor Better Health, 
which introduced plans to create 'Health Alliances' between the NHS and local 
authorities amongst other organisations. A progress report on the Health of the Nation 
project, Fitfor the Future, continued this promotion of joining up. Elsewhere, there 
was an endorsement of inter-working and joining up welfare functions under the 
Children's Act of 1989; an inter-departmental paper was released in 1991 that 
supported a multi-agency approach to the protection of children (Home Office et 
al, 199 1). In 1996 the Conservative government sustained the joining up theme with 
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The National Health: A service with ambition, which called for a 'seamless service, 
working across boundaries' (p48). 
Thus, the Health of the Nation and other initiatives showed a clear ambition, similar 
to some movements found in crime prevention, to improve coordination, collaboration 
and interoperation of welfare services for the benefit of citizens. As with the previous 
case study, thinking within the specific sphere of welfare predated the emergence of 
Cabinet Office rhetoric on joining up. However, as with previous initiatives, the 
policy emphasis on working across boundaries appeared difficult to convert to 
practice. An independent report, commissioned by the Department of Health in 1998 
assessed the impact of the Health of the Nation. Using the acronym 'HOTN', the 
report noted that 
The HOTN was regarded as a Department of Health initiative which lacked cross- 
departmental commitment and ownership. At local level, it was seen as principally a 
health service doctunent and lacked local government ownership (DOH, 1998b, pl3) 
The suggestion in this report was that, whifst the project had attempted to engender a 
corporate approach to welfare, it had fallen foul of the very pathologies it was 
attempting, at least in part, to subdue. Social care departments in local authorities felt 
able to ignore the programme as it was a 'health service document' and thus did not 
concern them. Furthermore, the programme required joining up at high-levels, but 
failed to generate joint-ownership, and thus was unlikely to procure results at ground 
level. 
Murther point was that the 1989-90 reforms, aimed at creating an internal market, 
were still in motion when the Health of the Nation began. Thus, the report argued that 
many welfare workers found that it was confusing and incongruent to introduce new 
strategies when the previous wave of reforms was still incomplete (ibid. &23). Still, 
the Health of the Nation programme can by no means be discounted, as it was 
responsible for stimulating some partnership activity. Yet, it was clear, as with 
partnerships described in case study one, that institutional configurations conflicted 
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with the reforms; the report found that 'pre-existing structures and challenges heavily 
influenced the starting point for joint working' and 'the different agendas/drivers and 
cultures of health services and local government were complicating factors' 
(ibid, pl4). 
Following the Conservative election defeat in 1997, the Labour government quickly 
produced a blueprint for reform in health services. The New NHS: Modern, 
Dependable white paper was published late that year, and despite the fanfare it 
included some familiar rhetoric. The vision was that the NHS should improve holistic 
service 'by breaking down organisational barriers and forging links with Local 
Authorities' (DOH, I 997a, p 11). The intention was to introduce a statutory obligation 
for NHS bodies and local authorities to collaborate, not unlike the responsibilities 
under the Crime and Disorder Act for partnership between police and local councils. 
In the report, the Labour goverm-nent had seized upon the Conservative internal 
market-reforms of welfare as being instrumental in previous failures, noting that 
because of this approach 'a fragmented NHS has been poorly placed to tackle the 
crucial issue of better integration across health and social care' (ibid, p 13). This 
distanced the Labour government from some aspects of Tory policy, but nonetheless, 
there was significant continuity across both administrations during the 1990s in terms 
ofjoining up welfare operations. This was continued in 1998, when the green paper 
Our Healthier Nation was produced, which instigated a programme not dissimilar to 
the Conservative Health of the Nation project which ran from 1992-1997. Our 
Healthier Nation created a scheme to develop partnerships in health and social care, 
arguing that Health Authorities and Local Authorities were the most vital partners in 
effective welfare delivery (DOH, 1998c, p44). So, familiar recommendations were 
being forwarded, albeit with a different vocabulary; this paper mentioned 'connected 
problems require joined up solutions' (ibid., p 12). Thus, old concerns were couched in 
terms of the new 'joined up' argot, perhaps indicating the influence in welfare policy 
of Cabinet Office thinking during this period. 
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More than ever before, the message from central government was that health and 
social care would need, significant reform. Frank Dobson, Secretary of State for 
Health, was calling for the demolition of the 'Berlin Wall' between health and social 
services in 1997 (DOH, I 997b), a phrase that was later repeat&d by Ministers Alan 
Milburn and Paul Boateng (DOH, 1998e). Similarly, the Modernising Social Services 
white paper stressed joining up between the two spheres from the social care side of 
the wall (DOH, 1998a, p97). In September 1998 another document was released, 
Partnership in 4 ction, which set out further proposals for the facilitation of increased 
inter-working between the two professions. The paper promised to 'remove barriers to 
joint working' by pooling budgets, integrating provision, issuing joint guidance and 
reforming finance procedures (DOH, I 998d, p8). Furthermore, the report provided 
detail on 'Health Action Zones', of which eleven were set up across the country in 
1997. These were partnerships between the NHS, local authorities, the voluntary 
sector and private companies to tackle health inequalities in deprived areas 
(ibid, p 10). This clearly included addressing the perceived gulf between health and 
social care, and a subsequent report on Health Action Zones indicated that, although 
the partnerships had a minimal impact on their main objective of reducing health 
inequality, they had contributed to emerging partnerships, collaborations and 
networks across the divide (Benzeval, 2003, p6). 
Joined Up Weýfare in the 1990s and Beyond: New measures and institutional barriers 
Despite problems with organisational differences, the Health Action Zones, as 
with the precursory Health Alliances, provided a conduit through which collaboration 
could take place. A further conduit was intermediate care teams (that worked on 
easing the transfer for patients from hospital to home) and single assessment 
processes (where older people had their needs assessed once through a multi-agency 
process, rather than several times to fulfil requirements of different agencies). 
Despite the joining up initiatives instigated by the Labour government from 1997, 
building from previous policies, familiar institutional barriers to increased 
coordination remained according to some sources. In early 1999, the Health 
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Committee produced its report on The Relationship between Health and Social Care, 
which drew on input from a vast array of witnesses from both sides of the divide. The 
report took as a starting point the acknowledgement that 'for various reasons - 
historical, professional, administrative and financial - barriers have arisen between 
these services. These barriers frustrate the goal of 'seamless' service provision' 
(Health Committee, I 999, para. 1). The committee found that the health and social care 
gulf had remained, with well placed witnesses commenting that services were still 
'fragmented and piecemeal' and 'the professionals themselves cannot sort out whether 
a person's problem is a social care problem, a health care problem or maybe an 
education or a housing problem' (ibid., para. 12). 
The apparent 'fragmentation, duplication, and gaps in services' translated to 
frustration in patients who 'often have to repeat their story to several different 
professionals' and 'may face several separate assessments which they find 
exasperating' (ibid., para. 15). The committee also identified a problem of 'lack of 
coterminosity'; health and social care boundaries (i. e. local authority districts and 
health trust or authority areas) were not coterminous, which created complications in 
delivering coordinated services (ibid., paras 51-52). As the committee identified, the 
potential barriers to joint working could be compounded by differences in the physical 
boundaries of health and social care jurisdictional areas. This was seen as a problem 
that could be solved however, particularly since the creation of Primary Care Trusts, 
following the 1999 Health Act. For instance, health responsibilities in one city in 
northern England were divided between five Primary Care Trusts, each of which 
controlled a district. As an interviewee noted, the social service department in the 
same city reorganised itself to follow suit, with the explicit aim of helping partnership 
working (interview - 23). Social care departments in other areas of the country were 
said to have reorganised operations in the same way. 
The Health Committee found that the professional and institutional differences 
between health and social care were reflected in the different sections of the 
Department of Health itself, the committee found a 'tribalism' that had a 'detrimental 
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impact on the health and social services boundary on the ground' (Health 
Committee, I 999, para. 13). Partially to ameliorate this situation, the Department 
created the Health and Social Care joint unit in 1998 to address the interfaces between 
the two spheres. Its general success was unknown by 2004, although a prominent 
responsibility the unit had was to fine local authorities that failed to arrange social 
care promptly for patients that were ready to leave hospital. 
The Health Act of 1999 provided some new scope for inter-working; for instance it 
introduced new Texibilities' in terms of pooled budgets, the capacity to assemble 
one-stop-shops and to delegate functions where appropriate. Although progress was 
slow, by 2001 a quarter of councils had told the Department of Health that they 
intended to use such flexibilities to improve inter-working (SSI, 2002, p3O). Still, the 
Health Act was just one of many measures introduced from 1997 to encourage closer 
working between health and social care. 
For instance, the Labour government published another major strategy document in 
2000, entitled The NHS Plan; it claimed that 'social services and the NHS will come 
together with new arrangements to pool resources' (DOH, 2000a, p 12-13). To this end, 
the new Primary Care Trusts operated similarly to their predecessors (Health 
Authorities) but had more scope to incorporate the activities of social care 
(NHS/NHSE, 1999). Some Care Trusts were established specifically to join up health 
and social care from 200 1, using a further piece of legislation, the Health and Social 
Care Act. However, whilst it was intended that 16 such integrated Care Trusts would 
be operating during 2002,, by late 2003 there were only eight (Batty, 2003b), with 
protagonists of failed or delayed Trusts pointing to "'horrendous' logistical, legal and 
financial problems' (Batty, 2003a). In September 2003 a ministerial enquiry was 
launched by Stephen Ladyman to ascertain why Care Trusts were failing; the enquiry 
was still ongoing by summer 2004. One interviewee had first hand experience of the 
difficulties that could emerge as health and social care organisations were put together 
as partners; 'pooled budgets and the joining together hasn't quite been as joined up as 
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we would have liked. Once the managers start arguing over who is going to pay for a 
patient ... then we know there's problems' (interview - 23). 
In 2002 a report was released by the King's Fund, which detected a 'toning down' of 
the original central government pressure to create Care Trusts (King's Fund, 2002, p8). 
It found serious general barriers to the implementation of health and social care 
paTtnerships policies (ibid., p 1 -2). The report did find that there was substantial 
support for joined up working from all parties concerned, and the raft of legislation 
covered in the preceding paragraphs provided means to set up collaborations 
(ibid., p6). However, the report made a familiar argument: 
it cannot be assumed that if inter-agency partnership policies, processes and 
structures are established, then frontline partnerships between a range of 
traditionally separate professions will simply fall into place (ibid., p9) 
In 2002, the publication Delivering the NHS Plan, acknowledged that the 'Berlin 
Wall' the government had pledged to knock down was still standing 
(DOH, 2002a, p32). Whilst the King's Fund report stressed the willingness of health 
and social care staff to engage with each other, some interviewees pointed to 
reluctance for joined up working. A manager from the primary care environment 
commented at around the same time: 
I don't think there is any huge enthusiasm from the people that are running the 
social services to join up really, that's my opinion. I think there is reluctance 
there, I think that people's attitude is still very much that they are two separate 
entities, and there are big bridges to cross to improve that (interview - 20) 
Whereas a protagonist attempting to instigate joining up from the other side of the 
divide noted: 
This is about a lack of understanding, there's a cultural gap which we are trying 
to bridge but sometimes I feel that the health side are not doing enough to help 
that (interview -27) 
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One more neutral interviewee summed up that 'there are just huge differences 
between the two organisations' (interview - 22); achieving closer collaboration would 
often involve a controversial redistribution of power. One interview drew attention to 
the feeling that social care organisations had in some ways been 'annexed' by the 
Department of Health in recent years, and told to fulfil centrally set criteria, 
particularly in terms of performance management. Thus, 'suddenly they expected us 
to measure things from a health point of view and to a certain extent that has clouded 
the perception a little bit' (interview - 23). Whilst it was agreed that joined up 
working was desired, calculating how this could be organised whilst allowing welfare 
professionals to continue to provide effective services was difficult. Certainly, social 
care protagonists were concerned that the aforementioned 'health bias' in welfare 
policy might mean that forms of collaboration and inter-working would be dominated 
by health concerns. 
By 2002, there had already been a significant number of initiatives, schemes, groups 
and programmes designed to join up health and social care, yet interviewees, as well 
as other sources including the Department of Health (DOH, 2002a, p32), felt that the 
Berlin Wall was still standing and patients were suffering as a result. 
In the same year, a new thrust of reform had emerged that, to a certain extent, 
superseded previous (and ongoing) modernisation strategies but with a novel focus on 
ICTs. This was the NHS NPf[T, within which the cornerstone ECR was located. ECR 
was positioned in part to bridge the gap between health and social care through 
technological means and was explicitly aimed at joining up services across and within 
health and social care delivery organisations. Although government had produced 
computer policies for welfare before 2002 and computing had a long history in health 
and social care service delivery, never before had IT been positioned so prominently 
to fulfil such a long standing policy objective, to join up health and social care 
services. The scale of the proposals was unprecedented. 
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Before charting the development of the ECR and NPflT, the case study will provide 
further context by depicting the history of IT in health and social care service 
delivery. A clear message from the history of welfare computing was that 
organisations had largely adopted IT for their own uses and there was unsurprisingly 
significant variation in practices, investment and scope across the vast welfare edifice. 
Whilst some observers and policyrnakers had long recognised the potential virtues of 
increasing the compatibility of the IT systems in use in GP surgeries and hospitals in 
particular, arguably little progress was made with policies aimed at introducing levels 
of coordination. 
5.3 THE HISTORY OF WELFARE COMPUTTNG 
The most prominent early applications of welfare computing came within the NHS, 
whilst social care IT apparently remained somewhat undeveloped for some years. It was 
unsurprising that computer development occurred in a piecemeal fashion in healthcare, 
considering the nature of the NHS as a loose aggregation of myriad bodies, boards, trusts, 
consultants and General Practices (Rayner, I 994, p 18). There had been some individual 
examples of computing use in healthcare administration as early as 1958, for instance 
when Jack Rowlandson wrote a programme to automate a nursing payroll system 
(Bullas, I 999, p2). Ministry of Health documentation discussed the potential of computing 
in the NHS in the early 1960s. The annual report for 1962 provided a small note that 
'several detailed studies of the use of automatic data processing' were being carried out 
(MOH, I 962, p23), and the following year it was mentioned that these studies had been 
completed (MOH, 1963 a, p3 3). For 1966, the Annual Report noted that 'the Ministry has 
set up a Computer Policy and Development Branch. It has been considering and 
discussing with interested authorities how an increasing use of computers should be 
encouraged, initiated, developed and co-ordinated' (MOH, 1966, p41). Thus, as with the 
wider history of 
, 
government computing, there was an imperative to coordinate the 
development of IT in the healthcare delivery arena. 
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In the 1960s the emphasis was on the automation of existing administrative tasks such as 
payroll (Gowing, I 994, p32), as with other areas of the public sector. In 1966, London 
Hospital had a comprehensive finance computer system (Bullas, 1999, p2) and by 1967 
there were 11 computers installed in hospitals across the country (DHS S, 1967, p64); in the 
following years computer use for payroll and other clerically related issues proliferated, 
Yet, although the Computing Policy and Development Branch wanted to 'provide a point 
for the exchange of views and the co-ordination of activities of all those concerned with 
computers in the service' (DHSS, 1967, p64), conduct 'studies of problems arising from 
the development of computing services on a national scale' and tackle 'compatibility' 
issues (DHS S, I 968, p68), it seemed unlikely that autonomous NHS organisations would 
see these concerns as a priority. 
In 1968, a NHS Computer Branch was established under Dr Don White, and began an 
'Experimental Computer Programme'. Richards noted that little progress was made in the 
Computer Branch's attempts to find a 'best buy' for hospital computer equipment or in 
establishing a standard programming language for NHS IT (Richards, 2001, p756-757). 
Not least this was because 'everyone believed that local circumstances and local hardware 
would be the deciding factor' (ibid. &757). 
By 1969 ten out of the 15 English health region bodies had purchased a computer 
(Bullas, I 999, p2), and in 1971 the DHSS did introduce a 'standardisation policy' for 
regional hospital boards, which appealed for them to use ICL's 1900 equipment 
(DHSS, 1971, pl 00). In 1974 an annual report claimed that 'further progress' with this 
standardisation was achieved, with four regions having installed the relevant hardware 
(DHSS, I 974, p97). Although it was not clear if this led to any interoperability or data 
sharing across the four regions, it did demonstrate that the central department felt it 
desirable to encourage technological compatibility across some health organisations. The 
DHSS demonstrated this further by compiling the Using Computers to Improve Health 
&rvices report in 1972, which recommended 'a continuous rolling 5 year programme of 
evaluated experiment and development of computer use in the NHS', 
(DHS S, I 972a, p 13 8). Social care IT appeared to have not emerged in the plans of 
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policyrnakers during this period as it was largely an issue for individual local authorities 
to address; it would be several more decades before any central government strategies 
materialised. 
The DHSS did succeed in its objective of stimulating interest in health computing during 
the early 1970s (interview - 21). However, as with the NPL and ECU, the NHS Computer 
Branch proved to be ephemeral, it was closed in 1976. Whilst most of the focus during 
the 1960s and 1970s was on automated administrative tasks, there was also the growing 
notion that computing could directly aid the delivery of medical services. For instance, 
the NPL itself had a cameo in the development of clinical support IT systems. Dr Chris 
Evans had by 1970 created a computer that interrogated patients about their symptoms, 
designed specifically to save consultant time (Yates, 1 997, p 177); in 1977 this had 
developed into the MICKIE desktop computer (ibid, p 179), and some patients were said 
to prefer it to human interrogation (Benson, 199l, p69). Elsewhere, much of the innovation 
of the period was conducted locally in General Practices and hospitals, rather than by 
central government. For instance, in 1972 a consultant at Leeds Teaching Hospitals 
employed the Leeds University computer to compute clinical decision-making support for 
acute abdominal pain (interview - 20). 
Computerization in Healthcare in the 1980s: The Kdrner influence 
Despite some central goverrunent attempts from the Ministry of Health and DHSS 
to instigate certain levels of technical standardisation, computing proliferated in a 
fragmented fashion in welfare organisations across the country in the 1970s. However, 
amplified attempts to increase coordinated IT use, in health at least, were introduced 
during the early 1980s with political pressure being placed on NHS organisations to 
produce more relevant and comparable data, for use in the overall improvement of 
healthcare service delivery (Gowing, 1994, p32). Following a Royal Commission report on 
the 'paucity and poor quality of NHS information' (Edwards, I 993, p 104), a committee 
lead by Dame Edith K6rner was established and published six reports from 1982 to 1984. 
The reports, did not recommend a national health or welfare IT system of any sort but 
advocated the increased use of IT to improve the capturing and use of patient related and 
223 
other medical data. K6mer was said to have stimulated considerable activity in hospitals 
that invested heavily in computer systems for a variety of clinical and administrative 
functions. One version of events was that the K6rner committee put IT on the 
management agenda, particularly in hospitals, with 'K6mer Clubs' up and down the 
country sharing ideas with IT applications (Gowing, I 994, p32; Edwards, I 993, p 105). 
Through this development, the emphasis in healthcare computing began to shift away 
from automation and towards informatization, with attempts being made to produce 
meaningful management information, that could be compared, manipulated and fed up to 
a central location. 
Benson noted that many of the Patient Administration Systems (PAS) in hospitals, which 
carried basic demographic, administrative and medical details, were installed as a direct 
result of K6mer (Benson, 199 l, p22). However, it was also argued that a techno-centric 
fixation on 'implementing K6mer' erroneously became the point in itself, and the IT 
systems were unsuccessful in improving information services for hospitals and doctors 
(Gowing, I 994, p32). During the mid- I 980s hospital managers expended resources and 
energy procuring computer systems to collect data, yet 'in practice the solutions never 
worked for they took too long to build' (Edwards, 1 993, p 105). Others argued that the 
K6mer reports were unclear; one interviewee commenting that: 
Well if you take the K6mer reports what I'd say is that the whole thing was an 
absolute disgrace and we are still suffering the consequences. What was it trying 
to say? Nobody knows even now - it was embarrassing (interview - 19) 
Whilst the upshot of K6rner-was that hospitals and other healthcare organisations began 
to invest in IT systems, there was unsurprisingly apparently little by way of orchestration 
across these organisations. Whilst it was the case that health bodies at regional, district 
and individual hospital level used IT for their own discrete purposes, there was also 
usually several unrelated IT systems contained within one hospital (Keen, 1 994a, p 17). 
This fragmentation of IT within welfare organisations was generally a reflection of the 
multiplicity of distinct administrative and medical information domains that existed in the 
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different departments of working hospitals. Yet, the informatization possibilities offered 
by information technology brought into sharper relief the perceived drawbacks of this 
situation. Many of the IT systems put in place during the K6rner era of the 1980s were 
still operational at the arrival of the new millennium (Cross, 200 l, p9) with little change 
occurring very slowly (Benson, 199l, p6). Kalra et al pointed out the difficulties in 
encountering six 'heterogeneous' computer systems in one department of London's 
Whittington Hospital, during an attempt to modernise IT provision in the organisation 
(I 999, p66). One Director for Information for a large hospital emphasised the difficulties 
faced with meeting the requirements of NPf[T considering the historical legacy systems 
that were in place. He noted that within his hospital in 2004 there were three Patient 
Administration Systems (PAS), two Accident and Emergency systems, five Theatre 
systems, over 300 clinical information systems and up to eight 'messy' sets of case notes 
for each patient (private seminar - 29). It was expected that ECR would provide some 
levels of consistency within and across welfare organisations for patient data yet, as 
demonstrated here, difficulties would be faced overhauling, replacing or using the many 
relevant existing IT systems within the planned national infrastructure. 
Audit scrutiny was critical otproject management skills of NHS organisations for IT 
initiatives; in 1990 the National Audit Office noted that its own studies (between 1980- 
86) demonstrated a poor track record with IT (NAO, I 990, p3) and the Audit Commission 
published a report, Caring Systems, that provided further criticism (AC, 1992). Specific IT 
projects in NHS organisations were also singled out; for instance the Wessex Regional 
Health Authority abandoned a project to develop five core computer systems following 
millions of pounds of expenditure, with the PAC arguing that a series of management 
effors were made (PAC, 1993). The prognosis by the early 1990s was not optimistic, as it 
was generally considered that: 
The history of healthcare computing is not a happy one. Even after 25 years of 
active development, it is not possible to point at a single operational healthcare 
system... that provides an adequate role model for the sort of systems which are 
really needed (Benson, 1991, p2) 
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Still,. whilst the state of healthcare IT was receiving considerable attention from 
policyrnakers, audit bodies and observers, social care IT remained virtually uncharted 
territory during the 1970s and 1980s. However, some local authorities had during this 
period helped social service departments to develop IT systems. One social care 
employee noted that his council offered some database functionality from its central 
mainframe, until 1991 when a dedicated programme was brought in to hold client - 
information. He added 'I think it was felt that even when it was delivered it was already a 
pretty out of date system, with a basic green screen, and it really was just for counting 
numbers' (interview - 23). 
Towards Joined Up Healthcare Through ICT Infrastructures: The NHSnet 
Spurred by the experiences and criticisms with IT in the NHS in the previous 
decades, policyrnakers in the Department of Health felt it prudent to devise a national 
strategy for healthcare IT in 1990, which was developed over the subsequent years. 
Although a step further than K6mer, the strategy had little conception of developing 
potential links with social care information systems, despite the enduring emphasis on 
coordination across the divide in general welfare policy. Concentrating on healthcare, 
the strategy was an attempt to focus information flows, data provision and service 
delivery around the needs of the patient rather than the provider (NHSE, 1992; 
Keen, I 994a, p22). This citizen-centric approach was redolent of some of the notions 
underpinning the broader central e-government strategy as expressed in the late 1990s 
with Modernising Government (Cabinet Office, 1998/99). However, the strategy was 
not as pervasive as the NPf1T, which emerged several years later. 
A key facet of the Department of Health strategy of the early 1990s was the 
development of a common infrastructure for information flows across the NHS; the 
strategy introduced the NHSnet, an email and data exchange system for use across 
many of the organisations involved in healthcare. The NHSnet took shape between 
1993 and 1995 and was 'the first NHS-wide computer network' (CrPss, 200 I, p 11), 
providing a secure intranet across the health sector that predated the central 
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government GSI system. Using intranet technology before many other public sector 
organisations, some regard it as a remarkable achievement. 
Still, considerable problems were experienced in getting the disparate groups involved 
in healthcare delivery to participate, for instance the British Medical Association 
(BMA) initially boycotted the system because of fears about confidentiality and 
because GPs had to purchase NHSnet services (Treleaven, 1998). There were also 
doubts expressed about the'viability of an NHS-wide IT infrastructure, especially 
considering the fragmented history of welfare computing (Keen, I 994a, p 16). It was 
not until 1999 that the NHSnet had its own central messaging service and user- 
friendly email (Gold, 2002). A report published in that year found that 'GPs do not see 
NHSnet as reliant, resilient or robust and are now using the Internet to send messages 
between themselves and to/from clinicians in hospitals' (Protti, I 999, p9), rendering 
the efforts to implement the dedicated infrastructure somewhat futile. One interviewee 
who agreed with this verdict remarked: 
I mean the NHSnet, why? The NHSnet was a brilliant example, because there was 
nobody there who really knew what they were doing with it. It's ridiculous 
because you don't need it, the internet is fine but the people at the time decided 
that they were doing it and that was it (interview - 20) 
Another interview contributed to this argument, noting that there was a failure to' 
engage with the healthcare practitioner community in the development of NHSnet: 
No-one knew what the NHSnet was in '94, and they failed to get anyone to go 
on a journey with them. They failed to get the medical profession to get on 
board, they should have said 'what do you want? If you want green we can do 
green! '... The failure is that almost no technical data is passed over the NHSnet 
(interview - 19) 
Despite this evidence, protagonists in the Department of Health still felt that a 
dedicated communications and data transfer infrastructure was worth aspiring to and 
planned to replace NHSnet under the aegis of the NPf[T from 2002. 
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In general, the strategy introduced from 1990, which developed further in subsequent 
years, received substantial criticism for incoherence (Keen, 1994a, p2l). The strategy 
was said to centre on technological issues and neglect the political, organisational and 
institutional issues implicated in NHS wide reform (ibid., p25). One interviewee 
described the strategy as; 
a complete shambles ... they knew absolutely nothing, and that's always been a 
problem, having someone that knows what it was that they were trying to do as 
well as the IT side (interview - 19) 
Nonetheless, although the execution of the strategy was allegedly flawed, its 
underpinning notion that information technology could be used to informatize the 
delivery of healthcare around the needs of the patient endured. One policyrnaker 
emphasised the importance of this in a thesis inierview,. noting the continuity not only 
between Department of Health information technology policy from 1992 with the' 
introduction of NPfiT but also the parallels with the central e-government strategy 
(interview - 21). 
During the mid- I 990s, although the concept of creating technological links between 
health and social care was still not being considered at that time (interview - 21), 
projects falling within the ongoing Department of Health IT strategy continued to be 
implemented in healthcare. Projects entitled 'Hospital Information and Support 
Systems' (HISS), 'Developing Information Systems for Purchases' and 'Enabling 
Clinical Systems' were developed. In part these involved a number of pilot initiatives 
across the country, with the intention of rolling them out nationally. However, these 
projects were never expanded to a national setting to the extent envisaged, with some 
commentators arguing that the technology employed was not sufficient for the' 
objectives of the Department (Say, 2002; Johnson/Keen, 2002, p7). 
By the mid- I 990s, it was becoming clear that the efforts of the Department of Health 
to introduce a sense of coherence with IT systems and information across NHS 
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organisations had yet to come to fruition. The ongoing task was difficult as, 
particularly in hospitals, patient information was held in separate administrative 
domains, making the holistic service delivery for the patient difficult. As Keen 
remarked, the standard scenario for hospitals in the mid- I 990s was: 
The holding of many separate records - medical, nursing, paramedical and all 
using different terminology - for the same patient. In any one ward or clinic 
there are several parallel data collection systems: this must militate against 
proper co-ordination of services (Keen, 1994b, pl28) 
Despite ongoing developments and an enduring notion that service delivery could be 
made more coherent for the patient through information technology, funding for 
hospital IT was said to plummet in the mid-1990s (Benson, 2002a, pIO88) whilst 
interest in NHS wide IT strategies appeared to reduce in policyrnaking circles; as one 
interviewee argued 'nothing happened; I know, I was there' (interview - 19). 
The History of General Practice IT 
Although involved in the strategies described above, General Practice IT had 
to an extent its own specific history largely separate to the experience in hospitals, 
other healthcare organisations and social services, which reflected the institutional 
independence of GPs. 
General Practices, along with supporting bodies such as the BMA had traditionally 
wielded considerabl 
,e political power 
in the delivery of healthcare. Keen pointed out that 
this made the NHS a6 singular' organisation, with the strength and leverage located on the 
periphery (1994a, p 17), away from central policy hubs. Unsurprisingly, during the 1970s 
and 1980s GPs acquired stand-alone IT systems to suit their own clinical and patient 
administration operations, and many were seen as pioneering for the era (Cross, 2001, pl 1) 
yet there was little evidence that there was much inclination or opportunity to f&ge any 
form of communication, data sharing, compatibility or interoperation between systems. 
This was despite at least some remonstration for levels of coordination in the procurement 
and use of General Practice IT; a BMA report from 1980 worriedthat: 
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an increasing proliferation of different hardware and software systems is being 
implemented by GPs. If this were to be continued willy-nilly, a point would be reached 
when the opportunity to take advantage from any of the obvious benefits of a concerted 
approach, would be lost beyond recall (Palmer/Rees, 1980, p 1) 
Funding had been made available for investment in IT systems for General Practices 
since 1982 (Benson, 2002a, plO88) and many GPs bought in stand-alone systems from 
leading suppliers such as EMIS; investment was supported by guidance and 
stimulation in Department of Health publications (e. g. DOH, 1987). Perhaps influenced 
by the arguments of the BMA and other protagonists, the Department also advocated 
movement towards integration and compatibility in General Practice software 
(DOH, 1990a), although little seemed to have been achieved. The lack of technical 
interoperability was seen as a missed opportunity to some interviewees, particularly as 
citizens moving to a new General Practice would often experience delays in the 
transfer of their medical records (interview - 18). 
As many GP IT systems held extensive information on patients (Greenfield, 1980, p4- 
5) it was likely that the ECR programme would have to draw down significant 
amounts of information from these to populate a national patient record with vital 
healthcare information. Although patient data was held in isolated systems in different 
formats and levels of detail, it was considered likely that this data was in a better state 
than that held in hospitals; one interviewee commented 'I think hospitals are way 
behind primary care in terms of IT' (interview - 20). While many hospitals had 
patient data spread across a variety of PAS and clinical data systems in departments, 
General Practices were more likely to have a unified computerised information 
system of sorts (interview - 22). 
However, as discussed in section 5.6, the General Practice community, with a set of 
incumbent IT suppliers and varying medical and patient information recording and 
storage practices, embedded and reflected in GP IT systems, would prove to be a 
difficult group to bring into the NNIT fold, to contribute and participate in ECR. 
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As a Labour government came into power in 1997, the considered opinion was that 
healthcare IT, in hospitals, GP surgeries and other NHS organisations, was 
fragmented and unable to support the patient-focused approach to service delivery 
that was being discussed in Department of Health documents. However, the 
Department's response, as the central e-government agenda began to emerge from the 
Cabinet Office, was to reinvigorate plans for a national IT strategy for the NHS. 
Drawing from the underpinning notions of the patient-focused delivery detectable in 
strategies from 1990, the refreshed plans contained within them not just the intent to 
increape commonality and compatibility between different NHS IT systems through 
technical standards and other measures. The plans also aimed to provide working 
technological infrastructures to encourage integration and interoperation of the 
disparate information domains across healthcare and the wider welfare edifice. 
Furthermore, the new programme offered to apply technological tools to realisq the 
enduring sentiment that health and social care services should be coordinated 
seamlessly around the needs of citizens, bringing together two policy streams that had 
historically largely remained separate. In a sense, under NPf[T and particularly with 
ECR, ICTs were set to be a key bridge across the health and social care divide, 
confronting the institutional diversity across welfare discussed in the previous 
sections. The emergence of the NPf[T and the place of ECR within it are discussed 
below, firstly in a section discussing the emergence of the concept of a national 
electronic records system. 
5.4 INFORAM TION FOR HEALTH- THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNIFIED 
ELECTRONIC RECORDS CONCEPT IN THE E-GOVERNMENT ERA 
As implied above, in 1997 the new Labour government came into power with the 
intent of reinvigorating what was seen as an ailing National Health Service, although 
social services received less attention. The strategy documents New NHS: Modern, 
Dependable, The NHS: A Service with Ambition and Our Healthier Nation 
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I demonstrated the objective of improving the quality of healthcare through a number 
of measures, although the use of information technology was not discussed to any 
great extent in the documents. 
However, in 1998 the NHS Information Authority (NHSIA) released Informationjor 
Health, which did set out a comprehensive IT strategy for the NHS. One interview 
summed up its significance, noting that despite the previous wave of IT policies 
beginning in 1990, 'it was the first time we ever haa a national strategy ... before that 
information management had always been the lowest of the low' (interview - 20). 
However, social care protagonists would have to wait three years for a Department of 
Health produced equivalent, Informationfor Social Care, which perhaps 
demonstrated the health bias existent in welfare policy. 
The Information for Health document began with an admission that 'the use of IT in 
the NHS has not been a success story' and that 'clinicians working in the NHS came 
to see data collection not as a help but as a hindrance' (NHSIA, I 998, foreword). 
Informationfor Health located the healthcare IT strategy within the wider e- 
government agenda; similar to the notions behind Modernising Government the 
argument was that 'access to public services is too often complicated, slow and 
inconvenient. People often have to contact or visit different departments or agencies, 
each dealing with separate aspects of the same problem' (ibid., para. 1.8). As with the 
central e-government vision, IT was promoted as a tool to remedy this situation; the 
document noted that in 'the information age' the 'new information and 
communications technologies represent a major vehicle for modernisation' 
(ibid., paras. 1.5-1.6). Drawing from notions brought to the fore in the previous 
strategies initiated in 1990, this modernisation aimed to base services around the 
patient rather than the healthcare provider (ibid., paras. 1.15-1.17). 
The document also provided, for the first time, a discussion of plans to introduce 
electronic health records (EHR) and electronic patient records (EPR) within the NHS. 
EHR equated to life-long electronic health records whilst EPR were records for an 
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identifiable episode, such as a spell in hospital. Informationfor Health indicated that 
policymakers saw the electronic records concept as a crucial element in reforming 
healthcare delivery to offer convenience and confidence to the patient, improve 
efficiency and quality and develop a more integrated service (ibid., para 2.4). Coupled 
with this commitment, there was also a concession that a number of challenges lay 
ahead in devising and implementing a national electronic records system; existing 
data inaccuracies, an absence of standards, fragmentation and concerns of patient 
confidentiality were highlighted as potential barriers (ibid., para. 3.6). 
The discussion of plans for EHR/EPR in Informationfor Health included some 
inchoate movements towards the notion that social care services could contribute to 
and benefit from an electronic records system. The document remarked that 'multi- 
professional and multi-agency care' should be facilitated and that 'information from 
records held by social care organisations may also contribute to the EHR'(ibid, paras. 
2.8,2.14). Later on the report acknowledged that use of electronic records across both 
spheres (i. e. ECR rather than just EHR or ERP) was yet to be fully considered; 
although the issue 'needs to be tackled urgently' (ibid., para. 2.43) and the specifics of 
how information could be shared through a single infrastructure had yet to be 
determined (ibid, para. 2.44). Despite these discussions, one interviewee involved in 
Department of Health IT policymaking during this period acknowledged that 'when 
we did Informationfor Health, social care concerns were way over the horizon' 
(interview - 21). 
Nonetheless, Informationfor Health paved the way for the development of a national 
ECR programme, which was a radical step in that it attempted, where needed, to 
incorporate social care information with health records for individual patients. 
Without considering the added social care dimension, the concept of a common, IT 
based infrastructure for medical records across NHS organisations brought with it 
inherent difficulties because of the historical institutional and technological isolation 
of healthcare information domains depicted above. However, the concept of 
converting hand-written medical records to an electronic format, in both discrete and 
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NHS-wide environments, had been long considered by different actors involved in 
healthcare IT. A brief excavation of the history of healthcare electronic records will, if 
considered alongside the wider history of welfare IT (see section 5.2 and 5.3), provide 
useful insight to the specifiC'objectives and challenges to the implementation of a 
national electronic records system. 
The History ofElectronic Records 
The medical profession had traditionally kept hand written notes for patients, 
which since the 1970s was supplemented in some cases, but rarely replaced, by 
electronic notes. Although performing a vital function in providing comprehensive 
and personalised care to patients from the cradle to grave, record keeping had often 
been fragmented and inconsistent across the many welfare organisations that a citizen 
may have come into contact with during an average lifetime. Particularly for citizens 
that relocated frequently or had complex and demanding welfare needs, this 
represented a serious problem. Whilst hospital records often remained locked within 
paper archives or stand-alone databases in individual departments, General Practices 
were more likely to be able to utilise the 'Lloyd-George' envelope system to share 
patient records. Although hand written by GPs and often using differing medical 
codes, this system, used for many decades, ensured that General Practices did have a 
set format for passing records to fellow practitioners if patients relocated. However, 
the sharing of patient records amongst General Practices was still cumbersome in the 
new millennium, as one interviewee noted: 
at the moment if a new patient comes and registers then you have to send 
off a form and write a letter to the previous GP ... if they are coming from 
somewhere like London you can wait months and months for the records 
to appear ... we often get print outs from other GPs systems, that we then 
retype in to our computers ... Of course it would be lots better if we could 
just send records electronically and you didn't have to do any of this, if 
you could just press a key and upload somebody's records. But I think 
that's a long way in the future (interview - 18) 
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Sppffed by this limitation, as well as variances in terminology, recording practices 
and illegibility in GP, nurse and consultant medical notes, the concept of developing 
electronic patient records in health emerged in the early 1960s, first of all in the 
United States. The Journal o the American Medical Association provided details of a ?f 
project using punch cards that represented a movement towards electronic records. 
The project leaders enthused 'any portion of the record can be retrieved immediately 
if appropriate orders are given to the electronic machine' (Schenthal et al, I 960, p 10). 
A year later the same project had begun to use magnetic tapes to store records and 
aimed to develop 'a magnetic record of a type which could eventually supplant the 
written record' (Schenthal et al, 196l, p270). By 1963 the research group was 
confident that: 
the way is open to regional or national medical records systems which will ensure that, 
through modem high-speed communications facilities, a person's medical record is 
made available quickly, although he has moved to a different location or is traveling far 
from home (Schenthal et al, I 963, p 10 1) 
Ledley and Lusted discussed the potential for electronic medical records at an even 
earlier stage in an article published for IEEE in 1960, and in an appearance at a 
conference at the Rockefeller Institute in New York (Kaplan, I 995, p8). Lusted had 
devised an impressive clinical records system by 1965 (Leavitt, I 999, p23 1). The fact 
that the system was for laboratory monkeys and not humans does not detract from its 
pioneering status. 
In Britain, perhaps the first mention of electronic patient records in central 
government policy documents could be found in the 1967 DHSS Annual Report, 
Nyhich noted that: 
For some years now, computers have been used in the hospital service for pay-roll 
and similar accounting work. Latterly there has been a growing interest in the 
possible use of computers in the clinical area both in hospitals and other parts of the 
National Health Service. Such computers, it is thought, might hold part or all of the 
patient's record and be used to facilitate the many activities, from appointments and 
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bed allocations to laboratory tests and discharge letters, which affect the patient 
during his stay (DHSS, 1967, p63) 
Although the influence of any DHSS support is unclear, pioneering work was 
conducted at Kings Colle ge Hospital, following the arrival of an ICL 1905E computer 
in April 1969. Advancement was made towards a computerised patient medical 
record, and Richards suggested that the project was 'probably the first in the world' of 
its kind (2001, p755). The project leader, Professor John Anderson noted at the time 
that he hoped to achieve the objective of a computerised 'total patient record' that 
would spread to the whole of the National Health Service (Anderson, 1972, p75). 
Later, there was the Charing Cross Hospital experimental project operating with 
electronic medical records in the early 1970s. It created 20,000 electronic patient 
records to support a computerised bed state system (Benson, 199l, p24). 
Back in GP surgeries, enthusiastic doctors were intent on developing systems for their 
own needs. In the 1970s John Preece was pioneering electronic patient records in 
Britain, making them 'the nucleus for all data activities in the practice' 
(Preece, I 983, p 124). The first 'paperless practice' was in operation by 1975 in a 
village near Exeter, using electronic medical records. The protagonist cited the 
&unique ability of the computer to search for and marshal information' as a major 
benefit (Bradshaw-Smith, I 976, p 13 97). Thus, at both service delivery and central 
policy levels there had been interest and activity in electronic health records, both in 
terms of a national and organisation-specific system. 
There were however, barriers to the development of electronic health records, even 
for discrete systems. Using computerised records alone, without paper backups was 
technically illegal right up until 2000, when the Civil Evidence Act made computer 
documents admissible as evidence in court (Anthony, 2000, p6). Furthen-nore, despite 
the example of a paperless practice from 1975, interviewees doubted that this was a 
realistic goal for many General Practices, as despite the ECR programme, paper was 
likely to remain a component of record keeping and administration for the foreseeable 
future (interview - 18). 
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Nonetheless, individual systems did develop that included a facility to access and 
update electronic patient records by multiple NHS organisations. An experiment near 
Exeter included the sharing of information between the GP and local hospital 
(Benson, 2002a, pIO87), indicating that interoperability (at least within the NHS) was 
both desired and achievable in the mid-1970s, where there was a need. By in large 
however, the proliferation of electronic medical records continued from the 1970s in 
isolated pockets, particularly in General Practices. 
Still, there were attempts to develop electronic medical record systems at a regional 
level. One project instigated in 1989 was unusual in that attempted to give citizens an 
high levels of ownership and control over medical records through using patient-held 
smart cards. In total 8,500 cards were given out to patients in the Exmouth area in 
Devon; medical records were contained on the smart cards, which could be used at 13 
different General Practices, pharmacies, dental hospitals and A+E rooms 
(Neame/Benson, 1994, pl 11; Benson, 199 l, p5O). Although considered to be a success 
(Nearne, 1997) it was difficult to see any lasting or profound influence on the 
trajectory of electronic patient records by the smart card project. Similarly, a three 
year research and development project to assess the potential of electronic records in 
the mid-1990s (NHSE, 1995, p5) seemed to disappear without a trace. By the late 
1990s, most GPs used electronic medical records, albeit in isolation and as a 
supplement to paper records. 
Thus, whilst electronic records were a popular and widespread tool, particularly in 
healthcare, by the time that Informationfor Health was published, there was no 
precedent for an NHS-wide system, despite some interest by central policyrnakers. 
There were some individual examples of innovative programmes to use electronic 
records across health organisations, to help join up service delivery around the needs 
of the patient. Yet the necessary levels of data sharing for patients who had moved or 
had complex needs was based around seemingly inefficient paper records transfer. 
Prompted by the central e-government strategy and the movement in healthcare policy 
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to improve the experience of patients in service delivery, it was this situation that was 
targeted for improvement in Informationfor Health, thus bringing electronic records 
to the fore of policy formulation. 
It was two years after Informationfor Health before anything of significance was 
attempted in terms of realising electronic records; this was the Electronic Record 
Development and Implementation Programme (ERDIP), which ran from 2000-2003. 
Supervised by the NHSIA, the ERDIP involved 19 demonstrator sites that each 
concentrated on different aspects of the problems and ambitions held for electronic 
records. The following section will summarise and provide comment on the findings 
and impact of the ERDIP. 
5.5 THE ERDIP AND WELFARE IT POLICY 2000-2003: WORKING TOWARDS 
A UNIFIED ELECTRONIC RECORDS SYSTEM 
Several of the 19 ERDIP pilots were instigated specifically to research and evaluate 
the potential use of electronic records as a bridge between the health and social care 
divide. A Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly group conducted one such pilot, finding that 
technological incompatibilities and a wariness to data sharing in the welfare 
institutions involved caused obstacles (Heathfield, 2003, p9). The team discovered that 
many health organisations had the inconvenience of using three IT systems at once, 
and thus new electronic records responsibilities were not taken to kindly; many 
clinicians reverted back to using dictaphones for the formulation of patient notes 
(ibld. &13). Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly did have a strong track record with cross- 
disciplinary working, which was said to have helped with the development of the pilot 
electronic record system as the conduits for discussion and development were already 
in place. Still, ultimately the Cornwall project was only able to aim at automating 
existing data flows (ibid, p9), rather than reengineering systems towards a closer form 
of integration and shared working between health and social care. 
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The Tees Health Authority group also experimented with linking health and social 
care data through electronic records. The project discovered a technical barrier in that 
the social services department did not have the capabilities to gain access to the 
NHSnet, which was seen as necessary for joint access and maintenance of electronic 
records. However, once the technical hurdle had been overcome 'Stockton council 
then refused to sign up to it' (Owens/Foord, 2003, p8). Elsewhere in the ERDIP, 
NHSNet connection was achieved by some social service departments, yet often at 
considerable effort; Suffolk County Council endeavoured for 12 months before 
achieving connectivity (NHSIA, 2003a, p4-5), whilst Leeds City Council were still 
waiting for connection during 2002 after several years (interview - 25). The Tees 
group also directed a complaint at the NHSIA; it argued that there were 'significant 
gaps in national guidance provision: such guidance is fragmented, and would be of 
most value if stored, maintained and disseminated in a more pragmatic and accessible 
way' (Owens/Foord, 2003, p5). Whilst this might have been expected of an explorative 
programme such as the ERDIP, this type of complaint appeared to become more 
prevalent when aimed at the Department of Health, as the NPflT and the ECR 
programme were initiated from 2002, as discussed in the below sections. 
South Staffordshire also had a team evaluating similar issues to Tees Health 
Authority, but ultimately found that the pilot did not have enough accurate data to 
justify taking it any further. Protagonists found that extracting vital information from 
GP systems was a significant barrier, not least as there was a 'lack of co-operation by 
the GP system suppliers' (Smith/Gowing, 2003, p2); which was an issue that would re- 
emerge under the NNIT, as dispUssed below. 
One interviewee, involved the evaluation of the South Staffordshire project, argued 
that the barriers to the particular approach to electronic records taken were more 
profound than technological compatibility issues. A deeply rooted problem of distinct 
medical coding practices were reflected in information procedures and welfare record 
keeping; 'they found that each GP system used different clinical codes, including ones 
they'd made up themselves, and this was a huge problem' (interview - 19). The South 
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Staffordshire project encountered discrete coding practices in many of the 
organisations involved, which were reflected in the medical records. It was judged 
that central government impetus would be needed if a common medical coding 
system was a necessary facet to a national electronic records system 
(Smith/Gowing, 2003, p2). Also, as with the Tees pilot, it was found that the project 
lacked guidance and a clear policy lead on a number of issues (ibid., pW-15). 
Finally, the Durham and Darlington demonstrator project report noted that significant 
fragmentation had to be overcome to reach the objectives of the pilot: 
Current health records are generated and held in many forms in a wide range of 
locations by many different types of health and social care agencies and the 
means for accessing and maintaining this information are cumbersome and 
fragmentary (Owen/Foord, 2002, p6) 
Thus, the lessons from the ERDIP were clear; aside from technological issues there 
were complex and profound differences in the informational practices in use with 
record keeping, which were a reflection of the institutional separation of different 
health and social care organisations. Furthermore, although an explorative 
programme, many participant bodies felt that the NHSIA had provided insufficient 
guidance and, according to one participant at least, the Information Authority had 
showed a lack of understanding of the legacy IT systems and procedures that existed 
in the welfare organisations involved (ibid., p7). 
Still, arguably the ERDIP had provided a number of useful indications. into the use of 
electronic records in welfare services. Certainly, the NHSIA itself found cause for 
optimism in the programme; it claimed that 'significant insight has been gained into 
the implementation of integrated records across health communities' (NHSIA, 2003b). 
Furthermore, the programme was clearly linked with general NHS and public sector 
modemisation, as it was noted that 'integrated electronic records solutions is an 
effective tool for achieving the strategic policy objectives of Modernising 
Government and the NHS Plan' (ibid. ). In this way, electronic records were 
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associated with the central e-government strategy expressed in the Modernising 
Government document. 
Despite the broadly positive conclusions of the NHSIA, other sources questioned the 
value of the ERDIP project as a whole. One interviewee, who was involved in the 
evaluation of the ERDIP, argued: 
With ERDIP they didn't know what they were doing - it was a sort of panic 
response after nothing happened following Informationfor Health, so they 
thought they'd better do something a year or so after it. Civil servants panicked - 
this is genuinely what happened. So there were a couple of things floating along 
and they picked them out of the garbage can in a panic and one of those was 
ERDIP. It was expediency that led to it, there was no clear goal, and it was just 
someone needing to be doing something in that area. It could have been 
interesting but it was pretty amateurish and it was a missed opportunity. Lots of 
interesting bits and pieces were done but because there was no overall structure 
in which it could fit, it was very difficult for anyone to see it as a coherent whole 
(interview - 19) 
Another ERDIP evaluator disliked the political involvement in the programme: 
It was all political, we were told that the EHR is going to be beneficial, so 
evaluating the sites was actually quite difficult in a way as there was this huge 
political command that EHR was good, and that was the starting point. What we 
had to look at was the problems and the issues and the lessons involved in 
actually trying to implement it. We weren't actually looking at the basic thing of 
whether it was good or not (interview - 20) 
It was logical to all parties that an electronic records system could greatly aid the 
delivery of coordinated welfare services at some level. However, there was genuine 
anxiety about the obstacles facing the incarnations of electronic records piloted under 
the ERDIP, which the NHSIA may have underestimated according to evidence given 
by these interviewees. 
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Nonetheless, the ERDIP was seen as a positive exercise by protagonists from within 
the Department of Health and it paved the way for the ECR programme. One 
interviewee from within the Department noted that whilst it was 'fair criticism' that 
the ERDIP did not fulfil its potential, all the same 'informally I think that people have 
known that the lessons from ERDIP have been constant with the current programme 
because it has basically reinforced the proposition that was explained in Information 
for Health, which was that we should have person based electronic records' (interview 
-21). 
During the period of the ERDIP, there was also interest in electronic records from 
other welfare organisations. For instance, one interviewee had led a social care 
electronic record pilot from within a local authority. The pilot aimed initially at 
holding electronic records for older people across social care and health organisations, 
particularly with the aim of improving service for those who had had a recent spell in 
hospital (interview - 25). However, similar problems to those highlighted in ERDIP 
reports were experienced; attempts to share information across the two spheres met 
with technological and organisational barriers. One interviewee commented that, 
despite the promise, the pilot had 'not really brought us into the wide and wonderful 
world ofjoined up systems as of yet' (interview - 23). 
Welfare IT Policy Activity 2000-2003 
C 
During the course of the ERDIP, policyrnakers produced a number of 
strategies that worked towards a national, unified approach to electronic records but 
there was considerable confusion as to the path ahead. First of all however, in January 
2001 a strategy document was released by the Department of Health that attempted to 
draw together the major reforms embodied in The NHS Plan (DOH, 2000a) and 
Informationfor Health (NHSIA, 1998). The NHS Plan was heralded as 'the most 
fundamental and far-reaching programme of reform in the history of the NHS' 
(DOH, 2000b), yet it failed to fully incorporate the issues raises in Informationfor 
Health or wider discussions on the role of IT in healthcare. To rectify this, Building 
the Information Core - Implementing the NHS Plan was'offered. Whereas The'NHS 
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Plan stressed a joined up, citizen-centric approach that aimed to cross the health and 
social care divide, it did little to associate itself with the central e-government strategy 
setting. Building the Information Core consciously attempted to amend this, 
reiterating that electronic records were an integral part of the reform plans 
(DOH, 2001 a, p25-26; Johnson/Keen, 2002, p9). However despite a mention of the 
ERDIP and brief comment on the need to use information from both spheres in 
electronic records, there was no clear and full account of how electronic records might 
be implemented or enable joint working across the health and social care divide. 
Three years earlier, Informationfor Health had mooted the idea of integrated records 
but the idea appeared to have not developed sufficiently to warrant much coverage in 
Building the Information Core. 
Informationfor Social Care was released by the Department of Health in May 2001, 
three years after Informationfor Health and several months before the Social Care 
Information Policy Unit was established to manage the social care information agenda 
(Staton, 2002). One interviewee, involved in the document, noted that its launch was a 
reaction to an ever growing feeling that social care was being left behind in welfare IT 
policy (interview - 27). The foreword of the report made it clear that it was to be seen 
in tandem with the equivalent health strategy, and that it was to be located in the 
wider e-government context (DOH, 200 1 b, p2). Despite some previous work by the 
Social Services Inspectorate, this document was considered to be the first concerted 
effort to provide social care IT with a strategic policy (Staton, 2002). 
This perceived delay could be attributable to the continuing lack of recognition of the 
importance of social care by central goverm-nent organisations. However, 
interviewees also pointed out that the institutional position of social services, deeply 
embedded in autonomous local authorities, made the concept of coordinated IT 
strategies difficult to realise. Around 2002, there were 150 autonomous local authority 
social service providers, with enough independence to mean that 'you ca 
, 
n't dictate to 
them from the centre' (interview - 27). As Informationfor Social Care was published, 
social care IT had hitherto been driven by the independent agenda of local councils, 
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resulting in a variety of capabilities across the social care sphere (interview - 25). 
According to one interviewee, this 'poor infrastructure' in social care IT had caused 
policyrnakers in the Department of Health to consider integrated electronic care 
records as particularly problematic (interview - 27). 
In terms of electronic records, Informationfor Social Care provided further evidence 
of the haziness that surrounded integrated electronic records policy; it detailed plans 
to implement Electronic Social Care Records (ESCR) (DOH, 2001b, pl 1), intimating 
that electronic records would develop separately in the two spheres. The document 
did note that 'many of the issues around the proposed ESCR arise in the context of the 
NHS development of the Electronic Health Record (EHR). Detailed work is required 
to agree how the ESCR and EHR should inter-relate' (ibid. ). Whilst the concept of 
integration was being considered, it was still the case by 2001 that all parties were 
uncertain as to the path ahead. Whilst uncertainty and tentativeness was by no means 
an inherent weakness, it was also the case that electronic records had become a central 
cog in the e-government modernisation plans of both health and social care spheres, 
yet the ERDIP had indicated that considerable effort was needed, particularly if a 
national and integrated programme was to be implemented. 
In July 2002 a further update to The NHS Plan was provided, entitled Delivering the 
NHS Plan (DOH, 2002a). Despite detailed consideration of the need to join up health 
and social care, IT, e-government and electronic records were barely mentioned. This 
intimated that these technological issues had not permeated into general health 
policymaking but had instead remained confined in distinct IT policy streams. 
However, three months before this document was published, plans for the enormous 
National Programme for IT (NPfiT) in the NHS in England were announced by Sir 
John Pattison, then the Director of Research and Development of the Department of 
Health. Such was the scale of the proposals, it seemed unlikely that e-government 
issues could be ignored by mainstream welfare policyinaking. The NPf[T will be 
considered in the next section. 
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5.6 THE NPFIT AND ECR: JOINING UP HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE AT A 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
The essence of the NPf[T was that health IT should be procured and implemented on 
a national scale, rather than supplying funding and delegating responsibility to 
individual health authorities, care trusts, hospitals and General Practices, as was often 
the case previously. Whilst individual organisations would retain some IT capacity to 
meet their own specific needs, NPflT would provide an infrastructure through which 
health information would be coordinated, shared and integrated on a national level 
where appropriate. 
This was set against the grain of other areas of NHS reform, where a policy of 
(shifting the balance of power' from central government to service deliverers was 
gaining significant momentum during this period. The argument was that the 
decentralised model 'was not delivering what the NHS needed' in terms of IT policy 
(Drury/Pattison 2003, p8O) and a national approach was a necessary and logical path 
considering the inadequacy of existing healthcare information systems to meet the 
new requirements for patient-centred joined up service delivery.. Other independent 
sources agreed that this national approach, although high-risk- and unprecedented, was 
likely to be the only way to successfully implement electronic records across the 
board (personal correspondence - 24). Still, the national approach implied that health 
and social care institutions would be required to adopt technological, administrative 
and procedural practices to be able to contribute to and participate in ECR. 
NPf[T was to consist of national systems, including integrated health and social care 
electronic records, a national communication and data exchange network to replace 
NHSnet, an electronic booking system for hospital patients, a platform for GPs to 
transfer patient prescriptions to pharmacies and an application to store and transfer 
medical images such as x-rays. Contracts to deliver these national systems were to be 
awarded to private IT suppliers; England was to be split into five clusters and 
contracts were to be awarded for each of these clusters for contractors to implement 
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the national systems in local settings. The logic with the clusters system was that, as a 
contractor could perform badly, it would not be solely relied on to deliver the 
programme; a preferred approach as highlighted particularly by the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC, 1999/2000b). 
The announcement in 2002 of the NPflT was reported with great alan-n and 
excitement in specialist health IT press. It was argued that 'the programme set out 
represents probably the most complex IT project ever to be undertaken in the UK', 
and the procurement would have to happen 'at breakneck speed' whilst an 
'investment bonanza' was unavoidable (EHI, 2002a). 
The first strategic document for the programme was entitled Delivering 21" Century 
IT, and was published in June 2002 (DOH, 2002b), a few weeks after the 
announcement. However, interviewees felt that the document itself seemed to have 
been compiled in a hasty manner, perhaps a reflection of the 'frenzy of activity, 
meetings and speculation' in the Department of Health following the NPflT 
announcement (EHI, 2002a). One interview certainly was not impressed by the report, 
commenting that: 
Delivering 21" Century IT is an appalling document that doesn't make any 
sense at all; very difficult to understand ... I was told it was 
just written in an 
incredible hurry because nothing had happened since Informationfor Health 
and they needed to say 'oh no, we are still here' - so they thought they'd 
better write something and launch it (interview - 19) 
Still, Delivering 21" Century IT did provide details of the management structure for 
the programme, which included a ministerial taskforce headed initially by former 
health Minister Lord Hunt, a single Department of Health NPf[T director in Sir John 
Pattison and a new director for the NPflT itself. (DOH, 2002b, p4). The roles of the 
Department of Health Information Policy Unit (IPU) and NHS Information Authority 
(ibid., p 18-19) were also clarified. Furthermore, the document provided timetables for 
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prospective implementation of electronic records and other facets to the programme, 
and detailed the provision for central funding (Johnson/Keen, 2002, p 10). 
On the subject of the electronic records, the document confirmed their centrality to 
NPflT; they were set to provide the infrastructure for other applications such as e- 
booking and e-prescriptions (DOH, 2002bpl2). Delivering 21" Century IT inferred 
that integrated ECR were still on the agenda as it suggested that a 'Unified Health 
Record' with social care information included could be in place by 2008 
(DOH, 2002b, p6). Despite this assertion, there was little else in the document on how 
social care IT might be incorporated into the programme. Johnson and Keen argued 
that the details from the document 'explicitly reverses the stated policy position in 
Building the Information Core, published just 18 months earlier, to develop shared 
health and social care records' (2002, plO). This appeared to be a major contradiction 
and an indication of the confusion in high-level policy on this issue; during the same 
period that Delivering 21"' Century IT document was published, Alan Milburn (the 
then Health Minister) advocated the ýmportance of integrated health and social care 
information (ibid. ). 
NPj7T Modernising the NHS 
Despite the apparent contradictions, the NPflT moved on apace, and as 
pledged, a director for the programme was appointed in September 2002. The 
appointment went to Richard Granger, who made an immediate impact when it was 
revealed that his wage of E250,000 was significantly more than both the NHS chief 
executive Nigel Crisp, and the then Health Minister, Alan Milburn (Butler, 2002a); it 
made him Britain's most highly paid public servant (Butler, 2002b). Naturally this led 
to criticism, and by the beginning of 2003, the feeling was that Granger had not 
v, isibl y progressed much aslie had 'not divulged how he is going to deliver the plan' 
(Sarson, 2003). The institutional distinctiveness and fragmented patient information 
practices of NHS organisations, as depicted in the sections above, provided an 
indication of the likely difficulties Granger faced. However, the programme director' 
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soon received significant praise, at least in tenns of his efforts to award thorough and 
efficient contracts to private suppliers for the different facets of NPflT. 
In December 2002 he met with major IT companies, and was said to have 'read them 
the riot act' and threatened severe penalties for under-Performance in the NPf[T 
(Cross, 2002b). By late February 2003, as details of the colossal procurement process 
for the National Programme were emerging, Granger had built up a reputation for 
being ruthless, blunt, aggressive and determined (Cross, 2003a). Even the most 
sceptical of interviewees were impressed by his persona (interview - 19). 
In March 2003 Lord Hunt resigned over the government's foreign policies, and Sir 
John Pattison announced that Granger would take over his duties following his 
imminent retirement. Thus, the NPflT was without a Minister for several months, and 
in June 2003 the portfolio was passed to Lord Warner of Brockley for a matter of days 
before it was handed to John Hutton (Kable, 2003f-, Kable, 2003g). The lack of 
consistency in ministerial presence could be considered a weakness, particularly with 
the stated goal of aligning welfare It policy with the central e-government agenda. 
Also, the confusion increased Richard Granger's prominence considerably, as he was 
seen as the only constant presence in the NPfiT. Collins noted that Granger became 
the 'public face' of the programme whereas Sir John Pattison had 'melted into the 
background' despite being the official Senior Responsible Owner for the NPfiT21 
(Collins, 2003). 
By early 2004 Granger had succeeded in securing seven immense contracts with 
private suppliers for the NNIT, worth at least E5 billion. Two of these contracts were 
based upon delivering a national infrastructure, one of which was for the ECR project 
(awarded to BT Syntegra) whilst the other concerned the e-booking service, which 
required electronic records to operate. The procurement process was seen as a 
21 Collins noted that this raised serious accountability issues, as in the OGC Senior Responsible Owner 
guidelines, those assigned to this position should not leave their post before the project was completed 
(Collins, 2003). By March 2004 Dr Aidan Halligan was appointed to share Senior Responsible Owner 
duties with Richard Granger. Six months later Halligan left whilst complaining that not enough had 
been done to ensure the 'buy in' of clinicians with the NPflT. 
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monumental achievement from many quarters and soon after contracts also appeared 
to replace the NHSnet. One interview noted 'he's awarded the contacts in the most 
difficult circumstances on the planet, pretty much on time, absolutely stunning' 
(interview - 19). As argued by Dunleavy et al (2004), the power of the IT industry 
may have had an adverse effect on the performance of e-government programmes. 
The indications here were that government may have wrested greater control with the 
NPf[T contracts; one interviewee noted 'we have never punched our weight in the 
market until now' (interview - 21). A high-ranking employee of one of the major IT 
suppliers, who was successful in the procurement campaign, admitted that the process 
was: 
Bloody terrible, the worst 18 months of my life, it was desperate, the hardest 
thing I've done in my professional career ... A process that would normally 
take three years took one year ... There was contestability right up to the end as 
they didn't tell us we had won until 20 minutes before going to the 
papers ... and even though we got the contract it 
is still possible for other 
companies to pitch for various parts of the contract we have won (private 
seminar - 28) 
Whilst determination of success with the contract awards may have only become 
clearer many years after, there was around 2003 a sense of optimism that the NPflT 
had the drive to work, and that IT managers in individual health organisations were 
willing to contribute. One interviewee commented: 
In the main they are up for this, they want it to happen - these are people that 
have been waiting for years and years and have seen little investment in IT. They 
see this as a unique opportunity and they have to grab it - get IT sorted once and 
for all ... So I think there 
is something about political will, and a huge driver is 
that we have a modernising government that want to modernise the healthcare 
provider. So the political will is there and the money is there (interview - 22) 
However, the procurement process was conducted under a veil of secrecy during the 
negotiation period, which left some welfare practitioners, managers and other staff 
feeling somewhat ostracised. 
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Electronic Care Records: Contradiction and ambiguity in plans tojoin up weýfare 
information 
Whilst the ECR project (referred to up until December 2003 as the ICRS - the 
Integrated Care Records Service) was an integral part of the NPf[T, it was not clear as 
to how social care would be incorporated into the strategy, despite some vague 
commitments towards integration. It was not until the summer of 2002 that a 
consultation document was released that discussed concrete plans for integrated care 
record services, and communications from Department of Health policyrnakers began 
to clearly disseminate the concept of e-enabled integrated care as a definite goal. Peter 
Drury, head of the Information Policy Unit in the Department of Health, presented a 
paper in April 2002 that outlined the vision of integrated care, supported by 
information systems (Drury, 2002, p2). It reiterated the objective that 'information will 
be shared across the NHS and ultimately across health and social care' (ibid. &3). 
This was developed further by a NHS Information Authority director, Jeremy Thorp; 
in a presentation in October 2002 he clarified that electronic records inherently 
implied the interoperation of health and social care information into a single record 
(Thorp, 2002, p6). The plan was ambitious, and aimed to unify information from 
disparate welfare organisations contained within primary, acute, mental, pathology 
and social care (ibid. &8). During an interview in the same month, Thorp provided 
more indications on the format of electronic records, arguing that the two spheres 
should not develop electronic records discretely and join them up afterwards 
(EHI, 2002b). Thorp advocated 'a record service integrated across the care continuum' 
where 'information needs to be available across the whole care process' (ibid). Here, 
the suggestion was that the format for electronic records would consist of integration 
across the full panoply of welfare organisations, and the project would encounter all 
manner of legacy IT systems, record keeping practices, service procedures, client 
groups, coding and professional conventions., 
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Contrasted with the vision for integrated electronic records, early doubts began to 
arise regarding the viability of the project management for ECR. In 2002 the OGC 
began to involve itself in the NPf[T facet of electronic records. It applied Gateway 
Review tests to the project and in November 2002 it was reported that electronic 
records were to be put on hold. The review was said to have 'major concerns about 
the management capacity required for the programme and the implementation 
capabilities underpinning the project' (EHI, 2002c). However, ECR was said to have 
fisufficient political impetus' behind it to continue, despite the weaknesses the OGC 
had identified (ibid. ). Thus the Gateway Review service was very much seen as 
advice rather than mandatory ordinance. , 
A few months later it was reported that the Department of Health had taken a decision 
that, in future, it would decide which projects would be put through the Gateway 
Review, rather than allowing the OGC autonomy on the matter (EHI, 2003c). One 
explanation offered was that the OGC consented to this on the understanding that the 
National Audit Office would have unprecedented access to the procurement and 
implementation stages of NPflT (interview - 19). This perhaps indicated a step- 
change in the role of auditors in government IT projects. Historically, audit bodies 
had deemed many IT projects 'disasters' after the fact, but being present during the 
NPf[T could have equipped the auditors with greater understanding of the pathologies 
and merits of large government IT initiatives. If insightful enough, the project audit 
report (which was not due for several years after 2004) could have signalled a 
permanent change and improvement in the function of audits in government IT. 
Following the Gateway Review events, the next few months were said to be typified 
by 'some furious activity behind the scenes ... and a great deal of dust and confusion 
across the NHS' as the first stages of the NPflT were developed (EHI, 2003a). Also, 
there was a new sense of uncertainty regarding ECR, as influential figures such as 
Lord Hunt and Sir John Pattison were said to be 'managing expectations' about the 
project because it was being 'seriously scaled back' and would look 'pretty thin' in 
the first years of the NPflT (ibid. ). Thus, Thorp's conception of a welfare-wide care 
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records service suddenly appeared unrealistic, at least for the initial stages of the 
programme. One observer complained that 'we have actually moved backward on the 
definition of what [ECR] is over the past year' (ibid). A source involved in NPfiT 
policyinaking noted that Richard Granger in particular had expressed concern that 
delivering integrated electronic records was too ambitious initially, thus: 
With electronic records, the social care side is basically one of timing, its not whether 
but when, we have to have them together. But the problem is that we can't deal with all 
the social care things as well as the health at the same time, so we are going to get the 
health done and then look at social care ... but there has been tension and anxiety that it 
had been pushed too far down the line. But over the last year or so we've been trying to 
make sure that we accelerate the social care process as much as we can (interview - 21) 
An interviewee from the social care side had a more cynical view; 'they don't want to 
be side-tracked from their main policy of health IT' (interview- 27). Still, although the 
vision had reportedly been scaled back considerably due to these concerns, the 
intention to develop an ECR system that operated across both spheres remained intact. 
Whilst the objectives of ECR appeared to be changing, there was still considerable 
confusion regarding the implementation of electronic records, leaving many welfare 
practitioners and managers unsure of the road ahead. There were complaints about 
lack of consistent central guidance for the. electronic records strategy (EHI, 2003b), 
echoing the issues raised in the ERDIP reports. This was reflected in the impression 
interviewees gave of the general modus operandi of the Department of Health for the 
NPflT: 
even people who by are very prominent and senior don't even know who to 
contact in the National Programme because it is all so complicated 
internally ... an incredible state of affairs and it makes it a bit like Kremlin 
watching to be honest (interview - 19) 
Others argued that certain levels of mystery were understandable. One interviewee 
noted, 'there were issues particularly up to the end of procurement with secrecy. But 
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what you have to understand that when you are negotiating with suppliers, 
confidentiality is absolutely key and there was lots of things around negotiation that 
should not have got into the public arena' (interview - 22). Still, ill feeling seemed to 
be set in at a local level, with a general conviction that 'communication is atrocious' 
in the NPf[T (EHI, 2003e). 
In late summer 2004 the BBC conducted a survey of 500 GP and hospital doctors, 
90% were said to be unhappy with levels of communication or consultation for the 
NPf[T (eGov Monitor, 2004). This was just one of a long line of surveys and reports 
that indicated severe mistrust in the NPfiT on the ground. Whilst the ECR programme 
was likely to require the participation and impetus of myriad welfare organisations, 
the danger was that the general unrest with the Department of Health's approach to 
the NPf[T could have debilitated progress. 
In March 2003 Richard Granger announced the creation of the National Design 
Authority, to devise and control healthcare IT technical standards. Amongst other 
responsibilities, the Authority helped administer compliance to e-GIF standards, as 
developed by the OeE. NPfiT included a commitment to use e-GIF to provide the 
technical means to share data across welfare organisations (DOH, 2003c). 
However, with the creation of the National Design Authority, it was not clear what the 
role of the pre-existing NHSIA would be. In April 2004 rumours surfaced that the 
NHSIA was likely to be terminated and shortly afterwards the organisation, which 
had existed for five years, was closed. It was also announced that the work of the 
Department of Health Information Policy Unit was to be absorbed into the sections 
responsible for the NPf[T (Government IT, 2004, p5). Furthermore, the Modernisation 
Agency, originally involved in the cultural change aspect*S of the NPflT, was set to be 
scrapped according to announcements in March 2004, after only three years in 
existence (Mulholland, 2004). Thus, efforts were being made to streamline IT related 
healthcare policy into the NPflT, plausibly to encourage a more consistent and 
commanding approach. 
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The long-awaiting official specification for the electronic records project was 
published in May 2003 and updated in August of the same year. Initially, the 
d ocument, which ran into 500 pages, was not available to the, public and wider 
practitioner community, thickening the perceived cloud of mystery. Still, the 
introduction restated the intent to bridge the divide: 'an objective of both [ECR] and 
the NPffT is to provide an integrated care record for individuals, including non-NHS 
organisations which provide care, including Social Care' (DOH, 2003a, p3). 
The document advised that the electronic records project would involve a unique 
identification number for each patient. This 'NHS number' was devised in 195 0 and 
attributed to each patient as a way of exercising administrative control over medical 
records, although many health organisations had not used the NHS Number in the 
way envisaged prior to the NPflT. The document held that full patient records held in 
discrete repositories in hospitals, GP practices and other organisations would feed into 
a 'national spine', which could be accessed by any practitioner or other staff member 
with appropriate permission. This spine would include demographic data, summarised 
medical records, allergies, treatments, discharge, referral and clinical correspondence 
information and a list of current care providers (ibid., p 12). 
In terms of social care, the document provided indications that ECR still included a 
firm commitment towards an integrated model despite some previous uncertainty. 
However the document only provided detail on the logistics of joining up across the 
two spheres in one of over 90 ECR component 'modules' covered. One interviewee, 
claimed even this would not have featured if it was not for his and his colleagues 
remonstrations (interview - 27). Within the module, ýthe document stressed that the 
ECR project should pay paiticular attention to interfaces between health and social 
care in terms of mental health, the elderly and children (DOH, 2003a, p372). It is noted 
that different levels of interoperation would be needed in different circumstances. For 
instance, full access to records and full ECR integration would be needed to improve 
care for mental health patients, whereas in other'circumstances, occasional data 
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exchange or access to databases across the divide could suffice (ibid, p373-74). Thus, 
interoperation with ECR could have ranged from fully unified records and shared 
working, to occasional communication via secure email. 
The indications provided in the document could be considered to be a climb-down 
from a full, seamless approach to ECR that was promoted most clearly by Jeremy 
Thorp. However, there was a sense that the approach advanced in the document 
inferred an acknowledgement of the institutional realities involved in welfare delivery 
and that, as one interviewee put it 'we'll never have one system for everyone' 
(interview -2 7). Mental health services were deemed the most appropriate area for 
integrated patient records across the divide, yet it was also an area where close 
partnership working had operated for decades. In other joint working scenarios, sights 
were set on opening up electronic communication channels and permitting periodic 
data exchange where the need arose. This could be taken as a failure considering the 
calls for fully integrated welfare information systems, but offering electronic 
communication across the divide was in reality a radical departure from the previous 
fragmentation of information provision across the two spheres. 
One interviewee, who worked in a General Practice, depicted the typical methods for 
joined up infonnation flows across the two spheres before the effects of ECR would 
be felt: 
We have a social worker that does one session a week here - and she is 
often in and out, so we are lucky. But most practices don't have that and 
therefore social services is much more remote on the whole. What happens 
is that you would fill in a long form and fax it through to social services and 
that's the contact most would have with them -I don't think there is any 
scope for emailing or sharing information electronically (interview - 18) - 
Despite the publication of the specification document published in May ý003, it 
continued to be the case that the precise path for ECR was unclear. One source close 
to NPf[T policyrnaking noted in spring 2004 that 'well what the model will look like 
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I'm not sure ... how it might be structured or where it might sit - and is the local 
service provider going to manage that record? How will that sit with the social 
services ... it's all very tricky stuff (interview - 22). The ambiguity was reflected in 
the faith that the practitioner community had in the electronic records programme 
being a success; a poll in September 2003 found that 92% of respondents believed the 
targets would not be met (EHI, 2003e). Further confusion occurred as the official title 
for the project, the Integrated Care Records Service (ICRS) was changed to the NHS 
Care Records Service in December 2003, although the functionality of the project was 
set to be unchanged (EHI, 2003f). 
Doubts about Joining Up Across the Health and Social Care Divide through 
Electronic Records 
What was suggested in the specification document was that Electronic Social 
Care Records projects would run separately to the NPflT initially, despite Jeremy 
Thorp's preference for developing integrated electronic records from the outset 
(EHI, 2002b). Major differences in the nature of the technical requirements for 
respective electronic records were inferred in the specification document, which 
acknowledged the institutional and professional differences inherent in informational 
procedures across the two spheres. Whilst the social care records project was set to 
concentrate on 'document management' (DOH, 2003a, p372), reflecting the prose- 
heavy format of social service case records, electronic health records could be based 
more on structured data fields, to reflect the concise, code-heavy structure of many 
healthcare recording processes. 
Although not discussed in the document, this fundamental difference could have been 
set to provide a profound obstacle to a working integrated electronic care records 
system that could be used to foster and facilitate joint working. Whilst it was likely 
that a technological infrastructure for shared electronic records should and could be 
created with adequate investment and resources, it was less clear that practitioners 
across the health and social care divide would be able to easily interpret and use one 
another's contributions to a joint patient record. For instance difficulties were likely to 
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be encountered in deciphering profound, embedded and perhaps irreconcilable 
differences in syntax, semantics and indeed the very ontology of the two professions 
reflected in record keeping processes. 
Whereas one interviewee close to the NPflT expressed doubts that these deeper issues 
were being tackled (interview -2 7), another stressed that they were being addressed 
seriously, and indicated that problems could be countered by robust and unified 
coding procedures (interview - 21). However, one observer's elucidation on this point 
suggested the difficulties might run deeper: 
The problems are about meaning of language. GPs put something in on a record 
that they know nurses and other doctors will understand, so the NHS will 
understand, but social workers just won't be able to understand the terminology 
even if they are relatively simple - and people in the health service need shorthand 
because of time constraints but social care workers won't understand it - so we are 
not in a position to make a judgment about electronic records but it looks pretty 
problematic. There is a non-trivial language and concept barrier there (interview - 
19) 
Another interviewee commented: 
if a social care worker goes out they are doing a social care assessment - but 
putting that in the bigger picture, you've got physiotherapists, pediatricians, 
dieticians, nurses and so on, all of whom would do it differently because they 
need to know different things. So what they haven't managed to crack is that if 
you put it together and shake it about what would that mean as a single record? 
(interview - 23) 
Thus, interviewees felt that, whilst collaboration between health and social care, 
might be aided by pooled resources, joint budgets, partnerships and shared records, 
there was concern that close integration, such as that implied through ECR, could be 
difficult. Shared electronic records, one interviewee argued, was not something to 
'throw together and hope it makes sense' (interview - 27). Day to day objectives, 
procedures, recording processýs, needs, expertise, skills, problems and traditions 
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could be seen as quintessentially dissimilar in the two spheres, despite the obyious 
need for interfaces for some patients and circumstances. The realisation of these 
potential obstacles was perhaps reflected in the drawing back from full joining up in 
the ECR specification documents. 
Despite this admission, it was still very much the case that social care protagonists felt 
that both spheres would benefit from levels of interoperation and data sharing, even if 
this did stop short of full integration. Officials from the Electronic Social Care 
Records (ESCR) project within the Department of Health were keen to stress that the 
two electronic records projects sat side by side. However, social care protagonists 
were increasingly feeling that, as activity gathered pace, the NPflT as a whole 
neglected social care issues. One interviewee close to ESCR policy maintained that 
'the National Programme is not really addressing social care issues. If you read all the 
rhetoric from reports then sure, social care is in there, but in reality it's not high on the 
priority list' (interview - 27). Another social care point of view was that the 
Department of Health was 'pretty distant, they could be a million miles away really, 
we just see them as a central department and we are local' (interview - 23). 
In early 2004 these concerns came to a head when a group of social service directors 
wrote to the Department of Health to argue 'there is no structure for engaging social 
care services in the National Programme for IT' (EHI, 2004a). One director, David 
Johnstone, said there was 'little recognition that there is a social care information 
world and that it is essential for the NPflT to interface with that world' (ibid). He 
added that the NPflT was 'dangerously inward looking and at odds with the principles 
of integration, modemisation and most important of all being person-centred' (ibid. ). 
A big concern was that responsibilities to social care had not been sufficiently written 
in to the contracts for private IT suppliers. Johnstone questioned whether social 
services would have any contact with the suppliers, whilst a thesis interviewee noted: 
the whole thrust of policy is now going the other way, and that is that there will be 
a fundamental disconnect between the two sectors ... its mainly because the nine 
contracts that have been awarded in the National Programme don't have any 
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obligation to social care, it's not in their contract as far as I'm aware. And those 
contracts run in principle until 2014 - there is just no understanding whatsoever on 
the dependence of health and social care on one another in the IT policyrnaking 
community (interview - 19) 
Despite these views the Department of Health was still, by 2004, communicating that 
social care and health information would be integrated in some way through electronic 
records. Departmental documentation indicated that 'work is underway to jointly 
define what information is shared' (DOH, 2004, p24) between health and social care. 
This was arguably a similarly inchoate position as that documented in Informationfor 
Health six years earlier, indicating that policyrnakers were finding progress difficult. 
By summer 2004 progrqss had certainly been made with the NPf[T and the 
programme's major facets, following the contractual agreements. The replacement of 
NHSnet had begun to be made available to healthcare organisations and the first 
electronic booking for hospital appointments had been made. The first software 
releases of the electronic records 'national spine' were also made available at this 
time'. Although effectively at pilot stage, with more functions set to be madeavailable 
after 2004, the progress demonstrated that the delivery of national healthcare IT 
systems could be a viable option under the correct circumstances. It would take many 
years to determine the long term success of the NPf[T and by summer 2004 there was 
still differences in opinion on if and how social care concerns were going to be 
incorporated into the programme, -despite some indications. 
Joined up Weýfare Outside the NPflT Tensions between local and national 
requirements 
Despite the absence of connections with social care organisations within 
NPflT according to some sources, other health and/or social care organisations had 
begun to develop ICT tools to create informational links between the two spheres at a 
local level and away from the National Programme. These projects, largely initiated 
'the NPflT contracts were signed, followed the traditional historic pattern for IT before 
in welfare services; they were devised to fulfil specific local requirements rather than 
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to comply with a national infrastructure. Some of these examples were borne directly 
or indirectly out of the ERDIP and several demonstrated an inclination to develop 
integrated records or share information independently of the NPf[T. 
For instance, a project set up in 2001 in the London borough-of Hammersmith and 
Fulham allowed doctors to electronically view social care information about clients. 
In May 2003 plans were announced to include in the project all GPs in the borough, 
as well as the local A+E ward (EHI, 2003d); it seemed to be operating outside of the 
NPf[T. However, it appeared that the Department of Health preferred to terminate 
local projects that covered similar grounds to the ECR programme. In spring 2003 a 
number of electronic record projects that were operating independently of the NPflT 
were closed by the Department of Health. 
In late May 2003 projects in Bristol and the south of England (Tbe Shires project) 
were closed, and the Department announced that there were to be 'no special cases' 
operating in competition to the national ECR plans, even though both of these projects 
were in the advanced stages of procurement (Amott, 2003b). The move prompted 
claims that 'millions of pounds have been wasted' (ibid) and controversy was caused 
as, three weeks before the termination, Bristol had announced that it had been given 
the 'green light' by government to go ahead with its initiative (Amott, 2003a). In 
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parliament, John Hutton contested the financial loss claims by noting 'the national 
health service is currently procuring an integrated care records service, which will 
provide, as part of its first phase, the functionality that the Shires'EPR would have 
delivered. The national procurement approach will provide better value for money for 
taxpayers' (Hansard, 2002/03b, col. 416 (W)). 
A month earlier, a project to link up electronic patient health records in twelve trusts 
in Birmingham and the Black Country was cancelled six months into its procurement 
process because it stood outside of the NPflT (BJHC&IM, 2003). Elsewhere, 
electronic records projects such as that found in Bradford were seen as highly 
successful in fulfilling a local service need, despite operating outside the National 
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Programme; it was suggested that pressure had been put on those involved to abandon 
local projects to make way for the NPflT (interview- 19). One interviewee was 
concerned that the ECR programme, as a national system, might not be able to fully 
capture the needs of practitioners working at the point of delivery: 
there is an almost total disconnect between government policy and activity on the 
ground, and that is the root of the problem in policy or political terms. There is also a 
complete disconnect between any serious thinking about the role of any given 
information system and the mindset of the people that implement it ... The people who 
are really thinking about these things seriously and the people charged with 
implementing it who have the money to purchase systems, well it's a massive 
disconnect ... it's people doing informal joining up that are keeping the system on the 
road, it's not because it is based on policy but because they know they can do their 
jobs better by talking to each other (interview - 19) 
Certainly the impact of a sizeable and wide reaching initiative such as NPflT and 
ECR within it was expected to create upheaval and change in the myriad 
organisations and institutions it touched. In a sense, the NPfIT was explicitly 
introduced to overhaul existing healthcare IT systems in favour of an integrated 
model, to encourage joined up working within the NHS and with social care 
organisations. However, the unprecedented move towards a national solution, with 
ECR as a key facet, had also exposed a tension; observers felt that there was some 
considerable currency in using ICTs to aid experienced local welfare protagonists to 
deliver services in partnership, according to the needs of communities. Whilst, it was 
argued, the introduction of any IT system should have accounted for this element, the 
fear was that a national electronic records system might not be capable of capturing 
and nurturing this quality, whereas a decentralised approach, where local welfare 
organisations chose how best to employ information technology, might have been best 
suited to improving services. Such a model would however have been less likely to be 
able to offer the advantages of a national infrastructure, where electronic records 
could be accessed regardless of location. 
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This tension was also played out in the relationship between General Practice and the 
NPflT. As stated above, the standalone systems held in GP surgeries across the 
country were likely to be crucial in terms of populating and using ECR. However at 
the time of the emergence of the NPflT, the General Practice community already had 
an incumbent set of IT suppliers and contracts, whilst to an extent the discrete 
operations of the Practices were embedded and reflected in the existing IT systems. 
From 20Q2 there was some controversy about whether General Practices were willing 
or should be forced to adopt and adapt to ECR. Later it had emerged that EMIS, a 
major supplier of GP systems with 50% of the market, had announced that it was not 
willing to take part in the NPflT or the ECR programme. This sparked off 
considerable panic in the healthcare community as expressed through the specialist 
press; it seemed that, remarkably, the potential repercussions of this was that either 
half of GPs practices would be unable to take part in the ECR plans, thus rendering 
the programme as a whole somewhat redundant, or EMIS systems would have to be 
thrown out and an alternative supplier used (EHI, 2004c). Andrew Lansley, then 
shadow health spokesman for the Conservative Party, was quoted as saying: 
I've been speaking to GP practices, and they've invested their own money and 
they've got their own systems, and they really don't know whether their 
systems are going to have to be thrown out of the door (ibid. ) 
This dispute threatened to derail the ECR programme before it was able to get off the 
ground, with one interviewee predicting 'mayhem' (interview ---ý 20). 
During the same period the Department of Health appeared to have made movements 
towards a long-term change to the landscape of General Practice IT, by making 
alterations to the General Medical Contract. This contract, a periodically renegotiated 
agreement between General Practitioners and the government to set GP salaries was 
voted upon in 2003 and introduced afresh in April 2004, bringing in a range of new 
features. Despite eagerness by the BMA and General Practices to retain some levels 
of autonomy and choice, the contract passed direct responsibility for the purchase and 
maintenance of GP IT systems up to supervising Primary Care Trusts 
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(DOH, 2003b, p29-32). Central to this was that Primary Care Trusts would be in a 
better position to bring GP IT systems into line with a national ECR programme 
(EHI, 2003g). Interviews suggested that while some practices were 'suspicious' about 
the new arrangement, many felt that it was likely to be a positive step (interview - 
. 22). Nonetheless, the General Practice community remained determined to retain 
levels of control with IT systems and by summer 2004 it was still not clear how the 
NPf1T would deal with the integration of GP IT into national systems. 
Thus, General Practice represented another arena in which a tension between the 
pervasive requirements of a national IT programme, designed to join up healthcare 
information (and potentially include social care information) and the entrenched and 
specific processes, needs and practices of local organisations and the communities 
they served, was played out. For ECR to succeed the NPflT was likely to not only 
need to engage and stimulate individual welfare organisations and partnerships and 
access patient data but also to dispose of or modify existing electronic or paper-based 
record systems in favour of a national system. Evidence suggests that this balance 
represented a substantial challenge to the objectives of ECR and the NPf[T as a 
whole. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Particularly since the Modernising Government white paper, Cabinet Office organisations 
such as the OeE had promoted an approach to e-govemment that reasoned that new ICTs 
could be used to join up public service delivery, thus improving the experience of 
citizens. As with the arena of criminal justice, broadly it can be observed that welfare 
policymakers had adopted this approach; the key component of the NPf[T, particularly 
with the ECR facet, was that NHS organisations should be able to share patient and other 
data through national electronic infrastructures, to provide a more coordinated, efficient 
and effective service. Similarly, although it was more difficult to see a clear and 
consistent commitment, this approach to e-government had a Iso been applied to linking 
health and social care operations through a shared electronic record, 
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As with criminal justice, the welfare arena had had a long tradition of partnership and 
joint working across organisations. In part, this was crystallised in the paper-based 
sharing mechanism intrinsic to the 'Lloyd-George' envelope system in General Practice. 
However, generally the idea of national electronic records was borne out of the 
inadequacy of paper based data sharing mechanisms and the fragmented nature of patient 
information systems in NHS organisations. It was reasoned that a shared electronic record 
would help the NHS join up operations around the patient through, for instance, specific 
health episodes. For instance a serious accident might have taken a patient through 
emergency ambulance responses, a hospital stay, occupational therapy, hospital outpatient 
visits, physiotherapy, pharmacy services and follow up GP contact. There were obvious 
benefits for joined up, seamless care if a single patient record could be accessed and 
maintained during and beyond this episode. Furthermore, policyinakers and observers 
alike had long recognised that, in many cases, citizen welfare needs would not sit within 
the confines of either health or social care, but would traverse the two spheres. As a 
result, there had been a long standing emphasis on joint working across the 'Berlin Wall'; 
considering this emphasis it was unsurprising that eventually plans for a joint electronic 
record for use across the two spheres would be acted upon. New technological solutions 
had been applied to old policy challenges under the aegis of e-government. 
In both the criminal justice system and welfare services, client information was the 
lifeblood of some key operations; whether pertaining to offenders, victims, patients or 
social care cases, this data was crucial to effective delivery. However, in both arenas 
information had been kept within distinct domains, in a manner that reflected the discrete 
nature of the processes and procedures of the institutions which generated, acted upon and 
stored this data. In the 1980s, under the CCCJS, central policymakers attempted to 
improve coordination across institutionally distinct arms of the criminal justice system, in 
part by increasing information flows and interoperability across organisational 
boundaries. The CCCJS and subsequent initiatives met with difficulties and by 2004 the 
renewed efforts to modernise criminal justice IT and share case management files more 
effectively between organisations were well underway, as discussed in the previous 
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chapter. Despite activities under the NHS Computer Branch, K6rner reports and the 
NHSnet initiative in previous decades, the NNIT of 2002, with ECR at its heart, was 
arguably the first attempt to instil comparable levels of informational coordination in the 
welfare sphere. 
However, in comparison to the CCCJS, NPflT could also be considered a significant step 
further; with ECR, the Programme carried in it the intention to provide a single national 
electronic record for every NHS patient, whereas CCCJS rested more on establishing 
technical standards for data sharing at least up to the mid-1990s 
(Bellamy/Taylor, I 996, p6-7). Nonetheless, in both cases highly institutionalised 
arrangements, replete with many distinct information domains reflected in information. 
systems, proved to be challenging. As Bellamy and Taylor noted, the different institutions 
involved in the CCCJS contained actors, politicians, managers, practitioners, consultants 
and IT suppliers, with different assumptions and needs regarding the specifications of 
new IT systems (ibid., p 13). Arguably, evidence comparable to this observation was found 
in this case study. A useful illustrative example was, particularly across the health and 
social care divide, the argument that institutional and professional differences were 
reflected as deeply as the coding and semantics of patient data recording processes. 
Equally, Bellamy and Taylor found that differing 'semantic sensibilities' across criminal 
justice professions provided a barrier to meaningful data sharing (ibld., p8). 
ECR was, however, much less comparable with the format of Crime Mapping itself; 
unlike the national electronic record programme, Crime Mapping tools tended to be used 
in the decentralised local partnership environments of CDRPs. In contrast, ECR was a 
programme embarked upon from a central position, with the intent to gain the 
participation in a single infrastructure of myriad NHS and social care organisations across 
England. In this sense, NPflT and ECR appeared closer to the philosophies behind the 
central e-government strategy as promoted and developed by the OeE. Just as the OeE put 
resources into providing central infrastructures, standards and hubs such as the GSI, 
Government Gateway, UK Online portal, DotP, e-GIF and the pan-governrnent toolbar to 
help realise joined up e-government, the Department of Health opted to pursue a national 
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solution for welfare organisations to feed into. Conversely, although Crime Mapping 
worked from standardised Ordnance Survey base maps and potentially utilised (e-GIF 
compliant) BS7666 address standards, the tool was used in a different model to ECR. 
Although ECR appeared more aligned with the activities of the OeE than Crime Mapping 
and there was an acknowledgement amongst policymakers that NPflT had parallels with 
the central e-government strategy (interview - 21), the OeE was ostensibly not heavily 
involved the Programme. It was the Department of Health that, understandably, was at the 
helm with the task of implementing the enormous NPflT, in conjunction with suppliers. 
Although general stimulation and discussions were likely to have occurred at a high level 
between the OeE and NPflT policymakers, interviewees felt that there was little in terms 
of guidance that the Office could offer with ECR (interview - 19,20). Still, behind the 
scenes the NPflT and the ECR had at their heart a commitment to use e-GIF standards, 
launched by the OeE, as the technical basis for interoperability (DOH, 2003c). Away from 
the. NPflT, the Department of Health was in'early 2004 the only government organisation 
to join the OeE Delivering on the Promise (DotP) website management service 
(OeE, 2004). 
Despite some attempts to coordinate and standardise CDRP activities, for instance under 
the PBM, the dominant application for Crime Mapping was within discrete partnerships, 
where bilateral data sharing fulfilled local needs but did not usually feed into other Crime 
Mapping initiatives or standardised central hubs, infrastructures or repositories. The ECR 
programme aimed to provide a national infrastructure for patient data to be deposited into. 
Within the NPfiT model, there was apparently no room for local initiatives such as those 
found in Bristol, Birmingham, Bradford and elsewhere. 
Because of the specific requirements of welfare, as judged by Department of Health 
(Drury/Pattison 2003, p8O; Hansard, 2002/03b, cgl. 416 (W); Amott, 2003b), the decision 
was made to take the high-investment route towards a national infrastructure for 
electronic. records, as discussed in section 5.6. This decision, although unprecedented and 
unanimously identified as difficult to implement, is certainly not seen as unequivocally 
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erroneous by this thesis. High levels of investment, new ICT products and an apparent 
uncompromising approach to contractual negotiations arguably provided the NPflT with a 
greater chance of success. Furthermore, although there was some confusion, the 
specification document did suggest the approach to incorporating social care information 
into ECR would not necessarily be monolithic; for some patients practitioners from both 
spheres would contribute to a single record whilst in other cases occasional 
communications would suffice (DOH, 2003a, p372-374). However, it was still the case 
that evidence suggested that the welfare practitioner community felt ostracised as a result 
of the opaqueness associated with the first years of the Programme (EHI, 2003b; 2000e; 
interview - 19). This ostracism was particularly felt in the social care community, which 
sensed a systemic failure to facilitate participation of its sphere in the NPf[T (EHI, 2004a; 
interview -2 7). 
As seen in Chapter Four, the virtue of the small-scale format of many Crime Mapping 
initiatives was that it allowed protagonists to meet and react to the idiosyncratic 
informational requirements and traits of individual partners, and to focus on building trust 
and understanding between groups. In Crime Mapping, joining up, although a clear part 
of the objectives, was positioned modestly, with the technology seemingly playing a 
secondary role in comparison to the emphasis on people and processes. In this sense, 
Crime Mapping tools appeared to be positioned to help CDRPs go with the institutional 
grain of the partners it engaged with. These partners were not asked to change operations 
or informational procedures, at least not in a radical sense, to participate in Crime 
Mapping. As a result, some of the perceived weaknesses and incompatibilities in data 
collection, storage and other processes could remain unchallenged beyond the 'cleaning' 
functions of middleware technology. Indications from progress with the PBM for instance 
were that the development any kind of national Crime Mapping system was unlikely and 
potentially unnecessary. 
Conversely, the NPflT and ECR had been designed, in a sense, to go against the 
institutional grain of the government organisations; and professional communities 
involved; to challenge, reform and fundamentally improve welfare services to meet the 
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needs of individual patients, using new ICT applications. As a result of the national 
infrastructure approach, the Department of Health had a prominent role in the 
development and implementation of the electronic record, whereas the Home Office 
appeared to largely have a more distant role with Crime Mapping uses. The remit of the 
Department of Health included cancelling smaller projects that were deemed to be 
duplicating the work of the NPflT. These smaller projects were likely to be closer to the 
dominant Crime Mapping model, where protagonists on the ground reacted to the specific 
needs and idiosyncrasies of participating organisations. Whilst undoubtedly local level 
electronic care records initiatives could have facilitated joining up on a small scale, they 
would not have provided the benefits of a national system desired by Department of 
Health policyrnakers, where patients could experience seamless deliver regardless of their 
location. 
The Department of Health and health ministers had chosen a different path, still being 
trodden by the summer of 2004, which aimed to achieve joining up on a grander scale 
than implied in the application of Crime Mapping tools, particularly within the health 
sphere. Whilst this thesis does not conclude that the objectives of the NPflT and ECR will 
not be reached, it does point to the complexity of historic institutional factors that made 
coordinated information flows and service delivery within and across the two spheres 
problematic. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As stated in Chapter One, the broad objective of the thesis was to investigate the role 
of e-government in facilitating joined up government in the UK, as articulated in 
central strategy and embodied in particular in the work of the Office of the e-Envoy. 
Although business and management literature recognised and promoted ICT-mediated 
seamless delivery as the zenith of e-government in its 'stages models' (e. g. 
Accenture, 2002; Deliotte and Touche, 2000), there was a lack of critical assessment of 
this notion in academic public administration literature; considerations of joined up 
government often failed to address the role of e-government. This thesis bridges the 
gap, building from the work of a vanguard of scholars who discussed the role of 
institutions in the adoption of ICT in public service delivery. In particular, the 
historical depth offered in the thesis chapters demonstrates the complex evolution of 
ICT applications within an intricate instiýutional landscape; to be fully understood, the 
role of e-government in achieving joined up government has to be placed within this 
context. 
This chapter draws together the findings of Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five to 
help answer the question of how e-govermnent contributed to joined up government. 
In Chapter Two, it was found that, whilst the automation perspective remained 
dominant during the post-war decades as computers were installed to satisfy 
departmental objectives, a lesser voice more attuned to coordination and 
informatization had existed since the 1950s. To an extent this notion led to the 
creation of the CCTA, an agency that attempted to instil coordination in the 
procurement and use of IT systems. Although the work of the CCTA appeared not to 
be wholly successful and gradually its prominence and power was'whittled away, the 
notions of coordination and informatization were enshrined within it. However, the 
institutional configuration of government appeared unconducive to interdepartmental 
IT coordination (Margetts, 1996, p74); one factor wa's that departments often chose to 
manage IT operations without the impetus of an external body (Margetts, I 999, p62- 
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63; CCTA, I 984, p IS), much to the dismay of some CCTA personnel (personal 
correspondence - 6). Whilst departments preferred not or were unable to collaborate 
much with IT issues, whether it be procurement, joint systems, data sharing or other 
initiatives, the centre of government had struggled to reach desired levels of general 
coordination (Macintosh, I 977, p546; Hennessy, I 989, p3O 1; Greenwood et 
al, 2002, p64; Hogwood/Peters, I 985, p4O). Although in some ways the managerialist 
agenda that emerged in the 1980s highlighted the potential of information 
technologies, it also increased the complexity of public service delivery, for instance 
through the creation of executive agencies and the introduction of new private sector 
actors. New demarcations, organisations, networks, information domains and 
relationships developed, which some scholars sought to understand under the 
tgovemance' concept. Despite these complications, the notion of IT coordination 
remained and in the late 1990s was revitalised through the creation of the CITU and 
the emergence of the e-government agenda, just as the internet took hold in the UK. 
In Chapter Three, it was demonstrated that the enduring notions of coordination and 
informatization were subsumed into the e-government agenda, through its alignment 
with the notion of joined up government. As expressed in government. direct, 
Modernising Government and the work of the OeE, new ICTs and particularly the 
internet were applied to delivering public services seamlessly across government 
organisations. Considering the potential improvement in the quality and efficiency of 
service delivery and the perceived impact of new ICTs around the end of the last 
millennium in business and society at large, through creating and enabling new 
information flows (Castells, 1996; 2001), thi s notion was both rational and legitimate. 
The OeE strived during the early years of the new millennium to realise the effective 
exploitation of new ICTs through e-government, as laid down by the e-envoy and his 
ministerial supervisors. 
As well as providing strategy, guidance, targets and direction for departments, the 
OeE led the development of a variety of infrastructural tools and portals. Chapter 
Three argues that whilst the GSI, Knowledge Network and e-GIF for instance could 
be considered to have had a considerable impact, many of the front office tools 
intended to present unified web services to citizens (the UK Online portal, Life 
Episodes, DotP and the pan-government toolbar) seemed less successful. Despite the 
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intentions of the UK Online programme to integrate government websites 
(OeE, 2001 a, p54) there was, under the OeFs own admission, considerable 
fragmentation; over 3000 government websites were in operation in 2003 
(OeE, 2003, p3O), with little drawing them together. 
This situation indicated that public service institutions felt primarily obligated to 
present online information and transactional services in their own terms and to fulfil 
their own requirements and those of their client group's needs rather than 
participating wholeheartedly in the centralised, orchestrated concept promoted from 
the Cabinet Office. Whilst essentially embracing the internet as an effective tool to 
interact with citizens and business, government organisations had in the main adopted 
the web to suit distinct needs and objectives rather than adhering to the concept of a 
single portal. In this important case, the logic that the technology should be employed 
to create a unified government web presence had not won out in public service 
institutions. Whilst the use of a central web portal may have initially aimed to mask 
fragmentation rather than transform and align services, the circumstances still 
provided useful indications of the progress with the application of the central 
government notion of e-government. The NAO (e. g. 1999/2000) and other audit and 
parliamentary bodies concurred that departments had tended to pursue their own 
objectives with internet-based services and criticised the management of many 
departmental IT projects (e. g. - PAC, I 999/2000a; 1999/2000b; 19.99/2000r.; 2001/02c). 
The OeE had also intended to identify and help develop new cross-departmental e- 
government services (CITU, 2000, pl2; OeE, 2002b, p46) as part of the effort'to break 
down barriers and drive deeper joining up between the back offices of government 
organisations (OeE, 2002b, p45). It was difficult to see this deeper incarnation of e- 
government having taken shape by the time the OeE was replaced by the e- 
Government Unit in 2004. A key mechanism for measuring departmental electronic 
service delivery, the overarching targets, did little to take into account or encourage 
joining up as they were largely applied to individual departmental operations 
(Walsh, 2001; Naylor, 2004). Furthermore, the NAO (2001/02d, pIO) and other 
observers (Kable, 20031) argued that the targets ultimately failed to take into account 
the users, who had not engaged with government through new ICTs to the extent . 
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envisaged; for instance 8% of internet users claimed to have transacted with 
government online in 2003 (OeE, 2003, p29). 
Despite these apparent shortcomings, the OeE publicly adopted an optimistic 
approach to the progress of the e-government agenda (OeE, 2000; 2001 a; 2002b; 
2003). Whilst many departments evidently had little involvement in some OeE 
activities, the language and rhetoric used by the Office suggested transformation, 
compulsion, inevitability and the power of new technologies in joining up. Whilst the 
OeE itself was never intended or able to be an omnipotent force able to'compel, the 
annual reports for instance did at times appear to appoint irresistible powers of 
transformation to the technologies in question. 
Although policymakers wished to take steps to ensure that the 'pendulum of 
decentralisation' swung back towards central steering (PAC, I 999/2000a, Q2) in the e- 
government era, the desired levels of coordination were difficult to effect within the 
existing configuration. For instance, despite the stated intention to use the Treasury to 
encourage departments to subscribe to the DotP (OeE, 2002b, p66), the tool did not 
appear to catch on. Whilst persuasion and advice may have been a crucial tactic in the 
work of the OeE, a mechanism through which this could be achieved, the e- 
champions network, was discontinued by central government in 2004. The positive 
stimulating role, vision, measures and tools offered by the OeE should not be 
underestimated; e-GIF may well have provided the technical basis for much 
departmental e-government activity and collaborations (including in criminal justice 
and welfare), GSI was adopted wholesale by many government organisations, whilst 
the overarching targets did provide important early stimulation 
(NAO, 1999/2000a, p58) despite criticism later. Regardless of problems and challenges 
the government had taken advantage of the internet's capacity to reach out to citizens, 
providing informational and some transactional services online, yet this had largely 
been delivered from a fragmented, departmental footing. 
This thesis does not argue that new technological innovations, which may have often 
carried risk with them, should not have been a feature of IT policymaking in UK 
government. As seen in Chapter Four, the digitisation process of base maps embarked 
upon by the Ordnance Survey over several decades had been riddled with doubt and 
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criticism yet emerged as a useful informatizing tool for public and private sector 
actors, including those involved in Crime Mapping. However, the argument that the 
central e-government strategy, promoted by Labour government ministers and 
embodied in the work of the OeE, had overstated the role of new information 
technologies in the facilitation ofjoined up government still had credence. This thesis 
points to institutional factors that acted as a foil to the perceived power attributed to 
ICTs in the e-government strategy. 
The clear emphasis on cross-departmental joining up in the e-government strategy 
was bound to create challenges at it implied changes to the practices and processes of 
government organisations, whether through requiring departments to use the same 
technical infrastructures, to share data, develop web services in partnership, contribute 
to central portals, adhere to technical standards and so on. Also, under the 
government's own admission, legacy IT systems had not been implemented with 
compatibility in mind during the post-war decades (Cabinet Office, I 998/99, p46). 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, the experiences of the CCTA, albeit 
under different circumstances, attested to long standing difficulties in encouraging 
orchestration across departments in a number of IT policy related issues. Thus, it was 
not a surprise that Chapter Three concludes that the activities of the OeE were a 
G curate's egg'; whilst some infrastructural tools appeared to become popular with 
departments, others were under used or disappeared whilst many departments 
continued to adopt internet and other new technologies to suit discrete objectives. 
Thus, through focusing on the issue of ICT-mediated joining up, Chapters Two and 
Three clearly demonstrate the continuity of the notion of coordination in the post-war 
era, made more visible through the e-government and wider Modernising Government 
agenda from 1999. However, the findings of the two chapters also allow the thesis to 
speculate that, despite the seemingly powerful logic of joined up delivery through 
electronic tools, institutional factors tended to lead to ambiguous outcomes in the 
implementation of central IT policy across government. The findings infer that, in 
accordance with previous scholarly work (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998a, pl68-170; , 
Margetts, 1999, pl78-179), institutions were likely to mould and shape information 
technology towards their own narrow needs and objectives, with variable success. 
Whereas central IT policy, particularly in the e-goverriment. era, placed emphasis on 
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high levels of informatization, coordination and joining up, the institutions tasked 
with service delivery would find it difficult to emulate this notion to the letter, at least 
in the short tenn. 
The indications were that the e-Government Unit, which replaced the OcE in spring 
2004, represented a change of approach in the e-government strategy, although the 
objective was still to attain joining up. The head of the new unit stated that a more 
consensual approach, seeking departmental buy in, would be encouraged 
(Amott, 2004b; Watmore, 2004). In discussing the need to avoid 'central diktats' in e- 
government (Amott, 2004b), Watmore inferred that he felt that there had been a 
tendency for the OeE to be overbearing in putting forward measures, targets and tools 
to departments; a similar criticism was levelled at the CCTA in the 1980s 
(CCTA, I 984, p 15; personal correspondence - 6). Arguably, the 'pendulum of 
decentralisation' (PAC, 1999/2000a, Q2) had swung back towards departments under 
the e-Government Unit. Some interviewees felt that the change in approach was a 
reflection of institutional realities and the difficulties the centre had in steering policy 
across government (interview - 4,5). Despite some successes under the OeE, the shift 
could be taken as an acknowledgement that joining up through e-government could 
make further progress if developed more on departmental terms. The role of the e- 
Government Unit was more explicitly focused on providing support for departments 
to develop their own agenda for e-government (Amott, 2004b); in a sense this 
appeared more likely to go with the institutional grain rather than against it. 
Lessonsftom Case Study One: Taking into account institutions in e-government 
Whilst Chapters Two and Three provided support for the broad institutionalist 
arguments put forward to explain how the premise of e-government would be played 
out in practice, it is Chapters Four and Five that deliver substantial evidence and 
allow refinement of this argument. This conclusion will draw out the key points of 
these case study chapters before moving on to offer more general analysis. 
Chapter Four demonstrates that, on the surface, the criminal justice system as a whole 
had, through the CHT programme for instance, adopted the notions of the 
Modernising Government agenda in terms of an emphasis on inter-organisational 
electronic information flows and other forms of ICT-mediated coordination. The 
I 
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policy history of the Chapter indicates however that, particularly in terms of crime 
prevention, an emphasis on multi-agency approaches had existed for several decades 
before the emergence of the e-government agenda. Not only that, but the CCCJS had 
been an attempt to bring information technology to bear on coordination between 
criminal justice agencies, particularly with case management, from the mid- I 980s. 
Thus, the Chapter illustrates the context from which the criminal justice system 
embraced the notions underpinning the e-government agenda. Furthermore, 
considering the evidence amassed (e. g. interview - 13; Sutton, 1996; 
Liddle/Gelsthorpe, I 994a; 1994b; Crawford, 1997; HMIC, 1998; Sampson et al, 1998; 
Bellamy/Taylor, 1996), the Chapter demonstrates the apparent barriers to forms of 
coordination around criminal justice or crime prevention issues. John Suffolk, director 
general of the CHT in 2004, was aware of the difficulties in bringing the different 
institutions of the criminal justice system together through information technology 
(Amott, 2004c). 
These observations provide a useful backcloth to the specifics of Crime Mapping, 
despite activities largely being confined to local settings away from the high-level 
policies surrounding the CJIT. The full picture indicates that the emergence of Crime 
Mapping was the result of a long term and complex interplay of large government 
institutions, parliamentary committees, GIS software providers, small government 
units, legislation, market sensibilities, political patterns and an emphasis on multi- 
agency crime prevention and the geography of crime borne out of trends in 
criminology. This eventual emergence rested more on the interplay between the 
actors, organisations and institutions involved than the irresistible force of the 
technologies. Interviewees tended to play down the role of ICTs in successful Crime 
Mapping. 
Certainly, ICTs and digital data sets were still very much an integral part of Crime 
Mapping but were often enmeshed in the organisations and institutions involved over 
time. For instance, base maps provided by the Ordnance Survey were produced as a 
result of a tortuous thirty-year digitization process but only became an accessible tool 
for many public sector organisations after the 2003 pan-government agreement. In 
part, Crime Mapping developed as afesult of affordable GIS software' 
(Chainey, 2001), which most CDRPs had access to. Yet CDRPs also had instilled 
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within in them an interest in the geography of crime and the benefits of a partnership 
approach to crime prevention, which arguably led to a propensity to use GIS 
technology in multi-agency Crime Mapping. The benefits of the historical elements of 
the Chapter are that the evolution of the use of technologies in Crime Mapping is 
demonstrated to a full extent; in this case, a more comprehensive understanding of the 
role of e-govemment in joining up, which takes into account the institutional 
complexities, is delivered. 
The deeper analysis offered also uncovered how the day to day modus operandi of 
CDRP Crime Mapping, whilst very much within the realms of ICT-mediated joined 
up government, included a strong emphasis on relationships, trust building and 
acceptance of different data formats. This approach could be taken as an 
acknowledgement of not only the array of factors that led to the creation of Crime 
Mapping initiatives but also of the institutional complexity of the multi-agency 
environment that stretched beyond the criminal justice system to local authorities, the 
NHS and other spheres. Protagonists were willing to go with the institutional grain in 
their approach to joining up; to accept variance in processes and data rather than, for 
instance attempting to align partner organisations with a Crime Mapping technical 
infrastructure. One element of the technology was employed in particular to facilitate 
this approach; middleware helped to deal with the inconsistencies in data recording 
across partners (interview - H, 13). 
It can certainly be argued that this picture contrasted somewhat with incarnations of e- 
government which placed emphasis on the creation of national infrastructures, 
standards or portals that government organisations were asked to channel activity 
through a central point. Although there was clear merit in both approaches under 
appropriate conditions and it is by no means argued that the two could not co-exist, 
the differences between them provide insights into the question 'of how ICTs 
facilitated joining up in e-govermnent practices. 
Whilst the use of standardised Ordnance Survey data, interest in national land, 
property and street repositories, and the application of BS7666 demonstrated some 
propensity towards infrastructural, standardised and systemic tools in Crime Mapping, 
the crucial element of gathering partner data for geo-coded analysis took a more ad 
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hoe and organic format. Still, with this crucial element aimed at harvesting insights 
into crime detection and prevention through the geo-coding of previously uncompared 
data from a variety of organisations, Crime Mapping had a strong informatizing and 
joining up thrust. Yet, despite some involvement in technical geographical standards, 
the OeE appeared distant from the CDRP Crime Mapping community. Although, with 
the back office focus of Crime Mapping, it was unlikely that the citizen-focused OeE 
tools (e. g. UK online portal) would be of any relevance, it was notable that e-GIF was 
evidently not in use in many CDRP partner organisations to facilitate data sharing up 
to 2004. 
The Home Office, the department ultimately responsible for CDRPs, had in other 
service delivery areas instigated a national technological infrastructure approach 
under the aegis of e-govermnent; projects under the CJIT were aimed to provide 
joined up case management in the criminal justice system. For Crime Mapping, there 
had also been attempts to provide some form of standardisation to CDRP activities, by 
creating central data repositories and other tools for use across partnerships, under the 
PBM (Radbum, 2002, p5; interview - 11). However, this attempt was scaled back in 
2004, with the Home Office appearing content for CDRPs to continue to develop 
Crime Mapping tools on a local basis, although the relative autonomy of the 
partnerships may have left the Department with little choice in this matter. 
Lessonsftom Case Study Two: Taking into account institutions in e-government 
Similarly to the policy history findings of Chapter Four, Chapter Five 
demonstrated that the adoption of the notions underpinning the e-government agenda, 
most clearly under NPf[T, should be considered in light of a long term concern for 
coordination and partnerships, particularly to help bridge the 'Berlin Wall' between 
health and social care (e. g. Hill, 1993, pIO2; Booth, 1981a, p23; DOH, 1990c; 1998c; 
Health Committee, 1999). However, unlike the criminal justice system with the 
CCCJS, there had previously been no concerted central effort to orchestrate 
information flows across the NHS and out to social care organisations using ICTs, 
with the exception of NHSnet and other smaller initiatives. Nonetheless, comparable 
institutional factors, which could provide profound barriers to the seamless provision 
of public services across organisations and were reflected in IT systems, were to be 
found in both criminal justice and welfare spheres. 
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The ECR programme, central to the wider NPfIT, was however a significant step 
further than CCCJS and offered a fundamentally different incarnation of e- 
government to the key elements of the dominant forinat for Crime Mapping. By 
planning to provide a single national electronic record for every NHS patient, which 
could include social care information, ECR appeared closer to the activities and 
underlying rhetoric of the OeE, as manifested in infrastructural tools. Whilst ECR was 
geared specifically to join up welfare patient data through a single system, OeE tools 
were more generic, for instance enabling online transactional services at a single 
point; nonetheless, there were similarities in the offering of technological 
infrastructures in both. The OeE itself was not, however, ostensibly directly involved 
heavily in NPflT, although it was significant that e-GIF formed the technical basis for 
interoperability in the ECR programme. 
Although high risk, the national, centralised approach had clear and rational motives 
(Drury/Pattison 2003, p8O; Hansard, 2002/03b, col. 416 (W); Arnott, 2003b) and up to 
summer 2004 the ECR was by no means considered to be an unambiguous failure. 
Yet, it was the case that some local electronic health or welfare patient information 
initiatives had been cancelled by the Department of Health, whilst many practitioners, 
particularly from the social care sphere, felt ostracised and badly treated as a result of 
the ECR programme. Some policy sources did appear to suggest that ECR would not, 
incorporate social care information in an all-encompassing, monolithic sense, and 
flexibility was to be retained depending on the needs of the patient 
(DOH, 2003a, p372-274). Nonetheless, ECR was seen as a threat and disruption to 
many of the existing professional and administrative informational practices across 
welfare; in a sense it went against the institutional grain. 
It is not argued that large-scale systems such as ECR, where the compliance of many 
organisations was required, intrinsically lost the close quarter trust and relationship 
building virtues that Crime Mapping protagonists valued. However, the indications 
from some interviewees (e. g. interview - 19,27), surveys and other evidence (see 
eGov Monitor, 2004; EHI, 2003e; 2003b; 2004c) suggested that this element had been 
somewhat overlooked. Clearly, NPflT policymakers had taken hard decisions that 
would challenge welfare organisations, practitioners and administrators. In part, the 
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sheer scale and complexity of the welfare institutional environment (as reflected in 
fragmented patient databases) and in particular the disjoint between health and social 
care practices made it necessary for the Department of Health to take a strong lead, 
once the decision had been made to implement national electronic records. Whilst 
consultation and dialogue was likely to be occurring at some levels, acrimony and 
unrest were distinctly apparent, particularly around flashpoints such as the incumbent 
General Practice IT suppliers and the inclusion of social care information in the 
programme. 
Arguably, levels of acerbity should have been expected with any large-scale reforms 
likely to affect and challenge a high volume of government organisations, regardless 
of the prominence of IT. However, the thesis speculates that part of the perceived 
problem may have been that, under the general aegis of e-government, the 
Department of Health's policyrnakers and ministers had overstated the ability of new 
ICTs to drive the desired changes for a joined up electronic patient records system, 
within the fragmented institutional landscape found in welfare. Human and 
organisational factors, pointing to the need to engage and involve welfare service 
delivery organisations in the design and implementation of ECR, may have been 
undermined somewhat as a result. Something similar had been seen before when, in 
the decade before the arrival of NNIT, the Department built the NHSnet, a secure 
email and intranet system for use across the NHS (Cross, 2001); interviewees and 
other sources argued, with the benefit of hindsight, that the system was cumbersome, 
under used and unnecessary (interview - 19,20; Protti, 1999; Keen, I 994a). Part of this 
perceived failure may have been the result of a lack of consultation and collaboration 
with health practitioner communities; policyrnakers had confidence in the technology 
to provide the desired facility without the need to heavily involve those who would 
use the system (interview - 19,20). 
In the e-government era, policyrnakers were certainly confident that the movement 
towards electronic records was wise (NHSIA, 1998, para. 2.4) whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging challenges and barriers. How&ver, as noted in Chapter Five, some 
interviewees felt that fundamental questions were left unanswered in the build up to 
I the ECR programme. This point was drawn out in particular during interviewee 
discussions of a joint electronic health and social care record. Although some' - ', 
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policyrnakers, particularly Jeremy Thorp, had advocated a fully integrated welfare 
record system (Thorp, 2002, p6; EHI, 2002b), some interviewees wondered if this was 
realistic, not least due to deep professional and institutional differences as reflected in 
the data recording, coding and semantics of information systems across the divide 
(interview - 19,23,27). 
For some time policy documents were not clear on the exact format for ECR. Yet, in 
2003 the ECR specification document did confirm a commitment to some interfaces 
with social care information but universal, fully integrated records did not appear to 
be high on the agenda (DOH, 2003a, p373-74). This apparent dilution of the original 
vision for unified electronic records may have been due to a growing realisation that, 
even if a shared infrastructure was successfully created, it was not assured that 
practitioners across the divide would be willing or able to routinely share data and use 
a unified patient information source effectively. Essentially, whilst the Department of 
Health had put significant resources into the creation of a national electronic care 
record system, interviewees had doubts that joined up welfare service delivery would 
germinate from it. Arguably however, the apparent dilution of the ECR concept, 
which implied different levels of data sharing depending on the needs of the patient, 
was a positive recognition of the institutional realities of the welfare sector (interview 
-2 7). The change in emphasis suggested that, particularly across the health and social 
care divide, ECR could be positioned to facilitate and support patient data sharing 
should the need arise, rather than driving it through a monolithic electronic records 
system. Still, particularly within health, ECR was very much positioned as a national 
infrastructure, set to challenge practitioner communities and reconfigure the historical 
demarcations between patient information domains. There was evidently no place for 
smaller, local electronic records projects under the Department of Health's concept of 
ECR. 
The approach taken with electronic records was by no means inherently erroneous and 
policymakers within the NPf[T would not have taken the decision to implement a 
national electronic records system lightly. New information and communication 
technologies did indeed offer new possibilities that, under the general policy emphasis 
on e-government in many parts of the public sector around the beginning of the 
millennium, the Department of Health had justifiably sought to exploit to facilitate 
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joining up. Yet the benefit of the historical elements of the case study has been to 
demonstrate the institutional fragmentation of welfare, which seemed to remain 
unconducive to collaborative working, despite long term policy efforts to bridge the 
divide. Professional and organisational differences, reflected and embedded in the use 
of IT to record and store patient data, indicated the enormity of the task to introduce a 
national patient record system into this environment. The institutional landscape of 
welfare, as depicted in the case study, should be juxtaposed with the powers that new 
technologies could offer, to provide a better understanding of the role of e- 
government in facilitating joining up in this particular case. 
Broadly, through focusing on the issue of ICT-mediated joining up, the case studies 
provide rich detail that supports the use of the institutionalist argument in facilitating 
understanding of how the e-government agenda was played out in practice. In doing 
so, the thesis provides much needed critical analysis of the central e-government 
strategy, analysis which acts as a foil to dominant 'stages model' perspectives that 
were represented in business and management literature. The evidence suggests that 
in the e-government era, just as previously, ICTs tended to be moulded and shaped to 
reflect the institutions in which they were placed. Through time, government 
organi sations seemed unable or unwilling to participate fully in some of the various 
efforts to join up service operations through information technologies; the lack of 
progression with the ultimate objectives for government online through OeFs central 
portal was one of the indications that this might be set to continue in the e- 
government era. The point of departure between the findings ofthe two case studies, 
whereby Crime Mapping tended to follow a localised format whilst ECR was being 
rolled out nationally, provides a useful manifestation of different approaches taken to 
e-government. Both had encountered the institutional landscapes of their respective 
policy fields but had developed different methods to instil ICT-mediated joining up 
within them. Whilst ECR challenged the epistemic communities and institutions of 
welfare, Crime Mapping tended to go with the institutional grain. 
6.2 RECOMMENDING A BALANCED APPROACH TO E-GOVERNMENT: THE 
BENEFITS OF A HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF INSTITUTIONS 
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The thesis has investigated how e-government was positioned to facilitate joined up 
government in different settings; Through research into the history of government IT, 
the central e-government strategy and the case studies, this thesis has investigated e- 
government and has tested the premise that ICTs were the key enabler for joined up 
government. Through a rich historical analysis over a substantial period, the thesis has 
provided deeper understanding of progress with ICT-mediated joining up in the e- 
government era, which had been missing from some scholarly work. It has shown that 
the development of ICT applications in government has been intertwined, through a 
complex set of processes, with institutions. Within the criminal justice and crime 
prevention spheres and within the welfare arena there was, over time, a complex 
interplay of organisations, actors and information systems, containing within them 
different professional and administrative values, representing different client groups 
and operating with discrete legislative and procedural frameworks. Here, drawing 
from institutional perspectives, the thesis demonstrates that, in each case, the complex 
procedures, rules, routines and traditions contained within the institutions in question, 
developed and embedded over time, were very much in evidence. Whilst providing 
stability and order (March/Olsen, 1984), these complex institutions meant that ICT- 
mediated joined up policies in public service delivery organisations were liable to 
meet with obstacles, adoption was unlikely to occur rapidly and outcomes would vary 
across institutions. The functions, status and traits of ICTs in public service 
institutions must be understood in these terms when researching e-government. 
The thesis has built on observations from institutional perspectives on the importance 
of researching historical developments in institutions (Pierson, 2000; 
Pierson/Skocpol, 2002), and has brought these to bear on contemporary e-government. 
The thesis has demonstrated that, crucial to understanding ICT-mediated joining up in 
the case studies in particular is an exploration into key historical patterns, including 
technological developments and policy trends, which explain and contextualise e- 
government. 
The importance in the empirical research of institutions traced through time indicates 
that there could be considerable benefits in public administration scholars 
incorporating elements of historical institutionalism into e-govemment research. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the power of institutions had certainly been recognised as a 
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crucial factor in understanding the relationship between information technology and 
government by key scholars (e. g. Bellamy/Taylor, I 998a, pl 57-158,168-170), just as it 
had been a&epted as important in wider political science (March/Olsen, 1984; 
Hall/Taylor, 1996). Yet the further research carried out for this thesis demonstrates in 
particular the benefits of delving deeper into historical institutional developments. 
This approach, in keeping with scholarly work that explicitly drew from historical 
institutionalism (Pierson/Skocpol, 2002, p7O6), has been able to look at the way 
institutions have related to one another over time; this was particularly apt for the 
study ofjoining up. For instance, the description of the relationship over time between 
health and social care spheres, as well as the long-standing policy emphasis on 
creating partnerships and commonalities between them, provided useful insight into 
the difficulties in creating a useable joint electronic patient record, under the auspices 
of e-govemment. 
Not only has the thesis been able to intimate that institutions had not been susceptible 
to change but also that the development of ICT systems, reflecting the institutions in 
which they were bound, could constrain innovation and joining up. Margetts noted 
that, in the case of computerisation in the Benefits Agency in the 1990s, the existing 
computer systems inhibited the movement towards the 'whole person' concept 
(1999, p 179). Similarly, the thesis shows that information systems and recording 
practices discretely constructed in, for instance GP surgeries, hospitals and police 
forces, provided challenges to the objectives for ECR and Crime Mapping. To an 
extent, to borrow from another strand of historical institutionalist thinking (e. g. 
Hacker, 1998; Pierson, 2000), the information technology itself contributed to 'path 
dependence'; institutional traits and boundaries were crystallised in information 
systems, which made a change of path, in this case towards ICT-mediated joining up, 
difficult to effect. These insights also help develop the debate between technological 
determinism and the social shaping of technology; as Bellamy and Taylor effectively 
argue, whilst ICTs were not shaped at will by government organisations, their 
influence must be understood in terms of specific institutional settings, where change 
tends to be incremental and evolutionary (1998a, pl52). The historical depth offered 
by the thesis demonstrates how this rings true in the case of e-government, regardless 
of the power attributed to new ICTs. 
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The thesis has demonstrated that 'history matters' in e-government; understanding of 
long term institutional developments brings much needed critical insight to juxtapose 
with the dominant 'stages model' and general assumptions about the power of new 
technologies. The use of notions of historical institutionalism does not lead to 
arguments that significant change cannot happen in well established institutions 
(Orren/Showronek, 1994; Thelen/Steinmo, 1992), rather it is more likely to occur 
through the convergence of a number of factors, beyond the influences- of technology. 
This point chimes well with the findings of the thesis; for instance the use of Crime 
Mapping in multi-agency environments was likely to have been the result of a variety 
of factors that shaped the institutions in question (e. g. patterns in criminology, base 
map licensing, legislation etc) rather than the power of ICTs alone. 
Certainly, the historical approach to e-government research would benefit from 
further theoretical and empirical explorations. In particular, it would be useful to 
conduct additional case study research, for instance in alternative service delivery 
realms such as transport, local government, taxation, education and other areas of 
health, social care and criminal justice, to further assess the role of e-government in 
joining up and the benefits or otherwise of a deep, historical appreciation of 
institutional factors. It is not suggested that this appreciation explains all but that it 
might provide an avenue of focus for scholarly attention to e-government, to respond 
to the dominant 'stages model'. Although this model did have some sense of history 
in that it detailed a modernist progression of e-government towards seamless delivery, 
this was largely restricted to a shorter period of development through internet related 
technologies, and thus was devoid of a fuller sense of the historical relationship 
between ICTs and government institutions. 
In terms of this thesis, armed with these insights into the intertwining of ICTs and 
institutions across service delivery organisations, it can be seen that e-government, 
which carried with it in some incarnations the imperative to adopt new ICT 
applications and processes to achieve joining up on a grand scale, would not be 
enacted easily in many cases. Despite the perceived power of the internet and other 
new ICTs, government institutions and organisations were able to resist, or objected 
to alignment with, for instance, some central infrastructural tools and portals. 
Arguably, * smaller, localised initiatives, such as those involving Crime Mapping tools, 
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had shown that, by engaging with partner organisations, it was possible to achieve 
some joining up objectives by going with the institutional grain. 
Still, there were clear and significant benefits in approaches that sought to develop 
large-scale electronic infrastructural tools and systems to bring together the operations 
of government organisations. Yet, there was a danger that the requirements and traits 
of complex institutions could be underplayed in this forinat, whereas smaller, local- 
level initiatives such as those observed in the first case study were seen to embrace 
institutional idiosyncrasies. Whilst this thesis does not advise that policyrnakers had a 
stark binary choice between localised e-government projects and high investment, 
national infrastructure endeavours such as ECR, it does recommend that close 
attention be paid to what is appropriate and feasible within the context of the 
institutional environments in question, when designing e-government applications. 
It is not the intention to suggest that ambitious and innovative ICT-mediated reforms 
should never have been embarked upon or that e-government projects and 
programmes that placed a great emphasis on technology were doomed to failure. 
Nonetheless, whilst ICTs had long been associated with the transformation of service 
delivery, the possibility of changes occurring incrementally and organically should be 
recognised alongside the appliance of technology in attempting more visible and 
immediate transformations. 
This argument does not mean to imply that existing institutions, and the norms, 
routines and rules that guide and define them, do not need to be confronted, 
particularly if they obstruct efficient and effective public services. Yet, whilst the 
procedures, operations and cultures'of the institutions of government did need to be 
challenged and modified as part of the ongoing mission to improve service delivery, 
electronic tools were unlikely to be able to drive change without many other measures 
being put in place. Still, the small-scale, localised approaches as seen with Crime 
Mapping were less likely to capture some of the perceived benefits of other 
incarnations of e-govemment; for instance, inadequate data collection by CDRP 
partner organisations was reported by some interviewees (interview - 13). This may 
have been set to continue, in the absence of a motive to improve systems and 
procedures. Conversely, one effect of the ECR programme may have been to improve 
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and standardise the collection of patient data across welfare. Whilst providing little 
challenge to the processes of partner organisations was lauded as a notable asset by 
Crime Mapping protagonists, this may also have been a long term drawback. The 
thesis argues that, although risks and benefits could be associated with each, there 
were likely to be many routes to ICT-mediated joined up government, as a reflection 
of the multitude of institutions found in service delivery organisations. 
Final Remarks: Thefuture of e-government in the UK 
These findings on the role of ICTs in facilitating joining up do help the thesis 
provide some consideration into the future of e-government. 
Up to 2004, it had been observed that the OeE had not ostensibly been able to 
instigate the holistic and deep levels of back office joining up that it had alluded to 
(e. g. OeE, 2002b, p45-46), despite some notable successes. The case studies provide 
some allusions to the engrained levels of institutional complexity in service delivery 
areas, indicating the difficulties the OeE would have had in bringing multiple 
government organisations and services together into a single, seamless model. 
Commensurately, the OeE had not heavily involved itself in the main thrusts of 
infrastructural e-government in welfare and criminal justice (NPflT and CJIT), which 
were led by the central departments concerned. 
As an acknowledgement of this landscape, there was a shift towards a departmental 
model for e-government as the OeE wound down; one official encapsulated the 
feeling with 'the best and most realistic thing that we can do is provide departments 
with the guidance to work best within themselves' (interview - 8). Early indications 
were that, building on the important stimulation the OeE had injected, the e- 
Government Unit was set to provide a balanced approach, which juxtaposed the 
power of ICTs with the power of government institutions. The approach was that 
government departments could collaborate to forge joining up through e-government, 
where appropriate using central infrastructural tools such as the Government - 
Gateway, Directgov or common technical standards, and continue to develop their 
own specialized uses of ICTs. The OGC was set to continue to provide procurement 
and project management support, whilst audit and parliamentary bodies would bring 
government organisations to account for investments made. Although evidence from 
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the thesis suggests that the full breadth of government online may never be offered 
solely through a single portal, the consensual approach may have also helped draw 
together some web services, if departments saw the need to collaborate. 
Although the centre of government had attempted to bring the 'pendulum of 
decentralisation' back towards central steering, the reality was that departments had 
taken the lead with much electronic service delivery during the OcE era; although 
some of the OeE infrastructural tools (e. g. GSI, e-GIF) were utilised, the overarching 
100% target was taken on board and both departments contributed something to the 
central web portal, the Home Office and Department of Health were for instance able 
to steer the more visible strands of e-government within their own domains (i. e. 
NPflT and CJIT) with relative autonomy, although this was no guarantee of success. 
Arguably then, little had changed in the dynamics between the centre of government 
and departments in the e-govemment era and, under the e-Government Unit, this had 
seemed set to continue, but arguably with a new consensual emphasis. Despite the 
alleged zeal with which the OeE and ministerial figures had attempted to disseminate 
strategies, targets and infrastructural tools, which according to some interviewees 
exposed an overemphasis on the power of new information technologies, departments 
had largely driven e-government just as they had taken the lead with IT in previous 
decades. Historically, the CCTA struggled to instil coordination on its own terms and, 
in the e-government era, the OeE had to an extent experienced a similar situation, 
despite the perceived qualities offered by new technologies. 
Although the OeE was never orientated towards wresting huge amounts of power 
away from departments, and guidance and advice had always been an important part 
of the intentions of the Office, some of the rhetoric, tools and measures meted out had 
suggested that closer alignment between service delivery spheres was expected to 
have developed under e-government. In this sense, the ambitious mission that the OeE 
was charged with, to instil ICT-mediated joining up, had not been realised although 
there were some successes. 
Perhaps then, central organisations such as the OeE and e-Govermnent Unit were best 
suited to concentrate on providing infrastructural tools and standards that departments I 
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could tailor to their own needs if required. Whilst persuasive tactics could be 
employed, ultimately it appeared that departments would not use those tools which 
did not offer the desired capabilities or features, in accordance with the institutional 
landscape within which they operated. Thus, whilst for instance DotP appeared up to 
2004 to have limited value to some departments, the GSI had merit for many 
government organisations and was widely used, particularly for email (Coates, 2004). 
The change of approach under the e-Government Unit, whereby forums would be 
provided for senior departmental players to come to their own bilateral or multilateral 
decisions regarding where and how ICT-mediated joining up could occur, may have 
been the most prudent tactic considering the evidence presented in the thesis. Whilst 
central government clearly had an ongoing role in developing strategies and tools to 
encourage joining up where appropriate, it was more likely that useful impetus would 
be generated if the perceived power of new ICTs was not used as a starting point. The 
shift under the e-Government Unit could have represented a new level of maturity in 
this, where ICTs were not viewed as 'magic wonder dust' to bring forth joining up 
(interview - 1), but as a facilitator in wider processes of service delivery. 
However, although a consensual departmental model may have been a welcome 
ingredient to e-govemment, as the case studies demonstrate it was not that the 
Department of Health or Home Office were able to lead e-government within their 
own domains with total command and control. The ECR programme was met with, 
significant opposition from the practitioner communities and networks involved 
whilst the apparent scaling back of the PBM indicated that Crime Mapping was to be 
left to the jurisdiction of individual CDRPs, despite the desire to provide some levels 
of standardisation by some Home Office officials. The case studies demonstrate that, 
within the domains of the lead departments involved, there was still institutional 
fragmentation across and within welfare and criminal justice communities and 
organisations, as reflected in differing information systems. 
Nonetheless, the H6me Office and Department of Health would arguably still have 
appeared best placed to lead and oversee e-govemment activity within their domains, 
choosing whether to reach out to other departments, where and when to implement 
national systems or, if appropriate, permit regional, local or organisational autonomy 
with ICT-mediated operations. The e-Government Unit, along with other central 
288 
organisations such as the OGC, could also contribute to a mature and flexible 
approach to e-govemment, for instance by offering guidance and tools in appropriate 
circumstances. 
Despite the new capabilities offered by the internet and other new technologies, it was 
not the case that e-govemment would sweep away all that stood before it, to produce 
an entirely new model for service delivery in a digital age. Instead, the institutions of 
government had often adapted new ICTs, in keeping with a historical pattern. As a 
result, e-government strategy needed to acknowledge and seek to understand service 
delivery institutions. In some cases, a localised approach could remain the optimal 
model; CDRPs had managed to bring together data from a variety of institutions and 
organisations within and beyond the criminal justice system (including the police, 
local government and health bodies) at an operational level, which might not have 
been possible under a national, infrastructural data sharing method. Thus, a mixed 
model to ICT-mediated joining up could have been the most appropriate way forward, 
which, although less likely to attain the more ambitious objectives of seamless, 
holistic service delivery, could provide significant improvements. 
Up to summer 2004, evidence suggested that government had yet to fully realise the 
improvements that e-government could offer but there were signs that a consensual, 
mixed model could emerge, that may have represented a more mature approach to the 
exploitation of ICTs in service delivery. What this thesis has demonstrated in 
particular is that policyrnakers and scholars alike should take on a historical view of 
institutions in developing and designing e-govemment; to look to the past to inform 
the future. 
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ANNEX ONE - METHODOLOGICAL DETAIL 
This Annex relates full details of the methodical parameters and apgoaches taken, 
embellishing on the details given in section 1.6. 
The decision was made to study e-government in the UK as the e-government strategy 
that emerged there in the late 1990s was high profile and accompanied by significant 
investment by the government. The emphasis and interest in achieving joining up 
through e-goverriment amongst policyrnaker circles and wider modernisation plans, 
set against the historic functional separation of service delivery organisations, made 
the UK an ideal selection to carry out the research. In this thesis, a delineation is made 
for much of the research at 1996, the year when the government published 
government. direct just as the internet had begun to reach the attention of the public at 
large, although other parts of the thesis considers the post-war period before 1996. 
The thesis considers events up to summer 2004, when the empirical phase of the 
research was concluded. 
The thesis utilises a case study based approach to produce empirical data to 
accompany historical and policy literature based research. The two case studies are 
found in Chapters Four and Five; scholarly and some policy context for this research 
is found in Chapter 
' 
One, whilst conclusions, using case study and other research set 
against the themes discussed in the first chapter, are found in Chapter Six. 
To provide a fuller understanding of the policy and institutional histories involved in 
government computing, the decision was made to investigate the notion of ICT- 
mediated joining up across time, to discover more of the historic use of computers in 
public service delivery and patterns of central governrnent activity and policy on the 
issue. This is presented in Chapter Two, and helps contextualise e-government by 
depicting previous IT policies and developments, across the post-war period up to 
1996. Evidence presented in the chapter shows that the perceived benefits of the 
coordination of computer systems across government organisations and the use of IT 
to help integrate service delivery had frequently been recognised during the post-war 
period. At several points, government units had been given the responsibility of IT 
coordination across departments; the story of these units is a key subject of the 
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chapter as it helps demonstrate the institutional factors and difficulties associated with 
this responsibility. Chapter Two is intended to build from the rich details offered by 
Bellamy, Taylor and Margetts in particular, for the experiences with the 
computerisation of parts of the criminal justice system and social security, by panning 
out to the wider patterns of IT policy through the post-war period. Cursory 
investigations revealed that there was very little academic commentary on historical 
government IT activity and IT in service delivery, particularly before the late 1980s. 
Margetts (1999) and Bellamy and Taylor (1998a) have provided brief historical 
overviews whilst elsewhere, GM Lamb (1973) provided some interesting detail, 
whereas Jon Agar's publication (2003) provided the most comprehensive exploration 
into the British government's use of mechanical and electronic apparatus over the last 
hundred years. Other academic sources were sparse particularly for the decades 
immediately after the Second World War; thus Chapter Two represents original work 
which-draws primarily from official parliamentary and government documents from 
the late 1940s onwards, supplemented where possible with thesis interview sources. 
The approach to the collection of material for Chapter Two was primarily to conduct 
library searches in public sector official document volumes. Using indexes, research 
initially focussed on identifying early discussions on the application of computing to 
public service delivery in government, from the 1940s onwards. From early work in 
the National Physical Laboratory, documented activity burgeoned into departmental 
and central government as well as parliament. By following through original 
references but remaining attentive to new sources, the library-based research provided 
a substantial body of evidence on the historic landscape of government computing and 
enabled a focus on IT policy over the decades. The historic narrative demonstrates the 
parallels between the underlying objectives of e-government strategy and previous 
thinking about IT in service delivery. It sketches the institutional landscape within 
which e-government strategies, projects and tools operate, thus providing the 
necessary backcloth for the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter Three narrates the progress of the central e-govemment strategy introduced in 
Chapter One. It takes the publication of government. direct as the commencement of 
the e-government era in the UK, as this paper brought ICTs to the forefront of central 
government service delivery reform for the first time (Bellamy/Taylor, 1998b, pl). The 
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appearance of the green paper also coincided *ith a time when the internet had begun 
to grow rapidly in terms of popularity, access and attention (see for example 
Anderson/Tracey, 2002, p 144). Chapter Three provides an exploration into the 
activities of the Office of the e-Envoy in particular, as this was the unit charged with 
steering e-government from the Cabinet Office, in parallel with previous IT policy 
organisations depicted in Chapter Two. As well as leading on policy issues, the Office 
of the e-Envoy also instigated and managed a number of internet portals and other 
technical infrastructure tools, which it was expected would channel joining up e- 
government transactions and interactions between departments and citizens. Not only' 
then did the Office develop policies and strategies for joining up through e- 
government, it also created the tools and measures through which a significant portion 
of this was to be realised. The development of these tools will also be covered in 
Chapter Three. Furthermore, the chapter includes passages on the development and 
implementation of e-government projects and tools across government organisations, 
set beside the emergence of the central strategy and the endeavours of the Office of 
the e-Envoy, and to provide indications of the state of play in departments and service 
sectors that did not feature in the case studies. Building from Chapter Two, Chapter 
Three provides rich detail on the central e-goverriment strategy that was constructed 
around government. direct and Modernising Government. 
The chapter uses official and parliamentary documents, audit scrutiny and thesis 
interviews as well as academic commentary where possible, for instance Holliday 
(2001), Bellamy and Taylor (1998b), Bellamy (1999; 2002), Organ (2003), Hudson 
(2001) and others. Although there was overall relatively little in terms of scholarly 
work to help profile the Office of the e-Envoy, central steering mechanisms and the e- 
government strategy, library and web searches indicated a plethora of Cabinet Office, 
parliamentary and audit documentation, readily available online or in library 
collections. All Office of the e-Envoy public documents were accessed, supplemented 
by other Cabinet Office material (for instance that produced by the then Performance 
and Innovation Unit). Usefully, the National Audit Office, supported by the Public 
Accounts Committee and other parliamentary committees, was also taking an interest 
in activities associated with the e-government strategy and related departmental 
activity. Audit and parliamentary reports helped provide a balanced profile and added 
critical appraisals of the public documents available from the Cabinet Office. 
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Constant monitoring of departmental, audit, parliamentary and specialist press 
websites ensured that newly released documents could be accessed promptly. 
Attempts were made to gain access to any internal documents generated by the Office 
of the e-Envoy in particular through contact with interviewees; although little was 
forthcoming here the volume and balance of documentation accessed, supplemented 
by interview work, still provided for a comprehensive profile. 
In passages that sketch the development of e-government projects in departments, 
audit and specialist press sources were used extensively, supplemented by official 
documents and thesis interviews to a lesser extent. However, as the intention in these 
particular passages was to provide brief accounts to support other areas of the thesis, 
rather than rich empirical detail, this was judged to be sufficient. Specialist press 
coverage during the period under question was often pre-dominantly negative towards 
the performance of e-government projects and initiatives. Although positive coverage 
was present, any bias towards sceptical press coverage in Chapter Three in particular 
serves to demonstrate the general perceptions of e-govemment performance across 
departments rather than an intrinsic prejudice in the thesis. 
Chapters Two and Three recount the history of government IT and profile the e- 
government strategy; the evidence and detail in both aid the empirical case studies 
found in Chapters Four and Five. This thesis agrees with Yin, in that the case study 
approach is most appropriate when asking 'how' and 'why' research questions 
(2003, p5-8). Case Studies are usefully applied when needing to understand complex 
social phenomena, to retain a fuller understanding of real-life events and to take 
account of a variety of evidence (ibid., p2,8). The case study approach was most 
appropriate to uncover the complex and long-standing processes expected with the 
mixture of actors, organisations, policies, technologies and institutions involved in e- 
government. The case studies were able to expose the way in which information 
flows, crucial to joining up, were enmeshed in the government organisations and 
institutions that surrounded them. Although essentially explorative, the case studies 
were augmented by the scholarly heritage charted in Chapter One, which 
acknowledged the power of institutions in use of ICTs in government. 
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Further methodological decisions needed to be made in terms of the number of case 
studies to be researched. A fully representative sample may have required up to ten 
, 
rich case studies, covering a variety of departments and public service delivery areas, 
including housing, law and order, crime, benefits, tax collection, health, social 
services, education, transport and so on. Time, resources and the constraints of the 
thesis format indicated that a high number of detailed case studies could not be 
attempted, particularly as the objective of the thesis was to delve deeply into e- 
government practice. It was judged that attempting up to ten short vignette type 
studies would not uncover the richness and detail involved in e-government 
implementation within the institutional environment in question, which was so 
integral to the thesis objectives. With this in mind, a two case study approach was 
deemed to be more appropriate, giving enough scope'and space to research and 
unpack e-government processes in the chosen fields adequately. As discussed some 
supplementary evidence on the applications of e-government in service areas away 
from those chosen for case study are found in Chapter Three. 
Case study selection was based upon a number of different yet related criteria. The 
overarching basis for selection was that the case studies should research a field that 
would represent an identifiable e-government programme or tool that ostensibly 
appeared to embody central e-govemment strategy, and aimed to use ICTs in joining 
up in some way. By picking service delivery areas that had been seen as high profile, 
high budget, complex and problematic, the case studies were likely to provide 
important indications of the ability of e-government to facilitate joined up 
government. Additionally, it was seen as appropriate to search for e-government 
programmes or tools operating within service delivery areas that tackled problems 
that had been earmarked as intractable or 'wicked' issues in the past. Using the 
discussions found in Section 1.4 in Chapter One, the cases in question needed to 
involve coordination, collaboration, partnerships or integration in traditionally distinct 
service organisations or sectors. Through careful case study selection, the thesis was 
able to provide an assessment not only of e-government policy and implementation in 
two specific areas, but of the feasibility of the ideas underpinning central strategy 
enshrined in Modernising Government and elsewhere. 
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Cursory investigations indicated that, firstly Crime Mapping tools in Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and, secondly combined health and social 
care patient Electronic Care Records (ECR) were suitable candidates for research. 
Both Crime Mapping tools and the ECR programme were found in policy fields that 
were traditionally high profile, high budget and problematic; respectively crime and 
health and social care. Both had as their basis joining up elements, as they aimed to 
pull together different organisations and professions, to share data across borders and 
to integrate or coordinate service delivery in some way. Furthermore, the case studies 
were largely institutionally distinct from each other, as crime and welfare have 
traditionally been discrete policy fields. This was beneficial on a number of levels; 
firstly, it allowed the construction of distinct historical sections of the case study 
chapters, which portray the rich institutional complexities involved in the 
development of Crime Mapping techniques and the ECR programme. These 
complement the historical narrative of government IT policy found in Chapter Two, 
and help understanding of the deeply-rooted institutional intricacies involved in 
achieving the joined up sentiments expressed in the central e-government strategy 
across organisations and service fields. 
Secondly, the thesis benefited from the examination of e-government in two distinct 
fields through providing two bodies of evidence with which to examine 
implementation. The case studies were chosen as being analytically similar, in terms 
of the joined up nature of Crime, Mapping and ECR, but institutionally distinct in 
terms of policy field and the development of IT use within each area. As described in 
the case studies themselves, the two incarnations ofjoined up e-government had some 
striking dissimilarities, pointed out and discussed in Chapters Four and Five as well as 
the concluding chapter. Specifically, whilst Crime Mapping was largely played out in 
distinct local settings, ECR was positioned as a national e-government programme. 
The primary objective was not to produce rigorous and systematic comparisons 
between the two cases but to explore the role of e-government in joined up '- 
government in the institutional settings of both; as expected comparative observations 
did, however, germinate. and are related in thesis conclusions. 
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Research methods were paralleled in each case study to provide consistency. Initial 
exploration indicated the suitability of Crime Mapping and ECR and research first 
centred on compiling a detailed organisational, institutional and technological history 
of Crime Mapping tool and the ECR programme, framed in the context of the 
institutions and organisations involved. This historical work complemented and built 
from the research already conducted into the wider history of government IT in the 
post-war period (presented in Chapter Two). Information was gathered for historical 
elements primarily from official departmental documents and parliamentary or 
parliamentary committee publications, and available academic mat6rial was used 
secondarily, whilst interview material proved useful occasionally. Efforts were made 
to search the origins of the technological basis for Crime Mapping and ECR, and to 
trace policy interest, often across several different government or parliamentary 
organisations and bodies over many decades. Challenges were met when the trail 
went 'cold', but systematic research, often using key word searches in indexes or 
contents pages, always led to a recovery of the scent, to build a comprehensive yet 
concise picture. During historical research, the'theme of the multi-agency or 
partnership approach and various policy attempts to join up service delivery in 
different ways emerged as a motif. This was elucidated fully as it contributed to an 
understanding of the institutional context to the e-government applications studied. 
The case study histories are presented, in edited form, at the beginning of each case 
study chapter to provide the necessary contextual understanding of Crime Mapping 
and ECR. Following the completion of the historical elements, an in depth exploration 
of contemporary government, audit and parliamentary documents was embarked 
upon, both online and offline, complemented by continual monitoring and searching 
of government IT press, most notably Government Computing or Kable and the eGov 
Monitor news service. As with related research conducted in Chapter Three, 
departmental documentation was in abundance, but supplemented by audit and 
parliamentary committee reports to provide balance. Here, the data gathering exercise, 
in part informed by the sources used in the historical section of research, produced a 
basis for understanding Crime Mapping and ECR. However, interview work was 
needed to meet the thesis objectives of the 'why and how' of e-government and 
provides a major source of evidence in the case studies. The review of government, 
audit, parliamentary and press information was highly effective in facilitating the 
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targeting of suitable candidates for contact, as many online publications featured 
contact details of key protagonists involved in the policies and programmes contained 
within the case studies. In both instances, a key protagonist was approached and 
interviewed, and asked for contact details of further suitable candidates for interviews. 
This iterative approach was adopted in further interviews and, coupled with 
information gleaned from documents and websites, it enabled interviews to be 
conducted with a broad representative sample. 
The sample model was based upon interviewing representatives of the entire length of 
what could be termed the 'policy chain 22 for methodological purposes, to provide the 
richness required to uncover the institutional and organisational. dynamics 
underpinning the developments in the cases under scrutiny. Therefore firstly, for the 
case studies, several high level policymakers were met with, who had a strategic role 
in Crime Mapping and ECR and were expected to have interfaces with the central e- 
government strategy. Secondly, research and advice helped target a selection of meso- 
level protagonists, who had responsibilities and relationships both with policyinakers 
and actors closer to the operational level where the projects and tools were being 
implemented. Thirdly, several of those actors close to 'street level', where e- 
government projects, were run and tools used (for instance Crime Mapping project 
workers in dDRPs or health and social service practitioners involved in ECR) were 
interviewed. To provide further balance, interviews were conducted with actors who 
had been identified as important observers, who operated outside of the policy chain. 
Thus, several parliamentarians and academics, who had 'hands on' experience (often 
having being involved in audit processes) were used to provide a fresh perspective on 
the case studies and wider e-government issues. For symmetry, it was ensured that, as 
far as possible, parity was achieved in terms of the number of actors interviewed in 
each position of the policy chain in both case studies. 
The majority of material found in Chapter Three draws from government, 
parliamentary and audit documentation; however interviews were also sought with 
key players within the Cabinet Office and particularly the Office of the e-Envoy. 
22 Although it is acknowledged that such a linear, neat sequence of actors, from policy inception to 
practice on the ground, did not exist in simplistic form in reality. The term is used here only to induce 
methodological clarity. 
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Several interviews were conducted with those involved in Cabinet Office e- 
government strategy. Furthermore, interviewed parliamentary figures and other 
observers provided a fresh perspective on the activities of the Office of the e-Envoy 
and the e-government strategy. 
Questioning was based around a semi-structured technique, using questions targeting 
a number of areas and tailored towards the individual in each case but always 
returning to the key theme of e-government and its role in joining up. Interviews 
conducted with policymakers aimed to elicit information, insights and opinions at a 
strategic level, to gather evidence, determine drivers and direction, and detect 
emergent patterns and themes both in terms of e-government policy within the 
Cabinet Office and case study areas. Interviewees were probed to understand if and 
how the connection between e-government and joined up government was being 
approached and realised at policy level. This question was addressed specifically 
regarding the Office of the e-Envoy for Chapter Three (building from the explorations 
of Chapter Two) and regarding policy in the case study service delivery areas in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
Interviews conducted at the meso-level followed a similar theme but differed slightly 
in that they were aimed more at gaining insight into the conversion of policy into 
practice within the case study arenas. Here, interviews were aimed at gathering 
insights into the role of e-government in facilitating joining up from protagonists 
placed close to both policymakers and 'street-level', in the middle of the chain. Meso- 
level interviews were particularly useful in that they provided useful material on the 
problems, challenges and implications of varying perspectives and objectives found at 
high-level policymaking in comparison to the 'coal face' of the applications 
considered in the case studies. Interviews with protagonists on the ground centred on 
views and perspectives on the project or tool under consideration in a narrow focus, in 
an attempt to understand the resources, mentality, bkkground, horizons, objectives, 
organisational and institutional culture and routines of those practitioners, 
professionals and communities involved. Following this, the interview would be 
broadened to establish interviewees' thoughts, experiences and judgements on wider 
departmental and central e-govemment strategies and the role of e-government in 
joining up. This semi-structured approach facilitated lines of questioning and 
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discussions that were conducive to the richly qualitative empirical observations 
sought, illuminating the organisational and informational dynamics of e-government. 
At all interview levels, questions were asked of each individual to ascertain their 
views on activity in other areas of the policy chain, complimented by interviews with 
parliamentarians and academics with a more independent viewpoint. Lines of 
questioned were thematic but flexible, allowing unexpected recurrent points and 
observations, which are part and parcel to explorative work, to be built into later 
interviews or, in the cases of some interviewees, revisited in follow up 
correspondence or meetings. For instance, a recurrent theme found in interviews with 
protagonists away from the Cabinet Office was an absence or awareness or denial of 
relevance of e-government strategy emanating from the Office of the e-Envoy. This 
issue was successfully unpacked in subsequent interview work once it had been 
identified as a common theme; the method of recording, then immediately 
transcribing and analysed interviews following completion was a vital part of this 
process. 
However, because of the explorative, inductive nature of the research, it was judged 
that formal analyse techniques such as various content analysis procedures, would not 
be suitable for this study. Instead, interviews following the strategic framework of the 
policy chain explained above but remained flexible yet thematic in the line of 
questions and discussion contained in each interview. In many cases initial interviews 
could be supplemented with emailed questions or further meetings and in some cases 
relationships were built up over time following the first interview. Thus, a 
longitudinal understanding could be gleaned to an extent, as projects, tools, 
programmes and policy developments under scrutiny for case studies or the 
evaluation of central e-government strategy could be monitored over time through 
correspondence with interviewees. This longitudinal monitoring was also aided by 
regular scrutiny of press coverage, government press releases and other grey literature 
published during research. 
Quotes found within this thesis are used primarily as concise representations of views, 1, 
comments and themes conveyed by interviewees during interviews. They were chosen, 
as encapsulations of general themes detected within individual and groups of 
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interviews. Where contradictory views appeared between interviewees, attempts were 
made to depict these differences. To retain anonymity, a numbering system was used 
in the text to attribute quotes to interviewees; see Annex Two for an explanatory note. 
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ANNEX TWO: INTERVIENWE NUNMERING AND DETAILS 
NB: The sequential numbering here corresponds with the humber attributed to each 
interviewee in the thesis chapters 
1) A Cabinet Off ice policyrnaker who worked on e-government policy. 
2) A Cabinet Off ice policyrnaker who worked on e-government policy. 
3) A Cabinet Office policyrnaker who worked on e-goverriment policy and tools. 
4) An MP who had an interest in e-government and worked on a number of parliamentary 
committees involved in IT policy. 
5) An MP who had interest in e-government particularly through a parliamentary group. 
6) A civil servant who had thirty years of experience in central government IT policy. 
7) A senior advisor who worked in a parliamentary organisation designed to inform 
parliamentarians on, amongst other issues, IT policy and e-government. 
8) A civil servant who worked on cross-goverriment IT project management advice. 
9) An MP who had been involved in the formulation of e-government policies. 
10) A civil servant who led a Crime Mapping initiative. 
11) A civil servant involved in Home Office strategy for CDRPs and Crime Mapping. 
Previously worked on the development and use of Crime Mapping tools at local level. 
12) An academic previously involved in the development and use of Crime Mapping 
tools before moving into criminology and Crime Mapping consultancy. 
13) An operational member of a Crime Mapping team, involved in gathering partner data 
for analysis. 
14) An academic involved in the development of GIS tools. 
15) A civil servant who led a Crime Mapping initiative and other uses of GIS. 
16) An academic who had close links with government on the uses of Ordnance Survey 
and census data in GIS. 
17) A protagonist within an independent'association dealing with geographic technology 
issues. 
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18) A GP practice manager involved in electronic record implementation issues. 
19) An ex-civil servant who worked on central welfare IT policy and was subsequently 
involved in auditing electronic records pilots. 
20) An academic who acted as a consultant and auditor for electronic records projects. 
2 1) A Department of Health e-government policymaker working on electronic care 
records. 
22) A civil servant involved in the implementation of the NNIT. 
23) A social care information manager involved in electronic care record issues. 
24) A consultant specializing in healthcare IT. 
25) A social care electronic records project manager. 
26) An academic who acted as consultant for electronic records. 
27) A social care policyrnaker involved in the development of electronic care records. 
28) A consultant who worked with government on GIS issues. 
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